Yang Zhou
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Yang Zhou has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Adam Nowak
College of Business & Economics, Department of Economics, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, USA
1 shared publicationBrad R. Humphreys
College of Business & Economics, Department of Economics, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV, USA
1 shared publication- Josh Matti
College of Business, Georgia Gwinnett College, Lawrenceville, USA
1 shared publication - Joshua C. Hall
West Virginia University
1 shared publication - Roger D. Congleton
West Virginia University, Morgantown, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 18 May 2020
- Published by West Virginia University Libraries
Essays on the Political Economy of Governance
This dissertation studies the governance structure and its economic impacts in the Chinese context. Specifically, I use a public choice framework to analyze how institutions influence economic and political activities of both public officials and private sectors. Chapter 1 employs the synthetic control method to investigate the effects of institutions to regional economic development. Chongqing Municipality, a province-level region in China, had a unique leader from late 2007 to early 2012 who conducted red ideology movements and legal intervention. The empirical results reveal that although the economic policies promoted the Chongqing economy, the Maoist political policies partially undermined its economic growth in the short run. Chapter 2 analyzes the collective actions and horizontal bargaining within every political branch in contemporary China. I argue that this horizontal bargaining within the party is enhanced by the vertical bargaining. Incorporating Kornai’s work on socialism, the “party chief and mayor” template extends the bargaining model from one key figure and one group in the “king and council” template to two key figures and their respective confidants. In addition, it incorporates institutional constraints into the graphical model. It also defines a “collective decision probability function,” which shows how the party chief and mayor model reaches “checks and balances” that limit the policy space, regardless of whether the policy is exogenous or endogenous. Chapter 3 empirically tests the theory proposed in the second chapter. It investigates how economic institutions influence the “matching” degree between party chief and mayor across provinces. In the Chinese context, these city level politicians are appointed, i.e. “elected”, by the province level politicians who also face institutional constraints. Results suggest that more economic freedom in one province reduces the difference between party chief and mayor in the biographical background and career experience components. However, more economic freedom in one province increases the difference of the ideology component between party chief and mayor. The results deepen understanding of institutions’ role in the political system of authoritarian regimes.
- 18 May 2020
- Published by West Virginia University Libraries
Open AccessEssays on the Political Economy of Governance
This dissertation studies the governance structure and its economic impacts in the Chinese context. Specifically, I use a public choice framework to analyze how institutions influence economic and political activities of both public officials and private sectors. Chapter 1 employs the synthetic control method to investigate the effects of institutions to regional economic development. Chongqing Municipality, a province-level region in China, had a unique leader from late 2007 to early 2012 who conducted red ideology movements and legal intervention. The empirical results reveal that although the economic policies promoted the Chongqing economy, the Maoist political policies partially undermined its economic growth in the short run. Chapter 2 analyzes the collective actions and horizontal bargaining within every political branch in contemporary China. I argue that this horizontal bargaining within the party is enhanced by the vertical bargaining. Incorporating Kornai’s work on socialism, the “party chief and mayor” template extends the bargaining model from one key figure and one group in the “king and council” template to two key figures and their respective confidants. In addition, it incorporates institutional constraints into the graphical model. It also defines a “collective decision probability function,” which shows how the party chief and mayor model reaches “checks and balances” that limit the policy space, regardless of whether the policy is exogenous or endogenous. Chapter 3 empirically tests the theory proposed in the second chapter. It investigates how economic institutions influence the “matching” degree between party chief and mayor across provinces. In the Chinese context, these city level politicians are appointed, i.e. “elected”, by the province level politicians who also face institutional constraints. Results suggest that more economic freedom in one province reduces the difference between party chief and mayor in the biographical background and career experience components. However, more economic freedom in one province increases the difference of the ideology component between party chief and mayor. The results deepen understanding of institutions’ role in the political system of authoritarian regimes.
- 27 July 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 184 (1-2) , 43-77
The economic impact of city–county consolidations: a synthetic control approach
- 27 July 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 184 (1-2) , 43-77
The economic impact of city–county consolidations: a synthetic control approach
- 18 December 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 51 (26) , 2818-2841
Superstition and real estate prices: transaction-level evidence from the US housing market
We investigate the impact of superstition on prices paid by Chinese-American home buyers. Chinese consider 8 lucky and 4 unlucky. Lacking explicit buyer ethnicity identifiers, we develop a binomial name classifier, a machine learning approach applicable to any data set containing names, that allows for falsification tests using other ethnic groups, and mitigates ambiguity from the transliteration of Chinese characters into the Latin alphabet. Chinese buyers pay 1–2% premiums for addresses including an 8 and 1% discounts for addresses including a 4. These results are unrelated to unobserved property quality; no premium exists when Chinese sell to non-Chinese. The persistence of superstitions reflects the extent of cultural assimilation.
- 18 December 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 51 (26) , 2818-2841
Superstition and real estate prices: transaction-level evidence from the US housing market
We investigate the impact of superstition on prices paid by Chinese-American home buyers. Chinese consider 8 lucky and 4 unlucky. Lacking explicit buyer ethnicity identifiers, we develop a binomial name classifier, a machine learning approach applicable to any data set containing names, that allows for falsification tests using other ethnic groups, and mitigates ambiguity from the transliteration of Chinese characters into the Latin alphabet. Chinese buyers pay 1–2% premiums for addresses including an 8 and 1% discounts for addresses including a 4. These results are unrelated to unobserved property quality; no premium exists when Chinese sell to non-Chinese. The persistence of superstitions reflects the extent of cultural assimilation.
- 14 December 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Economics of Governance
- Vol. 20 (2) , 103-128
A test of the institutionally-induced equilibrium hypothesis: on the limited fiscal impact of two celebrity governors
- 14 December 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Economics of Governance
- Vol. 20 (2) , 103-128
A test of the institutionally-induced equilibrium hypothesis: on the limited fiscal impact of two celebrity governors