Alexander Brown
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Alexander Brown has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Roger Baines
University of East Anglia, United Kingdom
1 shared publication - Sune Lægaard
Roskilde University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 December 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Philosophy & Social Criticism
- Vol. 52 (5) , 813-843
Reverse hate speech, pragmatics, and the authority problem
Applying speech act theory to the phenomenon of hate speech, some philosophers seek to explain how even ordinary people can obtain the capacity, power, or authority to oppress, subordinate, or marginalise the targets of their verbal attacks. Such explanations are answers to what is called the authority problem. However, hitherto these philosophers have focused exclusively on standard examples of racist speech in which members of historically oppressor groups verbally attack members of oppressed groups. In this paper, I address the (or an) authority problem in relation to examples of reverse hate speech, where members of historically oppressed groups verbally attack members of oppressor groups. I critically examine two conventional answers to the authority problem: the first is that even ordinary people can successfully perform prototypical hate speech acts by virtue of being participants in norm-governed social practices of racism; the second is that such people can do so by virtue of the silence of bystanders granting them licensed authority. I argue these conventional answers have lesser explanatory heft as applied to examples of reverse hate speech. I then introduce and defend a third answer to the authority problem, which I believe can adequately account for examples of both standard and reverse hate speech, namely the possession of informal social authority.
- 19 December 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Philosophy & Social Criticism
- Vol. 52 (5) , 813-843
Open AccessReverse hate speech, pragmatics, and the authority problem
Applying speech act theory to the phenomenon of hate speech, some philosophers seek to explain how even ordinary people can obtain the capacity, power, or authority to oppress, subordinate, or marginalise the targets of their verbal attacks. Such explanations are answers to what is called the authority problem. However, hitherto these philosophers have focused exclusively on standard examples of racist speech in which members of historically oppressor groups verbally attack members of oppressed groups. In this paper, I address the (or an) authority problem in relation to examples of reverse hate speech, where members of historically oppressed groups verbally attack members of oppressor groups. I critically examine two conventional answers to the authority problem: the first is that even ordinary people can successfully perform prototypical hate speech acts by virtue of being participants in norm-governed social practices of racism; the second is that such people can do so by virtue of the silence of bystanders granting them licensed authority. I argue these conventional answers have lesser explanatory heft as applied to examples of reverse hate speech. I then introduce and defend a third answer to the authority problem, which I believe can adequately account for examples of both standard and reverse hate speech, namely the possession of informal social authority.
- Open Access
- 21 November 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence
- Vol. 38 (1) , 29-67
The Free Speech Principle: A Topography
This paper argues that what scholars call ‘the free speech principle’ is not one principle but a slew of principles, and that these principles harbour several important differences that have remained largely unremarked upon, namely: (i) extending vs. limiting principles; (ii) comparative vs. non-comparative principles; and (iii) monistic vs. pluralistic principles. The paper also critically assesses certain generalisations that people might be tempted to make about these different principles, such as that one kind of free speech principle is harder to defend than another. Finally, the paper teases out the practical as well as theoretical implications of these insights, including degrees of complexity, the logical relationship between free speech principles and free speech policy dilemmas, and the virtue of compromise over free speech principles.
- 21 November 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence
- Vol. 38 (1) , 29-67
Open AccessThe Free Speech Principle: A Topography
This paper argues that what scholars call ‘the free speech principle’ is not one principle but a slew of principles, and that these principles harbour several important differences that have remained largely unremarked upon, namely: (i) extending vs. limiting principles; (ii) comparative vs. non-comparative principles; and (iii) monistic vs. pluralistic principles. The paper also critically assesses certain generalisations that people might be tempted to make about these different principles, such as that one kind of free speech principle is harder to defend than another. Finally, the paper teases out the practical as well as theoretical implications of these insights, including degrees of complexity, the logical relationship between free speech principles and free speech policy dilemmas, and the virtue of compromise over free speech principles.
- 18 August 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis
An Ethics of Political Communication
Working in the tradition of analytic philosophy, Alexander Brown argues that many different forms of political communication (or anti-communication) that often infuriate the public can also be ethically or morally objectionable. These forms include question dodging, offering scripted answers, stonewalling, not listening, disseminating propaganda, pandering, being insincere, giving false denials, issuing revisionist interpretations, refusing to take responsibility, never apologising, boasting, and gaslighting. Brown invokes a host of normative reasons including those having to do with epistemic arrogance, interference in autonomy, and violating the right to be heard. This is not to say that, all things considered, politicians should never engage in dubious political communication. Sometimes these are necessary evils. Brown argues, however, that further moral inquiry is needed to show why they are evils, and to determine when the use of these rhetorical tactics can be excessive, unreasonable, or out of place. Key Features: • Identifies and conceptualises forms of dubious political communication • Develops an ethical evaluation of political communication • Considers possible justifications for the use of dubious political communication • Makes practical recommendations on how to regulate unethical political communication
- 18 August 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis
An Ethics of Political Communication
Working in the tradition of analytic philosophy, Alexander Brown argues that many different forms of political communication (or anti-communication) that often infuriate the public can also be ethically or morally objectionable. These forms include question dodging, offering scripted answers, stonewalling, not listening, disseminating propaganda, pandering, being insincere, giving false denials, issuing revisionist interpretations, refusing to take responsibility, never apologising, boasting, and gaslighting. Brown invokes a host of normative reasons including those having to do with epistemic arrogance, interference in autonomy, and violating the right to be heard. This is not to say that, all things considered, politicians should never engage in dubious political communication. Sometimes these are necessary evils. Brown argues, however, that further moral inquiry is needed to show why they are evils, and to determine when the use of these rhetorical tactics can be excessive, unreasonable, or out of place. Key Features: • Identifies and conceptualises forms of dubious political communication • Develops an ethical evaluation of political communication • Considers possible justifications for the use of dubious political communication • Makes practical recommendations on how to regulate unethical political communication
- 18 August 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 344-385
Public Pressure, Codes of Conduct, and Sanctions
This chapter considers a range of different ways of regulating modes of dubious political communication. It ultimately advocates forms of hybrid and self-regulation that are based on the creation of rules of debate, rules of procedure, and codes of conduct that can be applicable to problematic modes of political communication, that can be enforced with proportionate sanctions, and, importantly, that could be the subject of hypothetical agreement.
- 18 August 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 344-385
Public Pressure, Codes of Conduct, and Sanctions
This chapter considers a range of different ways of regulating modes of dubious political communication. It ultimately advocates forms of hybrid and self-regulation that are based on the creation of rules of debate, rules of procedure, and codes of conduct that can be applicable to problematic modes of political communication, that can be enforced with proportionate sanctions, and, importantly, that could be the subject of hypothetical agreement.
- 18 August 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 283-343
Consent, Justifications, and Unintended Consequences
This chapter critically examines the argument that the public consents to political figures using forms of dubious political communication, as well as other more case-specific excuses and justifications for the use of such communication. It also explores the unintended consequences of this usage. Finally, it develops an overarching account of how to assess all of these considerations, drawing on a contractualist theory of normative political legitimacy based on hypothetical agreement.
- 18 August 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 283-343
Consent, Justifications, and Unintended Consequences
This chapter critically examines the argument that the public consents to political figures using forms of dubious political communication, as well as other more case-specific excuses and justifications for the use of such communication. It also explores the unintended consequences of this usage. Finally, it develops an overarching account of how to assess all of these considerations, drawing on a contractualist theory of normative political legitimacy based on hypothetical agreement.
- Open Access
- 15 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Rights Review
- Vol. 22 (1) , 23-43
Cosmopolitan Democratic and Communicative Rights: The Danish Cartoons Controversy and the Right to Be Heard, Even Across Borders
During the Danish cartoons controversy in 2005–2006, a group of ambassadors to Denmark representing eleven predominantly Muslim countries requested a meeting with the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to protest against the cartoons. Rasmussen interpreted their viewpoint as one of demanding limits to freedom of speech and he ignored their request for a meeting. Drawing on this case study, the article argues that it is an appropriate, and potentially effective, moral criticism of anyone who is in a position of political power—taking into account reasonable constraints of feasibility and practicality—that they have refused to receive information, ideas, or opinions from individuals, or their representatives, with dissenting viewpoints. The article also articulates one possible theoretical ground for such a moral criticism: that they could be violating a fundamental (cosmopolitan) moral right of people to submit information, ideas, or opinions to those who wield power over them and to be meaningfully heard—a right which can span state borders.
- 15 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Rights Review
- Vol. 22 (1) , 23-43
Open AccessCosmopolitan Democratic and Communicative Rights: The Danish Cartoons Controversy and the Right to Be Heard, Even Across Borders
During the Danish cartoons controversy in 2005–2006, a group of ambassadors to Denmark representing eleven predominantly Muslim countries requested a meeting with the Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, to protest against the cartoons. Rasmussen interpreted their viewpoint as one of demanding limits to freedom of speech and he ignored their request for a meeting. Drawing on this case study, the article argues that it is an appropriate, and potentially effective, moral criticism of anyone who is in a position of political power—taking into account reasonable constraints of feasibility and practicality—that they have refused to receive information, ideas, or opinions from individuals, or their representatives, with dissenting viewpoints. The article also articulates one possible theoretical ground for such a moral criticism: that they could be violating a fundamental (cosmopolitan) moral right of people to submit information, ideas, or opinions to those who wield power over them and to be meaningfully heard—a right which can span state borders.
- Open Access
- 8 June 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of African American Studies
- Vol. 23 (3) , 162-177
African American Enslavement, Speech Act Theory, and the Law
- 8 June 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of African American Studies
- Vol. 23 (3) , 162-177
Open AccessAfrican American Enslavement, Speech Act Theory, and the Law
- Open Access
- 15 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in The International Sports Law Journal
- Vol. 19 (3-4) , 205-221
The potential exploitation of non-English-speaking players in UK professional football contracts
- 15 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in The International Sports Law Journal
- Vol. 19 (3-4) , 205-221
Open AccessThe potential exploitation of non-English-speaking players in UK professional football contracts
- 19 May 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Ethnicities
- Vol. 18 (3) , 297-326
What is so special about online (as compared to offline) hate speech?
There is a growing body of literature on whether or not online hate speech, or cyberhate, might be special compared to offline hate speech. This article aims to both critique and augment that literature by emphasising a distinctive feature of the Internet and of cyberhate that, unlike other features, such as ease of access, size of audience, and anonymity, is often overlooked: namely, instantaneousness. This article also asks whether there is anything special about online (as compared to offline) hate speech that might warrant governments and intergovernmental organisations contracting out, so to speak, the responsibility for tackling online hate speech to the very Internet companies which provide the websites and services that hate speakers utilise.
- 19 May 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Ethnicities
- Vol. 18 (3) , 297-326
What is so special about online (as compared to offline) hate speech?
There is a growing body of literature on whether or not online hate speech, or cyberhate, might be special compared to offline hate speech. This article aims to both critique and augment that literature by emphasising a distinctive feature of the Internet and of cyberhate that, unlike other features, such as ease of access, size of audience, and anonymity, is often overlooked: namely, instantaneousness. This article also asks whether there is anything special about online (as compared to offline) hate speech that might warrant governments and intergovernmental organisations contracting out, so to speak, the responsibility for tackling online hate speech to the very Internet companies which provide the websites and services that hate speakers utilise.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 17 April 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 36 (5) , 561-613
What is Hate Speech? Part 2: Family Resemblances
- 17 April 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 36 (5) , 561-613
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessWhat is Hate Speech? Part 2: Family Resemblances