Bing Li
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Bing Li has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jianfeng Lu
Wuhan University of Science and Technology
4 shared publications - Shuqin Cao
School of Computer Science and Technology, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China
2 shared publications - Zhiwei Ye
Hubei University of Technology
2 shared publications - Abegaz Mohammed Seid
University of Quebec at Montreal (UQAM)
1 shared publication Bangqi Pan
School of Mathematics and Computer Science, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua, China
1 shared publication- Bin Ma
School of Computer Science and Technology (School of Cyber Security), Qilu University of Technology (Shandong Academy of Sciences), Jinan 250353, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 17 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Ocean Engineering
- Vol. 357
Disturbance estimator-based robust optimal formation control for switched multi-AUV systems via reinforcement learning
- 17 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Ocean Engineering
- Vol. 357
Disturbance estimator-based robust optimal formation control for switched multi-AUV systems via reinforcement learning
- Open Access
- 18 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of King Saud University Computer and Information Sciences
- Vol. 37 (7) , 1-21
TRACE: A trust-aware incentive mechanism for federated learning in IoMT
- 18 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of King Saud University Computer and Information Sciences
- Vol. 37 (7) , 1-21
Open AccessTRACE: A trust-aware incentive mechanism for federated learning in IoMT
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 121-132
GAIN: Game-Theoretic Design of Fair Incentive Mechanisms for Multiple Model Owners in Federated Learning
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 121-132
GAIN: Game-Theoretic Design of Fair Incentive Mechanisms for Multiple Model Owners in Federated Learning
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. PP (1) , 1
RATE: Game-Theoretic Design of Sustainable Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning
Although Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative training across multiple decentralized devices, strategic clients may be reluctant to participate in FL unless sufficient incentives are available. Existing researches predominantly emphasize short-term incentives, while FL model training is typically a long-term process, and malicious clients may exhibit dishonest behavior during local training. Although designing a long-term incentive mechanism is crucial for FL, this task is challenging due to the heterogeneous nature of FL and the limitations of imperfect system monitoring. To this end, this paper designs the first sustainable incentive mechanism for FL called RATE, which aims to incentivize clients to continuously contribute more high-quality data. Specifically, by modeling the competition and cooperation relationship between servers and clients as a multi-server multi-client Stackelberg game, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE), and derive the unique SE through the cautious calculation of designed algorithms. Since the derived SE may not be optimal, we further utilize reputation to measure the long-term contribution of clients and build a function between their revenues and reputations to ensure the optimal revenue allocation, thereby maximzing the social welfare of RATE. Extensive experiments on both synthetic and real datasets demonstrate the superiority of RATE. Compared to the state-of-the-art baselines, RATE increases the total utility of the servers by up to 20%, reduces the reputation of malicious clients by up to 90%, and improves the average test accuracy overall.
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. PP (1) , 1
RATE: Game-Theoretic Design of Sustainable Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning
Although Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative training across multiple decentralized devices, strategic clients may be reluctant to participate in FL unless sufficient incentives are available. Existing researches predominantly emphasize short-term incentives, while FL model training is typically a long-term process, and malicious clients may exhibit dishonest behavior during local training. Although designing a long-term incentive mechanism is crucial for FL, this task is challenging due to the heterogeneous nature of FL and the limitations of imperfect system monitoring. To this end, this paper designs the first sustainable incentive mechanism for FL called RATE, which aims to incentivize clients to continuously contribute more high-quality data. Specifically, by modeling the competition and cooperation relationship between servers and clients as a multi-server multi-client Stackelberg game, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE), and derive the unique SE through the cautious calculation of designed algorithms. Since the derived SE may not be optimal, we further utilize reputation to measure the long-term contribution of clients and build a function between their revenues and reputations to ensure the optimal revenue allocation, thereby maximzing the social welfare of RATE. Extensive experiments on both synthetic and real datasets demonstrate the superiority of RATE. Compared to the state-of-the-art baselines, RATE increases the total utility of the servers by up to 20%, reduces the reputation of malicious clients by up to 90%, and improves the average test accuracy overall.
- 29 December 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems
- Vol. 10 (6) , 2909-2923
Truthful Incentive Mechanism Design via Internalizing Externalities and LP Relaxation for Vertical Federated Learning
Although vertical federated learning (VFL) has become a new paradigm of distributed machine learning for emerging multiparty joint modeling applications, how to effectively incentivize self-conscious clients to actively and reliably contribute to collaborative learning in VFL has become a critical issue. Existing efforts are inadequate to address this issue since the training sample size needs to be unified before model training in VFL. To this end, selfish clients should unconditionally and honestly declare their private information, such as model training costs and benefits. However, such an assumption is unrealistic. In this article, we develop the first Truthful incEntive mechAnism for VFL, $\mathbb{TEA}$ , to handle both information self-disclosure and social utility maximization. Specifically, we design a transfer payment rule via internalizing externalities, which bundles the clients’ utilities with the social utility, making truthful reporting by clients be a Nash equilibrium. Theoretically, we prove that $\mathbb{TEA}$ can achieve truthfulness and social utility maximization, as well as budget balance (BB) or individual rationality (IR). On this basis, we further design a sample size decision rule via linear programming (LP) relaxation to meet the requirements of different scenarios. Finally, extensive experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets validate the theoretical properties of $\mathbb{TEA}$ and demonstrate its superiority compared with the state-of-the-art.
- 29 December 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems
- Vol. 10 (6) , 2909-2923
Truthful Incentive Mechanism Design via Internalizing Externalities and LP Relaxation for Vertical Federated Learning
Although vertical federated learning (VFL) has become a new paradigm of distributed machine learning for emerging multiparty joint modeling applications, how to effectively incentivize self-conscious clients to actively and reliably contribute to collaborative learning in VFL has become a critical issue. Existing efforts are inadequate to address this issue since the training sample size needs to be unified before model training in VFL. To this end, selfish clients should unconditionally and honestly declare their private information, such as model training costs and benefits. However, such an assumption is unrealistic. In this article, we develop the first Truthful incEntive mechAnism for VFL, $\mathbb{TEA}$ , to handle both information self-disclosure and social utility maximization. Specifically, we design a transfer payment rule via internalizing externalities, which bundles the clients’ utilities with the social utility, making truthful reporting by clients be a Nash equilibrium. Theoretically, we prove that $\mathbb{TEA}$ can achieve truthfulness and social utility maximization, as well as budget balance (BB) or individual rationality (IR). On this basis, we further design a sample size decision rule via linear programming (LP) relaxation to meet the requirements of different scenarios. Finally, extensive experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets validate the theoretical properties of $\mathbb{TEA}$ and demonstrate its superiority compared with the state-of-the-art.
- Open Access
- 17 January 2019
- Published by Wiley in Security and Communication Networks
- Vol. 2019, 1-9
Code Division Multiplexing and Machine Learning Based Reversible Data Hiding Scheme for Medical Image
In this paper, a new reversible data hiding (RDH) scheme based on Code Division Multiplexing (CDM) and machine learning algorithms for medical image is proposed. The original medical image is firstly converted into frequency domain with integer-to-integer wavelet transform (IWT) algorithm, and then the secret data are embedded into the medium frequency subbands of medical image robustly with CDM and machine learning algorithms. According to the orthogonality of different spreading sequences employed in CDM algorithm, the secret data are embedded repeatedly, most of the elements of spreading sequences are mutually canceled, and the proposed method obtained high data embedding capacity at low image distortion. Simultaneously, the to-be-embedded secret data are represented by different spreading sequences, and only the receiver who has the spreading sequences the same as the sender can extract the secret data and original image completely, by which the security of the RDH is improved effectively. Experimental results show the feasibility of the proposed scheme for data embedding in medical image comparing with other state-of-the-art methods.
- 17 January 2019
- Published by Wiley in Security and Communication Networks
- Vol. 2019, 1-9
Open AccessCode Division Multiplexing and Machine Learning Based Reversible Data Hiding Scheme for Medical Image
In this paper, a new reversible data hiding (RDH) scheme based on Code Division Multiplexing (CDM) and machine learning algorithms for medical image is proposed. The original medical image is firstly converted into frequency domain with integer-to-integer wavelet transform (IWT) algorithm, and then the secret data are embedded into the medium frequency subbands of medical image robustly with CDM and machine learning algorithms. According to the orthogonality of different spreading sequences employed in CDM algorithm, the secret data are embedded repeatedly, most of the elements of spreading sequences are mutually canceled, and the proposed method obtained high data embedding capacity at low image distortion. Simultaneously, the to-be-embedded secret data are represented by different spreading sequences, and only the receiver who has the spreading sequences the same as the sender can extract the secret data and original image completely, by which the security of the RDH is improved effectively. Experimental results show the feasibility of the proposed scheme for data embedding in medical image comparing with other state-of-the-art methods.
- Open Access
- 3 July 2010
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 24 (1) , 327-332
Automated Program Debugging Via Multiple Predicate Switching
In a previous paper, Liu argued for the importance of establishing a precise theoretical foundation for program debugging from first principles. In this paper, we present a first step towards a theoretical exploration of program debugging algorithms. The starting point of our work is the recent debugging approach based on predicate switching. The idea is to switch the outcome of an instance of a predicate to bring the program execution to a successful completion and then identify the fault by examining the switched predicate. However, no theoretical analysis of the approach is available. In this paper, we generalize the above idea, and propose the bounded debugging via multiple predicate switching (BMPS) algorithm, which locates faults through switching the outcomes of instances of multiple predicates to get a successful execution where each loop is executed for a bounded number of times. Clearly, BMPS can be implemented by resorting to a SAT solver. We focus attention on RHS faults, that is, faults that occur in the control predicates and right-hand-sides of assignment statements. We prove that for conditional programs, BMPS is quasi-complete for RHS faults in the sense that some part of any true diagnosis will be returned by BMPS; and for iterative programs, when the bound is sufficiently large, BMPS is also quasi-complete for RHS faults. Initial experimentation with debugging small C programs showed that BMPS can quickly and effectively locate the faults.
- 3 July 2010
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 24 (1) , 327-332
Open AccessAutomated Program Debugging Via Multiple Predicate Switching
In a previous paper, Liu argued for the importance of establishing a precise theoretical foundation for program debugging from first principles. In this paper, we present a first step towards a theoretical exploration of program debugging algorithms. The starting point of our work is the recent debugging approach based on predicate switching. The idea is to switch the outcome of an instance of a predicate to bring the program execution to a successful completion and then identify the fault by examining the switched predicate. However, no theoretical analysis of the approach is available. In this paper, we generalize the above idea, and propose the bounded debugging via multiple predicate switching (BMPS) algorithm, which locates faults through switching the outcomes of instances of multiple predicates to get a successful execution where each loop is executed for a bounded number of times. Clearly, BMPS can be implemented by resorting to a SAT solver. We focus attention on RHS faults, that is, faults that occur in the control predicates and right-hand-sides of assignment statements. We prove that for conditional programs, BMPS is quasi-complete for RHS faults in the sense that some part of any true diagnosis will be returned by BMPS; and for iterative programs, when the bound is sufficiently large, BMPS is also quasi-complete for RHS faults. Initial experimentation with debugging small C programs showed that BMPS can quickly and effectively locate the faults.