Amirhossein Bazargan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Amirhossein Bazargan has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Saeed Zolfaghari
Ryerson Univ, 350 Victoria St, Toronto, ON M5B 2K3, Canada
3 shared publications- Salma Karray
Faculty of Business and IT, Ontario Tech University
3 shared publications Salma Karray
2 shared publications- Ali RezaHoseini
School of Industrial Engineering
1 shared publication Constance Bygrave
School of Public and Global Affairs, Fairleigh Dickinson University
1 shared publicationDilpreet Singh Saini
School of Public and Global Affairs, Fairleigh Dickinson University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 18 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Computational Management Science
- Vol. 23 (2) , 32
A bi-objective mixed-integer optimization framework for industrial project portfolio selection under sustainability and uncertainty
- 18 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Computational Management Science
- Vol. 23 (2) , 32
A bi-objective mixed-integer optimization framework for industrial project portfolio selection under sustainability and uncertainty
- 22 August 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Journal of Human Resource Management
- Vol. 36 (15) , 2785-2814
Beyond the EVLN model: Quiet Quitting and the evolving dynamics of job dissatisfaction in human resource management
- 22 August 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Journal of Human Resource Management
- Vol. 36 (15) , 2785-2814
Beyond the EVLN model: Quiet Quitting and the evolving dynamics of job dissatisfaction in human resource management
- 24 June 2025
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management
- Vol. 33 (8) , 6750-6775
Cash flow risk management across multiple construction projects using value at risk
Purpose: Managing cash flow risk across multiple concurrent construction projects presents significant challenges due to inherent uncertainties and complexities, which can jeopardize a company’s financial stability and project success. This research aims to develop a robust and reliable model for effective cash flow prediction and risk management in the construction industry. Design/methodology/approach: We propose a novel framework that integrates value at risk (VaR) with simulation-based optimization techniques to quantify and manage the impact of various financial risks on cash flow across multiple projects. This robust predictive method combines theoretical and practical approaches, advancing existing cash flow management practices in construction project management and finance. Findings: The study demonstrates that traditional cash flow management methods often fail to account for the cumulative risks in multi-project environments. Our approach effectively mitigates the adverse effects of financial volatility by providing a probabilistic assessment of potential losses, ensuring alignment of cash flows with established baselines and thereby improving project outcomes and financial resilience. Originality/value: This research makes a significant contribution by introducing an innovative method that applies VaR to construction cash flow management for multiple concurrent projects – a novel application in this context. By addressing the major difficulties of quantifying and managing financial risks in complex project portfolios, our approach offers new insights and practical tools for enhancing financial planning, risk management and overall resilience in the construction industry.
- 24 June 2025
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management
- Vol. 33 (8) , 6750-6775
Cash flow risk management across multiple construction projects using value at risk
Purpose: Managing cash flow risk across multiple concurrent construction projects presents significant challenges due to inherent uncertainties and complexities, which can jeopardize a company’s financial stability and project success. This research aims to develop a robust and reliable model for effective cash flow prediction and risk management in the construction industry. Design/methodology/approach: We propose a novel framework that integrates value at risk (VaR) with simulation-based optimization techniques to quantify and manage the impact of various financial risks on cash flow across multiple projects. This robust predictive method combines theoretical and practical approaches, advancing existing cash flow management practices in construction project management and finance. Findings: The study demonstrates that traditional cash flow management methods often fail to account for the cumulative risks in multi-project environments. Our approach effectively mitigates the adverse effects of financial volatility by providing a probabilistic assessment of potential losses, ensuring alignment of cash flows with established baselines and thereby improving project outcomes and financial resilience. Originality/value: This research makes a significant contribution by introducing an innovative method that applies VaR to construction cash flow management for multiple concurrent projects – a novel application in this context. By addressing the major difficulties of quantifying and managing financial risks in complex project portfolios, our approach offers new insights and practical tools for enhancing financial planning, risk management and overall resilience in the construction industry.
- 6 August 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 172
The impact of retailers’ loyalty programs in a supply chain context
- 6 August 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Industrial Engineering
- Vol. 172
The impact of retailers’ loyalty programs in a supply chain context
- 22 January 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the Operational Research Society
- Vol. 71 (2) , 280-300
Should competing firms offer ‘Buy n times, get one free’ loyalty programs? A game-theoretic analysis
This study investigates the profitability of ‘Buy n, get one free’ loyalty programs (LPs) for competing firms deciding on whether to offer such LP. We use a game-theoretic approach and obtain the equilibrium by considering four subgames; two symmetric ones where both firms either offer or do not offer a LP, and two asymmetric ones where only one firm offers a LP. We derive the demand using an analytical choice model. Then, we obtain the firms’ optimal decision variables (prices and reward periods) and profits for each subgame under different combinations of behavioral parameters of time and reward valuations for both symmetric and asymmetric production cost for the firms. The results show that when customers highly value reward but not time, offering loyalty programs is a dominant strategy. However, under different market conditions, firms face a prisoner dilemma or find that not offering a LP is a dominant equilibrium.
- 22 January 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of the Operational Research Society
- Vol. 71 (2) , 280-300
Should competing firms offer ‘Buy n times, get one free’ loyalty programs? A game-theoretic analysis
This study investigates the profitability of ‘Buy n, get one free’ loyalty programs (LPs) for competing firms deciding on whether to offer such LP. We use a game-theoretic approach and obtain the equilibrium by considering four subgames; two symmetric ones where both firms either offer or do not offer a LP, and two asymmetric ones where only one firm offers a LP. We derive the demand using an analytical choice model. Then, we obtain the firms’ optimal decision variables (prices and reward periods) and profits for each subgame under different combinations of behavioral parameters of time and reward valuations for both symmetric and asymmetric production cost for the firms. The results show that when customers highly value reward but not time, offering loyalty programs is a dominant strategy. However, under different market conditions, firms face a prisoner dilemma or find that not offering a LP is a dominant equilibrium.
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 265 (2) , 621-630
‘Buy n times, get one free’ loyalty cards: Are they profitable for competing firms? A game theoretic analysis
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 265 (2) , 621-630
‘Buy n times, get one free’ loyalty cards: Are they profitable for competing firms? A game theoretic analysis
- 1 November 2017
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 193, 352-364
Modeling reward expiry for loyalty programs in a competitive market
- 1 November 2017
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 193, 352-364
Modeling reward expiry for loyalty programs in a competitive market
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Modeling Reward Expiry for Loyalty Programs in a Competitive Market
This paper investigates reward expiry for loyalty programs. It provides insights into the profitability of setting reward expiry for competing firms and identifies conditions under which such a policy would be beneficial. We develop and solve a stochastic model that reflects consumer behavior in choosing products and redeeming rewards. Applying a new iterative algorithm, we get the Nash equilibrium outputs for three scenarios (games): (1) neither firm sets an expiry date, (2) both firms set an expiry date, and (3) only one firm sets an expiry date. Comparison of the firms’ profits across scenarios shows that the firms’ price and profits are affected by the loyalty program of the competing firm and by consumers’ valuation of rewards and of time distance to rewards. In particular, a firm offering rewards that do not expire should increase its price if the competing firm changes its reward policy from no expiry to expiry, even when the expiry period is quite long. Finally, when customers are highly sensitive to rewards and time, reward expiry is a dominant strategy for both firms, i.e., both firms gain the most profits when they both have reward expiry. However, both firms’ rewards should not expire if consumers have low valuations of both rewards and time.
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Modeling Reward Expiry for Loyalty Programs in a Competitive Market
This paper investigates reward expiry for loyalty programs. It provides insights into the profitability of setting reward expiry for competing firms and identifies conditions under which such a policy would be beneficial. We develop and solve a stochastic model that reflects consumer behavior in choosing products and redeeming rewards. Applying a new iterative algorithm, we get the Nash equilibrium outputs for three scenarios (games): (1) neither firm sets an expiry date, (2) both firms set an expiry date, and (3) only one firm sets an expiry date. Comparison of the firms’ profits across scenarios shows that the firms’ price and profits are affected by the loyalty program of the competing firm and by consumers’ valuation of rewards and of time distance to rewards. In particular, a firm offering rewards that do not expire should increase its price if the competing firm changes its reward policy from no expiry to expiry, even when the expiry period is quite long. Finally, when customers are highly sensitive to rewards and time, reward expiry is a dominant strategy for both firms, i.e., both firms gain the most profits when they both have reward expiry. However, both firms’ rewards should not expire if consumers have low valuations of both rewards and time.