Skip Mark
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Skip Mark has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Cingranelli
Binghamton University, SUNY
2 shared publications - Almira Sadykova-DuMond
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902, USA
1 shared publication - Amanda Goodrick
State University of New York at Binghamton
1 shared publication - Andrew Foote
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902, USA
1 shared publication Binghamton University Libraries
1 shared publication- Daniel Arnon
University of Arizona
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Binghamton University Libraries in Northeast Journal of Complex Systems (NEJCS)
- Vol. 6 (1) , 3
Multivariate Analysis of the Temporal and Spatial Correlations of the Global Human Rights Dataset
We propose an extension of a previously proposed method for lead-lag analysis of multivariate time series to include the analysis of spatial correlations. We applied the extended spatial and temporal method to CIRIGHTS, a large global human rights dataset, in order to determine the most influential and most influenced indicators of human rights, freedoms, and atrocities over time. We consider four target countries, each from a different continent. The previously proposed method used a weighted directed network with several lags of each variable as nodes and with edges weighted by transfer entropy. In this study, that method is extended to the spatial multivariate time series by investigating geographical correlations between each target country and its surrounding region to determine which variables best represent activity between the target country and the surrounding region. The nodes in this undirected network are variables in the target country and variables in the surrounding region, with edges weighted by mutual information. Eigenvector centrality is used to determine which variables best represent activity between the target country and the surrounding region. Key findings indicate that occupational and worker rights are the most influential and most influenced in the target countries over time and by region, and laws tend to influence future activity.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Binghamton University Libraries in Northeast Journal of Complex Systems (NEJCS)
- Vol. 6 (1) , 3
Open AccessMultivariate Analysis of the Temporal and Spatial Correlations of the Global Human Rights Dataset
We propose an extension of a previously proposed method for lead-lag analysis of multivariate time series to include the analysis of spatial correlations. We applied the extended spatial and temporal method to CIRIGHTS, a large global human rights dataset, in order to determine the most influential and most influenced indicators of human rights, freedoms, and atrocities over time. We consider four target countries, each from a different continent. The previously proposed method used a weighted directed network with several lags of each variable as nodes and with edges weighted by transfer entropy. In this study, that method is extended to the spatial multivariate time series by investigating geographical correlations between each target country and its surrounding region to determine which variables best represent activity between the target country and the surrounding region. The nodes in this undirected network are variables in the target country and variables in the surrounding region, with edges weighted by mutual information. Eigenvector centrality is used to determine which variables best represent activity between the target country and the surrounding region. Key findings indicate that occupational and worker rights are the most influential and most influenced in the target countries over time and by region, and laws tend to influence future activity.
- Open Access
Democracy, Capacity, and the Implementation of Laws Protecting Human Rights
We analyze the cross-national and cross-temporal variation in the presence or absence of domestic compliance gaps for three different human rights: the right to a fair trial, children’s rights, and the right of workers to form unions. Besides constitutional provisions, which have been the focus of previous research on the de jure-de facto compliance gap, statutes, executive actions, and judicial decisions all can contain promises by domestic politicians to protect human rights. Our indicator of whether legal protection exists and how strong it is reflects the many ways states make human rights legal commitments to their citizens. Our findings show that (a) the probability of promise-keeping and the effects of combinations of accountability and capacity are different for each right; (b) strong laws are a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective protection of rights; (c) treaty participation does not affect the probability of promise-keeping for any right; (d) promise-keeping for one right predicted promise-keeping for other rights. For all rights, the number of countries with gaps grew between 1994 and 2008 and then declined between 2008 and 2019. An important inference from our findings is that international treaties may only be effective when ratifiers are willing to change their domestic laws to be consistent with international norms. One counterintuitive policy implication of our findings is that democratizing low-capacity authoritarian states may lead to more violations of some human rights.
Open AccessDemocracy, Capacity, and the Implementation of Laws Protecting Human Rights
We analyze the cross-national and cross-temporal variation in the presence or absence of domestic compliance gaps for three different human rights: the right to a fair trial, children’s rights, and the right of workers to form unions. Besides constitutional provisions, which have been the focus of previous research on the de jure-de facto compliance gap, statutes, executive actions, and judicial decisions all can contain promises by domestic politicians to protect human rights. Our indicator of whether legal protection exists and how strong it is reflects the many ways states make human rights legal commitments to their citizens. Our findings show that (a) the probability of promise-keeping and the effects of combinations of accountability and capacity are different for each right; (b) strong laws are a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective protection of rights; (c) treaty participation does not affect the probability of promise-keeping for any right; (d) promise-keeping for one right predicted promise-keeping for other rights. For all rights, the number of countries with gaps grew between 1994 and 2008 and then declined between 2008 and 2019. An important inference from our findings is that international treaties may only be effective when ratifiers are willing to change their domestic laws to be consistent with international norms. One counterintuitive policy implication of our findings is that democratizing low-capacity authoritarian states may lead to more violations of some human rights.
- Open Access
- 14 May 2021
- Published by MDPI AG in Social Sciences
- Vol. 10 (5) , 171
It’s a Hard-Knock Life: Child Labor Practices and Compliance with IMF Agreements
How does IMF lending impact child labor? We argue that, as compliance with IMF reforms increases, child labor increases. IMF loans can help governments avoid bankruptcy, prevent debt defaults, and credibly signal a commitment to pro-market reforms which should generate trade and investment. However, IMF policies associated with revenue and social policies can have negative impacts on child labor. Education reforms undermine the quality of schooling, making child labor more likely. Healthcare reforms undermine the quality of healthcare; when parents are ill or injured, their children are more likely to enter the workforce to make up for lost income. Similarly, social safety net reforms reduce the ability of families to access a safety net during times of hardship and make it more likely that children are pushed into the labor market to keep families afloat. To test our argument, we use a control function selection model on a sample of 70 IMF borrowers between 2002 and 2016. Using new datasets on IMF compliance and child labor, we find that increased compliance with IMF reforms worsens child labor practices. Revenue and social policy compliance in particular are associated with an increase in child labor.
- 14 May 2021
- Published by MDPI AG in Social Sciences
- Vol. 10 (5) , 171
Open AccessIt’s a Hard-Knock Life: Child Labor Practices and Compliance with IMF Agreements
How does IMF lending impact child labor? We argue that, as compliance with IMF reforms increases, child labor increases. IMF loans can help governments avoid bankruptcy, prevent debt defaults, and credibly signal a commitment to pro-market reforms which should generate trade and investment. However, IMF policies associated with revenue and social policies can have negative impacts on child labor. Education reforms undermine the quality of schooling, making child labor more likely. Healthcare reforms undermine the quality of healthcare; when parents are ill or injured, their children are more likely to enter the workforce to make up for lost income. Similarly, social safety net reforms reduce the ability of families to access a safety net during times of hardship and make it more likely that children are pushed into the labor market to keep families afloat. To test our argument, we use a control function selection model on a sample of 70 IMF borrowers between 2002 and 2016. Using new datasets on IMF compliance and child labor, we find that increased compliance with IMF reforms worsens child labor practices. Revenue and social policy compliance in particular are associated with an increase in child labor.
- Open Access
- 28 January 2019
- Published by MDPI AG in Social Sciences
- Vol. 8 (2) , 41
Human Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict
This research project uses econometric methods and comparative, cross-national data to see whether violations of human rights increase the likelihood of the onset or escalation of violent protest, terrorism and/or civil war. The findings show that these types of violent internal conflict will occur and escalate if governments: (1) torture, politically imprison, kill, or “disappear” people, (2) do not allow women to participate fully in the political system, including allowing them to hold high level national political office, and (3) do not allow women to participate fully in the economic life of the nation by ensuring equal pay for equal work, by encouraging their entry to the highest paid occupations, and by protecting them from sexual harassment at their workplaces. These types of violations of human rights and the existence of large horizontal inequalities in societies independently produce an increased risk of the onset and escalation of many forms of violent internal conflict. The results also provide some evidence for the argument that there is a trade-off between liberty and security.
- 28 January 2019
- Published by MDPI AG in Social Sciences
- Vol. 8 (2) , 41
Open AccessHuman Rights Violations and Violent Internal Conflict
This research project uses econometric methods and comparative, cross-national data to see whether violations of human rights increase the likelihood of the onset or escalation of violent protest, terrorism and/or civil war. The findings show that these types of violent internal conflict will occur and escalate if governments: (1) torture, politically imprison, kill, or “disappear” people, (2) do not allow women to participate fully in the political system, including allowing them to hold high level national political office, and (3) do not allow women to participate fully in the economic life of the nation by ensuring equal pay for equal work, by encouraging their entry to the highest paid occupations, and by protecting them from sexual harassment at their workplaces. These types of violations of human rights and the existence of large horizontal inequalities in societies independently produce an increased risk of the onset and escalation of many forms of violent internal conflict. The results also provide some evidence for the argument that there is a trade-off between liberty and security.