Heiko Borchert
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Heiko Borchert has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Ralph Thiele
3 shared publications- Joseph Verbovszky
Universität der Bundeswehr München
2 shared publications Jürg Martin Gabriel
2 shared publicationsStanley R. Sloan
2 shared publications- Torben Schütz
Helmut Schmidt University
2 shared publications Albert Hofmeister
Swiss Federal Department for Defense, Civil Protection and Sports CDU: 35.073:658.114(494)
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 31 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Ambivalent Acceleration: War, Battlefield Deployment, and Money Push Defense AI But Fundamental Questions Remain Unresolved
Artificial intelligence (AI) goes to war and is not (yet) winning. Contrary to the prevailing rhetoric, this outcome results from the fact that AI is still primarily considered an extension of existing military systems and platforms, thus prolonging the imaginaries, concepts, and practices developed to use them. Against this background the chapter discusses the current state of defense AI in 37 nations along six lines of effort: Thoughts and concepts, development, organization, funding, fielding and operation, and training.
- 31 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAmbivalent Acceleration: War, Battlefield Deployment, and Money Push Defense AI But Fundamental Questions Remain Unresolved
Artificial intelligence (AI) goes to war and is not (yet) winning. Contrary to the prevailing rhetoric, this outcome results from the fact that AI is still primarily considered an extension of existing military systems and platforms, thus prolonging the imaginaries, concepts, and practices developed to use them. Against this background the chapter discusses the current state of defense AI in 37 nations along six lines of effort: Thoughts and concepts, development, organization, funding, fielding and operation, and training.
- Open Access
- 15 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Flow Control Rewrites Globalization. Implications for Business and Investors
Today's international order has enabled and has been shaped by the free flow of goods, services, data, and capital and the unrestricted movement of people. These global exchanges have created strategic flows that have advanced prosperity and deepened connectedness. But the fraying international order gives rise to a more skeptical view on connectedness. Rather than emphasizing the benefits and opportunities, a prevailing zero-sum logic underlines and exploits the vulnerabilities of dependence. That is why nations, in particular ambitious emerging status quo challengers, are focusing increasingly on flow control. Flow control describes the will and the capability of an actor to define the framework and the operational conditions for strategic flows. As the paper discusses in detail, flow control is the testing ground on which a new grand systemic competition is emerging.
- 15 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessFlow Control Rewrites Globalization. Implications for Business and Investors
Today's international order has enabled and has been shaped by the free flow of goods, services, data, and capital and the unrestricted movement of people. These global exchanges have created strategic flows that have advanced prosperity and deepened connectedness. But the fraying international order gives rise to a more skeptical view on connectedness. Rather than emphasizing the benefits and opportunities, a prevailing zero-sum logic underlines and exploits the vulnerabilities of dependence. That is why nations, in particular ambitious emerging status quo challengers, are focusing increasingly on flow control. Flow control describes the will and the capability of an actor to define the framework and the operational conditions for strategic flows. As the paper discusses in detail, flow control is the testing ground on which a new grand systemic competition is emerging.
- Open Access
- 10 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 459-487
Zum aktuellen Stand des weltweiten militärischen Einsatzes Künstlicher Intelligenz
- 10 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 459-487
Open AccessZum aktuellen Stand des weltweiten militärischen Einsatzes Künstlicher Intelligenz
- 26 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 137-161
Athena’s Shield Is Brittle: Why and How NATO Needs to Get Serious About Economic Warfare
- 26 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 137-161
Athena’s Shield Is Brittle: Why and How NATO Needs to Get Serious About Economic Warfare
- Open Access
- 19 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 195-216
Master and Servant: Defense AI in Germany
Germany’s defense AI path is caught in a “master and servant” logic. Germany struggles to readjust its input-driven strategic culture, which puts greater emphasis on the socio-political acceptance and legitimization of military power than on the effects it can achieve. As a result, Germany considers defense AI as a tool—the humble servant—subordinate to humans, who must always remain in the loop. Incrementalism dominates, which makes it difficult to assess what defense AI is expected to achieve and whether it delivers on this expectation. As a result, most German defense AI development projects focus on decision-making support and gradual improvements of other technologies in the fields of Command, Control, Computers, and Communications (C4) and Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR). An open-source intelligence system for crisis early warning, AI-based warning receivers for helicopters, and intelligent image processing for missiles feature among the more prominent, publicly known examples of fielded defense AI capabilities. In parallel to adapting defense structures, Germany has stepped up defense funding. While an aggregate number of German defense AI spending is not available, we contend that the country spends around €50M per year on AI-related software development. As defense AI also affects military education and training, the Bundeswehr’s Command and Staff College as well as the University of the Bundeswehr in Hamburg are preparing to adapt existing curricula and setting up new degree courses. Individual military services also explore opportunities for AI-enhanced simulation-based training, while different initiatives have been launched to train defense AI algorithms.
- 19 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 195-216
Open AccessMaster and Servant: Defense AI in Germany
Germany’s defense AI path is caught in a “master and servant” logic. Germany struggles to readjust its input-driven strategic culture, which puts greater emphasis on the socio-political acceptance and legitimization of military power than on the effects it can achieve. As a result, Germany considers defense AI as a tool—the humble servant—subordinate to humans, who must always remain in the loop. Incrementalism dominates, which makes it difficult to assess what defense AI is expected to achieve and whether it delivers on this expectation. As a result, most German defense AI development projects focus on decision-making support and gradual improvements of other technologies in the fields of Command, Control, Computers, and Communications (C4) and Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR). An open-source intelligence system for crisis early warning, AI-based warning receivers for helicopters, and intelligent image processing for missiles feature among the more prominent, publicly known examples of fielded defense AI capabilities. In parallel to adapting defense structures, Germany has stepped up defense funding. While an aggregate number of German defense AI spending is not available, we contend that the country spends around €50M per year on AI-related software development. As defense AI also affects military education and training, the Bundeswehr’s Command and Staff College as well as the University of the Bundeswehr in Hamburg are preparing to adapt existing curricula and setting up new degree courses. Individual military services also explore opportunities for AI-enhanced simulation-based training, while different initiatives have been launched to train defense AI algorithms.
- Open Access
- 19 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-38
The Very Long Game of Defense AI Adoption: Introduction
The introduction contextualizes and summarizes the key results of the 25 case studies along the six lines of effort that constitute the analytical framework of the country analyses. First, it argues that core strategic motives, the role of partners and challengers, and a human or tech-centric understanding of defense AI shape the respective national approaches. Taken together the prevailing perspectives lead to a collective “lock-in” as all countries analyzed operate in a human and data-centric paradigm. Second, this affects current defense AI development priorities. Most nations develop AI in tandem with uncrewed systems, for example, for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions, to support predictive maintenance and logistics, advance command and control, and further data analytics and data management. Third, in view of preparing for the use of defense AI many countries have set up new cross-functional entities to advance defense AI or improve AI-related technology developments. Most countries, however, have entrusted existing organizational entities with these tasks. In addition to organizational change at the ministerial level, some countries also introduce novel elements at service and command levels. Fourth, funding for defense AI is most difficult to compare as an internationally accepted spending taxonomy on defense AI is missing. Some nations operate in opaqueness as they do not publicly disclose financial figures. Others have dedicated AI budget lines, fund defense AI as part of ongoing procurement projects, and one country has ensured interagency funding. Fifth, in line with the development priorities, most nations also field defense AI for the use with uncrewed assets, followed by target identification/detection and data analytics. Almost every second country uses defense AI for predictive maintenance, logistics and simulation-based training. Most importantly, “learning by procuring” is an important inroad for defense AI to enter a foreign market via the defense solution procured from a partner. Finally, training for defense AI is evolving slowly. About a third of the countries focus on training only for the military service workforce. The same number of countries is also active in training civilian defense and military service workforces. Fewer countries also look at training the defense industrial workforce. Some countries also launch dedicated data training initiatives.
- 19 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-38
Open AccessThe Very Long Game of Defense AI Adoption: Introduction
The introduction contextualizes and summarizes the key results of the 25 case studies along the six lines of effort that constitute the analytical framework of the country analyses. First, it argues that core strategic motives, the role of partners and challengers, and a human or tech-centric understanding of defense AI shape the respective national approaches. Taken together the prevailing perspectives lead to a collective “lock-in” as all countries analyzed operate in a human and data-centric paradigm. Second, this affects current defense AI development priorities. Most nations develop AI in tandem with uncrewed systems, for example, for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions, to support predictive maintenance and logistics, advance command and control, and further data analytics and data management. Third, in view of preparing for the use of defense AI many countries have set up new cross-functional entities to advance defense AI or improve AI-related technology developments. Most countries, however, have entrusted existing organizational entities with these tasks. In addition to organizational change at the ministerial level, some countries also introduce novel elements at service and command levels. Fourth, funding for defense AI is most difficult to compare as an internationally accepted spending taxonomy on defense AI is missing. Some nations operate in opaqueness as they do not publicly disclose financial figures. Others have dedicated AI budget lines, fund defense AI as part of ongoing procurement projects, and one country has ensured interagency funding. Fifth, in line with the development priorities, most nations also field defense AI for the use with uncrewed assets, followed by target identification/detection and data analytics. Almost every second country uses defense AI for predictive maintenance, logistics and simulation-based training. Most importantly, “learning by procuring” is an important inroad for defense AI to enter a foreign market via the defense solution procured from a partner. Finally, training for defense AI is evolving slowly. About a third of the countries focus on training only for the military service workforce. The same number of countries is also active in training civilian defense and military service workforces. Fewer countries also look at training the defense industrial workforce. Some countries also launch dedicated data training initiatives.
- Open Access
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen
- Vol. 7 (2) , 150-159
Toxische Türöffner – Smart Ports als geoökonomisches Handlungsfeld
Kurzfassung Organisatorische Transformation und digitale Technologien verwandeln Überseehäfen in sogenannte Smart Ports. Diese optimieren Lieferketten, fördern Prosperität und stärken die Resilienz, ermöglichen aber auch tiefe Einblicke in Lieferbeziehungen und wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeiten. Kompetitive Kollaboration prägt die Smart Ports, denn diese sind nur erfolgreich, wenn sie unterschiedliche Akteure, die miteinander auch im Wettbewerb stehen, vernetzen und integrieren. Dies stellt im aktuellen geoökonomischen Umfeld eine besondere Herausforderung dar, wenn ordnungspolitische Wettbewerber eingebunden werden sollen. Deutschlands Wirtschaftskraft ist von maritimem Transport abhängig, doch Smart Ports beeinflussen Berlins internationale Politik bislang kaum. Der Beitrag entwickelt deshalb in einem 5-Punkte-Plan einen deutschen Smart-Ports-Ansatz, um dieses dynamische Handlungsfeld mitgestalten zu können.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in SIRIUS – Zeitschrift für Strategische Analysen
- Vol. 7 (2) , 150-159
Open AccessToxische Türöffner – Smart Ports als geoökonomisches Handlungsfeld
Kurzfassung Organisatorische Transformation und digitale Technologien verwandeln Überseehäfen in sogenannte Smart Ports. Diese optimieren Lieferketten, fördern Prosperität und stärken die Resilienz, ermöglichen aber auch tiefe Einblicke in Lieferbeziehungen und wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeiten. Kompetitive Kollaboration prägt die Smart Ports, denn diese sind nur erfolgreich, wenn sie unterschiedliche Akteure, die miteinander auch im Wettbewerb stehen, vernetzen und integrieren. Dies stellt im aktuellen geoökonomischen Umfeld eine besondere Herausforderung dar, wenn ordnungspolitische Wettbewerber eingebunden werden sollen. Deutschlands Wirtschaftskraft ist von maritimem Transport abhängig, doch Smart Ports beeinflussen Berlins internationale Politik bislang kaum. Der Beitrag entwickelt deshalb in einem 5-Punkte-Plan einen deutschen Smart-Ports-Ansatz, um dieses dynamische Handlungsfeld mitgestalten zu können.
- Open Access
- 18 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik
- Vol. 15 (4) , 429-451
“Unchain My Heart.” A Defense Industrial Policy Agenda for Germany’s Zeitenwende
A Zeitenwende that delivers one of Europe’s most powerful armed forces needs to correct the (non-existent) position of defense industrial issues within German political discourse. This paper therefore develops a defense industrial policy agenda based on four lines of effort: Make daringness Germany’s prime ambition; establish Germany as a defense industrial framework nation; promote German defense industrial diplomacy with foreign partners; solidify a true public-private defense partnership between the German government and the defense industrial base.
- 18 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik
- Vol. 15 (4) , 429-451
Open Access“Unchain My Heart.” A Defense Industrial Policy Agenda for Germany’s Zeitenwende
A Zeitenwende that delivers one of Europe’s most powerful armed forces needs to correct the (non-existent) position of defense industrial issues within German political discourse. This paper therefore develops a defense industrial policy agenda based on four lines of effort: Make daringness Germany’s prime ambition; establish Germany as a defense industrial framework nation; promote German defense industrial diplomacy with foreign partners; solidify a true public-private defense partnership between the German government and the defense industrial base.
- 8 August 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Comparative Strategy
- Vol. 37 (4) , 299-315
The Arab Gulf defense pivot: Defense industrial policy in a changing geostrategic context
Arab Gulf countries have been trying to set up a local defense industrial base for decades. Recently, these efforts have become much more serious due to a changing geostrategic context, local transformation, and the striving for a more active foreign policy role beyond the region. Today's Arab Gulf defense pivot rests on four pillars: broadening the traditional defense-supplier base; establishing indigenous defense industries; setting up a defense-industrial network within and beyond the region; enlarging foreign policy clout by way of defense exports, defense-material donations, and third-country defense funding. Despite progress, challenges regarding strategic and financial stability and local skill sets remain.
- 8 August 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Comparative Strategy
- Vol. 37 (4) , 299-315
The Arab Gulf defense pivot: Defense industrial policy in a changing geostrategic context
Arab Gulf countries have been trying to set up a local defense industrial base for decades. Recently, these efforts have become much more serious due to a changing geostrategic context, local transformation, and the striving for a more active foreign policy role beyond the region. Today's Arab Gulf defense pivot rests on four pillars: broadening the traditional defense-supplier base; establishing indigenous defense industries; setting up a defense-industrial network within and beyond the region; enlarging foreign policy clout by way of defense exports, defense-material donations, and third-country defense funding. Despite progress, challenges regarding strategic and financial stability and local skill sets remain.
- 12 April 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik
- Vol. 11 (2) , 149-159
Achtung Fallstricke. Der Europäische Verteidigungs-Aktionsplan ist ambitioniert, aber lückenhaft
- 12 April 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik
- Vol. 11 (2) , 149-159
Achtung Fallstricke. Der Europäische Verteidigungs-Aktionsplan ist ambitioniert, aber lückenhaft