Gabriel L. Broughton
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Legal Theory
- Vol. 31 (2) , 139-165
Weakening the Plaintiff’s Case Without Strengthening the Defendant’s
The reason model of precedential constraint is supposed to generate a stricter doctrine than the minimalist result model. In the standard setting in which these models were originally formalized, that is exactly what we find. Surprisingly, however, in the more complex dimensional setting, the models become indistinguishable. In this paper, we provide an illuminating explanation of the collapse. We also shed light on recent proposals to modify the reason model, or the underlying dimensional setting, in order to avoid it. Finally, we show how the models can be made to collapse even in the simpler standard setting.
- 1 June 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Legal Theory
- Vol. 31 (2) , 139-165
Weakening the Plaintiff’s Case Without Strengthening the Defendant’s
The reason model of precedential constraint is supposed to generate a stricter doctrine than the minimalist result model. In the standard setting in which these models were originally formalized, that is exactly what we find. Surprisingly, however, in the more complex dimensional setting, the models become indistinguishable. In this paper, we provide an illuminating explanation of the collapse. We also shed light on recent proposals to modify the reason model, or the underlying dimensional setting, in order to avoid it. Finally, we show how the models can be made to collapse even in the simpler standard setting.
- Open Access
- 1 February 2025
- Published by Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
- Vol. 29 (3) , 462-501
Refining the Argument from Democracy
This paper presents a new version of the democratic argument for the freedom of expression that has the resources to give a plausible reply to the perennial objection—ordinarily considered fatal—that such accounts fail to deliver protections for abstract art, instrumental music, and lots of other deserving nonpolitical speech. The argument begins with the observation that there are different things that a free speech theory might aim to accomplish. It will aim to justify a right to free speech with a particular scope and shape, but that right might be a moral right, an ordinary legal right, or a specifically constitutional right. The new version of the argument—the refined argument from democracy—aims to justify a specifically constitutional right to political speech, administered by strong-form judicial review. The democracy theorist can accommodate the intuition that abstract art deserves protection by agreeing that we have a moral right, and probably ought to have an ordinary legal right, to produce and view abstract art. She must only insist that abstract art should not be protected by a specifically constitutional right administered by strong-form judicial review. Not because abstract art does not deserve constitutional protection but because, on this view, whether a particular right ought to be enshrined in the constitution and administered by judicial review is not solely a matter of the importance of the right or the value of the interests it protects.
- 1 February 2025
- Published by Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
- Vol. 29 (3) , 462-501
Open AccessRefining the Argument from Democracy
This paper presents a new version of the democratic argument for the freedom of expression that has the resources to give a plausible reply to the perennial objection—ordinarily considered fatal—that such accounts fail to deliver protections for abstract art, instrumental music, and lots of other deserving nonpolitical speech. The argument begins with the observation that there are different things that a free speech theory might aim to accomplish. It will aim to justify a right to free speech with a particular scope and shape, but that right might be a moral right, an ordinary legal right, or a specifically constitutional right. The new version of the argument—the refined argument from democracy—aims to justify a specifically constitutional right to political speech, administered by strong-form judicial review. The democracy theorist can accommodate the intuition that abstract art deserves protection by agreeing that we have a moral right, and probably ought to have an ordinary legal right, to produce and view abstract art. She must only insist that abstract art should not be protected by a specifically constitutional right administered by strong-form judicial review. Not because abstract art does not deserve constitutional protection but because, on this view, whether a particular right ought to be enshrined in the constitution and administered by judicial review is not solely a matter of the importance of the right or the value of the interests it protects.
- 6 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (1-2) , 4097-4126
Carnapian frameworks
- 6 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 199 (1-2) , 4097-4126
Carnapian frameworks
- 8 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Artificial Intelligence and Law
- Vol. 27 (3) , 253-307
Vertical precedents in formal models of precedential constraint
- 8 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Artificial Intelligence and Law
- Vol. 27 (3) , 253-307
Vertical precedents in formal models of precedential constraint