Erwann Sbaï
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Erwann Sbaï has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ananish Chaudhuri
Department of Economics, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
1 shared publication Jean-Pierre Florens
Toulouse School of Economics
1 shared publication- Matthew Larsen
Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Auckland Business School, 12 Grafton Road, Auckland 1142, New Zealand
1 shared publication - Peter Zámborský
University of Auckland Business School
1 shared publication - Tirnud Paichayontvijit
Faculty of Economics, Ramkhamhaeng University
1 shared publication - Zheng Joseph Yan
Department of Management and International Business, University of Auckland Business School, Auckland, New Zealand
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 3 October 2021
- Published by MDPI AG in Journal of Risk and Financial Management
- Vol. 14 (10) , 468
Cross-Border M&A Motives and Home Country Institutions: Role of Regulatory Quality and Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific Region
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between home country institutions and cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) motives of MNEs from the Asia-Pacific region, with a focus on the role of regulatory quality and dynamics. We empirically examine how M&A motives are affected by elements related to risk of the institutional environment of the acquiring firm’s home country regulatory quality over time. The study is grounded in the general theory of springboard MNEs, and the institutional views of cross-border operations, namely the institutional escapism and institutional fostering perspectives. Using data on over 700 cross-border M&As of European firms by Asia-Pacific MNEs in 2007–2017, we analyze the rationales for these deals and their relationship to the institutional characteristics of the buyers’ home countries including regulatory quality and voice and accountability. We found that the quality of home country regulatory environment is significantly related to domestic firms’ motivation for international M&As. However, the significance and sign of the effects differ for different types of motives and over time. Our findings contribute to the literature on general versus emerging MNE-specific internationalization theories (particularly the theory of springboard MNEs) by expounding on the types and dynamics of cross-border M&A motives.
- 3 October 2021
- Published by MDPI AG in Journal of Risk and Financial Management
- Vol. 14 (10) , 468
Open AccessCross-Border M&A Motives and Home Country Institutions: Role of Regulatory Quality and Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific Region
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between home country institutions and cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) motives of MNEs from the Asia-Pacific region, with a focus on the role of regulatory quality and dynamics. We empirically examine how M&A motives are affected by elements related to risk of the institutional environment of the acquiring firm’s home country regulatory quality over time. The study is grounded in the general theory of springboard MNEs, and the institutional views of cross-border operations, namely the institutional escapism and institutional fostering perspectives. Using data on over 700 cross-border M&As of European firms by Asia-Pacific MNEs in 2007–2017, we analyze the rationales for these deals and their relationship to the institutional characteristics of the buyers’ home countries including regulatory quality and voice and accountability. We found that the quality of home country regulatory environment is significantly related to domestic firms’ motivation for international M&As. However, the significance and sign of the effects differ for different types of motives and over time. Our findings contribute to the literature on general versus emerging MNE-specific internationalization theories (particularly the theory of springboard MNEs) by expounding on the types and dynamics of cross-border M&A motives.
- Open Access
The Role of Framing, Inequity and History in a Corruption Game: Some Experimental Evidence
We investigate the role of framing, inequity in initial endowments and history in shaping behavior in a corrupt transaction by extending the one-shot bribery game introduced by Cameron et al. (2009) to a repeated game setting. We find that the use of loaded language significantly reduces the incidence of bribery and increases the level of punishment. Punishment of bribery leads to reduced bribery in future. The evidence suggests that this game captures essential features of a corrupt transaction, over and above any sentiments of inequity aversion or negative reciprocity However, showing subjects the history of past play has little effect on the level of corruption.
Open AccessThe Role of Framing, Inequity and History in a Corruption Game: Some Experimental Evidence
We investigate the role of framing, inequity in initial endowments and history in shaping behavior in a corrupt transaction by extending the one-shot bribery game introduced by Cameron et al. (2009) to a repeated game setting. We find that the use of loaded language significantly reduces the incidence of bribery and increases the level of punishment. Punishment of bribery leads to reduced bribery in future. The evidence suggests that this game captures essential features of a corrupt transaction, over and above any sentiments of inequity aversion or negative reciprocity However, showing subjects the history of past play has little effect on the level of corruption.
- 17 March 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Econometric Theory
- Vol. 26 (6) , 1638-1662
LOCAL IDENTIFICATION IN EMPIRICAL GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
This paper studies identification for a broad class of empirical games in a general functional setting. Global identification results are known for some specific models, e.g., in some standard auction models. We use functional formulations to obtain general criteria for local identification. These criteria can be applied to both parametric and nonparametric models, and also to models with asymmetry among players and affiliated private information. A benchmark model is developed where the structural parameters of interest are the distribution of private information and an additional dissociated parameter, such as a parameter of risk aversion. Criteria are derived for some standard auction models, games with exogenous variables, games with randomized strategies, such as mixed strategies, and games with strategic functions that cannot be derived analytically.
- 17 March 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Econometric Theory
- Vol. 26 (6) , 1638-1662
LOCAL IDENTIFICATION IN EMPIRICAL GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
This paper studies identification for a broad class of empirical games in a general functional setting. Global identification results are known for some specific models, e.g., in some standard auction models. We use functional formulations to obtain general criteria for local identification. These criteria can be applied to both parametric and nonparametric models, and also to models with asymmetry among players and affiliated private information. A benchmark model is developed where the structural parameters of interest are the distribution of private information and an additional dissociated parameter, such as a parameter of risk aversion. Criteria are derived for some standard auction models, games with exogenous variables, games with randomized strategies, such as mixed strategies, and games with strategic functions that cannot be derived analytically.