ZIZachary C. Irving

Zachary C. Irving

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Zachary C. Irving has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Affect in Action

    by Aaron Glasser, Zachary C. Irving

    I begin to feel as though my thoughts and voice here are in some way the creative products of something outside me, not in my control, and yet that this shaping, determining influence outside me is...

  • Open Access

    Guidance without ends

    by Zachary C. Irving

    Attentional guidance plays two crucial roles in temporally extended agency. First, guidance stabilizes attention onto our tasks—and tunes out distractions—for extended periods of time. Second, guidance makes attention telic/atelic. Guidance imposes completion conditions on telic attention (e.g., searching for your keys) but not atelic attention (e.g., staring at a mountain vista). Telic attention unfolds towards an endpoint (a telos) and is then complete, whereas atelic attention unfolds until it is interrupted at some arbitrary time. My account of the distinction between telic and atelic guidance undermines three common assumptions about attention: the extrinsic, completion, and individuation assumptions.

  • The Catch-22 of Forgetfulness: Responsibility for Mental Mistakes

    by Zachary C. Irving, Samuel Murray, Aaron Glasser, Kristina Krasich

    Attribution theorists assume that character information informs judgments of blame. But there is disagreement over why. One camp holds that character information is a fundamental determinant of blame. Another camp holds that character information merely provides evidence about the mental states and processes that determine responsibility. We argue for a two-channel view, where character simultaneously has fundamental and evidential effects on blame. In two large factorial studies (n = 495), participants rate whether someone is blameworthy when he makes a mistake (burns a cake or misses a bus stop). Although mental state inferences predict blame judgments, character information does not. Using mediation analyses, we find that character information influences responsibility via two channels (Studies 3–4; n = 447), which are sensitive to different kinds of information (Study 5; n = 149). On the one hand, forgetfulness increases judgments of responsibility, because mental lapses manifest an objectionable character flaw. On the other hand, forgetfulness decreases judgments of state control, which in turn decreases responsibility judgments. These two channels cancel out, which is why we find no aggregate effect of forgetfulness on responsibility. Our results challenge several fundamental assumptions about the role of character information in moral judgment, including that good character typically mitigates blame.


  • Mental control and attributions of blame for negligent wrongdoing.

    by Samuel Murray, Kristina Krasich, Zachary Irving, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Felipe De Brigard

    Third-personal judgments of blame are typically sensitive to what an agent knows and desires. However, when people act negligently, they do not know what they are doing and do not desire the outcomes of their negligence. How, then, do people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing? We propose that people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing based on perceived mental control, or the degree to which an agent guides their thoughts and attention over time. To acquire information about others' mental control, people self-project their own perceived mental control to anchor third-personal judgments about mental control and concomitant responsibility for negligent wrongdoing. In four experiments (N = 841), we tested whether perceptions of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Study 1 showed that the ease with which people can counterfactually imagine an individual being non-negligent mediated the relationship between judgments of control and blame. Studies 2a and 2b indicated that perceived mental control has a strong effect on judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and that first-personal judgments of mental control are moderately correlated with third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Finally, we used an autobiographical memory manipulation in Study 3 to make personal episodes of forgetfulness salient. Participants for whom past personal episodes of forgetfulness were made salient judged negligent wrongdoers less harshly compared with a control group for whom past episodes of negligence were not salient. Collectively, these findings suggest that first-personal judgments of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and indicate a novel role for counterfactual thinking in the attribution of responsibility. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).


  • Open Access

    Will-Powered: Synchronic Regulation is the Difference-Maker for Self-Control

    by Zachary Irving, Jordan Bridges, Aaron Glasser, Juan Pablo Bermúdez, Chandra Sripada

    Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have reached the consensus that one can use two different kinds of regulation to achieve self-control. Synchronic regulation uses willpower to resist current temptation. Diachronic regulation implements a plan to avoid future temptation. Yet this consensus may rest on contaminated intuitions. Specifically, agents typically use willpower (synchronic regulation) to achieve their plans to avoid temptation (diachronic regulation). So even if cases of diachronic regulation seem to involve self-control, this may be because they are contaminated by synchronic regulation. We therefore developed a novel multifactorial method to disentangle synchronic and diachronic regulation. Using this method, we find that ordinary usage assumes that only synchronic––not diachronic––regulation counts as self-control. We find this pattern across four experiments involving different kinds of temptation, as well as a paradigmatic case of diachronic regulation based on the classic story of Odysseus and the Sirens. Our final experiment finds that self-control in a diachronic case depends on whether the agent uses synchronic regulation at two moments: when she (1) initiates and (2) follows-through on a plan to resist temptation. Taken together, our results strongly suggest that synchronic regulation is the sole difference maker in the folk concept of self-control.

  • Will-powered: Synchronic regulation is the difference maker for self-control

    by Zachary C. Irving, Jordan Bridges, Aaron Glasser, Juan Pablo Bermúdez, Chandra Sripada


  • Distinct electrophysiological signatures of task-unrelated and dynamic thoughts

    by Julia W. Y. Kam, Zachary C. Irving, Caitlin Mills, Shawn Patel, Alison Gopnik, Robert T. Knight

    Significance: Our minds rarely stay still when left alone. Such trains of thought, however, may unfold in vastly different ways. Here, we combined electrophysiological recording with thought sampling to assess four types of thoughts: task-unrelated, freely moving, deliberately constrained, and automatically constrained. Parietal P3 was larger for task-related relative to task-unrelated thoughts, whereas frontal P3 was increased for deliberately constrained compared with unconstrained thoughts. Enhanced frontal alpha power was observed during freely moving thoughts compared with non-freely moving thoughts. Alpha-power variability was increased for task-unrelated, freely moving, and unconstrained thoughts. Our findings indicate these thought types have distinct electrophysiological signatures, suggesting that they capture the heterogeneity of our ongoing thoughts.


  • What Does “Mind‐Wandering” Mean to the Folk? An Empirical Investigation

    by Zachary C. Irving, Aaron Glasser, Alison Gopnik, Verity Pinter, Chandra Sripada

    Although mind‐wandering research is rapidly progressing, stark disagreements are emerging about what the term “mind‐wandering” means. Four prominent views define mind‐wandering as (a) task‐unrelated thought, (b) stimulus‐independent thought, (c) unintentional thought, or (d) dynamically unguided thought. Although theorists claim to capture the ordinary understanding of mind‐wandering, no systematic studies have assessed these claims. Two large factorial studies present participants (N = 545) with vignettes that describe someone's thoughts and ask whether her mind was wandering, while systematically manipulating features relevant to the four major accounts of mind‐wandering. Dynamics explains between four and 40 times more variance in participants' mind‐wandering judgments than other features. Our third study (N = 153) tests and supports a unique prediction of the dynamic framework—obsessive rumination contrasts with mind‐wandering. Our final study (N = 277) used vignettes that resemble mind‐wandering experiments. Dynamics had significant and large effects, while task‐unrelatedness was nonsignificant. These results strongly suggest that the central feature of mind‐wandering is its dynamics.


  • Open Access

    The Catch-22 of Forgetfulness: Responsibility for Mental Mistakes

    by Zachary Irving, Samuel Murray, Aaron Glasser, Kristina Krasich

    Attribution theorists widely assume that people rely on character assessments to assign blame. But there is disagreement over why. One camp holds that character has a fundamental effect on blame. Another camp holds that character merely provides evidence about the mental states and processes that determine responsibility. We provide empirical evidence for a two-channel view, where character simultaneously has both fundamental and evidential effects on blame. In two large factorial studies (n = 505), participants rate whether someone is blameworthy when he makes a mistake (burns a cake or misses a bus stop). Although mental state inferences predict blame judgments, character assessments do not. Studies 3 and 4 (n = 447) perform a mediation analysis and find that character assessments (about forgetfulness) influence responsibility via two channels, one direct and another indirect. Forgetfulness directly increases judgments of responsibility, presumably because one’s mistakes manifest bad character. But forgetfulness also decreases judgments of state control, which indirectly decreases responsibility judgments. These two channels cancel out, which is why we find no aggregate effect of forgetfulness on responsibility. This is the catch-22 of forgetfulness. Our results challenge several fundamental assumptions in the moral psychology of character, including that good character always decreases blame.