Zachary C. Irving
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Zachary C. Irving has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Aaron Glasser
University of Michigan Ann Arbor
7 shared publications- Samuel Murray
Providence College
4 shared publications - Alison Gopnik
University of California Berkeley
3 shared publications - Chandra Sripada
University of Michigan
3 shared publications Kristina Krasich
Department of Psychology and Neuroscience
3 shared publications- Aaron Glasser
University of Michigan
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 September 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- p. 1-22
Affect in Action
I begin to feel as though my thoughts and voice here are in some way the creative products of something outside me, not in my control, and yet that this shaping, determining influence outside me is...
- 15 September 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- p. 1-22
Open AccessAffect in Action
I begin to feel as though my thoughts and voice here are in some way the creative products of something outside me, not in my control, and yet that this shaping, determining influence outside me is...
- Open Access
- 7 July 2026
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
Guidance without ends
Attentional guidance plays two crucial roles in temporally extended agency. First, guidance stabilizes attention onto our tasks—and tunes out distractions—for extended periods of time. Second, guidance makes attention telic/atelic. Guidance imposes completion conditions on telic attention (e.g., searching for your keys) but not atelic attention (e.g., staring at a mountain vista). Telic attention unfolds towards an endpoint (a telos) and is then complete, whereas atelic attention unfolds until it is interrupted at some arbitrary time. My account of the distinction between telic and atelic guidance undermines three common assumptions about attention: the extrinsic, completion, and individuation assumptions.
- 7 July 2026
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
Open AccessGuidance without ends
Attentional guidance plays two crucial roles in temporally extended agency. First, guidance stabilizes attention onto our tasks—and tunes out distractions—for extended periods of time. Second, guidance makes attention telic/atelic. Guidance imposes completion conditions on telic attention (e.g., searching for your keys) but not atelic attention (e.g., staring at a mountain vista). Telic attention unfolds towards an endpoint (a telos) and is then complete, whereas atelic attention unfolds until it is interrupted at some arbitrary time. My account of the distinction between telic and atelic guidance undermines three common assumptions about attention: the extrinsic, completion, and individuation assumptions.
- 1 December 2024
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts
- Vol. 18 (6) , 1096-1107
The shower effect: Mind wandering facilitates creative incubation during moderately engaging activities.
- 1 December 2024
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts
- Vol. 18 (6) , 1096-1107
The shower effect: Mind wandering facilitates creative incubation during moderately engaging activities.
- 2 January 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 102 (1) , 100-118
The Catch-22 of Forgetfulness: Responsibility for Mental Mistakes
Attribution theorists assume that character information informs judgments of blame. But there is disagreement over why. One camp holds that character information is a fundamental determinant of blame. Another camp holds that character information merely provides evidence about the mental states and processes that determine responsibility. We argue for a two-channel view, where character simultaneously has fundamental and evidential effects on blame. In two large factorial studies (n = 495), participants rate whether someone is blameworthy when he makes a mistake (burns a cake or misses a bus stop). Although mental state inferences predict blame judgments, character information does not. Using mediation analyses, we find that character information influences responsibility via two channels (Studies 3–4; n = 447), which are sensitive to different kinds of information (Study 5; n = 149). On the one hand, forgetfulness increases judgments of responsibility, because mental lapses manifest an objectionable character flaw. On the other hand, forgetfulness decreases judgments of state control, which in turn decreases responsibility judgments. These two channels cancel out, which is why we find no aggregate effect of forgetfulness on responsibility. Our results challenge several fundamental assumptions about the role of character information in moral judgment, including that good character typically mitigates blame.
- 2 January 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 102 (1) , 100-118
The Catch-22 of Forgetfulness: Responsibility for Mental Mistakes
Attribution theorists assume that character information informs judgments of blame. But there is disagreement over why. One camp holds that character information is a fundamental determinant of blame. Another camp holds that character information merely provides evidence about the mental states and processes that determine responsibility. We argue for a two-channel view, where character simultaneously has fundamental and evidential effects on blame. In two large factorial studies (n = 495), participants rate whether someone is blameworthy when he makes a mistake (burns a cake or misses a bus stop). Although mental state inferences predict blame judgments, character information does not. Using mediation analyses, we find that character information influences responsibility via two channels (Studies 3–4; n = 447), which are sensitive to different kinds of information (Study 5; n = 149). On the one hand, forgetfulness increases judgments of responsibility, because mental lapses manifest an objectionable character flaw. On the other hand, forgetfulness decreases judgments of state control, which in turn decreases responsibility judgments. These two channels cancel out, which is why we find no aggregate effect of forgetfulness on responsibility. Our results challenge several fundamental assumptions about the role of character information in moral judgment, including that good character typically mitigates blame.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 152 (1) , 120-138
Mental control and attributions of blame for negligent wrongdoing.
Third-personal judgments of blame are typically sensitive to what an agent knows and desires. However, when people act negligently, they do not know what they are doing and do not desire the outcomes of their negligence. How, then, do people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing? We propose that people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing based on perceived mental control, or the degree to which an agent guides their thoughts and attention over time. To acquire information about others' mental control, people self-project their own perceived mental control to anchor third-personal judgments about mental control and concomitant responsibility for negligent wrongdoing. In four experiments (N = 841), we tested whether perceptions of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Study 1 showed that the ease with which people can counterfactually imagine an individual being non-negligent mediated the relationship between judgments of control and blame. Studies 2a and 2b indicated that perceived mental control has a strong effect on judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and that first-personal judgments of mental control are moderately correlated with third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Finally, we used an autobiographical memory manipulation in Study 3 to make personal episodes of forgetfulness salient. Participants for whom past personal episodes of forgetfulness were made salient judged negligent wrongdoers less harshly compared with a control group for whom past episodes of negligence were not salient. Collectively, these findings suggest that first-personal judgments of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and indicate a novel role for counterfactual thinking in the attribution of responsibility. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 January 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 152 (1) , 120-138
Mental control and attributions of blame for negligent wrongdoing.
Third-personal judgments of blame are typically sensitive to what an agent knows and desires. However, when people act negligently, they do not know what they are doing and do not desire the outcomes of their negligence. How, then, do people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing? We propose that people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing based on perceived mental control, or the degree to which an agent guides their thoughts and attention over time. To acquire information about others' mental control, people self-project their own perceived mental control to anchor third-personal judgments about mental control and concomitant responsibility for negligent wrongdoing. In four experiments (N = 841), we tested whether perceptions of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Study 1 showed that the ease with which people can counterfactually imagine an individual being non-negligent mediated the relationship between judgments of control and blame. Studies 2a and 2b indicated that perceived mental control has a strong effect on judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and that first-personal judgments of mental control are moderately correlated with third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Finally, we used an autobiographical memory manipulation in Study 3 to make personal episodes of forgetfulness salient. Participants for whom past personal episodes of forgetfulness were made salient judged negligent wrongdoers less harshly compared with a control group for whom past episodes of negligence were not salient. Collectively, these findings suggest that first-personal judgments of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and indicate a novel role for counterfactual thinking in the attribution of responsibility. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
- 30 June 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Will-Powered: Synchronic Regulation is the Difference-Maker for Self-Control
Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have reached the consensus that one can use two different kinds of regulation to achieve self-control. Synchronic regulation uses willpower to resist current temptation. Diachronic regulation implements a plan to avoid future temptation. Yet this consensus may rest on contaminated intuitions. Specifically, agents typically use willpower (synchronic regulation) to achieve their plans to avoid temptation (diachronic regulation). So even if cases of diachronic regulation seem to involve self-control, this may be because they are contaminated by synchronic regulation. We therefore developed a novel multifactorial method to disentangle synchronic and diachronic regulation. Using this method, we find that ordinary usage assumes that only synchronic––not diachronic––regulation counts as self-control. We find this pattern across four experiments involving different kinds of temptation, as well as a paradigmatic case of diachronic regulation based on the classic story of Odysseus and the Sirens. Our final experiment finds that self-control in a diachronic case depends on whether the agent uses synchronic regulation at two moments: when she (1) initiates and (2) follows-through on a plan to resist temptation. Taken together, our results strongly suggest that synchronic regulation is the sole difference maker in the folk concept of self-control.
- 30 June 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessWill-Powered: Synchronic Regulation is the Difference-Maker for Self-Control
Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have reached the consensus that one can use two different kinds of regulation to achieve self-control. Synchronic regulation uses willpower to resist current temptation. Diachronic regulation implements a plan to avoid future temptation. Yet this consensus may rest on contaminated intuitions. Specifically, agents typically use willpower (synchronic regulation) to achieve their plans to avoid temptation (diachronic regulation). So even if cases of diachronic regulation seem to involve self-control, this may be because they are contaminated by synchronic regulation. We therefore developed a novel multifactorial method to disentangle synchronic and diachronic regulation. Using this method, we find that ordinary usage assumes that only synchronic––not diachronic––regulation counts as self-control. We find this pattern across four experiments involving different kinds of temptation, as well as a paradigmatic case of diachronic regulation based on the classic story of Odysseus and the Sirens. Our final experiment finds that self-control in a diachronic case depends on whether the agent uses synchronic regulation at two moments: when she (1) initiates and (2) follows-through on a plan to resist temptation. Taken together, our results strongly suggest that synchronic regulation is the sole difference maker in the folk concept of self-control.
- 18 January 2021
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 118 (4)
Distinct electrophysiological signatures of task-unrelated and dynamic thoughts
Significance: Our minds rarely stay still when left alone. Such trains of thought, however, may unfold in vastly different ways. Here, we combined electrophysiological recording with thought sampling to assess four types of thoughts: task-unrelated, freely moving, deliberately constrained, and automatically constrained. Parietal P3 was larger for task-related relative to task-unrelated thoughts, whereas frontal P3 was increased for deliberately constrained compared with unconstrained thoughts. Enhanced frontal alpha power was observed during freely moving thoughts compared with non-freely moving thoughts. Alpha-power variability was increased for task-unrelated, freely moving, and unconstrained thoughts. Our findings indicate these thought types have distinct electrophysiological signatures, suggesting that they capture the heterogeneity of our ongoing thoughts.
- 18 January 2021
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 118 (4)
Distinct electrophysiological signatures of task-unrelated and dynamic thoughts
Significance: Our minds rarely stay still when left alone. Such trains of thought, however, may unfold in vastly different ways. Here, we combined electrophysiological recording with thought sampling to assess four types of thoughts: task-unrelated, freely moving, deliberately constrained, and automatically constrained. Parietal P3 was larger for task-related relative to task-unrelated thoughts, whereas frontal P3 was increased for deliberately constrained compared with unconstrained thoughts. Enhanced frontal alpha power was observed during freely moving thoughts compared with non-freely moving thoughts. Alpha-power variability was increased for task-unrelated, freely moving, and unconstrained thoughts. Our findings indicate these thought types have distinct electrophysiological signatures, suggesting that they capture the heterogeneity of our ongoing thoughts.
- 9 October 2020
- Published by Wiley in Cognitive Science
- Vol. 44 (10) , e12908
What Does “Mind‐Wandering” Mean to the Folk? An Empirical Investigation
Although mind‐wandering research is rapidly progressing, stark disagreements are emerging about what the term “mind‐wandering” means. Four prominent views define mind‐wandering as (a) task‐unrelated thought, (b) stimulus‐independent thought, (c) unintentional thought, or (d) dynamically unguided thought. Although theorists claim to capture the ordinary understanding of mind‐wandering, no systematic studies have assessed these claims. Two large factorial studies present participants (N = 545) with vignettes that describe someone's thoughts and ask whether her mind was wandering, while systematically manipulating features relevant to the four major accounts of mind‐wandering. Dynamics explains between four and 40 times more variance in participants' mind‐wandering judgments than other features. Our third study (N = 153) tests and supports a unique prediction of the dynamic framework—obsessive rumination contrasts with mind‐wandering. Our final study (N = 277) used vignettes that resemble mind‐wandering experiments. Dynamics had significant and large effects, while task‐unrelatedness was nonsignificant. These results strongly suggest that the central feature of mind‐wandering is its dynamics.
- 9 October 2020
- Published by Wiley in Cognitive Science
- Vol. 44 (10) , e12908
What Does “Mind‐Wandering” Mean to the Folk? An Empirical Investigation
Although mind‐wandering research is rapidly progressing, stark disagreements are emerging about what the term “mind‐wandering” means. Four prominent views define mind‐wandering as (a) task‐unrelated thought, (b) stimulus‐independent thought, (c) unintentional thought, or (d) dynamically unguided thought. Although theorists claim to capture the ordinary understanding of mind‐wandering, no systematic studies have assessed these claims. Two large factorial studies present participants (N = 545) with vignettes that describe someone's thoughts and ask whether her mind was wandering, while systematically manipulating features relevant to the four major accounts of mind‐wandering. Dynamics explains between four and 40 times more variance in participants' mind‐wandering judgments than other features. Our third study (N = 153) tests and supports a unique prediction of the dynamic framework—obsessive rumination contrasts with mind‐wandering. Our final study (N = 277) used vignettes that resemble mind‐wandering experiments. Dynamics had significant and large effects, while task‐unrelatedness was nonsignificant. These results strongly suggest that the central feature of mind‐wandering is its dynamics.
- Open Access
- 27 April 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
The Catch-22 of Forgetfulness: Responsibility for Mental Mistakes
Attribution theorists widely assume that people rely on character assessments to assign blame. But there is disagreement over why. One camp holds that character has a fundamental effect on blame. Another camp holds that character merely provides evidence about the mental states and processes that determine responsibility. We provide empirical evidence for a two-channel view, where character simultaneously has both fundamental and evidential effects on blame. In two large factorial studies (n = 505), participants rate whether someone is blameworthy when he makes a mistake (burns a cake or misses a bus stop). Although mental state inferences predict blame judgments, character assessments do not. Studies 3 and 4 (n = 447) perform a mediation analysis and find that character assessments (about forgetfulness) influence responsibility via two channels, one direct and another indirect. Forgetfulness directly increases judgments of responsibility, presumably because one’s mistakes manifest bad character. But forgetfulness also decreases judgments of state control, which indirectly decreases responsibility judgments. These two channels cancel out, which is why we find no aggregate effect of forgetfulness on responsibility. This is the catch-22 of forgetfulness. Our results challenge several fundamental assumptions in the moral psychology of character, including that good character always decreases blame.
- 27 April 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessThe Catch-22 of Forgetfulness: Responsibility for Mental Mistakes
Attribution theorists widely assume that people rely on character assessments to assign blame. But there is disagreement over why. One camp holds that character has a fundamental effect on blame. Another camp holds that character merely provides evidence about the mental states and processes that determine responsibility. We provide empirical evidence for a two-channel view, where character simultaneously has both fundamental and evidential effects on blame. In two large factorial studies (n = 505), participants rate whether someone is blameworthy when he makes a mistake (burns a cake or misses a bus stop). Although mental state inferences predict blame judgments, character assessments do not. Studies 3 and 4 (n = 447) perform a mediation analysis and find that character assessments (about forgetfulness) influence responsibility via two channels, one direct and another indirect. Forgetfulness directly increases judgments of responsibility, presumably because one’s mistakes manifest bad character. But forgetfulness also decreases judgments of state control, which indirectly decreases responsibility judgments. These two channels cancel out, which is why we find no aggregate effect of forgetfulness on responsibility. This is the catch-22 of forgetfulness. Our results challenge several fundamental assumptions in the moral psychology of character, including that good character always decreases blame.