Gerard J. Holzmann
Research Subjects
Gerard J. Holzmann has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Klaus Havelund
California Institute of Technology
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 22 January 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 51 (3) , 774-777
The Analysis of Safety Critical Software Systems
We reflect on the impact of software verification techniques, as implemented in the logic model checking tool SPIN, on the development of modern safety critical software systems and reflect on future developments in the application of formal verification techniques, especially in the context of the new generation of AI-based systems and tools.
- 22 January 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
- Vol. 51 (3) , 774-777
The Analysis of Safety Critical Software Systems
We reflect on the impact of software verification techniques, as implemented in the logic model checking tool SPIN, on the development of modern safety critical software systems and reflect on future developments in the application of formal verification techniques, especially in the context of the new generation of AI-based systems and tools.
- 22 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer
- Vol. 26 (1) , 33-47
Programming event monitors
- 22 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer
- Vol. 26 (1) , 33-47
Programming event monitors
- 17 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 127-133
Comparing Two Methods for Checking Runtime Properties
- 17 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 127-133
Comparing Two Methods for Checking Runtime Properties
- 19 April 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Software
- Vol. 38 (3) , 13-16
Keeping It Simple: Agile Analysis
Writing reliable software is hard. No matter how determined we all are to avoid it, we do make mistakes and at a fairly predictable rate. What makes a software system reliable is not determined just by the care we take in planning and structuring a design but also by the methods we use in catching those pesky bugs that come along for the ride. For safety-critical code, the use of strong static source code analyzers has become an essential part of the development process. The best analyzers are based on solid theory and maintained by large teams of highly skilled developers. The tools can patiently trace through complex execution paths to reveal a range of subtle bugs, although, of course, only the types of bugs the tools have been trained on. The tools can be slow and costly, though, and the warnings they generate are sometimes difficult for humans to evaluate accurately.
- 19 April 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Software
- Vol. 38 (3) , 13-16
Keeping It Simple: Agile Analysis
Writing reliable software is hard. No matter how determined we all are to avoid it, we do make mistakes and at a fairly predictable rate. What makes a software system reliable is not determined just by the care we take in planning and structuring a design but also by the methods we use in catching those pesky bugs that come along for the ride. For safety-critical code, the use of strong static source code analyzers has become an essential part of the development process. The best analyzers are based on solid theory and maintained by large teams of highly skilled developers. The tools can patiently trace through complex execution paths to reveal a range of subtle bugs, although, of course, only the types of bugs the tools have been trained on. The tools can be slow and costly, though, and the warnings they generate are sometimes difficult for humans to evaluate accurately.
- 23 December 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Software
- Vol. 38 (1) , 13-15
Right Code
These days, when you see the headline "How Safe Are Airplanes?" the text more likely refers to the spread of disease than the likelihood of a crash. With steady safety improvements over at least the last five decades, airplane crashes have become exceedingly uncommon, and they are rarely caused by flaws in the design of the airplane itself. The most common remaining causes are the usual suspects of human error, extreme weather events, and mechanical failure.
- 23 December 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Software
- Vol. 38 (1) , 13-15
Right Code
These days, when you see the headline "How Safe Are Airplanes?" the text more likely refers to the spread of disease than the likelihood of a crash. With steady safety improvements over at least the last five decades, airplane crashes have become exceedingly uncommon, and they are rarely caused by flaws in the design of the airplane itself. The most common remaining causes are the usual suspects of human error, extreme weather events, and mechanical failure.
- 19 June 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Software
- Vol. 37 (4) , 11-16
Test Fatigue
As the recent coronavirus outbreak has made painfully clear, the quantity and quality of our test efforts determine what defect rates we measure. If you don't test, or test poorly, you will discover few defects and may be tempted to draw the wrong conclusions about the quality of whatever it was that you were testing.
- 19 June 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Software
- Vol. 37 (4) , 11-16
Test Fatigue
As the recent coronavirus outbreak has made painfully clear, the quantity and quality of our test efforts determine what defect rates we measure. If you don't test, or test poorly, you will discover few defects and may be tempted to draw the wrong conclusions about the quality of whatever it was that you were testing.
- 1 March 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Software
- Vol. 37 (2) , 10-12
Predicting the Past
- 1 March 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Software
- Vol. 37 (2) , 10-12
Predicting the Past
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Software
- Vol. 36 (6) , 73-75
Code Overload
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Software
- Vol. 36 (6) , 73-75
Code Overload
- 16 April 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Software
- Vol. 36 (3) , 14-16
Does Not Compute
Most of us who work with software know all too well how easy it is to make small mistakes that escape detection in tests and come back to haunt us later. Unfortunately, when you study formal software verification techniques, one of the first things you learn is that a foolproof method for analyzing your code to reliably prevent these types of unpleasantries does not exist. Worse, you learn that it cannot exist. Although you may not remember a proof, you've certainly heard of the halting problem. Alan Turing already showed in 1936 that there cannot be an algorithm that can decisively show whether an arbitrary program will terminate on a given input or not.
- 16 April 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Software
- Vol. 36 (3) , 14-16
Does Not Compute
Most of us who work with software know all too well how easy it is to make small mistakes that escape detection in tests and come back to haunt us later. Unfortunately, when you study formal software verification techniques, one of the first things you learn is that a foolproof method for analyzing your code to reliably prevent these types of unpleasantries does not exist. Worse, you learn that it cannot exist. Although you may not remember a proof, you've certainly heard of the halting problem. Alan Turing already showed in 1936 that there cannot be an algorithm that can decisively show whether an arbitrary program will terminate on a given input or not.
- 27 September 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Software
- Vol. 35 (5) , 85-87
Code Vault
So, what has changed since that first NATO software engineering conference in 1968? Depending on your point of view, nothing much has changed, or everything has changed. The part that didn't change much is that we still struggle with writing code that's robust enough to trust. The part that has changed dramatically is the performance of the hardware that runs our code. This article is part of a theme issue on software engineering's 50th anniversary.
- 27 September 2018
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Software
- Vol. 35 (5) , 85-87
Code Vault
So, what has changed since that first NATO software engineering conference in 1968? Depending on your point of view, nothing much has changed, or everything has changed. The part that didn't change much is that we still struggle with writing code that's robust enough to trust. The part that has changed dramatically is the performance of the hardware that runs our code. This article is part of a theme issue on software engineering's 50th anniversary.