Boris van Leeuwen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Boris van Leeuwen has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jeroen van de Ven
ASE, University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute
2 shared publicationsTheo Offerman
CREED, University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute
2 shared publications- Abhijit Ramalingam
Department of Economics, Walker College of Business, Appalachian State University, Peacock Hall, Boone, USA
1 shared publication Andrew Whitehouse
Telethon Kids Institute, University of Western Australia, Crawley, Western Australia, Australia
1 shared publicationArthur Schram
University of Amsterdam
1 shared publication- Arthur Schram
CREED, Amsterdam School of Economics, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 March 2022
- Published by MIT Press in Review of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 104 (2) , 217-231
Fight or Flight: Endogenous Timing in Conflicts
We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a “deterrence value” on top of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We show that this value is a key determinant of the type of equilibrium. For intermediate values, sorting takes place, with weaker players fleeing before others fight. Time then helps to reduce battles. In an experiment, we find support for the key theoretical predictions and document suboptimal predatory fighting.
- 1 March 2022
- Published by MIT Press in Review of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 104 (2) , 217-231
Open AccessFight or Flight: Endogenous Timing in Conflicts
We study a dynamic game in which players compete for a prize. In a waiting game with two-sided private information about strength levels, players choose fighting, fleeing, or waiting. Players earn a “deterrence value” on top of the prize if their opponent escapes without a battle. We show that this value is a key determinant of the type of equilibrium. For intermediate values, sorting takes place, with weaker players fleeing before others fight. Time then helps to reduce battles. In an experiment, we find support for the key theoretical predictions and document suboptimal predatory fighting.
- Open Access
Estimating Social Preferences and Kantian Morality in Strategic Interactions
Recent theoretical work suggests that a form of Kantian morality has evolutionary foundations. To investigate the relative importance of Kantian morality and social preferences, we run laboratory experiments on strategic interaction in social dilemmas. Using a structural model, we estimate social preferences and morality concerns both at the individual level and the aggregate level. We observe considerable heterogeneity in social preferences and Kantian morality. A finite mixture analysis shows that the subject pool is well described as consisting of two types. One exhibits a combination of inequity aversion and Kantian morality, while the other combines spite and Kantian morality.
Open AccessEstimating Social Preferences and Kantian Morality in Strategic Interactions
Recent theoretical work suggests that a form of Kantian morality has evolutionary foundations. To investigate the relative importance of Kantian morality and social preferences, we run laboratory experiments on strategic interaction in social dilemmas. Using a structural model, we estimate social preferences and morality concerns both at the individual level and the aggregate level. We observe considerable heterogeneity in social preferences and Kantian morality. A finite mixture analysis shows that the subject pool is well described as consisting of two types. One exhibits a combination of inequity aversion and Kantian morality, while the other combines spite and Kantian morality.
- Open Access
- 23 December 2020
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings Of The Royal Society B-Biological Sciences
- Vol. 287 (1941) , 20201756
Do sex hormones at birth predict later-life economic preferences? Evidence from a pregnancy birth cohort study
Economic preferences may be shaped by exposure to sex hormones around birth. Prior studies of economic preferences and numerous other phenotypic characteristics use digit ratios (2D : 4D), a purported proxy for prenatal testosterone exposure, whose validity has recently been questioned. We use direct measures of neonatal sex hormones (testosterone and oestrogen), measured from umbilical cord blood ( n = 200) to investigate their association with later-life economic preferences (risk preferences, competitiveness, time preferences and social preferences) in an Australian cohort (Raine Study Gen2). We find no significant associations between testosterone at birth and preferences, except for competitiveness, where the effect runs opposite to the expected direction. Point estimates are between 0.05–0.09 percentage points (pp) and 0.003–0.14 s.d. We similarly find no significant associations between 2D : 4D and preferences ( n = 533, point estimates 0.003–0.02 pp and 0.001–0.06 s.d.). Our sample size allows detecting effects larger than 0.11 pp or 0.22 s.d. for testosterone at birth, and 0.07 pp or 0.14 s.d. for 2D : 4D ( α = 0.05 and power = 0.90). Equivalence tests show that most effects are unlikely to be larger than these bounds. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of prior findings relating 2D : 4D to economic preferences, and highlight the importance of future large-sample studies that permit detection of small effects.
- 23 December 2020
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings Of The Royal Society B-Biological Sciences
- Vol. 287 (1941) , 20201756
Open AccessDo sex hormones at birth predict later-life economic preferences? Evidence from a pregnancy birth cohort study
Economic preferences may be shaped by exposure to sex hormones around birth. Prior studies of economic preferences and numerous other phenotypic characteristics use digit ratios (2D : 4D), a purported proxy for prenatal testosterone exposure, whose validity has recently been questioned. We use direct measures of neonatal sex hormones (testosterone and oestrogen), measured from umbilical cord blood ( n = 200) to investigate their association with later-life economic preferences (risk preferences, competitiveness, time preferences and social preferences) in an Australian cohort (Raine Study Gen2). We find no significant associations between testosterone at birth and preferences, except for competitiveness, where the effect runs opposite to the expected direction. Point estimates are between 0.05–0.09 percentage points (pp) and 0.003–0.14 s.d. We similarly find no significant associations between 2D : 4D and preferences ( n = 533, point estimates 0.003–0.02 pp and 0.001–0.06 s.d.). Our sample size allows detecting effects larger than 0.11 pp or 0.22 s.d. for testosterone at birth, and 0.07 pp or 0.14 s.d. for 2D : 4D ( α = 0.05 and power = 0.90). Equivalence tests show that most effects are unlikely to be larger than these bounds. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of prior findings relating 2D : 4D to economic preferences, and highlight the importance of future large-sample studies that permit detection of small effects.
- Open Access
- 30 April 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Strategic Display of Emotions
The emotion that someone expresses has consequences for how that person is treated. We study whether people display emotions strategically. In two laboratory experiments, participants play task delegation games in which managers assign a task to one of two workers. When assigning the task, managers see pictures of the workers and we vary whether getting the task is desirable or not. We find that workers strategically adapt their emotional expressions to the incentives they face, and that it indeed pays off to do so. Yet, workers do not exploit the full potential of the strategic display of emotions.
- 30 April 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Strategic Display of Emotions
The emotion that someone expresses has consequences for how that person is treated. We study whether people display emotions strategically. In two laboratory experiments, participants play task delegation games in which managers assign a task to one of two workers. When assigning the task, managers see pictures of the workers and we vary whether getting the task is desirable or not. We find that workers strategically adapt their emotional expressions to the incentives they face, and that it indeed pays off to do so. Yet, workers do not exploit the full potential of the strategic display of emotions.
- Open Access
- 22 February 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 18 (2) , 666-707
Competition for Status Creates Superstars: an Experiment on Public Good Provision and Network Formation
We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically examine the effects of group size and exogenously monetarized status rents. The experimental results provide very clear support for the concept of challenge-freeness, a refinement that predicts when a repeated game equilibrium will be played, and if so which one. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that these observations are driven by social preferences, independently of the competition for status.
- 22 February 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 18 (2) , 666-707
Open AccessCompetition for Status Creates Superstars: an Experiment on Public Good Provision and Network Formation
We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically examine the effects of group size and exogenously monetarized status rents. The experimental results provide very clear support for the concept of challenge-freeness, a refinement that predicts when a repeated game equilibrium will be played, and if so which one. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that these observations are driven by social preferences, independently of the competition for status.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 22 (1) , 178-196
Centrality and cooperation in networks
We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, groups with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.
- 20 September 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 22 (1) , 178-196
Centrality and cooperation in networks
We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, groups with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 64 (7) , 3352-3364
Predictably Angry—Facial Cues Provide a Credible Signal of Destructive Behavior
Evolutionary explanations of anger as a commitment device hinge on two key assumptions. The first is that it is predictable, ex ante, whether someone will get angry when feeling that he or she has been badly treated. The second is that anger is associated with destructive behavior. We test the validity of these two assumptions. We collected photos of responders in an ultimatum game before they were informed about the game that they would be playing, and we filmed responders with webcams during play. We then showed pairs of photos consisting of one responder who rejected and one responder who accepted (a low offer) to an independent group of observers. We find that observers are better than chance at detecting who rejected the low offer; they do 10% better than random guessing would. We also find that anger at receiving a low offer is associated with rejection.Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2727 .This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 64 (7) , 3352-3364
Predictably Angry—Facial Cues Provide a Credible Signal of Destructive Behavior
Evolutionary explanations of anger as a commitment device hinge on two key assumptions. The first is that it is predictable, ex ante, whether someone will get angry when feeling that he or she has been badly treated. The second is that anger is associated with destructive behavior. We test the validity of these two assumptions. We collected photos of responders in an ultimatum game before they were informed about the game that they would be playing, and we filmed responders with webcams during play. We then showed pairs of photos consisting of one responder who rejected and one responder who accepted (a low offer) to an independent group of observers. We find that observers are better than chance at detecting who rejected the low offer; they do 10% better than random guessing would. We also find that anger at receiving a low offer is associated with rejection.Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2727 .This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.