Lachlan Kent
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Lachlan Kent has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Britt Klein
8 shared publicationsGeorge H Van Doorn
5 shared publications- Jakob Hohwy
Monash University
3 shared publications - Amy Zadow
University of South Australia
2 shared publications Bronwyn Gresham
Health, Safety and Wellbeing, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, Victoria, Australia
2 shared publicationsGeorge Van Doorn
School of Health Sciences and Psychology, Federation University Australia, Australia
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 January 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
The dual continua in mental health policy and practice: Screening and intervention for low mental wellbeing in youth to achieve targeted prevention
Background: The mental health of young people in Australia and other nations has declined dramatically over the last decade and a half. While an increase in youth mental healthcare services is needed to meet rising demand, on its own, this is unlikely to reverse the concerning trend. A greater focus on prevention is needed.Aims: This article aims to propose an innovative, theoretically-grounded approach to prevention that complements more common population-based (i.e., changing risk and protective factors) and targeted (i.e., supporting individuals with subthreshold symptoms of mental illness) approaches. Aligned with the dual-continua model of mental health (i.e., where mental well-being and ill-health are distinct dimensions of overall mental health), this third approach focuses on addressing low levels of mental wellbeing, which is both a significant predictor of future mental ill-health and a distressing and disabling state that requires intervention in its own right. Recommendations: Large-scale screening for low mental wellbeing, using psychometrically sound tools, could be conducted online and through schools, higher education, and primary care services. Those with low mental wellbeing could be linked to community services offering evidence-based interventions. This approach is likely to carry less stigma and may be easier to achieve than targeting those with subthreshold symptoms through clinical services.Conclusions: The dire state of youth mental health is an urgent call-to-action to adopt novel approaches to address this crisis. We need to make better use of the available evidence and tools at-hand to strengthen our focus on low mental wellbeing, not just mental ill-health.
- 30 January 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessThe dual continua in mental health policy and practice: Screening and intervention for low mental wellbeing in youth to achieve targeted prevention
Background: The mental health of young people in Australia and other nations has declined dramatically over the last decade and a half. While an increase in youth mental healthcare services is needed to meet rising demand, on its own, this is unlikely to reverse the concerning trend. A greater focus on prevention is needed.Aims: This article aims to propose an innovative, theoretically-grounded approach to prevention that complements more common population-based (i.e., changing risk and protective factors) and targeted (i.e., supporting individuals with subthreshold symptoms of mental illness) approaches. Aligned with the dual-continua model of mental health (i.e., where mental well-being and ill-health are distinct dimensions of overall mental health), this third approach focuses on addressing low levels of mental wellbeing, which is both a significant predictor of future mental ill-health and a distressing and disabling state that requires intervention in its own right. Recommendations: Large-scale screening for low mental wellbeing, using psychometrically sound tools, could be conducted online and through schools, higher education, and primary care services. Those with low mental wellbeing could be linked to community services offering evidence-based interventions. This approach is likely to carry less stigma and may be easier to achieve than targeting those with subthreshold symptoms through clinical services.Conclusions: The dire state of youth mental health is an urgent call-to-action to adopt novel approaches to address this crisis. We need to make better use of the available evidence and tools at-hand to strengthen our focus on low mental wellbeing, not just mental ill-health.
- 14 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Higher Education
- Vol. 90 (5) , 1273-1290
How university climate impacts psychosocial safety, psychosocial risk, and mental health among staff in Australian higher education: a qualitative study
- 14 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Higher Education
- Vol. 90 (5) , 1273-1290
How university climate impacts psychosocial safety, psychosocial risk, and mental health among staff in Australian higher education: a qualitative study
- Open Access
- 24 April 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
How do institutional, psychosocial, and individual factors influence staff mental wellbeing in Australian higher education? Findings from a cross-sectional study
There are significant mental health concerns among staff in higher education globally, shaped by wide-ranging complex factors such as poor management, excessive workloads, and escalating expectations for productivity. Yet, measuring such complex influences remains a significant methodological challenge for universities. In this article, we propose a theoretical model that integrates institutional (Psychosocial Safety Climate [PSC]), psychosocial (work-related factors), and individual (emotional exhaustion, work engagement) factors to predict mental wellbeing. We tested this model in a cross-sectional survey study with staff at an Australian university (N = 2697). Via correlation analysis and structural equation modelling, we generated a minimal model and an alternative model with additional paths between selected factors. The latter yielded excellent fit (GFI = 1.0, CFI = 1.0, TLI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.036 [90% CI = 0.018 to 0.056]) and strong mediation from PSC through mental wellbeing (standardised regression coefficient 95% CI 0.29 to 0.34, p < 0.01) with all relationships significant (p < 0.05). Our validated model serves as an empirical impetus for more comprehensive institutional measurement. It also highlights that in order to improve staff mental wellbeing, interventions are needed that specifically target university management. We conclude with recommendations for institutional research, practice, and policy.
- 24 April 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessHow do institutional, psychosocial, and individual factors influence staff mental wellbeing in Australian higher education? Findings from a cross-sectional study
There are significant mental health concerns among staff in higher education globally, shaped by wide-ranging complex factors such as poor management, excessive workloads, and escalating expectations for productivity. Yet, measuring such complex influences remains a significant methodological challenge for universities. In this article, we propose a theoretical model that integrates institutional (Psychosocial Safety Climate [PSC]), psychosocial (work-related factors), and individual (emotional exhaustion, work engagement) factors to predict mental wellbeing. We tested this model in a cross-sectional survey study with staff at an Australian university (N = 2697). Via correlation analysis and structural equation modelling, we generated a minimal model and an alternative model with additional paths between selected factors. The latter yielded excellent fit (GFI = 1.0, CFI = 1.0, TLI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.036 [90% CI = 0.018 to 0.056]) and strong mediation from PSC through mental wellbeing (standardised regression coefficient 95% CI 0.29 to 0.34, p < 0.01) with all relationships significant (p < 0.05). Our validated model serves as an empirical impetus for more comprehensive institutional measurement. It also highlights that in order to improve staff mental wellbeing, interventions are needed that specifically target university management. We conclude with recommendations for institutional research, practice, and policy.
- Open Access
- 14 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Psychology
- Vol. 94
Mental gravity: Modelling the embodied self on the physical environment
- 14 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Psychology
- Vol. 94
Open AccessMental gravity: Modelling the embodied self on the physical environment
- Open Access
Mental Gravity: Depression as Spacetime Curvature of the Self, Mind, and Brain
The principle of mental gravity contends that the mind uses physical gravity as a mental model or simulacrum to express the relation between the inner self and the outer world in terms of “UP”-ness and “DOWN”-ness. The simulation of increased gravity characterises a continuum of mental gravity which states includes depression as the paradigmatic example of being down, low, heavy, and slow. The physics of gravity can also be used to model spacetime curvature in depression, particularly gravitational time dilation as a property of MG analogous to subjective time dilation (i.e., the slowing of temporal flow in conscious experience). The principle has profound implications for the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) with regard to temporo-spatial alignment that establishes a “world-brain relation” that is centred on embodiment and the socialisation of conscious states. The principle of mental gravity provides the TTC with a way to incorporate the structure of the world into the structure of the brain, conscious experience, and thought. In concert with other theories of cognitive and neurobiological spacetime, the TTC can also work towards the “common currency” approach that also potentially connects the TTC to predictive processing frameworks such as free energy, neuronal gauge theories, and active inference accounts of depression. It gives the up/down dimension of space, as defined by the gravitational field, a unique status that is connected to both our embodied interaction with the physical world, and also the inverse, reflective, emotional but still embodied experience of ourselves.
Open AccessMental Gravity: Depression as Spacetime Curvature of the Self, Mind, and Brain
The principle of mental gravity contends that the mind uses physical gravity as a mental model or simulacrum to express the relation between the inner self and the outer world in terms of “UP”-ness and “DOWN”-ness. The simulation of increased gravity characterises a continuum of mental gravity which states includes depression as the paradigmatic example of being down, low, heavy, and slow. The physics of gravity can also be used to model spacetime curvature in depression, particularly gravitational time dilation as a property of MG analogous to subjective time dilation (i.e., the slowing of temporal flow in conscious experience). The principle has profound implications for the Temporo-spatial Theory of Consciousness (TTC) with regard to temporo-spatial alignment that establishes a “world-brain relation” that is centred on embodiment and the socialisation of conscious states. The principle of mental gravity provides the TTC with a way to incorporate the structure of the world into the structure of the brain, conscious experience, and thought. In concert with other theories of cognitive and neurobiological spacetime, the TTC can also work towards the “common currency” approach that also potentially connects the TTC to predictive processing frameworks such as free energy, neuronal gauge theories, and active inference accounts of depression. It gives the up/down dimension of space, as defined by the gravitational field, a unique status that is connected to both our embodied interaction with the physical world, and also the inverse, reflective, emotional but still embodied experience of ourselves.
- Open Access
- 10 August 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Mental Gravity: A novel theory of self, brain, mind and depression
The theory of Mental Gravity explains what it means to be psychologically “down” and how mental downness manifests in various aspects of cognition and behaviour, emotion and personality, the brain, phenomenology, and psychopathology. The theory contends that Mental Gravity is experienced as a simulation of (increased) physical gravity that communicates different mental states associated with being down, low, heavy, and slow, including when depressed. The simulation relates to core aspects of autobiographical memory, selfhood, and subjective space and time. The theory proposes that the intuitive physics of physical gravity (i.e., the “internal gravity model”) is used as a mental “template” for behaviours that communicate social or emotional gravity in particularly solemn, serious, or grave situations. Mental Gravity thus draws a behavioural analogy between the physical and social-emotional environments. At a deeper level, the theory also describes the underlying neural, cognitive, and phenomenological processes driving the mental simulation of physical gravity in terms of fundamental physics. Neural correlates are proposed in the vestibular, salience, default mode, and central executive networks. On the basis of default mode activity, the self is viewed as the brain’s cognitive “centre of mental gravity” constituting an accumulated “mass” of autobiographical memory. Phenomenologically, the theory uses gravity to model the interaction between the internal self and the external world. Depression represents severe Mental Gravity where persistently strong feelings of increased physical gravity are underscored by more drastic changes in the sense of self, seclusion from the world, and distorted subjective experience of space and time.
- 10 August 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessMental Gravity: A novel theory of self, brain, mind and depression
The theory of Mental Gravity explains what it means to be psychologically “down” and how mental downness manifests in various aspects of cognition and behaviour, emotion and personality, the brain, phenomenology, and psychopathology. The theory contends that Mental Gravity is experienced as a simulation of (increased) physical gravity that communicates different mental states associated with being down, low, heavy, and slow, including when depressed. The simulation relates to core aspects of autobiographical memory, selfhood, and subjective space and time. The theory proposes that the intuitive physics of physical gravity (i.e., the “internal gravity model”) is used as a mental “template” for behaviours that communicate social or emotional gravity in particularly solemn, serious, or grave situations. Mental Gravity thus draws a behavioural analogy between the physical and social-emotional environments. At a deeper level, the theory also describes the underlying neural, cognitive, and phenomenological processes driving the mental simulation of physical gravity in terms of fundamental physics. Neural correlates are proposed in the vestibular, salience, default mode, and central executive networks. On the basis of default mode activity, the self is viewed as the brain’s cognitive “centre of mental gravity” constituting an accumulated “mass” of autobiographical memory. Phenomenologically, the theory uses gravity to model the interaction between the internal self and the external world. Depression represents severe Mental Gravity where persistently strong feelings of increased physical gravity are underscored by more drastic changes in the sense of self, seclusion from the world, and distorted subjective experience of space and time.
- 15 June 2022
- Published by Wiley in Early Intervention in Psychiatry
- Vol. 17 (3) , 231-243
Can disorders of subjective time inform the differential diagnosis of psychiatric disorders? A transdiagnostic taxonomy of time
Aim: Time is a core aspect of psychopathology with potential for clinical use and early intervention. Temporal experience, perception, judgement and processing are distorted in various psychiatric disorders such as mood (depression and mania), anxiety, autistic, impulse‐control, dissociative and attention‐deficit/hyperactivity disorders. Can these disorders of time be used as early diagnostic or predictive markers? To answer this question, we develop a Transdiagnostic Taxonomy of (disordered) Time (TTT) that maps on to the symptomatological, phenomenal, perceptual and functional descriptions of each underlying disorder in a 2 × 2 × 2 state space. Temporal distortions may precede functional decline, and so assist efforts at early detection and intervention in at‐risk groups.Method: Firstly, this article integrates a psychological model of how time is processed with a subjective or phenomenological model of how time is experienced or perceived. Secondly, the integrated combined model of time is then used to heuristically map major psychiatric disorders on to the basic elements of temporal flow and integration.Results: The TTT systematically describes the basic temporal nature of eight diagnostic categories of psychiatric illness. It differentiates between diagnoses primarily associated with distorted “macro‐level” phenomenal temporal experiences (i.e. anxiety, dissociation/PTSD, depression, and mania) from those primarily related to distorted ‘micro‐level’ temporal processing (i.e. psychotic, impulse‐control, autistic and attention‐deficit/hyperactivity disorders).Conclusions: The TTT allows differential diagnostic classification of various psychiatric disorders in terms of a possible underlying time disorder, making it useful for future diagnostic and predictive purposes using novel techniques of temporal processing, time perception, passage of time, and time perspective.
- 15 June 2022
- Published by Wiley in Early Intervention in Psychiatry
- Vol. 17 (3) , 231-243
Can disorders of subjective time inform the differential diagnosis of psychiatric disorders? A transdiagnostic taxonomy of time
Aim: Time is a core aspect of psychopathology with potential for clinical use and early intervention. Temporal experience, perception, judgement and processing are distorted in various psychiatric disorders such as mood (depression and mania), anxiety, autistic, impulse‐control, dissociative and attention‐deficit/hyperactivity disorders. Can these disorders of time be used as early diagnostic or predictive markers? To answer this question, we develop a Transdiagnostic Taxonomy of (disordered) Time (TTT) that maps on to the symptomatological, phenomenal, perceptual and functional descriptions of each underlying disorder in a 2 × 2 × 2 state space. Temporal distortions may precede functional decline, and so assist efforts at early detection and intervention in at‐risk groups.Method: Firstly, this article integrates a psychological model of how time is processed with a subjective or phenomenological model of how time is experienced or perceived. Secondly, the integrated combined model of time is then used to heuristically map major psychiatric disorders on to the basic elements of temporal flow and integration.Results: The TTT systematically describes the basic temporal nature of eight diagnostic categories of psychiatric illness. It differentiates between diagnoses primarily associated with distorted “macro‐level” phenomenal temporal experiences (i.e. anxiety, dissociation/PTSD, depression, and mania) from those primarily related to distorted ‘micro‐level’ temporal processing (i.e. psychotic, impulse‐control, autistic and attention‐deficit/hyperactivity disorders).Conclusions: The TTT allows differential diagnostic classification of various psychiatric disorders in terms of a possible underlying time disorder, making it useful for future diagnostic and predictive purposes using novel techniques of temporal processing, time perception, passage of time, and time perspective.
- Open Access
- 9 June 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Systema Psyches: A Timescale Framework for the Hierarchical Mind
This paper proposes a hierarchical time-based framework for wide-ranging domains of mental activity, emotion, and behavior. Expanding on an integrated model of cognitive and emotional intelligence (i.e., Systema Temporis) that ranged up to the timescales of human memory (cf. decades), the current approach incorporates longer timescales relevant to sociocultural and biological evolution (cf. up to millions of years). Extended timescales are drawn from the Hierarchically Mechanistic Mind (HMM) model of the embodied human brain that proposes a temporal basis for four ontological levels of description, namely adaptation, phylogeny, ontogeny, and mechanism. The resulting model (i.e., Systema Psyches) furnishes real-time processes of the HMM with theoretical details relevant to cognitive and emotional intelligence. The hierarchical structure is also amenable to further theoretical assignment within domains of integrative personality as described by the New Big Five, namely the role of culture, development, trait psychology, and biological structure. An example is given of how Systema Psyches can be applied using predictive processing to differentiate mental disorders like depression and autism.
- 9 June 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessSystema Psyches: A Timescale Framework for the Hierarchical Mind
This paper proposes a hierarchical time-based framework for wide-ranging domains of mental activity, emotion, and behavior. Expanding on an integrated model of cognitive and emotional intelligence (i.e., Systema Temporis) that ranged up to the timescales of human memory (cf. decades), the current approach incorporates longer timescales relevant to sociocultural and biological evolution (cf. up to millions of years). Extended timescales are drawn from the Hierarchically Mechanistic Mind (HMM) model of the embodied human brain that proposes a temporal basis for four ontological levels of description, namely adaptation, phylogeny, ontogeny, and mechanism. The resulting model (i.e., Systema Psyches) furnishes real-time processes of the HMM with theoretical details relevant to cognitive and emotional intelligence. The hierarchical structure is also amenable to further theoretical assignment within domains of integrative personality as described by the New Big Five, namely the role of culture, development, trait psychology, and biological structure. An example is given of how Systema Psyches can be applied using predictive processing to differentiate mental disorders like depression and autism.
- Open Access
- 9 January 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Time Consciousness: The Missing Link in Theories of Consciousness
There are plenty of issues to be solved in order for researchers to agree on a neural model of consciousness. Here we emphasize an often under-represented aspect in the debate: time consciousness. Consciousness and the present moment both extend in time. Experience flows through a succession of moments and progresses from future predictions, to present experiences, to past memories. However, a brief review finds that many dominant theories of consciousness only refer to brief, static, and discrete “functional moments” of time. Very few refer to more extended, dynamic, and continuous time, which is associated with conscious experience (cf. the “experienced moment”). This confusion between short and discrete versus long and continuous is, we argue, one of the core issues in theories of consciousness. Given the lack of work dedicated to time consciousness, its study could test novel predictions of rival theories of consciousness. It may be that different theories of consciousness are compatible/complementary if the different aspects of time are taken into account. Or, if it turns out that no existing theory can fully accommodate time consciousness, then perhaps it has something new to add. Regardless of outcome, the crucial step is to make subjective time a central object of study.
- 9 January 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessTime Consciousness: The Missing Link in Theories of Consciousness
There are plenty of issues to be solved in order for researchers to agree on a neural model of consciousness. Here we emphasize an often under-represented aspect in the debate: time consciousness. Consciousness and the present moment both extend in time. Experience flows through a succession of moments and progresses from future predictions, to present experiences, to past memories. However, a brief review finds that many dominant theories of consciousness only refer to brief, static, and discrete “functional moments” of time. Very few refer to more extended, dynamic, and continuous time, which is associated with conscious experience (cf. the “experienced moment”). This confusion between short and discrete versus long and continuous is, we argue, one of the core issues in theories of consciousness. Given the lack of work dedicated to time consciousness, its study could test novel predictions of rival theories of consciousness. It may be that different theories of consciousness are compatible/complementary if the different aspects of time are taken into account. Or, if it turns out that no existing theory can fully accommodate time consciousness, then perhaps it has something new to add. Regardless of outcome, the crucial step is to make subjective time a central object of study.