AHAlexander Hicks

Alexander Hicks

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Alexander Hicks has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Transparency, Compliance, And Contestability When Code Is(n't) Law

    by Alexander Hicks

    Both technical security mechanisms and legal processes serve as mechanisms to deal with misbehaviour according to a set of norms. While they share general similarities, there are also clear differences in how they are defined, act, and the effect they have on subjects. This paper considers the similarities and differences between both types of mechanisms as ways of dealing with misbehaviour, and where they interact with each other. Taking into consideration the idea of code as law, we discuss accountability mechanisms for code, and how they must relate to both security principles and legal principles. In particular, we identify the ability to contest norms enforced by code as an important part of accountability in this context. Based on this analysis, we make the case for transparency enhancing technologies as security mechanisms that can support legal processes, in contrast to other types of accountability mechanisms for code. We illustrate this through two examples based on recent court cases that involved Post Office in the United Kingdom and Uber in the Netherlands, and discuss some practical considerations.

  • Smart Contracts for Bribing Miners

    by Patrick McCorry, Alexander Hicks, Sarah Meiklejohn


  • Open Access

    Incentivising Privacy in Cryptocurrencies

    by Sarah Azouvi, Haaroon Yousaf, Alexander Hicks

    Privacy was one of the key points mentioned in Nakamoto's Bitcoin whitepaper, and one of the selling points of Bitcoin in its early stages. In hindsight, however, de-anonymising Bitcoin users turned out to be more feasible than expected. Since then, privacy focused cryptocurrencies such as Zcash and Monero have surfaced. Both of these examples cannot be described as fully successful in their aims, as recent research has shown. Incentives are integral to the security of cryptocurrencies, so it is interesting to investigate whether they could also be aligned with privacy goals. A lack of privacy often results from low user counts, resulting in low anonymity sets. Could users be incentivised to use the privacy preserving implementations of the systems they use? Not only is Zcash much less used than Bitcoin (which it forked from), but most Zcash transactions are simply transparent transactions, rather than the (at least intended to be) privacy-preserving shielded transactions. This paper and poster briefly discusses how incentives could be incorporated into systems like cryptocurrencies with the aim of achieving privacy goals. We take Zcash as example, but the ideas discussed could apply to other privacy-focused cryptocurrencies. This work was presented as a poster at OPERANDI 2018, the poster can be found within this short document.