Sara Hagemann
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Sara Hagemann has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bjørn Høyland
University of Oslo
2 shared publications Alexander Herzog
School of Computing Clemson University Clemson
1 shared publication- Christopher Wratil
University of Vienna, Department of Government, Vienna, Austria
1 shared publication - Fabio Franchino
Department of Social and Political Sciences, Università degli Studi di Milano, Milan
1 shared publication - Sara Binzer Hobolt
London School of Economics and Political Science
1 shared publication Simon Hix
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 28 August 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 23 (4) , 729-740
Why does gender inequality in academic publishing persist? Lessons and recommendations
Data from leading scholarly journals and publishing houses show that the gender gap in academic publishing is deep and persistent. This has considerable consequences for individual careers and for academic knowledge across disciplines. As European political science journals have started to publish their gender data for submissions and publication processes, this article evaluates this trend and the conclusions from a recent symposium on ‘The gendered distribution of authors and reviewers in major European political science journals’. It summarises a list of ‘key gender data’ that journal editors are encouraged to publish on an annual basis to achieve a more accurate and comprehensive picture for individual journals and across the discipline. It also includes suggestions for editors to ensure better citations of female scholars in their journals.
- 28 August 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 23 (4) , 729-740
Why does gender inequality in academic publishing persist? Lessons and recommendations
Data from leading scholarly journals and publishing houses show that the gender gap in academic publishing is deep and persistent. This has considerable consequences for individual careers and for academic knowledge across disciplines. As European political science journals have started to publish their gender data for submissions and publication processes, this article evaluates this trend and the conclusions from a recent symposium on ‘The gendered distribution of authors and reviewers in major European political science journals’. It summarises a list of ‘key gender data’ that journal editors are encouraged to publish on an annual basis to achieve a more accurate and comprehensive picture for individual journals and across the discipline. It also includes suggestions for editors to ensure better citations of female scholars in their journals.
- 1 August 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Journal of International Law
- Vol. 31 (3) , 1105-1112
Politics and Diplomacy: Lessons from Donald Tusk’s Time as President of the European Council
- 1 August 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Journal of International Law
- Vol. 31 (3) , 1105-1112
Politics and Diplomacy: Lessons from Donald Tusk’s Time as President of the European Council
- 9 March 2019
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 57 (3) , 634-650
Signals to Their Parliaments? Governments’ Use of Votes and Policy Statements in the EU Council
- 9 March 2019
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 57 (3) , 634-650
Signals to Their Parliaments? Governments’ Use of Votes and Policy Statements in the EU Council
- Open Access
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Parliamentary Affairs
- Vol. 71 (suppl_1) , 155-170
The Brexit Context
After the vote for Brexit in the United Kingdom referendum in 2016 and the victory of Donald Trump in the United States, the European Union (EU) faced a make-it-or-break-it moment as it embarked on a year of national elections in key member states: the electorate in the Netherlands voted in March 2017; France went to the ballot box for the presidential and legislative elections in April/May and June; the British also cast their vote in June; Germany held elections in September and the Czech Republic their legislative election in October (Figure 10.1). In each of these elections, the EU was a crucial issue for the candidates and parties. Indeed, in today’s Europe, governments and opposition parties are—at least partly—judged by their electorates based on their stance on EU membership and policies. There is some variation in how this is played out across countries (Hobolt, 2016), but after this year’s round of elections there is no doubt that national governments’ attitudes towards the European Union play an important role at election time.
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Parliamentary Affairs
- Vol. 71 (suppl_1) , 155-170
Open AccessThe Brexit Context
After the vote for Brexit in the United Kingdom referendum in 2016 and the victory of Donald Trump in the United States, the European Union (EU) faced a make-it-or-break-it moment as it embarked on a year of national elections in key member states: the electorate in the Netherlands voted in March 2017; France went to the ballot box for the presidential and legislative elections in April/May and June; the British also cast their vote in June; Germany held elections in September and the Czech Republic their legislative election in October (Figure 10.1). In each of these elections, the EU was a crucial issue for the candidates and parties. Indeed, in today’s Europe, governments and opposition parties are—at least partly—judged by their electorates based on their stance on EU membership and policies. There is some variation in how this is played out across countries (Hobolt, 2016), but after this year’s round of elections there is no doubt that national governments’ attitudes towards the European Union play an important role at election time.
- 7 July 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 17 (3) , 408-428
Transparency vs efficiency? A study of negotiations in the Council of the European Union
Recent studies suggest there is a direct trade-off between transparency and efficiency in legislative politics. We challenge this conclusion and present a bargaining model where one particular kind of transparency – the publication of legislative records – works to overcome problems of incomplete information. We also present empirical findings from legislative activities in the Council of the European Union from 1999 to 2014 and from 23 interviews with senior officials in Brussels. Our results show that increased transparency, in the form of publication of legislative records, does not lead to gridlock or prolonged negotiations. On the contrary, recordings of governments’ positions help facilitate decision-making as it increases credibility of policy positions. This, in turn, lowers risk of negotiation failure and screens out marginal amendments.
- 7 July 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 17 (3) , 408-428
Transparency vs efficiency? A study of negotiations in the Council of the European Union
Recent studies suggest there is a direct trade-off between transparency and efficiency in legislative politics. We challenge this conclusion and present a bargaining model where one particular kind of transparency – the publication of legislative records – works to overcome problems of incomplete information. We also present empirical findings from legislative activities in the Council of the European Union from 1999 to 2014 and from 23 interviews with senior officials in Brussels. Our results show that increased transparency, in the form of publication of legislative records, does not lead to gridlock or prolonged negotiations. On the contrary, recordings of governments’ positions help facilitate decision-making as it increases credibility of policy positions. This, in turn, lowers risk of negotiation failure and screens out marginal amendments.
- Top Cited Papers
- 12 January 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 50 (6) , 850-876
Government Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence From Council Voting
Are governments responsive to public preferences when legislating in international organizations? This article demonstrates that governments respond to domestic public opinion even when acting at the international level. Specifically, we examine conflict in the European Union’s primary legislative body, the Council of the European Union (EU). We argue that domestic electoral incentives compel governments to react to public opinion. Analyzing a unique data set on all legislative decisions adopted in the Council since 1999, we show that governments are more likely to oppose legislative proposals that extend the level and scope of EU authority when their domestic electorates are skeptical about the EU. We also find that governments are more responsive when the issue of European integration is salient in domestic party politics. Our findings demonstrate that governments can use the international stage to signal their responsiveness to public concerns and that such signals resonate in the domestic political debate.
- 12 January 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 50 (6) , 850-876
Top Cited PapersGovernment Responsiveness in the European Union: Evidence From Council Voting
Are governments responsive to public preferences when legislating in international organizations? This article demonstrates that governments respond to domestic public opinion even when acting at the international level. Specifically, we examine conflict in the European Union’s primary legislative body, the Council of the European Union (EU). We argue that domestic electoral incentives compel governments to react to public opinion. Analyzing a unique data set on all legislative decisions adopted in the Council since 1999, we show that governments are more likely to oppose legislative proposals that extend the level and scope of EU authority when their domestic electorates are skeptical about the EU. We also find that governments are more responsive when the issue of European integration is salient in domestic party politics. Our findings demonstrate that governments can use the international stage to signal their responsiveness to public concerns and that such signals resonate in the domestic political debate.
- 12 August 2010
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 48 (4) , 811-833
Bicameral Politics in the European Union
The literature on legislative decision‐making and bargaining in the EU has reached a common conclusion that the European Parliament (Parliament) and the Council of the European Union (Council) are on an equal footing in the main legislative procedure, the co‐decision procedure. We present theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that this is not the case. First, our analysis of the formal rules reveals that the Council has conditional agenda‐setting power due to a change in the majority thresholds for adopting legislation from the first to the second reading in the Parliament. This change has important implications for the internal dynamics of the Parliament and its institutional powers vis‐à‐vis the Council. Testing these analytical considerations of the formal decision rules against voting data on all co‐decision legislation adopted in the two institutions between 1999 and 2004, our empirical findings show that: first, from 1999 to 2004 coalition formation in the Council fell predominantly along the traditional left–right political dimensions when negotiating co‐decision proposals. Second, when disagreement over legislation is recorded in the Council, a strong divide can also be found in the Parliament. Third, when the Parliament is divided along party political lines, it is less likely to be able to meet the absolute majority requirement for amending the proposal adopted by the Council. Lastly, Parliament amendments are most likely to be adopted when a decision by voting is requested by a party group associated with the main ideological contingency in the Council.
- 12 August 2010
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 48 (4) , 811-833
Bicameral Politics in the European Union
The literature on legislative decision‐making and bargaining in the EU has reached a common conclusion that the European Parliament (Parliament) and the Council of the European Union (Council) are on an equal footing in the main legislative procedure, the co‐decision procedure. We present theoretical and empirical evidence to suggest that this is not the case. First, our analysis of the formal rules reveals that the Council has conditional agenda‐setting power due to a change in the majority thresholds for adopting legislation from the first to the second reading in the Parliament. This change has important implications for the internal dynamics of the Parliament and its institutional powers vis‐à‐vis the Council. Testing these analytical considerations of the formal decision rules against voting data on all co‐decision legislation adopted in the two institutions between 1999 and 2004, our empirical findings show that: first, from 1999 to 2004 coalition formation in the Council fell predominantly along the traditional left–right political dimensions when negotiating co‐decision proposals. Second, when disagreement over legislation is recorded in the Council, a strong divide can also be found in the Parliament. Third, when the Parliament is divided along party political lines, it is less likely to be able to meet the absolute majority requirement for amending the proposal adopted by the Council. Lastly, Parliament amendments are most likely to be adopted when a decision by voting is requested by a party group associated with the main ideological contingency in the Council.
- 26 October 2009
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Politique européenne
- Vol. n° 28 (2) , 37-52
Could changing the electoral rules fix European parliament elections ?
Une révision des règles électorales pourrait-elle rendre les élections européennes plus attractives ? Les élections européennes n’ont pas réussi à établir une connexion électorale entre les citoyens européens et la vie politique au niveau européen. La modification du système électoral pourrait-elle résoudre ce problème ? Nous pensons que cela est possible, en tout cas partiellement. La modification des règles électorales ne résoudrait pas l’ensemble des problèmes auxquels est confronté le Parlement européen. Cependant, l’analyse des élections passées conduit à suggérer que des circonscriptions relativement petites et des listes électorales ouvertes (qui autoriseraient les citoyens à voter pour des candidats spécifiques) renforcent la connexion entre les citoyens et leurs eurodéputés ainsi que le taux de participation aux élections européennes.
- 26 October 2009
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Politique européenne
- Vol. n° 28 (2) , 37-52
Could changing the electoral rules fix European parliament elections ?
Une révision des règles électorales pourrait-elle rendre les élections européennes plus attractives ? Les élections européennes n’ont pas réussi à établir une connexion électorale entre les citoyens européens et la vie politique au niveau européen. La modification du système électoral pourrait-elle résoudre ce problème ? Nous pensons que cela est possible, en tout cas partiellement. La modification des règles électorales ne résoudrait pas l’ensemble des problèmes auxquels est confronté le Parlement européen. Cependant, l’analyse des élections passées conduit à suggérer que des circonscriptions relativement petites et des listes électorales ouvertes (qui autoriseraient les citoyens à voter pour des candidats spécifiques) renforcent la connexion entre les citoyens et leurs eurodéputés ainsi que le taux de participation aux élections européennes.
- 3 November 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 15 (8) , 1205-1221
Parties in the Council?
Ideology is widely seen as a powerful explanatory force of behaviour in collective decision-making. Yet, research on the Council of the European Union, the chief legislative body in the European Union, has only recently started to pay attention to ideology. We investigate to what extent formal position-taking can be explained by the ideological party affiliation of the governing parties. The focus is twofold. First, can aggregated coalition patterns be explained by ideological party affiliation? Second, do countries change coalition partners when there is a change of parties in government?
- 3 November 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 15 (8) , 1205-1221
Parties in the Council?
Ideology is widely seen as a powerful explanatory force of behaviour in collective decision-making. Yet, research on the Council of the European Union, the chief legislative body in the European Union, has only recently started to pay attention to ideology. We investigate to what extent formal position-taking can be explained by the ideological party affiliation of the governing parties. The focus is twofold. First, can aggregated coalition patterns be explained by ideological party affiliation? Second, do countries change coalition partners when there is a change of parties in government?
- 1 January 2008
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 36-63
Voting, Statements and Coalition-Building in the Council from 1999 to 2006
- 1 January 2008
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 36-63
Voting, Statements and Coalition-Building in the Council from 1999 to 2006