Balázs Király
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Balázs Király has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- György Szabó
HUN-REN Centre for Energy Research
4 shared publications György Szabó
2 shared publications- András Simonovits
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
1 shared publication B. Szőts
University of Pecs, Pecs, Hungary
1 shared publication- Bálint Molics
Department of Sport Physiotherapy, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Pécs, Pécs, Hungary
1 shared publication Hugo Fort
Institute of Physics, Faculty of Science, Universidad de la Republica Uruguay, Montevideo, Montevideo, URUGUAY
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 October 2026
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 114 (4) , 044302
Coevolution of strategies and interactions in donation games on a square lattice
The coevolution of strategies and interactions is investigated with players located on a square lattice with interactions between first and second neighbors. The pair interactions are described by two-strategy (cooperation or defection) donation games with variable cost and benefit parameters for each player. During the evolutionary process, the players can adopt strategy or payoff parameters from one of their neighbors with a payoff-dependent probability. Numerical simulations indicate the formation of homogeneous defection or cooperation depending on the initial strategy and payoff distributions. The introduction of weak and rare mutations in the payoff adoption proves beneficial for the cooperative state, in which it increases the average payoff linearly in time. In contrast, the population cannot capitalize on the possibility of innovations in its defective state.
- 1 October 2026
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 114 (4) , 044302
Coevolution of strategies and interactions in donation games on a square lattice
The coevolution of strategies and interactions is investigated with players located on a square lattice with interactions between first and second neighbors. The pair interactions are described by two-strategy (cooperation or defection) donation games with variable cost and benefit parameters for each player. During the evolutionary process, the players can adopt strategy or payoff parameters from one of their neighbors with a payoff-dependent probability. Numerical simulations indicate the formation of homogeneous defection or cooperation depending on the initial strategy and payoff distributions. The introduction of weak and rare mutations in the payoff adoption proves beneficial for the cooperative state, in which it increases the average payoff linearly in time. In contrast, the population cannot capitalize on the possibility of innovations in its defective state.
- 26 December 2025
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 112 (6) , 064317
Derivation of potential for group interactions in evolutionary games
For spatial evolutionary games, a potential can be derived if the interaction is described by two-player, two-strategy, symmetric games that yield thermodynamical behavior for a suitable dynamical rule. Here, we show the existence of a potential for two-strategy group interactions in which the players with identical strategies receive equal payoffs. This type of group interaction includes some extended versions of the public goods game. Some peculiar consequences of these group interactions are illustrated in a simple model in which the players are located at the sites of a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. This five-player group interaction supports the formation of striplike arrangements of the two strategies. Monte Carlo simulations, however, indicate the existence of many other ground states and the relevance of frustration in shaping the macroscopic behavior when the effect of noise is taken into consideration.
- 26 December 2025
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 112 (6) , 064317
Derivation of potential for group interactions in evolutionary games
For spatial evolutionary games, a potential can be derived if the interaction is described by two-player, two-strategy, symmetric games that yield thermodynamical behavior for a suitable dynamical rule. Here, we show the existence of a potential for two-strategy group interactions in which the players with identical strategies receive equal payoffs. This type of group interaction includes some extended versions of the public goods game. Some peculiar consequences of these group interactions are illustrated in a simple model in which the players are located at the sites of a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. This five-player group interaction supports the formation of striplike arrangements of the two strategies. Monte Carlo simulations, however, indicate the existence of many other ground states and the relevance of frustration in shaping the macroscopic behavior when the effect of noise is taken into consideration.
- Open Access
- 23 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
- Vol. 677
Orthogonal elementary interactions for bimatrix games
- 23 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
- Vol. 677
Open AccessOrthogonal elementary interactions for bimatrix games
- 22 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Physics Letters A
- Vol. 502
A tensor renormalization group analysis of an evolutionary game of competing Ising and Potts subgames
- 22 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Physics Letters A
- Vol. 502
A tensor renormalization group analysis of an evolutionary game of competing Ising and Potts subgames
- 14 October 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
- Vol. 630
A tensor renormalization group analysis of the Blume–Capel model inspired by game theory
- 14 October 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
- Vol. 630
A tensor renormalization group analysis of the Blume–Capel model inspired by game theory
- 15 March 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
- Vol. 617
Quantification and statistical analysis of topological features of recursive trees
- 15 March 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
- Vol. 617
Quantification and statistical analysis of topological features of recursive trees
- 1 April 2022
- Published by IOP Publishing in Europhysics Letters
- Vol. 138 (2) , 22003
A game-theory–inspired decomposition of interspecific interaction matrices
In evolutionary game theory, pair interactions are usually defined through so-called payoff matrices, which can be decomposed as linear combinations of basis matrices that represent just four different orthogonal interaction types. In this paper, we take the first steps in exploring the utility of this decomposition in ecology. We introduce the componental cosines of the irrelevant, external, coordination, and conflict components of matrices to measure the relative weight of the different interaction types, and use them to analyse the composition of 33 experimentally obtained interspecific interaction matrices compiled from the literature, which reveals statistically significant correlations both between different components and some components and community productivity and biodiversity.
- 1 April 2022
- Published by IOP Publishing in Europhysics Letters
- Vol. 138 (2) , 22003
A game-theory–inspired decomposition of interspecific interaction matrices
In evolutionary game theory, pair interactions are usually defined through so-called payoff matrices, which can be decomposed as linear combinations of basis matrices that represent just four different orthogonal interaction types. In this paper, we take the first steps in exploring the utility of this decomposition in ecology. We introduce the componental cosines of the irrelevant, external, coordination, and conflict components of matrices to measure the relative weight of the different interaction types, and use them to analyse the composition of 33 experimentally obtained interspecific interaction matrices compiled from the literature, which reveals statistically significant correlations both between different components and some components and community productivity and biodiversity.
- Open Access
- 17 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The European Physical Journal B
- Vol. 94 (5) , 1-9
General features of Nash equilibria in combinations of elementary interactions in symmetric two-person games
Two-person games are used in many multi-agent mathematical models to describe pair interactions. The type (pure or mixed) and the number of Nash equilibria affect fundamentally the macroscopic behavior of these systems. In this paper, the general features of Nash equilibria are investigated systematically within the framework of matrix decomposition for n strategies. This approach distinguishes four types of elementary interactions that each possess fundamentally different characteristics. The possible Nash equilibria are discussed separately for different types of interactions and also for their combinations. A relation is established between the existence of infinitely many mixed Nash equilibria and the zero-eigenvalue eigenvectors of the payoff matrix.
- 17 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The European Physical Journal B
- Vol. 94 (5) , 1-9
Open AccessGeneral features of Nash equilibria in combinations of elementary interactions in symmetric two-person games
Two-person games are used in many multi-agent mathematical models to describe pair interactions. The type (pure or mixed) and the number of Nash equilibria affect fundamentally the macroscopic behavior of these systems. In this paper, the general features of Nash equilibria are investigated systematically within the framework of matrix decomposition for n strategies. This approach distinguishes four types of elementary interactions that each possess fundamentally different characteristics. The possible Nash equilibria are discussed separately for different types of interactions and also for their combinations. A relation is established between the existence of infinitely many mixed Nash equilibria and the zero-eigenvalue eigenvectors of the payoff matrix.
- 14 March 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
- Vol. 14 (1) , 121-145
Learning to save in a voluntary pension system: toward an agent-based model
- 14 March 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
- Vol. 14 (1) , 121-145
Learning to save in a voluntary pension system: toward an agent-based model