Yuriy S. Polyakov
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yuriy S. Polyakov has a total of 190 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Serge F. Timashev
14 shared publications- Kurt Rohloff
New Jersey Institute of Technology
11 shared publications - Ahmad Al Badawi
Duality Technologies
6 shared publications S. F. Timashev
Russian Academy of Sciences
6 shared publicationsD. A. Kazenin
Moscow State University of Environmental Engineering
4 shared publicationsIbrahim Musaev
USPolyResearch, 906 Spruce St, Ashland, PA, USA
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 January 2026
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2026 (1) , 559-591
Evaluating Larger Lookup Tables using CKKS
The Cheon–Kim–Kim–Song (CKKS) scheme is a fully homomorphic encryption scheme that traditionally supports only the evaluation of smooth functions. Recent works have enabled the evaluation of arbitrary (discontinuous) integer functions represented as lookup tables (LUT) on small inputs using the method of functional bootstrapping (FBT). Although well-suited for small integers (up to around 10 bits), the efficiency of FBT quickly declines for large LUTs, and a considerable increase in both runtime and memory requirements is observed. Building on CKKS functional bootstrapping, we propose in this paper two functional bootstrapping algorithms, specifically designed to target larger LUTs (up to 20 bits). For a 16-bit LUT, our implementation in OpenFHE achieves a speed-up of 47.5 in amortized time and 95.1 in latency for single-threaded execution, compared to the state-of-the-art CKKS-based functional bootstrapping method of Alexandru et al. (CRYPTO’25).
- 16 January 2026
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
- Vol. 2026 (1) , 559-591
Open AccessEvaluating Larger Lookup Tables using CKKS
The Cheon–Kim–Kim–Song (CKKS) scheme is a fully homomorphic encryption scheme that traditionally supports only the evaluation of smooth functions. Recent works have enabled the evaluation of arbitrary (discontinuous) integer functions represented as lookup tables (LUT) on small inputs using the method of functional bootstrapping (FBT). Although well-suited for small integers (up to around 10 bits), the efficiency of FBT quickly declines for large LUTs, and a considerable increase in both runtime and memory requirements is observed. Building on CKKS functional bootstrapping, we propose in this paper two functional bootstrapping algorithms, specifically designed to target larger LUTs (up to 20 bits). For a 16-bit LUT, our implementation in OpenFHE achieves a speed-up of 47.5 in amortized time and 95.1 in latency for single-threaded execution, compared to the state-of-the-art CKKS-based functional bootstrapping method of Alexandru et al. (CRYPTO’25).
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 8 January 2026
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 2 (4)
Application-Aware Approximate Homomorphic Encryption
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a powerful tool for performing computations on encrypted data. The Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) scheme, an instantiation of approximate FHE, is particularly effective for privacy-preserving machine learning applications over real and complex numbers. Although CKKS offers clear efficiency advantages, confusion persists around accurately describing applications in FHE libraries and securely instantiating the scheme for these applications, particularly after the key recovery attacks by Li and Micciancio (EUROCRYPT'21) for the IND-CPA^D setting. There is presently a gap between the application-agnostic, generic definition of IND-CPA^D, and efficient, application-specific instantiation of CKKS in software libraries, which led to recent attacks by Guo et al. (USENIX Security'24). To close this gap, we introduce the notion of application-aware homomorphic encryption (AAHE) and devise related security definitions. This model corresponds more closely to how FHE schemes are implemented and used in practice, and provides a mechanism to identify and address potential vulnerabilities in popular libraries. We then propose an application specification language (ASL) and formulate guidelines for implementing the AAHE model to achieve IND-IND-CPA^D security for practical applications of CKKS. We present a proof-of-concept implementation of the ASL in the OpenFHE library showing how the attacks by Guo et al. can be countered. Moreover, we show that our new model and ASL can be used for the secure and efficient instantiation of exact FHE schemes and to counter the recent IND-IND-CPA^D attacks by Cheon et al. (CCS'24) and Checri et al. (CRYPTO'24).
- 8 January 2026
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 2 (4)
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessApplication-Aware Approximate Homomorphic Encryption
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a powerful tool for performing computations on encrypted data. The Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) scheme, an instantiation of approximate FHE, is particularly effective for privacy-preserving machine learning applications over real and complex numbers. Although CKKS offers clear efficiency advantages, confusion persists around accurately describing applications in FHE libraries and securely instantiating the scheme for these applications, particularly after the key recovery attacks by Li and Micciancio (EUROCRYPT'21) for the IND-CPA^D setting. There is presently a gap between the application-agnostic, generic definition of IND-CPA^D, and efficient, application-specific instantiation of CKKS in software libraries, which led to recent attacks by Guo et al. (USENIX Security'24). To close this gap, we introduce the notion of application-aware homomorphic encryption (AAHE) and devise related security definitions. This model corresponds more closely to how FHE schemes are implemented and used in practice, and provides a mechanism to identify and address potential vulnerabilities in popular libraries. We then propose an application specification language (ASL) and formulate guidelines for implementing the AAHE model to achieve IND-IND-CPA^D security for practical applications of CKKS. We present a proof-of-concept implementation of the ASL in the OpenFHE library showing how the attacks by Guo et al. can be countered. Moreover, we show that our new model and ASL can be used for the secure and efficient instantiation of exact FHE schemes and to counter the recent IND-IND-CPA^D attacks by Cheon et al. (CCS'24) and Checri et al. (CRYPTO'24).
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4926-4927
WAHC 2025: 13th Workshop on Encrypted Computing & Applied Homomorphic Cryptography
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 4926-4927
Open AccessWAHC 2025: 13th Workshop on Encrypted Computing & Applied Homomorphic Cryptography
- Open Access
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 68-76
FHERMA Cookbook: FHE Components for Privacy-Preserving Applications
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 68-76
Open AccessFHERMA Cookbook: FHE Components for Privacy-Preserving Applications
- Open Access
- 19 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Computer Physics Communications
- Vol. 318
Secure numerical simulations using fully homomorphic encryption
- 19 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Computer Physics Communications
- Vol. 318
Open AccessSecure numerical simulations using fully homomorphic encryption
- 24 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 96-115
Encrypt What Matters: Selective Model Encryption for More Efficient Secure Federated Learning
- 24 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 96-115
Encrypt What Matters: Selective Model Encryption for More Efficient Secure Federated Learning
- Open Access
- 8 April 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 2 (1)
HRA-Secure Homomorphic Lattice-Based Proxy Re-Encryption with Tight Security
We construct an efficient proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme secure against honest re-encryption attacks (HRA-secure) with precise concrete security estimates. To get these precise concrete security estimates, we introduce the tight, fine-grained noise-flooding techniques of Li et al. (CRYPTO'22) to RLWE-based (homomorphic) PRE schemes, as well as a mixed statistical-computational security definition to HRA security analysis. Our solution also supports homomorphic operations on the ciphertexts. Such homomorphism allows for advanced applications, e.g., encrypted computation of network statistics across networks, and unlimited hops in the case of full homomorphism, i.e., when bootstrapping is available. We implement our PRE scheme in the OpenFHE software library and apply it to a problem of secure multi-hop data distribution in the context of 5G virtual network slices. We also experimentally evaluate the performance of our scheme, demonstrating that the implementation is practical. Moreover, we compare our PRE method with other lattice-based PRE schemes and approaches targeting HRA security. These achieve HRA security, but not in a tight, practical scheme such as our work. Further, we present an attack on the PRE scheme proposed in Davidson et al.'s (ACISP'19), which was claimed to achieve HRA security without noise flooding, i.e., without adding large noise.
- 8 April 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 2 (1)
Open AccessHRA-Secure Homomorphic Lattice-Based Proxy Re-Encryption with Tight Security
We construct an efficient proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme secure against honest re-encryption attacks (HRA-secure) with precise concrete security estimates. To get these precise concrete security estimates, we introduce the tight, fine-grained noise-flooding techniques of Li et al. (CRYPTO'22) to RLWE-based (homomorphic) PRE schemes, as well as a mixed statistical-computational security definition to HRA security analysis. Our solution also supports homomorphic operations on the ciphertexts. Such homomorphism allows for advanced applications, e.g., encrypted computation of network statistics across networks, and unlimited hops in the case of full homomorphism, i.e., when bootstrapping is available. We implement our PRE scheme in the OpenFHE software library and apply it to a problem of secure multi-hop data distribution in the context of 5G virtual network slices. We also experimentally evaluate the performance of our scheme, demonstrating that the implementation is practical. Moreover, we compare our PRE method with other lattice-based PRE schemes and approaches targeting HRA security. These achieve HRA security, but not in a tight, practical scheme such as our work. Further, we present an attack on the PRE scheme proposed in Davidson et al.'s (ACISP'19), which was claimed to achieve HRA security without noise flooding, i.e., without adding large noise.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 13 January 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (4)
Security Guidelines for Implementing Homomorphic Encryption
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a cryptographic primitive that allows performing arbitrary operations on encrypted data. Since the conception of the idea in [RAD78], it has been considered a holy grail of cryptography. After the first construction in 2009 [Gen09], it has evolved to become a practical primitive with strong security guarantees. Most modern constructions are based on well-known lattice problems such as Learning With Errors (LWE). Besides its academic appeal, in recent years FHE has also attracted significant attention from industry, thanks to its applicability to a considerable number of real-world use-cases. An upcoming standardization effort by ISO/IEC aims to support the wider adoption of these techniques. However, one of the main challenges that standards bodies, developers, and end users usually encounter is establishing parameters. This is particularly hard in the case of FHE because the parameters are not only related to the security level of the system, but also to the type of operations that the system is able to handle. In this paper we provide examples of parameter sets for LWE targeting particular security levels, that can be used in the context of FHE constructions. We also give examples of complete FHE parameter sets, including the parameters relevant for correctness and performance, alongside those relevant for security. As an additional contribution, we survey the parameter selection support offered in open-source FHE libraries.
- 13 January 2025
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (4)
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessSecurity Guidelines for Implementing Homomorphic Encryption
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a cryptographic primitive that allows performing arbitrary operations on encrypted data. Since the conception of the idea in [RAD78], it has been considered a holy grail of cryptography. After the first construction in 2009 [Gen09], it has evolved to become a practical primitive with strong security guarantees. Most modern constructions are based on well-known lattice problems such as Learning With Errors (LWE). Besides its academic appeal, in recent years FHE has also attracted significant attention from industry, thanks to its applicability to a considerable number of real-world use-cases. An upcoming standardization effort by ISO/IEC aims to support the wider adoption of these techniques. However, one of the main challenges that standards bodies, developers, and end users usually encounter is establishing parameters. This is particularly hard in the case of FHE because the parameters are not only related to the security level of the system, but also to the type of operations that the system is able to handle. In this paper we provide examples of parameter sets for LWE targeting particular security levels, that can be used in the context of FHE constructions. We also give examples of complete FHE parameter sets, including the parameters relevant for correctness and performance, alongside those relevant for security. As an additional contribution, we survey the parameter selection support offered in open-source FHE libraries.
- Open Access
Investigating Privacy Attacks in the Gray-Box Setting to Enhance Collaborative Learning Schemes
The notion that collaborative machine learning can ensure privacy by just withholding the raw data is widely acknowledged to be flawed. Over the past seven years, the literature has revealed several privacy attacks that enable adversaries to extract information about a model's training dataset by exploiting access to model parameters during or after training. In this work, we study privacy attacks in the gray-box setting, where the attacker has only limited access - in terms of view and actions - to the model. The findings of our investigation provide new insights for the development of privacy-preserving collaborative learning solutions. We deploy SmartCryptNN, a framework that tailors homomorphic encryption to protect the portions of the model posing higher privacy risks. Our solution offers a trade-off between privacy and efficiency, which varies based on the extent and selection of the model components we choose to protect. We explore it on dense neural networks, where through extensive evaluation of diverse datasets and architectures, we uncover instances where a favorable sweet spot in the trade-off can be achieved by safeguarding only a single layer of the network. In one of such instances, our approach trains ~4 times faster compared to fully encrypted solutions, while reducing membership leakage by 17.8 times compared to plaintext solutions.
Open AccessInvestigating Privacy Attacks in the Gray-Box Setting to Enhance Collaborative Learning Schemes
The notion that collaborative machine learning can ensure privacy by just withholding the raw data is widely acknowledged to be flawed. Over the past seven years, the literature has revealed several privacy attacks that enable adversaries to extract information about a model's training dataset by exploiting access to model parameters during or after training. In this work, we study privacy attacks in the gray-box setting, where the attacker has only limited access - in terms of view and actions - to the model. The findings of our investigation provide new insights for the development of privacy-preserving collaborative learning solutions. We deploy SmartCryptNN, a framework that tailors homomorphic encryption to protect the portions of the model posing higher privacy risks. Our solution offers a trade-off between privacy and efficiency, which varies based on the extent and selection of the model components we choose to protect. We explore it on dense neural networks, where through extensive evaluation of diverse datasets and architectures, we uncover instances where a favorable sweet spot in the trade-off can be achieved by safeguarding only a single layer of the network. In one of such instances, our approach trains ~4 times faster compared to fully encrypted solutions, while reducing membership leakage by 17.8 times compared to plaintext solutions.
- Open Access
- 7 August 2023
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 120 (33)
Collaborative privacy-preserving analysis of oncological data using multiparty homomorphic encryption
Real-world healthcare data sharing is instrumental in constructing broader-based and larger clinical datasets that may improve clinical decision-making research and outcomes. Stakeholders are frequently reluctant to share their data without guaranteed patient privacy, proper protection of their datasets, and control over the usage of their data. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a cryptographic capability that can address these issues by enabling computation on encrypted data without intermediate decryptions, so the analytics results are obtained without revealing the raw data. This work presents a toolset for collaborative privacy-preserving analysis of oncological data using multiparty FHE. Our toolset supports survival analysis, logistic regression training, and several common descriptive statistics. We demonstrate using oncological datasets that the toolset achieves high accuracy and practical performance, which scales well to larger datasets. As part of this work, we propose a cryptographic protocol for interactive bootstrapping in multiparty FHE, which is of independent interest. The toolset we develop is general-purpose and can be applied to other collaborative medical and healthcare application domains.
- 7 August 2023
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 120 (33)
Open AccessCollaborative privacy-preserving analysis of oncological data using multiparty homomorphic encryption
Real-world healthcare data sharing is instrumental in constructing broader-based and larger clinical datasets that may improve clinical decision-making research and outcomes. Stakeholders are frequently reluctant to share their data without guaranteed patient privacy, proper protection of their datasets, and control over the usage of their data. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a cryptographic capability that can address these issues by enabling computation on encrypted data without intermediate decryptions, so the analytics results are obtained without revealing the raw data. This work presents a toolset for collaborative privacy-preserving analysis of oncological data using multiparty FHE. Our toolset supports survival analysis, logistic regression training, and several common descriptive statistics. We demonstrate using oncological datasets that the toolset achieves high accuracy and practical performance, which scales well to larger datasets. As part of this work, we propose a cryptographic protocol for interactive bootstrapping in multiparty FHE, which is of independent interest. The toolset we develop is general-purpose and can be applied to other collaborative medical and healthcare application domains.