Stephen M. Casner
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Stephen M. Casner has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jonathan W. Schooler
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA
3 shared publicationsEdwin L. Hutchins
University of California San Diego, USA
2 shared publicationsErin C. Neville
San José State University Research Foundation , San José , California , USA
2 shared publicationsRichard W. Geven
San José State University Research Foundation, Moffett Field, California
2 shared publicationsClayton Lewis
1 shared publicationDon Norman
University of California, San Diego
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 25 June 2021
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 372 (6549) , 1400
Cultivating discerning citizens Science Denial: Why It Happens and What to Do About It Gale M. Sinatra and Barbara K. Hofer Oxford University Press, 2021. 208 pp.
"Are vaccines safe for my baby?" wonders a new mother. After reading a few articles online that seem authoritative, she steps away from the computer and decides that there is not enough evidence to answer her question definitively. This scenario appears in the first of many vignettes in Science Denial that educational psychologists Gale Sinatra and Barbara Hofer use to confront a worrisome problem that extends beyond ideological science denial itself: the denial of science to those who seek credible information and who are often in great need of it.
- 25 June 2021
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 372 (6549) , 1400
Cultivating discerning citizens Science Denial: Why It Happens and What to Do About It Gale M. Sinatra and Barbara K. Hofer Oxford University Press, 2021. 208 pp.
"Are vaccines safe for my baby?" wonders a new mother. After reading a few articles online that seem authoritative, she steps away from the computer and decides that there is not enough evidence to answer her question definitively. This scenario appears in the first of many vignettes in Science Denial that educational psychologists Gale Sinatra and Barbara Hofer use to confront a worrisome problem that extends beyond ideological science denial itself: the denial of science to those who seek credible information and who are often in great need of it.
- Open Access
- 8 March 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making
- Vol. 13 (2) , 55-66
What Do We Tell the Drivers? Toward Minimum Driver Training Standards for Partially Automated Cars
Each year, millions of automobile crashes occur when drivers fail to notice and respond to conflicts with other vehicles, bicyclists, and pedestrians. Today, manufacturers race to deploy automation technologies to help eliminate these mishaps. To date, little effort has been made to educate drivers about how these systems work or how they affect driver behavior. Driver education for automated systems amounts to additional pages in an owner’s manual that is known to be a seldom-used glove box reference. In this article, we review the history of automation deployed in the airline cockpit decades ago. We describe how automation helped avoid many common crash scenarios but at the same time gave rise to new kinds of crashes. It was only following a concerted effort to educate pilots about the automation, about themselves, and about the concept of a human-automation team that we reached the near-zero crash rate we enjoy today. Drawing parallels between the automation systems, the available pilot and driver research, and operational experience in both airplanes and automobiles, we outline knowledge standards for drivers of partially automated cars and argue that the safe operation of these vehicles will be enhanced by drivers’ incorporation of this knowledge in their everyday travels.
- 8 March 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making
- Vol. 13 (2) , 55-66
Open AccessWhat Do We Tell the Drivers? Toward Minimum Driver Training Standards for Partially Automated Cars
Each year, millions of automobile crashes occur when drivers fail to notice and respond to conflicts with other vehicles, bicyclists, and pedestrians. Today, manufacturers race to deploy automation technologies to help eliminate these mishaps. To date, little effort has been made to educate drivers about how these systems work or how they affect driver behavior. Driver education for automated systems amounts to additional pages in an owner’s manual that is known to be a seldom-used glove box reference. In this article, we review the history of automation deployed in the airline cockpit decades ago. We describe how automation helped avoid many common crash scenarios but at the same time gave rise to new kinds of crashes. It was only following a concerted effort to educate pilots about the automation, about themselves, and about the concept of a human-automation team that we reached the near-zero crash rate we enjoy today. Drawing parallels between the automation systems, the available pilot and driver research, and operational experience in both airplanes and automobiles, we outline knowledge standards for drivers of partially automated cars and argue that the safe operation of these vehicles will be enhanced by drivers’ incorporation of this knowledge in their everyday travels.
- Open Access
- 26 April 2016
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Communications of the ACM
- Vol. 59 (5) , 70-77
The challenges of partially automated driving
Car automation promises to free our hands from the steering wheel but might demand more from our minds.
- 26 April 2016
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Communications of the ACM
- Vol. 59 (5) , 70-77
Open AccessThe challenges of partially automated driving
Car automation promises to free our hands from the steering wheel but might demand more from our minds.
- 1 September 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Consciousness and Cognition
- Vol. 35, 33-41
Vigilance impossible: Diligence, distraction, and daydreaming all lead to failures in a practical monitoring task
- 1 September 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Consciousness and Cognition
- Vol. 35, 33-41
Vigilance impossible: Diligence, distraction, and daydreaming all lead to failures in a practical monitoring task
- Open Access
- 26 August 2014
- Published by Purdue University (bepress) in Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering
- Vol. 4 (1) , 2
Increasing Participation in the Pilot Weather Reporting (PIREP) System Through User Interface Design
Although pilots regard pilot weather reports (PIREPs) as valuable flight planning resources, the number of PIREPs that pilots submit is relatively small. In a previous survey, pilots indicated that submitting PIREPs sometimes requires too much effort, and that they are often unable to recall the information fields required to complete a report. Pilots also indicated that the idea of submitting a PIREP often does not occur to them, and that they feel that other pilots are mainly interested in receiving reports about severe weather. In this study the authors attempt to address obstacles to submitting PIREPs by proposing two alternative designs of a cockpit PIREP interface that: (1) provides pilots with the PIREP form, (2) reduces the process of filling it out to a few button presses, and (3) includes a feature by which pilots can request specific weather reports from other pilots. The request feature reduces the decision to submit a PIREP to deciding whether or not to assist another pilot with a specific request. A series of survey questions probed pilots about how such a system would affect the volume and quality of PIREPs that are submitted.
- 26 August 2014
- Published by Purdue University (bepress) in Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering
- Vol. 4 (1) , 2
Open AccessIncreasing Participation in the Pilot Weather Reporting (PIREP) System Through User Interface Design
Although pilots regard pilot weather reports (PIREPs) as valuable flight planning resources, the number of PIREPs that pilots submit is relatively small. In a previous survey, pilots indicated that submitting PIREPs sometimes requires too much effort, and that they are often unable to recall the information fields required to complete a report. Pilots also indicated that the idea of submitting a PIREP often does not occur to them, and that they feel that other pilots are mainly interested in receiving reports about severe weather. In this study the authors attempt to address obstacles to submitting PIREPs by proposing two alternative designs of a cockpit PIREP interface that: (1) provides pilots with the PIREP form, (2) reduces the process of filling it out to a few button presses, and (3) includes a feature by which pilots can request specific weather reports from other pilots. The request feature reduces the decision to submit a PIREP to deciding whether or not to assist another pilot with a specific request. A series of survey questions probed pilots about how such a system would affect the volume and quality of PIREPs that are submitted.
- 16 May 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society
- Vol. 56 (8) , 1506-1516
The Retention of Manual Flying Skills in the Automated Cockpit
Objective: The aim of this study was to understand how the prolonged use of cockpit automation is affecting pilots’ manual flying skills. Background: There is an ongoing concern about a potential deterioration of manual flying skills among pilots who assume a supervisory role while cockpit automation systems carry out tasks that were once performed by human pilots. Method: We asked 16 airline pilots to fly routine and nonroutine flight scenarios in a Boeing 747-400 simulator while we systematically varied the level of automation that they used, graded their performance, and probed them about what they were thinking about as they flew. Results: We found pilots’ instrument scanning and manual control skills to be mostly intact, even when pilots reported that they were infrequently practiced. However, when pilots were asked to manually perform the cognitive tasks needed for manual flight (e.g., tracking the aircraft’s position without the use of a map display, deciding which navigational steps come next, recognizing instrument system failures), we observed more frequent and significant problems. Furthermore, performance on these cognitive tasks was associated with measures of how often pilots engaged in task-unrelated thought when cockpit automation was used. Conclusion: We found that while pilots’ instrument scanning and aircraft control skills are reasonably well retained when automation is used, the retention of cognitive skills needed for manual flying may depend on the degree to which pilots remain actively engaged in supervising the automation.
- 16 May 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society
- Vol. 56 (8) , 1506-1516
The Retention of Manual Flying Skills in the Automated Cockpit
Objective: The aim of this study was to understand how the prolonged use of cockpit automation is affecting pilots’ manual flying skills. Background: There is an ongoing concern about a potential deterioration of manual flying skills among pilots who assume a supervisory role while cockpit automation systems carry out tasks that were once performed by human pilots. Method: We asked 16 airline pilots to fly routine and nonroutine flight scenarios in a Boeing 747-400 simulator while we systematically varied the level of automation that they used, graded their performance, and probed them about what they were thinking about as they flew. Results: We found pilots’ instrument scanning and manual control skills to be mostly intact, even when pilots reported that they were infrequently practiced. However, when pilots were asked to manually perform the cognitive tasks needed for manual flight (e.g., tracking the aircraft’s position without the use of a map display, deciding which navigational steps come next, recognizing instrument system failures), we observed more frequent and significant problems. Furthermore, performance on these cognitive tasks was associated with measures of how often pilots engaged in task-unrelated thought when cockpit automation was used. Conclusion: We found that while pilots’ instrument scanning and aircraft control skills are reasonably well retained when automation is used, the retention of cognitive skills needed for manual flying may depend on the degree to which pilots remain actively engaged in supervising the automation.
- 7 November 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making
- Vol. 7 (4) , 309-310
Guest Editor’s Introduction to the Special Issue on Humans and Automation: Next Steps
- 7 November 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making
- Vol. 7 (4) , 309-310
Guest Editor’s Introduction to the Special Issue on Humans and Automation: Next Steps
- Open Access
- 20 August 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society
- Vol. 56 (3) , 433-442
Thoughts in Flight
Objective: The objective was to examine the relationship between cockpit automation use and task-related and task-unrelated thought among airline pilots. Background: Studies find that cockpit automation can sometimes relieve pilots of tedious control tasks and afford them more time to think ahead. Paradoxically, automation has also been shown to lead to lesser awareness. These results prompt the question of what pilots think about while using automation. Method: A total of 18 airline pilots flew a Boeing 747-400 simulator while we recorded which of two levels of automation they used. As they worked, pilots were verbally probed about what they were thinking. Pilots were asked to categorize their thoughts as pertaining to (a) a specific task at hand, (b) higher-level flight-related thoughts (e.g., planning ahead), or (c) thoughts unrelated to the flight. Pilots’ performance was also measured. Results: Pilots reported a smaller percentage of task-at-hand thoughts (27% vs. 50%) and a greater percentage of higher-level flight-related thoughts (56% vs. 29%) when using the higher level of automation. However, when all was going according to plan, using either level of automation, pilots also reported a higher percentage of task-unrelated thoughts (21%) than they did when in the midst of an unsuccessful performance (7%). Task-unrelated thoughts peaked at 25% when pilots were not interacting with the automation. Conclusion: Although cockpit automation may provide pilots with more time to think, it may encourage pilots to reinvest only some of this mental free time in thinking flight-related thoughts. Application: This research informs the design of human–automation systems that more meaningfully engage the human operator.
- 20 August 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society
- Vol. 56 (3) , 433-442
Open AccessThoughts in Flight
Objective: The objective was to examine the relationship between cockpit automation use and task-related and task-unrelated thought among airline pilots. Background: Studies find that cockpit automation can sometimes relieve pilots of tedious control tasks and afford them more time to think ahead. Paradoxically, automation has also been shown to lead to lesser awareness. These results prompt the question of what pilots think about while using automation. Method: A total of 18 airline pilots flew a Boeing 747-400 simulator while we recorded which of two levels of automation they used. As they worked, pilots were verbally probed about what they were thinking. Pilots were asked to categorize their thoughts as pertaining to (a) a specific task at hand, (b) higher-level flight-related thoughts (e.g., planning ahead), or (c) thoughts unrelated to the flight. Pilots’ performance was also measured. Results: Pilots reported a smaller percentage of task-at-hand thoughts (27% vs. 50%) and a greater percentage of higher-level flight-related thoughts (56% vs. 29%) when using the higher level of automation. However, when all was going according to plan, using either level of automation, pilots also reported a higher percentage of task-unrelated thoughts (21%) than they did when in the midst of an unsuccessful performance (7%). Task-unrelated thoughts peaked at 25% when pilots were not interacting with the automation. Conclusion: Although cockpit automation may provide pilots with more time to think, it may encourage pilots to reinvest only some of this mental free time in thinking flight-related thoughts. Application: This research informs the design of human–automation systems that more meaningfully engage the human operator.
- Open Access
- 26 November 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society
- Vol. 55 (3) , 477-485
The Effectiveness of Airline Pilot Training for Abnormal Events
Objective: To evaluate the effectiveness of airline pilot training for abnormal in-flight events. Background: Numerous accident reports describe situations in which pilots responded to abnormal events in ways that were different from what they had practiced many times before. One explanation for these missteps is that training and testing for these skills have become a highly predictable routine for pilots who arrive to the training environment well aware of what to expect. Under these circumstances, pilots get plentiful practice in responding to abnormal events but may get little practice in recognizing them and deciding which responses to offer. Method: We presented 18 airline pilots with three abnormal events that are required during periodic training and testing. Pilots were presented with each event under the familiar circumstances used during training and also under less predictable circumstances as they might occur during flight. Results: When presented in the routine ways seen during training, pilots gave appropriate responses and showed little variability. However, when the abnormal events were presented unexpectedly, pilots’ responses were less appropriate and showed great variability from pilot to pilot. Conclusion: The results suggest that the training and testing practices used in airline training may result in rote-memorized skills that are specific to the training situation and that offer modest generalizability to other situations. We recommend a more complete treatment of abnormal events that allows pilots to practice recognizing the event and choosing and recalling the appropriate response. Application: The results will aid the improvement of existing airline training practices.
- 26 November 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society
- Vol. 55 (3) , 477-485
Open AccessThe Effectiveness of Airline Pilot Training for Abnormal Events
Objective: To evaluate the effectiveness of airline pilot training for abnormal in-flight events. Background: Numerous accident reports describe situations in which pilots responded to abnormal events in ways that were different from what they had practiced many times before. One explanation for these missteps is that training and testing for these skills have become a highly predictable routine for pilots who arrive to the training environment well aware of what to expect. Under these circumstances, pilots get plentiful practice in responding to abnormal events but may get little practice in recognizing them and deciding which responses to offer. Method: We presented 18 airline pilots with three abnormal events that are required during periodic training and testing. Pilots were presented with each event under the familiar circumstances used during training and also under less predictable circumstances as they might occur during flight. Results: When presented in the routine ways seen during training, pilots gave appropriate responses and showed little variability. However, when the abnormal events were presented unexpectedly, pilots’ responses were less appropriate and showed great variability from pilot to pilot. Conclusion: The results suggest that the training and testing practices used in airline training may result in rote-memorized skills that are specific to the training situation and that offer modest generalizability to other situations. We recommend a more complete treatment of abnormal events that allows pilots to practice recognizing the event and choosing and recalling the appropriate response. Application: The results will aid the improvement of existing airline training practices.
- 11 October 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Journal of Aviation Psychology
- Vol. 22 (4) , 367-381
Pilots as Weather Briefers: The Direct Use of Aviation Weather Products by General Aviation Pilots
When planning a flight, pilots have traditionally consulted with trained weather briefers who gather, select, review, and to some extent interpret aviation weather products for them. Today, pilots can directly access these same weather products from their own computers, aircraft cockpits, and mobile devices, and choose to skip the services offered by weather briefers. A sample of 191 general aviation pilots completed a survey designed to determine how frequently they directly access weather products, how frequently they still consult with weather briefers, and which weather products pilots use and why. We identified a subset of surveyed pilots who usually or always rely solely on directly accessed weather products (approximately 25%). Although these self-briefing pilots trend toward holding higher grades of pilot certificates and make greater use of cockpit weather systems, they do not differ from other pilots in the weather products they review, and they prefer simple weather observations to more complex forecasts and descriptions of larger weather systems such as fronts and pressure regions. We explore the reasons why self-briefing pilots choose to review the products they do, and how the next generation of pilots might best be trained and supported.
- 11 October 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Journal of Aviation Psychology
- Vol. 22 (4) , 367-381
Pilots as Weather Briefers: The Direct Use of Aviation Weather Products by General Aviation Pilots
When planning a flight, pilots have traditionally consulted with trained weather briefers who gather, select, review, and to some extent interpret aviation weather products for them. Today, pilots can directly access these same weather products from their own computers, aircraft cockpits, and mobile devices, and choose to skip the services offered by weather briefers. A sample of 191 general aviation pilots completed a survey designed to determine how frequently they directly access weather products, how frequently they still consult with weather briefers, and which weather products pilots use and why. We identified a subset of surveyed pilots who usually or always rely solely on directly accessed weather products (approximately 25%). Although these self-briefing pilots trend toward holding higher grades of pilot certificates and make greater use of cockpit weather systems, they do not differ from other pilots in the weather products they review, and they prefer simple weather observations to more complex forecasts and descriptions of larger weather systems such as fronts and pressure regions. We explore the reasons why self-briefing pilots choose to review the products they do, and how the next generation of pilots might best be trained and supported.