Can Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Can Zhang has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Turgay Ayer
H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial & Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332
4 shared publications - Atalay Atasu
INSEAD
3 shared publications Chelsea C. White
H. Milton Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332
2 shared publications- L. Beril Toktay
Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30308
2 shared publications Anne C. Spaulding
Rollins School of Public Health, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia 30322
1 shared publicationAnthony Bonifonte
Data Analytics Program, Denison University, Granville, Ohio 43023
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 28 (6) , 1785-1803
Sharing Platforms in Emerging Markets: The Role of Human Intermediaries
Problem definition: In emerging markets, sharing economy platforms that connect customers with independent service providers often operate in environments with low digital literacy and small, fragmented demand. To address these challenges, such platforms often rely on human intermediaries, known as booking agents, to collect demand from individual customers and submit the aggregated demand on the platform. The presence of such agents requires the platform to set not only the customer price and provider wage but also the agent wage to coordinate supply and demand. This paper analyzes the platform’s pricing and wage decisions and examines how the presence of booking agents affects the surplus of providers, customers, and the platform. Methodology/results: We model a platform involving providers, customers, and booking agents and characterize the platform’s optimal price, wages, and equilibrium outcomes. Our analysis yields several actionable insights. First, a larger provider pool can make it optimal for the platform to raise agent wages while lowering customer prices, even if this combination may reduce the platform’s commission. Second, platforms may find it optimal to pair surge pricing with increased agent wages and decreased provider wages, departing from the conventional strategy of pairing surge pricing with increased provider wages. Finally, whereas the presence of booking agents increases provider earnings by enabling more demand to be served, it may not always benefit customers or the platform. Nevertheless, these agents lead to a “win-win-win” outcome when agents’ demand aggregation cost is moderate or when providers incur high fixed costs in serving colocated customers. Managerial implications: Our findings highlight how platforms should respond to different supply and demand conditions in the presence of booking agents and inform when the use of booking agents generates value for all stakeholders. Our insights have informed changes in the practice of our industry partner, Hello Tractor. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1217 .
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 28 (6) , 1785-1803
Sharing Platforms in Emerging Markets: The Role of Human Intermediaries
Problem definition: In emerging markets, sharing economy platforms that connect customers with independent service providers often operate in environments with low digital literacy and small, fragmented demand. To address these challenges, such platforms often rely on human intermediaries, known as booking agents, to collect demand from individual customers and submit the aggregated demand on the platform. The presence of such agents requires the platform to set not only the customer price and provider wage but also the agent wage to coordinate supply and demand. This paper analyzes the platform’s pricing and wage decisions and examines how the presence of booking agents affects the surplus of providers, customers, and the platform. Methodology/results: We model a platform involving providers, customers, and booking agents and characterize the platform’s optimal price, wages, and equilibrium outcomes. Our analysis yields several actionable insights. First, a larger provider pool can make it optimal for the platform to raise agent wages while lowering customer prices, even if this combination may reduce the platform’s commission. Second, platforms may find it optimal to pair surge pricing with increased agent wages and decreased provider wages, departing from the conventional strategy of pairing surge pricing with increased provider wages. Finally, whereas the presence of booking agents increases provider earnings by enabling more demand to be served, it may not always benefit customers or the platform. Nevertheless, these agents lead to a “win-win-win” outcome when agents’ demand aggregation cost is moderate or when providers incur high fixed costs in serving colocated customers. Managerial implications: Our findings highlight how platforms should respond to different supply and demand conditions in the presence of booking agents and inform when the use of booking agents generates value for all stakeholders. Our insights have informed changes in the practice of our industry partner, Hello Tractor. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1217 .
- 18 September 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Index-Based Yield Protection for Smallholder Farmers
Smallholder farmers in emerging economies are vital to the global food supply, yet they remain highly vulnerable to yield risks such as extreme weather. Whereas government subsidies that compensate farmers in low-yield scenarios are common in developed countries, such policies are often impractical in emerging economies because of the high cost of assessing yields on small farms. To address this, an innovative index-based approach has gained traction, under which payments are triggered when a predetermined index (e.g., rainfall) predicts a low yield. Yet the inevitable inaccuracy of indices in reflecting actual yields weakens the alignment between payments and actual yields, reducing risk protection for farmers. This paper analyzes how governments should design yield protection subsidies under index inaccuracy. Our analysis reveals several insights. First, unlike actual yield–based policies, higher subsidies under index-based policies can inadvertently increase farmers’ income variability. Building on this, we identify a nonmonotonic relationship between the optimal subsidy and index accuracy: as accuracy improves, subsidies should initially increase but then decrease once accuracy becomes sufficiently high. Second, whereas price protection subsidies (which compensate for low prices) are often viewed as strategic substitutes for yield protection as both can increase income and incentivize planting, we show that they act as strategic complements when index accuracy is low, meaning the presence of price protection warrants a higher index-based yield protection subsidy and vice versa. Finally, when governments allocate budgets between subsidy payments and improving index accuracy, we find that tighter budgets can make it especially important to prioritize index accuracy. This paper was accepted by Christoph H. Loch, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.05008 .
- 18 September 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Index-Based Yield Protection for Smallholder Farmers
Smallholder farmers in emerging economies are vital to the global food supply, yet they remain highly vulnerable to yield risks such as extreme weather. Whereas government subsidies that compensate farmers in low-yield scenarios are common in developed countries, such policies are often impractical in emerging economies because of the high cost of assessing yields on small farms. To address this, an innovative index-based approach has gained traction, under which payments are triggered when a predetermined index (e.g., rainfall) predicts a low yield. Yet the inevitable inaccuracy of indices in reflecting actual yields weakens the alignment between payments and actual yields, reducing risk protection for farmers. This paper analyzes how governments should design yield protection subsidies under index inaccuracy. Our analysis reveals several insights. First, unlike actual yield–based policies, higher subsidies under index-based policies can inadvertently increase farmers’ income variability. Building on this, we identify a nonmonotonic relationship between the optimal subsidy and index accuracy: as accuracy improves, subsidies should initially increase but then decrease once accuracy becomes sufficiently high. Second, whereas price protection subsidies (which compensate for low prices) are often viewed as strategic substitutes for yield protection as both can increase income and incentivize planting, we show that they act as strategic complements when index accuracy is low, meaning the presence of price protection warrants a higher index-based yield protection subsidy and vice versa. Finally, when governments allocate budgets between subsidy payments and improving index accuracy, we find that tighter budgets can make it especially important to prioritize index accuracy. This paper was accepted by Christoph H. Loch, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.05008 .
- 3 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Sustainable Sourcing of Agricultural Products: Fixed vs. Flexible Premiums
Sustainability certifications have gained increasing popularity for agricultural product sourcing. To help improve smallholder farmers’ livelihoods, these certifications set a premium that firms must pay to farmers for certified crops on top of the market price. This premium can be structured in different ways: a popular approach adopted by several major certifications is called a fixed premium, under which farmers receive a fixed level of premium independent of the market price. However, this approach has been criticized for not sufficiently protecting farmers when the market price is low. Accordingly, an alternative approach called a flexible premium, under which farmers receive a higher premium when the market price is lower, has been promoted by farmer advocacy groups and recently implemented by some certifications. We analyze and compare the effectiveness of these premium approaches and offer several managerial insights. First, contrary to expectation, we show that the flexible premium approach can lead to a lower expected farmer income than the fixed premium approach. Even when a flexible premium improves farmer income, it can lead to a lower expected sustainable sourcing quantity and firm profit. Second, we nevertheless identify that a flexible premium can lead to a win–win–win outcome for farmer income, sustainable sourcing quantity, and firm profit but only in settings with ample certified supply relative to demand. Finally, motivated by the trend of firms creating their own sustainability labels, we show that such self-labeling can lead to a higher sustainable sourcing quantity but lower farmer income compared with nongovernmental organization labeling. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2025.01093 .
- 3 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Sustainable Sourcing of Agricultural Products: Fixed vs. Flexible Premiums
Sustainability certifications have gained increasing popularity for agricultural product sourcing. To help improve smallholder farmers’ livelihoods, these certifications set a premium that firms must pay to farmers for certified crops on top of the market price. This premium can be structured in different ways: a popular approach adopted by several major certifications is called a fixed premium, under which farmers receive a fixed level of premium independent of the market price. However, this approach has been criticized for not sufficiently protecting farmers when the market price is low. Accordingly, an alternative approach called a flexible premium, under which farmers receive a higher premium when the market price is lower, has been promoted by farmer advocacy groups and recently implemented by some certifications. We analyze and compare the effectiveness of these premium approaches and offer several managerial insights. First, contrary to expectation, we show that the flexible premium approach can lead to a lower expected farmer income than the fixed premium approach. Even when a flexible premium improves farmer income, it can lead to a lower expected sustainable sourcing quantity and firm profit. Second, we nevertheless identify that a flexible premium can lead to a win–win–win outcome for farmer income, sustainable sourcing quantity, and firm profit but only in settings with ample certified supply relative to demand. Finally, motivated by the trend of firms creating their own sustainability labels, we show that such self-labeling can lead to a higher sustainable sourcing quantity but lower farmer income compared with nongovernmental organization labeling. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2025.01093 .
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (6) , 2352-2370
Truncated Balancing Policy for Perishable Inventory Management: Combating High Shortage Penalties
Problem definition: Motivated by a platelet inventory management problem, we study a fixed lifetime perishable inventory management problem under a general demand process. Determining an optimal ordering policy for perishable inventory systems is particularly challenging because of the well-known “curse of dimensionality.” Approximation policies with worst-case performance bounds have been developed in the literature for perishable inventory systems. However, using real data, we observe that the existing policies tend to underorder when the unit shortage penalty is high, which is an important concern for critical perishable products, such as lifesaving blood products. We seek to address this problem in this paper. Methodology/results: We present a new approximation policy for perishable inventory systems, which we call a truncated balancing (TB) policy. In particular, we first define a new balancing ordering quantity and prove a novel lower bound on the optimal ordering quantity. We then define our TB policy such that the maximum between the balancing ordering quantity and the lower bound is ordered at each period. We prove that when first in, first out is an optimal issuing policy, (1) our proposed TB policy admits a worst-case performance bound of two, and (2) it is asymptotically optimal when the unit shortage penalty goes to infinity. Finally, we present a calibrated numerical study based on real data from our partner hospital and show that our proposed policy performs significantly better than the existing policies in practical scenarios with reasonably high shortage penalties. Managerial implications: Our analysis offers managerial insights for perishable inventory management, especially for systems with an imbalance in underage and overage cost parameters. When the unit shortage penalty is high, simply balancing the underage and overage costs can lead to underordering, whereas our proposed policy effectively addresses this drawback. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0644 .
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 25 (6) , 2352-2370
Truncated Balancing Policy for Perishable Inventory Management: Combating High Shortage Penalties
Problem definition: Motivated by a platelet inventory management problem, we study a fixed lifetime perishable inventory management problem under a general demand process. Determining an optimal ordering policy for perishable inventory systems is particularly challenging because of the well-known “curse of dimensionality.” Approximation policies with worst-case performance bounds have been developed in the literature for perishable inventory systems. However, using real data, we observe that the existing policies tend to underorder when the unit shortage penalty is high, which is an important concern for critical perishable products, such as lifesaving blood products. We seek to address this problem in this paper. Methodology/results: We present a new approximation policy for perishable inventory systems, which we call a truncated balancing (TB) policy. In particular, we first define a new balancing ordering quantity and prove a novel lower bound on the optimal ordering quantity. We then define our TB policy such that the maximum between the balancing ordering quantity and the lower bound is ordered at each period. We prove that when first in, first out is an optimal issuing policy, (1) our proposed TB policy admits a worst-case performance bound of two, and (2) it is asymptotically optimal when the unit shortage penalty goes to infinity. Finally, we present a calibrated numerical study based on real data from our partner hospital and show that our proposed policy performs significantly better than the existing policies in practical scenarios with reasonably high shortage penalties. Managerial implications: Our analysis offers managerial insights for perishable inventory management, especially for systems with an imbalance in underage and overage cost parameters. When the unit shortage penalty is high, simply balancing the underage and overage costs can lead to underordering, whereas our proposed policy effectively addresses this drawback. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0644 .
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 71 (5) , 1756-1776
Inventory Sharing for Perishable Products: Application to Platelet Inventory Management in Hospital Blood Banks
A Simple and Provably Good Inventory Policy Led to a Significant Reduction in Platelet Outdates Platelets are critical blood products. The management of platelet inventory is particularly challenging because of its perishable nature with a short shelf life. This paper studies how the wastage of platelets and, more broadly, perishable products can be reduced through inventory sharing. The authors derive structural results on the optimal ordering and transshipment policies for a two-location perishable inventory system and prove that an easy-to-implement myopic transshipment policy is optimal for a few special cases relevant to practice and serves as a lower bound on the optimal transshipment policy for more general settings. This policy has been successfully implemented by the Emory University Hospital System, which led to a reduction of approximately 20% in platelet outdates. Moreover, this paper also sheds light on how the presence of inventory sharing affects the optimal ordering quantities and provides insights that significant depart from existing findings for nonperishable inventory systems.
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 71 (5) , 1756-1776
Inventory Sharing for Perishable Products: Application to Platelet Inventory Management in Hospital Blood Banks
A Simple and Provably Good Inventory Policy Led to a Significant Reduction in Platelet Outdates Platelets are critical blood products. The management of platelet inventory is particularly challenging because of its perishable nature with a short shelf life. This paper studies how the wastage of platelets and, more broadly, perishable products can be reduced through inventory sharing. The authors derive structural results on the optimal ordering and transshipment policies for a two-location perishable inventory system and prove that an easy-to-implement myopic transshipment policy is optimal for a few special cases relevant to practice and serves as a lower bound on the optimal transshipment policy for more general settings. This policy has been successfully implemented by the Emory University Hospital System, which led to a reduction of approximately 20% in platelet outdates. Moreover, this paper also sheds light on how the presence of inventory sharing affects the optimal ordering quantities and provides insights that significant depart from existing findings for nonperishable inventory systems.
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 24 (6) , 2962-2981
Partial Completion as a Nonprofit Strategy
Problem definition: Faced with the challenge of serving beneficiaries with heterogeneous needs and under budget constraints, some nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have adopted an innovative solution: providing partially complete products or services to beneficiaries. We seek to understand what drives an NPO’s choice of partial completion as a design strategy and how it interacts with the level of variety offered in the NPO’s product or service portfolio. Academic/practical relevance: Although partial product or service provision has been observed in the nonprofit operations, there is limited understanding of when it is an appropriate strategy—a void that we seek to fill in this paper. Methodology: We synthesize the practices of two NPOs operating in different contexts to develop a stylized analytical model to study an NPO’s product/service completion and variety choices. Results: We identify when and to what extent partial completion is optimal for an NPO. We also characterize a budget allocation structure for an NPO between product/service variety and completion. Our analysis sheds light on how beneficiary characteristics (e.g., heterogeneity of their needs, capability to self-complete) and NPO objectives (e.g., total-benefit maximization versus fairness) affect the optimal levels of variety and completion. Managerial implications: We provide three key observations. (1) Partial completion is not a compromise solution to budget limitations but can be an optimal strategy for NPOs under a wide range of circumstances, even in the presence of ample resources. (2) Partial provision is particularly valuable when beneficiary needs are highly heterogeneous, or beneficiaries have high self-completion capabilities. A higher self-completion capability generally implies a lower optimal completion level; however, it may lead to either a higher or a lower optimal variety level. (3) Although providing incomplete products may appear to burden beneficiaries, a lower completion level can be optimal when fairness is factored into an NPO’s objective or when beneficiary capabilities are more heterogeneous. History: This paper has been accepted for the Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Special Section on Responsible Research in Operations Management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.1031 .
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 24 (6) , 2962-2981
Partial Completion as a Nonprofit Strategy
Problem definition: Faced with the challenge of serving beneficiaries with heterogeneous needs and under budget constraints, some nonprofit organizations (NPOs) have adopted an innovative solution: providing partially complete products or services to beneficiaries. We seek to understand what drives an NPO’s choice of partial completion as a design strategy and how it interacts with the level of variety offered in the NPO’s product or service portfolio. Academic/practical relevance: Although partial product or service provision has been observed in the nonprofit operations, there is limited understanding of when it is an appropriate strategy—a void that we seek to fill in this paper. Methodology: We synthesize the practices of two NPOs operating in different contexts to develop a stylized analytical model to study an NPO’s product/service completion and variety choices. Results: We identify when and to what extent partial completion is optimal for an NPO. We also characterize a budget allocation structure for an NPO between product/service variety and completion. Our analysis sheds light on how beneficiary characteristics (e.g., heterogeneity of their needs, capability to self-complete) and NPO objectives (e.g., total-benefit maximization versus fairness) affect the optimal levels of variety and completion. Managerial implications: We provide three key observations. (1) Partial completion is not a compromise solution to budget limitations but can be an optimal strategy for NPOs under a wide range of circumstances, even in the presence of ample resources. (2) Partial provision is particularly valuable when beneficiary needs are highly heterogeneous, or beneficiaries have high self-completion capabilities. A higher self-completion capability generally implies a lower optimal completion level; however, it may lead to either a higher or a lower optimal variety level. (3) Although providing incomplete products may appear to burden beneficiaries, a lower completion level can be optimal when fairness is factored into an NPO’s objective or when beneficiary capabilities are more heterogeneous. History: This paper has been accepted for the Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Special Section on Responsible Research in Operations Management. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.1031 .
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 24 (1) , 524-541
Extended Producer Responsibility for Pharmaceuticals
Problem definition: We investigate the effectiveness of different extended producer responsibility (EPR) implementation models for pharmaceuticals. In particular, we study two viable and prevalent models: (1) source reduction (SR), where a form of fee on sale is imposed on producers, and (2) end-of-pipe control (EC), where producers are made responsible for the collection of unused pharmaceuticals. Academic/practical relevance: The existing literature on EPR implementation models has focused primarily on nonconsumable products (e.g., electronics), whereas there is limited research on the effectiveness of different EPR implementation models for pharmaceuticals used in practice. We aim to fill this gap in this study. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model to characterize the equilibrium strategies of different stakeholders under both the SR and EC models and compare the resulting producer profit, environmental/social impact, and total welfare. Results: In contrast to the nonconsumable contexts where the SR model is shown to maximize total welfare, the EC model leads to a higher total welfare for certain categories of pharmaceuticals because of its effectiveness in eliminating overprescription. Moreover, we characterize conditions under which stakeholder (e.g., producer, environmental/social advocacy groups) preferences toward EPR implementation model choices are (mis-)aligned. We further show that limiting the social planner’s budget surplus under SR can eliminate the preference misalignment but leads to a loss of total welfare. Managerial implications: (1) Policymakers should be cautious about directly applying preferred EPR models from other product categories to the pharmaceutical setting. (2) The EC model maximizes the objectives of all stakeholders for a salient category of pharmaceuticals with high health benefits, high collection costs, and high environmental/social costs. (3) Policymakers should give thought to differentiating EPR implementation models across pharmaceutical categories. (4) It is important to carefully quantify the health impact of the pharmaceuticals and the operational cost parameters to inform policymaking.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 24 (1) , 524-541
Extended Producer Responsibility for Pharmaceuticals
Problem definition: We investigate the effectiveness of different extended producer responsibility (EPR) implementation models for pharmaceuticals. In particular, we study two viable and prevalent models: (1) source reduction (SR), where a form of fee on sale is imposed on producers, and (2) end-of-pipe control (EC), where producers are made responsible for the collection of unused pharmaceuticals. Academic/practical relevance: The existing literature on EPR implementation models has focused primarily on nonconsumable products (e.g., electronics), whereas there is limited research on the effectiveness of different EPR implementation models for pharmaceuticals used in practice. We aim to fill this gap in this study. Methodology: We develop a game-theoretic model to characterize the equilibrium strategies of different stakeholders under both the SR and EC models and compare the resulting producer profit, environmental/social impact, and total welfare. Results: In contrast to the nonconsumable contexts where the SR model is shown to maximize total welfare, the EC model leads to a higher total welfare for certain categories of pharmaceuticals because of its effectiveness in eliminating overprescription. Moreover, we characterize conditions under which stakeholder (e.g., producer, environmental/social advocacy groups) preferences toward EPR implementation model choices are (mis-)aligned. We further show that limiting the social planner’s budget surplus under SR can eliminate the preference misalignment but leads to a loss of total welfare. Managerial implications: (1) Policymakers should be cautious about directly applying preferred EPR models from other product categories to the pharmaceutical setting. (2) The EC model maximizes the objectives of all stakeholders for a salient category of pharmaceuticals with high health benefits, high collection costs, and high environmental/social costs. (3) Policymakers should give thought to differentiating EPR implementation models across pharmaceutical categories. (4) It is important to carefully quantify the health impact of the pharmaceuticals and the operational cost parameters to inform policymaking.
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 22 (4) , 735-753
Truthful Mechanisms for Medical Surplus Product Allocation
Problem definition: We analyze a resource allocation problem faced by medical surplus recovery organizations (MSROs) that recover medical surplus products to fulfill the needs of underserved healthcare facilities in developing countries. The objective of this study is to identify implementable strategies to support recipient selection decisions to improve MSROs’ value provision capability. Academic/practical relevance: MSRO supply chains face several challenges that differ from those in traditional for-profit settings, and there is a lack of both academic and practical understanding of how to better match supply with demand in this setting where recipient needs are typically private information. Methodology: We propose a mechanism design approach to determine which recipient to serve at each shipping opportunity based on recipients’ reported preference rankings of different products. Results: We find that when MSRO inventory information is shared with recipients, the only truthful mechanism is random selection among recipients, which defeats the purpose of eliciting information. Subsequently, we show that (1) eliminating inventory information provision enlarges the set of truthful mechanisms, thereby increasing the total value provision; and (2) further withholding information regarding other recipients leads to an additional increase in total value provision. Finally, we show that under a class of implementable mechanisms, eliciting recipient valuations has no value added beyond eliciting preference rankings. Managerial implications: (1) MSROs with large recipient bases and low inventory levels can significantly improve their value provision by appropriately determining the recipients to serve through a simple scoring mechanism; (2) to truthfully elicit recipient needs information to support the recipient selection decisions, MSROs should withhold inventory and recipient-base information; and (3) under a set of easy-to-implement scoring mechanisms, it is sufficient for MSROs to elicit recipients’ preference ranking information. Our findings have already led to a change in the practice of an award-winning MSRO.
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
- Vol. 22 (4) , 735-753
Truthful Mechanisms for Medical Surplus Product Allocation
Problem definition: We analyze a resource allocation problem faced by medical surplus recovery organizations (MSROs) that recover medical surplus products to fulfill the needs of underserved healthcare facilities in developing countries. The objective of this study is to identify implementable strategies to support recipient selection decisions to improve MSROs’ value provision capability. Academic/practical relevance: MSRO supply chains face several challenges that differ from those in traditional for-profit settings, and there is a lack of both academic and practical understanding of how to better match supply with demand in this setting where recipient needs are typically private information. Methodology: We propose a mechanism design approach to determine which recipient to serve at each shipping opportunity based on recipients’ reported preference rankings of different products. Results: We find that when MSRO inventory information is shared with recipients, the only truthful mechanism is random selection among recipients, which defeats the purpose of eliciting information. Subsequently, we show that (1) eliminating inventory information provision enlarges the set of truthful mechanisms, thereby increasing the total value provision; and (2) further withholding information regarding other recipients leads to an additional increase in total value provision. Finally, we show that under a class of implementable mechanisms, eliciting recipient valuations has no value added beyond eliciting preference rankings. Managerial implications: (1) MSROs with large recipient bases and low inventory levels can significantly improve their value provision by appropriately determining the recipients to serve through a simple scoring mechanism; (2) to truthfully elicit recipient needs information to support the recipient selection decisions, MSROs should withhold inventory and recipient-base information; and (3) under a set of easy-to-implement scoring mechanisms, it is sufficient for MSROs to elicit recipients’ preference ranking information. Our findings have already led to a change in the practice of an award-winning MSRO.
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 67 (3) , 853-873
Prioritizing Hepatitis C Treatment in U.S. Prisons
Hepatitis C virus (HCV) prevalence in prison systems is about 10 times higher than in the community. As such, prison systems offer a unique opportunity to control the HCV epidemic. New HCV-treatment drugs are very effective, but providing treatment to all inmates is prohibitively expensive unless prices fall. Current practice is to prioritize treatment based on disease severity and puts less emphasis on other factors such as the remaining sentence length and injection drug use behavior. In “Prioritizing Hepatitis C Treatment in U.S. Prisons,” T. Ayer, C. Zhang, A. Bonifonte, A. Spaulding, and J. Chhatwal analyze optimal approaches for treatment prioritization under resource constraints by developing a restless bandit modeling framework. They present an easy-to-implement closed-form index policy to support hepatitis C treatment prioritization decisions in U.S. prisons. They also test their proposed policy using a detailed, realistic agent-based simulation model and shed light on several controversial health policy decisions related to hepatitis C treatment prioritization.
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 67 (3) , 853-873
Prioritizing Hepatitis C Treatment in U.S. Prisons
Hepatitis C virus (HCV) prevalence in prison systems is about 10 times higher than in the community. As such, prison systems offer a unique opportunity to control the HCV epidemic. New HCV-treatment drugs are very effective, but providing treatment to all inmates is prohibitively expensive unless prices fall. Current practice is to prioritize treatment based on disease severity and puts less emphasis on other factors such as the remaining sentence length and injection drug use behavior. In “Prioritizing Hepatitis C Treatment in U.S. Prisons,” T. Ayer, C. Zhang, A. Bonifonte, A. Spaulding, and J. Chhatwal analyze optimal approaches for treatment prioritization under resource constraints by developing a restless bandit modeling framework. They present an easy-to-implement closed-form index policy to support hepatitis C treatment prioritization decisions in U.S. prisons. They also test their proposed policy using a detailed, realistic agent-based simulation model and shed light on several controversial health policy decisions related to hepatitis C treatment prioritization.