William Jack
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
William Jack has a total of 26 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- James Habyarimana
Georgetown University
2 shared publications - Antony Kariri
Department of Medical Microbiology University of Nairobi Nairobi Kenya
1 shared publication - Benson Ba Estambale
Jaramogi Oginga Odinga University of Science and Technology, P. O. Box 210-40601, Bondo, Kenya.
1 shared publication - Edward J. Mills
Department of Clinical Epidemiology & Biostatistics, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada
1 shared publication - Elizabeth Ngugi
Centre for HIV Prevention and Research, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya
1 shared publication - Francis A Plummer
National Microbiology Laboratories, Public Health Agency of Canada, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 2 March 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 90 (6) , 3153-3185
Credit Access, Selection, and Incentives in a Market for Asset-Collateralized Loans: Evidence From Kenya
We study the potential for asset collateralization to expand access to credit in rural Kenya. Increasing the share of a loan for a durable agricultural asset that is collateralized by the physical asset itself (from 0 to 96%) while reducing the share backed by financial assets increases loan take-up considerably, with only a very limited impact on repayment behavior and the lender's profitability. A Karlan–Zinman test finds evidence of small and marginally significant selection effects in some specifications but no evidence of moral hazard. We find no evidence that joint versus individual liability affects take-up or repayment. Loans had real impacts on investment, milk sales, and girls’ school enrollment. The lender, a savings and credit cooperative, responded to the study results by offering 80% asset-collateralized loans.
- 2 March 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 90 (6) , 3153-3185
Credit Access, Selection, and Incentives in a Market for Asset-Collateralized Loans: Evidence From Kenya
We study the potential for asset collateralization to expand access to credit in rural Kenya. Increasing the share of a loan for a durable agricultural asset that is collateralized by the physical asset itself (from 0 to 96%) while reducing the share backed by financial assets increases loan take-up considerably, with only a very limited impact on repayment behavior and the lender's profitability. A Karlan–Zinman test finds evidence of small and marginally significant selection effects in some specifications but no evidence of moral hazard. We find no evidence that joint versus individual liability affects take-up or repayment. Loans had real impacts on investment, milk sales, and girls’ school enrollment. The lender, a savings and credit cooperative, responded to the study results by offering 80% asset-collateralized loans.
- Open Access
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 65, 15-30
Cash on delivery: Results of a randomized experiment to promote maternal health care in Kenya
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 65, 15-30
Open AccessCash on delivery: Results of a randomized experiment to promote maternal health care in Kenya
- 10 August 2015
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 112 (34) , E4661-E4670
Results of a large-scale randomized behavior change intervention on road safety in Kenya
Significance: Road accidents kill 1.3 million people each year, most in the developing world. Evocative messages inside Kenyan matatus, or mini-buses, that promote passenger agency and legitimize complaints against dangerous driving are found to reduce average maximum speeds and average moving speeds by 1–2 km/h and insurance claims by between one-quarter and one-third. The cost-effectiveness of the most impactful stickers is between $10 and $45 per disability-adjusted life-year saved.
- 10 August 2015
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 112 (34) , E4661-E4670
Results of a large-scale randomized behavior change intervention on road safety in Kenya
Significance: Road accidents kill 1.3 million people each year, most in the developing world. Evocative messages inside Kenyan matatus, or mini-buses, that promote passenger agency and legitimize complaints against dangerous driving are found to reduce average maximum speeds and average moving speeds by 1–2 km/h and insurance claims by between one-quarter and one-third. The cost-effectiveness of the most impactful stickers is between $10 and $45 per disability-adjusted life-year saved.
- Open Access
- 22 September 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Trials
- Vol. 10 (1) , 87
The HAART cell phone adherence trial (WelTel Kenya1): a randomized controlled trial protocol
The objectives are to compare the effectiveness of cell phone-supported SMS messaging to standard care on adherence, quality of life, retention, and mortality in a population receiving antiretroviral therapy (ART) in Nairobi, Kenya.
- 22 September 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Trials
- Vol. 10 (1) , 87
Open AccessThe HAART cell phone adherence trial (WelTel Kenya1): a randomized controlled trial protocol
The objectives are to compare the effectiveness of cell phone-supported SMS messaging to standard care on adherence, quality of life, retention, and mortality in a population receiving antiretroviral therapy (ART) in Nairobi, Kenya.
- 1 January 2007
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The World Bank Economic Review
- Vol. 21 (1) , 73-91
Protecting the Vulnerable: the Tradeoff between Risk Reduction and Public Insurance
In a risky world should governments provide public goods that reduce risk or compensate the victims of bad outcomes through social insurance? This article examines a basic question in designing social protection policies: how should a government allocate a fixed budget between these two activities? In the presence of income and risk heterogeneities a simple public insurance scheme that pays a fixed benefit to all households that suffer a negative shock is an effective redistributional instrument of public policy. This is true even when a well functioning private insurance market exists, and so the role of public insurance is not to correct a market failure. In fact, the existence of a private insurance market means that the public system has desirable targeting properties—all but the poor and high-risk take up private insurance. The provision of public goods that reduce risk for all should therefore be complemented with public insurance that (automatically) benefits those who are especially vulnerable.
- 1 January 2007
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The World Bank Economic Review
- Vol. 21 (1) , 73-91
Protecting the Vulnerable: the Tradeoff between Risk Reduction and Public Insurance
In a risky world should governments provide public goods that reduce risk or compensate the victims of bad outcomes through social insurance? This article examines a basic question in designing social protection policies: how should a government allocate a fixed budget between these two activities? In the presence of income and risk heterogeneities a simple public insurance scheme that pays a fixed benefit to all households that suffer a negative shock is an effective redistributional instrument of public policy. This is true even when a well functioning private insurance market exists, and so the role of public insurance is not to correct a market failure. In fact, the existence of a private insurance market means that the public system has desirable targeting properties—all but the poor and high-risk take up private insurance. The provision of public goods that reduce risk for all should therefore be complemented with public insurance that (automatically) benefits those who are especially vulnerable.
- 1 September 2006
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 25 (5) , 908-926
Optimal risk adjustment with adverse selection and spatial competition
- 1 September 2006
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 25 (5) , 908-926
Optimal risk adjustment with adverse selection and spatial competition
- Open Access
- 1 February 2005
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The World Bank Economic Review
- Vol. 19 (1) , 45-67
Financing Pharmaceutical Innovation: How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute?
A public economics framework is used to consider how pharmaceuticals should be priced when at least some of the research and development incentive comes from sales revenues. Familiar techniques of public finance are used to relax some of the restrictions implied in the standard use of Ramsey pricing. Under the more general model, poor countries should not necessarily cover even their own marginal costs, and the pricing structure is not related to that which would be chosen by a monopolist in a simple way. This framework is then used to examine ongoing debates regarding the international patent system as embodied in the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
- 1 February 2005
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The World Bank Economic Review
- Vol. 19 (1) , 45-67
Open AccessFinancing Pharmaceutical Innovation: How Much Should Poor Countries Contribute?
A public economics framework is used to consider how pharmaceuticals should be priced when at least some of the research and development incentive comes from sales revenues. Familiar techniques of public finance are used to relax some of the restrictions implied in the standard use of Ramsey pricing. Under the more general model, poor countries should not necessarily cover even their own marginal costs, and the pricing structure is not related to that which would be chosen by a monopolist in a simple way. This framework is then used to examine ongoing debates regarding the international patent system as embodied in the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
- 1 January 2005
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 24 (1) , 73-93
Purchasing health care services from providers with unknown altruism
- 1 January 2005
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 24 (1) , 73-93
Purchasing health care services from providers with unknown altruism
- Open Access
- 1 June 2003
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Health Policy and Planning
- Vol. 18 (2) , 195-204
Contracting for health services: an evaluation of recent reforms in Nicaragua
Nicaragua has embarked on a reform of the way in which publicly provided medical care is organized and financed. A principal feature of the reforms includes a decentralization of decision-making authority coupled with an increase in local accountability. Local decision-making authority has been increased by allowing managers more freedom to allocate inputs. Accountability has been strengthened by stipulating what is expected of hospitals and health centres in the form of performance agreements, and tying rewards (i.e. bonuses) to the satisfaction of these requirements provides incentives. This paper provides a critical assessment of these reforms, and presents some early evidence of their effects.
- 1 June 2003
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Health Policy and Planning
- Vol. 18 (2) , 195-204
Open AccessContracting for health services: an evaluation of recent reforms in Nicaragua
Nicaragua has embarked on a reform of the way in which publicly provided medical care is organized and financed. A principal feature of the reforms includes a decentralization of decision-making authority coupled with an increase in local accountability. Local decision-making authority has been increased by allowing managers more freedom to allocate inputs. Accountability has been strengthened by stipulating what is expected of hospitals and health centres in the form of performance agreements, and tying rewards (i.e. bonuses) to the satisfaction of these requirements provides incentives. This paper provides a critical assessment of these reforms, and presents some early evidence of their effects.
- 12 March 2003
- Published by Elsevier in Social Science & Medicine
- Vol. 58 (2) , 223-225
Falling short of expectations: public health interventions in developing and transition economies
- 12 March 2003
- Published by Elsevier in Social Science & Medicine
- Vol. 58 (2) , 223-225
Falling short of expectations: public health interventions in developing and transition economies