Ariel Rubinstein
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Ariel Rubinstein has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Martin J. Osborne
University of Toronto
84 shared publications - Michael Richter
Royal Holloway, University of London
14 shared publications - Amos Tversky
Stanford University
1 shared publication - Dana Heller
Stanford University
1 shared publication Jacob Glazer
Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel; and Department of Economics, The University of Warwick, Coventry, CV47AL, United Kingdom
1 shared publicationMichele Piccione
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 11 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 158, 122-131
Failing to correctly aggregate signals
- 11 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 158, 122-131
Failing to correctly aggregate signals
- Open Access
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 93-112
4. Biased Preferences Equilibrium
This chapter follows Rubinstein and Wolinsky (2022) who propose a biased preferences equilibrium solution concept in which agents' preference relations are systematically biased. The bias does not affect the agents' opportunity sets, but rather their preferences, which are systematically biased in such a way that the profile of agents' biased optimal choices is feasible. We envision biases as a mechanism for bringing harmony to a multi-agent economy. These biases, like prices, apply uniformly to all agents. Every agent's final preferences are determined by his initial preferences and the commonly shared bias. We apply the concept to three types of economies: the give-and-take, market economies with fixed prices and housing-type economies.
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 93-112
Open Access4. Biased Preferences Equilibrium
This chapter follows Rubinstein and Wolinsky (2022) who propose a biased preferences equilibrium solution concept in which agents' preference relations are systematically biased. The bias does not affect the agents' opportunity sets, but rather their preferences, which are systematically biased in such a way that the profile of agents' biased optimal choices is feasible. We envision biases as a mechanism for bringing harmony to a multi-agent economy. These biases, like prices, apply uniformly to all agents. Every agent's final preferences are determined by his initial preferences and the commonly shared bias. We apply the concept to three types of economies: the give-and-take, market economies with fixed prices and housing-type economies.
- Open Access
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 37-64
2. The Permissible and the Forbidden
Following Richter and Rubinstein (2020), we analyze an equilibrium concept based upon social norms: the Y-equilibrium. A Y-equilibrium is a set of permissible alternatives and a profile of choices, one for each agent, such that: (i) each agent's choice is optimal from among the permissible alternatives; (ii) the profile of choices is feasible; and (iii) the set of permissible alternatives is maximal in the sense that there is no superset of permissible alternatives from which a profile satisfying (i) and (ii) can be found. By this definition, two forces make a permissible set unstable: The first modifies the permissible set in the case that the profile of (intended) choices is not feasible, while the second loosens restrictions on the permissible set as long as a new profile of optimal choices is feasible. We also consider a variant of this concept where we require that the permissible set is convex. We study the Y-equilibria of a variety of examples and prove existence theorems, “welfare” theorems and a structure theorem when the set of alternatives is Euclidean.
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 37-64
Open Access2. The Permissible and the Forbidden
Following Richter and Rubinstein (2020), we analyze an equilibrium concept based upon social norms: the Y-equilibrium. A Y-equilibrium is a set of permissible alternatives and a profile of choices, one for each agent, such that: (i) each agent's choice is optimal from among the permissible alternatives; (ii) the profile of choices is feasible; and (iii) the set of permissible alternatives is maximal in the sense that there is no superset of permissible alternatives from which a profile satisfying (i) and (ii) can be found. By this definition, two forces make a permissible set unstable: The first modifies the permissible set in the case that the profile of (intended) choices is not feasible, while the second loosens restrictions on the permissible set as long as a new profile of optimal choices is feasible. We also consider a variant of this concept where we require that the permissible set is convex. We study the Y-equilibria of a variety of examples and prove existence theorems, “welfare” theorems and a structure theorem when the set of alternatives is Euclidean.
- Open Access
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 65-92
3. Status and Indoctrination
In this chapter, the parameter which brings harmony is a commonly accepted public ordering on the set of alternatives. Its main interpretation is of a status ranking. Society restricts an agent's ability to replace the alternative he has. He can only move “down” to a “less prestigious” one, but not “up”. The main equilibrium notion is a status equilibrium which is a public ordering and a feasible profile of choices such that no agent strictly prefers any weakly lower-status alternative than the one he is assigned to. As in a market, deviations are purely self-serving and contemplated without regard to feasibility. We also study a variant, the initial status equilibrium, which operates on a model of an economy that is extended to include an initial profile. In the initial profile, each agent is assigned an alternative which he can always choose and which together with the public ordering determines his choice set. In an initial status equilibrium no agent strictly prefers any weakly lower-status alternative than the one he is assigned to initially. The equilibrium concepts are discussed in abstract, ``welfare'' theorems are shown, and they are applied to a variety of examples.
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 65-92
Open Access3. Status and Indoctrination
In this chapter, the parameter which brings harmony is a commonly accepted public ordering on the set of alternatives. Its main interpretation is of a status ranking. Society restricts an agent's ability to replace the alternative he has. He can only move “down” to a “less prestigious” one, but not “up”. The main equilibrium notion is a status equilibrium which is a public ordering and a feasible profile of choices such that no agent strictly prefers any weakly lower-status alternative than the one he is assigned to. As in a market, deviations are purely self-serving and contemplated without regard to feasibility. We also study a variant, the initial status equilibrium, which operates on a model of an economy that is extended to include an initial profile. In the initial profile, each agent is assigned an alternative which he can always choose and which together with the public ordering determines his choice set. In an initial status equilibrium no agent strictly prefers any weakly lower-status alternative than the one he is assigned to initially. The equilibrium concepts are discussed in abstract, ``welfare'' theorems are shown, and they are applied to a variety of examples.
- Open Access
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 1-12
0. Introduction
The stage on which this book's plots are set is a model called an economy. The model captures situations in which each agent in a society chooses an alternative and there exists a fundamental tension between the agents' personal desires and society-wide feasibility constraints. The chapter includes many examples of economies. A candidate for an equilibrium includes two components: (i) A profile of choices - one choice for each agent. (ii) A specification of certain parameters that systematically influence either agents' choice problems or their preference relations. In equilibrium, agents make individually optimal choices, and the parameters restrict their choice sets to be compatible, in the sense that the resulting profile of choices is feasible. We provide an overview of the equilibrium concepts we study in the book. They are classified into two groups. In the choice group, each agent's choice set depends on a price-like equilibrium parameter, but not on the equilibrium profile of choices. In the deviation group, an equilibrium is a profile of choices which is immune to any single agent's deviation from his prescribed alternative to any other alternative in a set determined by the equilibrium parameters.
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 1-12
Open Access0. Introduction
The stage on which this book's plots are set is a model called an economy. The model captures situations in which each agent in a society chooses an alternative and there exists a fundamental tension between the agents' personal desires and society-wide feasibility constraints. The chapter includes many examples of economies. A candidate for an equilibrium includes two components: (i) A profile of choices - one choice for each agent. (ii) A specification of certain parameters that systematically influence either agents' choice problems or their preference relations. In equilibrium, agents make individually optimal choices, and the parameters restrict their choice sets to be compatible, in the sense that the resulting profile of choices is feasible. We provide an overview of the equilibrium concepts we study in the book. They are classified into two groups. In the choice group, each agent's choice set depends on a price-like equilibrium parameter, but not on the equilibrium profile of choices. In the deviation group, an equilibrium is a profile of choices which is immune to any single agent's deviation from his prescribed alternative to any other alternative in a set determined by the equilibrium parameters.
- Open Access
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
No Prices No Games!
While current economic theory focuses on prices and games, this book models economic settings where harmony is established through one of the following societal conventions: • A power relation according to which stronger agents are able to force weaker ones to do things against their will. • A norm that categorizes actions as permissible or forbidden. • A status relation over alternatives which limits each agent's choices. • Systematic biases in agents' preferences. These four conventions are analysed using simple and mathematically straightforward models, without any pretensions regarding direct applied usefulness. While we do not advocate for the adoption of any of these conventions specifically – we do advocate that when modelling an economic situation, alternative equilibrium notions should be considered, rather than automatically reaching for the familiar approaches of prices or games.
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
Open AccessNo Prices No Games!
While current economic theory focuses on prices and games, this book models economic settings where harmony is established through one of the following societal conventions: • A power relation according to which stronger agents are able to force weaker ones to do things against their will. • A norm that categorizes actions as permissible or forbidden. • A status relation over alternatives which limits each agent's choices. • Systematic biases in agents' preferences. These four conventions are analysed using simple and mathematically straightforward models, without any pretensions regarding direct applied usefulness. While we do not advocate for the adoption of any of these conventions specifically – we do advocate that when modelling an economic situation, alternative equilibrium notions should be considered, rather than automatically reaching for the familiar approaches of prices or games.
- Open Access
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 113-138
5. A Comparison to Game Theory
In the final chapter, we compare this book's modeling approaches with each other and to those of standard Game Theory on two ` battlegrounds''. The first is the matching economy. An even-sized population of agents must match into exclusive pairs (pairings). Each agent possesses a preference relation over potential mates. The standard cooperative game theory solution concept for matching economies is pairwise stability''. Following Richter and Rubinstein (2024), we compare this concept with the jungle equilibrium, the Y-equilibrium and the status and initial status equilibrium concepts. The second battleground is a `political economy'' situation. A group of agents hold views on a political issue. Each agent chooses a position and has preferences only regarding the position he himself chooses (and not the choices of others). However, there is a need that a majority of agents choose the same position. Traditionally, such a situation is modeled as a non-cooperative game and its Nash equilibria are calculated. Extending Richter and Rubinstein (2021), we compare this approach with the convex Y-equilibrium and the biased preferences equilibria. On both battlegrounds, the new approaches lead to very different outcomes than the traditional ones.
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 113-138
Open Access5. A Comparison to Game Theory
In the final chapter, we compare this book's modeling approaches with each other and to those of standard Game Theory on two ` battlegrounds''. The first is the matching economy. An even-sized population of agents must match into exclusive pairs (pairings). Each agent possesses a preference relation over potential mates. The standard cooperative game theory solution concept for matching economies is pairwise stability''. Following Richter and Rubinstein (2024), we compare this concept with the jungle equilibrium, the Y-equilibrium and the status and initial status equilibrium concepts. The second battleground is a `political economy'' situation. A group of agents hold views on a political issue. Each agent chooses a position and has preferences only regarding the position he himself chooses (and not the choices of others). However, there is a need that a majority of agents choose the same position. Traditionally, such a situation is modeled as a non-cooperative game and its Nash equilibria are calculated. Extending Richter and Rubinstein (2021), we compare this approach with the convex Y-equilibrium and the biased preferences equilibria. On both battlegrounds, the new approaches lead to very different outcomes than the traditional ones.
- Open Access
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 13-36
1. Equilibrium in the Jungle
The standard economic approach treats economic activity as voluntary: all involved parties do whatever they do of their own free will. However, life is not just a series of voluntary actions. An agent might use power to seize assets from others or to force others to do things against their will. Economic Theory typically ignores the use of power as a driver of social activity. This chapter follows Piccione and Rubinstein (2007) which introduces a model of a society referred to as the jungle, in which economic transactions are governed only by coercion. The model consists of a set of agents with exogenous preferences over a set of assets and a power ordering of the agents. Power means that a stronger agent is able to take things away from a weaker agent without the weaker agent's consent. A jungle equilibrium is a feasible allocation of the assets such that no agent wishes to take assets from an agent (or agents) weaker than himself. We will apply versions of the concept to the housing economy (Shapley and Scarf (1974)) and to the division economy. Throughout, we will deal with standard issues, such as: existence, uniqueness and the fundamental theorems of welfare.
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 13-36
Open Access1. Equilibrium in the Jungle
The standard economic approach treats economic activity as voluntary: all involved parties do whatever they do of their own free will. However, life is not just a series of voluntary actions. An agent might use power to seize assets from others or to force others to do things against their will. Economic Theory typically ignores the use of power as a driver of social activity. This chapter follows Piccione and Rubinstein (2007) which introduces a model of a society referred to as the jungle, in which economic transactions are governed only by coercion. The model consists of a set of agents with exogenous preferences over a set of assets and a power ordering of the agents. Power means that a stronger agent is able to take things away from a weaker agent without the weaker agent's consent. A jungle equilibrium is a feasible allocation of the assets such that no agent wishes to take assets from an agent (or agents) weaker than himself. We will apply versions of the concept to the housing economy (Shapley and Scarf (1974)) and to the division economy. Throughout, we will deal with standard issues, such as: existence, uniqueness and the fundamental theorems of welfare.
- Open Access
- 24 April 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 65-90
3. Status and Indoctrination
In this chapter, the parameter which brings harmony is a commonly accepted public ordering on the set of alternatives. Its main interpretation is of a status ranking. Society restricts an agent's ability to replace the alternative he has. He can only move “down” to a “less prestigious” one, but not “up”. The main equilibrium notion is a status equilibrium which is a public ordering and a feasible profile of choices such that no agent strictly prefers any weakly lower-status alternative than the one he is assigned to. As in a market, deviations are purely self-serving and contemplated without regard to feasibility. We also study a variant, the initial status equilibrium, which operates on a model of an economy that is extended to include an initial profile. In the initial profile, each agent is assigned an alternative which he can always choose and which together with the public ordering determines his choice set. In an initial status equilibrium no agent strictly prefers any weakly lower-status alternative than the one he is assigned to initially. The equilibrium concepts are discussed in abstract, ``welfare'' theorems are shown, and they are applied to a variety of examples.
- 24 April 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 65-90
Open Access3. Status and Indoctrination
In this chapter, the parameter which brings harmony is a commonly accepted public ordering on the set of alternatives. Its main interpretation is of a status ranking. Society restricts an agent's ability to replace the alternative he has. He can only move “down” to a “less prestigious” one, but not “up”. The main equilibrium notion is a status equilibrium which is a public ordering and a feasible profile of choices such that no agent strictly prefers any weakly lower-status alternative than the one he is assigned to. As in a market, deviations are purely self-serving and contemplated without regard to feasibility. We also study a variant, the initial status equilibrium, which operates on a model of an economy that is extended to include an initial profile. In the initial profile, each agent is assigned an alternative which he can always choose and which together with the public ordering determines his choice set. In an initial status equilibrium no agent strictly prefers any weakly lower-status alternative than the one he is assigned to initially. The equilibrium concepts are discussed in abstract, ``welfare'' theorems are shown, and they are applied to a variety of examples.
- Open Access
- 24 April 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 13-36
1. Equilibrium in the Jungle
The standard economic approach treats economic activity as voluntary: all involved parties do whatever they do of their own free will. However, life is not just a series of voluntary actions. An agent might use power to seize assets from others or to force others to do things against their will. Economic Theory typically ignores the use of power as a driver of social activity. This chapter follows Piccione and Rubinstein (2007) which introduces a model of a society referred to as the jungle, in which economic transactions are governed only by coercion. The model consists of a set of agents with exogenous preferences over a set of assets and a power ordering of the agents. Power means that a stronger agent is able to take things away from a weaker agent without the weaker agent's consent. A jungle equilibrium is a feasible allocation of the assets such that no agent wishes to take assets from an agent (or agents) weaker than himself. We will apply versions of the concept to the housing economy (Shapley and Scarf (1974)) and to the division economy. Throughout, we will deal with standard issues, such as: existence, uniqueness and the fundamental theorems of welfare.
- 24 April 2024
- Published by Open Book Publishers
- p. 13-36
Open Access1. Equilibrium in the Jungle
The standard economic approach treats economic activity as voluntary: all involved parties do whatever they do of their own free will. However, life is not just a series of voluntary actions. An agent might use power to seize assets from others or to force others to do things against their will. Economic Theory typically ignores the use of power as a driver of social activity. This chapter follows Piccione and Rubinstein (2007) which introduces a model of a society referred to as the jungle, in which economic transactions are governed only by coercion. The model consists of a set of agents with exogenous preferences over a set of assets and a power ordering of the agents. Power means that a stronger agent is able to take things away from a weaker agent without the weaker agent's consent. A jungle equilibrium is a feasible allocation of the assets such that no agent wishes to take assets from an agent (or agents) weaker than himself. We will apply versions of the concept to the housing economy (Shapley and Scarf (1974)) and to the division economy. Throughout, we will deal with standard issues, such as: existence, uniqueness and the fundamental theorems of welfare.