Yanhu Han
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Yanhu Han has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Fei Ma
Xi'an Jiaotong University
1 shared publication - Lufan Wang
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1 shared publication - Miroslaw J. Skibniewski
Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering, University of Maryland, College Park, USA
1 shared publication - Qianqian Cheng
School of Economics and Management, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710064, China
1 shared publication - Qipeng Sun
School of Economics and Management, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710064, China
1 shared publication - Siyuan Song
School of Sustainable Engineering and the Built Environment, Arizona State University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Behavioral Strategies between Government and Real Estate Developers on Prefabricated Buildings Based on Triangular Fuzzy Matrix Game
The subsidies provided by the local government to real estate developers are an important and common practice to promote the development of prefabricated buildings worldwide. However, there is a lack of current research on how government subsidies affect the decision-making of real estate developers with respect to adopting prefabricated construction methods. This study developed a fuzzy game model integrating classical game theory with the triangular fuzzy number approach between the local government and a real estate developer, with different behavioral strategies regarding whether or not to develop prefabricated buildings. It analyzed the Nash equilibriums under the circumstances of pure and mixed strategies and probed the influencing factors of the game equilibrium results via numerical simulation. The research conclusions are as follows: (1) the government should encourage real estate developers to actively participate in prefabricated building by using financial subsidies, fund rewards, process supervision and economic penalties comprehensively; (2) the pure strategy (no manufacturing process supervision, active development) between the government and real estate developers is feasible when the benefit of “active development” for real estate developers is larger than that of “passive development”; (3) positive incentives, such as offering financial subsidies, reducing the cost of prefabricated building development and improving the popularity of prefabricated construction in the building market, should be taken to motivate real estate developers; and (4) negative incentives, such as increasing economic punishment and enhancing manufacturing process supervision, can also facilitate real estate developers to actively participate in the development of prefabricated buildings. Incentives are more effective when the economic penalties are greater than the incremental costs of developing prefabricated buildings. Some policy implications are given to guide prefabricated building market development. Finally, the main problems that need further study in the future are highlighted.
Open AccessBehavioral Strategies between Government and Real Estate Developers on Prefabricated Buildings Based on Triangular Fuzzy Matrix Game
The subsidies provided by the local government to real estate developers are an important and common practice to promote the development of prefabricated buildings worldwide. However, there is a lack of current research on how government subsidies affect the decision-making of real estate developers with respect to adopting prefabricated construction methods. This study developed a fuzzy game model integrating classical game theory with the triangular fuzzy number approach between the local government and a real estate developer, with different behavioral strategies regarding whether or not to develop prefabricated buildings. It analyzed the Nash equilibriums under the circumstances of pure and mixed strategies and probed the influencing factors of the game equilibrium results via numerical simulation. The research conclusions are as follows: (1) the government should encourage real estate developers to actively participate in prefabricated building by using financial subsidies, fund rewards, process supervision and economic penalties comprehensively; (2) the pure strategy (no manufacturing process supervision, active development) between the government and real estate developers is feasible when the benefit of “active development” for real estate developers is larger than that of “passive development”; (3) positive incentives, such as offering financial subsidies, reducing the cost of prefabricated building development and improving the popularity of prefabricated construction in the building market, should be taken to motivate real estate developers; and (4) negative incentives, such as increasing economic punishment and enhancing manufacturing process supervision, can also facilitate real estate developers to actively participate in the development of prefabricated buildings. Incentives are more effective when the economic penalties are greater than the incremental costs of developing prefabricated buildings. Some policy implications are given to guide prefabricated building market development. Finally, the main problems that need further study in the future are highlighted.
- Open Access
- 21 March 2019
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 11 (6) , 1721
Synergetic Effect and Spatial-Temporal Evolution of Railway Transportation in Sustainable Development of Trade: An Empirical Study Based on the Belt and Road
The low-energy consumption and large-capacity of railway transportation play vital catalytic roles in economy and trade. Scientific research investigating the relationship between railway transportation and trade is important in promoting their coordinated development, exerting their synergistic effects, and realizing sustainable trade. Given the serious imbalance between the development of railway transportation and trade of countries along the “the Belt and Road” (The “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”), we used the entropy weight method to calculate the level of railway transportation and trade development, and then calculated the coordination degrees of the countries along the Belt and Road between them using the coupling-coordination model. The results showed that the average coupling degree between railway transportation and trade development was 0.728, which means that there is a strong interaction between railway transportation and trade. Only 25% of these countries achieved highly coordinated development, and these countries could achieve sustainable trade by fully utilizing the synergetic effect of railway transportation and trade. The coordination degrees of countries along the Belt and Road have strong spatial agglomeration, and the performance of Middle and Eastern European countries is better. Finally, we put forward some suggestions, such as strengthening the construction of railway infrastructure, improving the railway operation level, developing multimodal transport, and enlarging the role of the railway transportation network in the trade of the Belt and Road to achieve sustainable trade.
- 21 March 2019
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 11 (6) , 1721
Open AccessSynergetic Effect and Spatial-Temporal Evolution of Railway Transportation in Sustainable Development of Trade: An Empirical Study Based on the Belt and Road
The low-energy consumption and large-capacity of railway transportation play vital catalytic roles in economy and trade. Scientific research investigating the relationship between railway transportation and trade is important in promoting their coordinated development, exerting their synergistic effects, and realizing sustainable trade. Given the serious imbalance between the development of railway transportation and trade of countries along the “the Belt and Road” (The “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”), we used the entropy weight method to calculate the level of railway transportation and trade development, and then calculated the coordination degrees of the countries along the Belt and Road between them using the coupling-coordination model. The results showed that the average coupling degree between railway transportation and trade development was 0.728, which means that there is a strong interaction between railway transportation and trade. Only 25% of these countries achieved highly coordinated development, and these countries could achieve sustainable trade by fully utilizing the synergetic effect of railway transportation and trade. The coordination degrees of countries along the Belt and Road have strong spatial agglomeration, and the performance of Middle and Eastern European countries is better. Finally, we put forward some suggestions, such as strengthening the construction of railway infrastructure, improving the railway operation level, developing multimodal transport, and enlarging the role of the railway transportation network in the trade of the Belt and Road to achieve sustainable trade.
- Open Access
- 10 November 2017
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 9 (11) , 2069
A Market Equilibrium Supply Chain Model for Supporting Self-Manufacturing or Outsourcing Decisions in Prefabricated Construction
Prefabricated construction is a sustainable alternative to traditional on-site construction methods. However, many challenges still exist in the prefabricated construction process. For example, self-manufacturing or outsourcing decisions are vital to the industrial structure and organization of the prefabricated construction industry, and the company’s production and operation decision-making. This paper considers a prefabricated construction supply chain, which is composed of one upstream component manufacturing company and two downstream contractors. The large contractor can get the precast component through self-manufacturing or outsourcing, while the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) contractor can only buy components from the component manufacturer. A comprehensive game model (Cournot-Stackelberg model) under different decisions, that is, component self-manufacturing or outsourcing, was established. By solving the profit functions of different companies in the prefabricated construction supply chain, the equilibrium solutions of output, price and profit can be achieved. These solutions of equilibrium indicate the optimal decision on the production and operation, and the profit’s boundary conditions. After assuming relevant parameters, the profit levels of the companies in the supply chain are analyzed via a dynamic simulation in the changing process of prefabricated construction market size under different behavioral decisions. The conclusions are as follows: (1) the profit levels of all supply chain enterprises and the whole supply chain are increasing with an increase of market size; (2) the downstream contractors and the whole supply chain have a higher profit level under the component self-manufacturing decision, however, on the contrary, the upstream component suppliers get a higher profit level under the component outsourcing decision; (3) the equilibrium output of the SME contractor is reduced under the outsourcing decision of the large contractor, and the SME contractor is at a disadvantage in market competition, which is particularlyfull of risk when the market size is not big enough, but higher profit level can be expected as the market size increases. According to the results of the game-theoreticanalysis and the numerical simulation, managerial implications are put forward from the angles of extensive publicity, mandatory implementation, strengthening industrial chain integration, and intensifying component factory guidance to promote the development of prefabricated construction. Finally, the main problems which need to be studied further in the future are presented.
- 10 November 2017
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 9 (11) , 2069
Open AccessA Market Equilibrium Supply Chain Model for Supporting Self-Manufacturing or Outsourcing Decisions in Prefabricated Construction
Prefabricated construction is a sustainable alternative to traditional on-site construction methods. However, many challenges still exist in the prefabricated construction process. For example, self-manufacturing or outsourcing decisions are vital to the industrial structure and organization of the prefabricated construction industry, and the company’s production and operation decision-making. This paper considers a prefabricated construction supply chain, which is composed of one upstream component manufacturing company and two downstream contractors. The large contractor can get the precast component through self-manufacturing or outsourcing, while the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) contractor can only buy components from the component manufacturer. A comprehensive game model (Cournot-Stackelberg model) under different decisions, that is, component self-manufacturing or outsourcing, was established. By solving the profit functions of different companies in the prefabricated construction supply chain, the equilibrium solutions of output, price and profit can be achieved. These solutions of equilibrium indicate the optimal decision on the production and operation, and the profit’s boundary conditions. After assuming relevant parameters, the profit levels of the companies in the supply chain are analyzed via a dynamic simulation in the changing process of prefabricated construction market size under different behavioral decisions. The conclusions are as follows: (1) the profit levels of all supply chain enterprises and the whole supply chain are increasing with an increase of market size; (2) the downstream contractors and the whole supply chain have a higher profit level under the component self-manufacturing decision, however, on the contrary, the upstream component suppliers get a higher profit level under the component outsourcing decision; (3) the equilibrium output of the SME contractor is reduced under the outsourcing decision of the large contractor, and the SME contractor is at a disadvantage in market competition, which is particularlyfull of risk when the market size is not big enough, but higher profit level can be expected as the market size increases. According to the results of the game-theoreticanalysis and the numerical simulation, managerial implications are put forward from the angles of extensive publicity, mandatory implementation, strengthening industrial chain integration, and intensifying component factory guidance to promote the development of prefabricated construction. Finally, the main problems which need to be studied further in the future are presented.