Yongsheng Cheng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yongsheng Cheng has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Chenchen Zhu
School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
1 shared publication - Hong Chen
School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
1 shared publication - Sidai Guo
School of Economics and Management, Southwest University of Science and Technology, Mianyang 621010, China
1 shared publication - Simeng Wang
School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
1 shared publication - Xiaoxian Zhang
School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, China
1 shared publication - Yan Liu
College of Electron and Information University of Electronic Science and Technology of China Zhongshan Institute Zhongshan China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 September 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 12 (18) , 7441
The Implications of Vertical Strategic Interaction on Green Technology Investment in a Supply Chain
Numerous studies on supply chains have indicated that vertical strategic interactions usually involve the classical double marginalization problem, leading to a downward distortion in profitability. However, at present, the implications of vertical strategic interactions for green technology investment in a supply chain are not all that clear. In particular, such a vertical interaction not only can translate into profits between different parties, but usually also involves differentiated environmental performance. A question which arises is: who is the right undertaker for green technology investment in a supply chain, the supplier or retailer? To answer this question, we highlight the implications of vertical strategic interaction for green technology investment in a supply chain. To fill this gap, using a game-theoretic approach, we formulate two models: (a) Model M, in which an upstream manufacturer adopts technologies to meet consumer demand; and (b) Model R, where a retailer integrates environmental concerns into their supply chain decisions. We find that the retailer, who is closer to the customer, is the more effective undertaker for green technology investment, as this not only creates higher profitability for both parties, but also achieves a more sustainable scheme for our environment. When green technologies are invested in by the manufacturer, the double marginalization effect not only may downward-distort their economic performance but can also reduce the equilibrium of product greenness.
- 10 September 2020
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 12 (18) , 7441
Open AccessThe Implications of Vertical Strategic Interaction on Green Technology Investment in a Supply Chain
Numerous studies on supply chains have indicated that vertical strategic interactions usually involve the classical double marginalization problem, leading to a downward distortion in profitability. However, at present, the implications of vertical strategic interactions for green technology investment in a supply chain are not all that clear. In particular, such a vertical interaction not only can translate into profits between different parties, but usually also involves differentiated environmental performance. A question which arises is: who is the right undertaker for green technology investment in a supply chain, the supplier or retailer? To answer this question, we highlight the implications of vertical strategic interaction for green technology investment in a supply chain. To fill this gap, using a game-theoretic approach, we formulate two models: (a) Model M, in which an upstream manufacturer adopts technologies to meet consumer demand; and (b) Model R, where a retailer integrates environmental concerns into their supply chain decisions. We find that the retailer, who is closer to the customer, is the more effective undertaker for green technology investment, as this not only creates higher profitability for both parties, but also achieves a more sustainable scheme for our environment. When green technologies are invested in by the manufacturer, the double marginalization effect not only may downward-distort their economic performance but can also reduce the equilibrium of product greenness.
- Open Access
- 11 July 2018
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 10 (7) , 2427
Selling Remanufactured Products under One Roof or Two? A Sustainability Analysis on Channel Structures for New and Remanufactured Products
Even though many manufacturers integrate remanufacturing into existing business models, it should be noted that such efforts are usually accompanied by a major concern for cannibalization of new product sales from remanufactured products. To deal with this problem, many manufacturers, such as Dell, adopt a “two-roof policy” where the sale of new products takes place in a store and their remanufactured products in another. However, in contrast, some manufacturers, including Apple and HP, adopt a “one-roof policy”, by which all new and remanufactured products are sold through one store/chain. Although the literature on remanufacturing has extensively addressed sustainability issues within operations management, little attention has been paid to how “differentiated roof policy” for the marketing of remanufactured products affects sustainability issues. To fill this gap, in this paper, the authors develop two theoretical models in which manufacturers have the flexibility to distribute new and remanufactured products (1) through a one-roof policy (Model O) or (2) through a two-roof policy (Model T), respectively, and strive to address the question of how differentiated roof policies impact sustainability issues related to remanufacturing operations. Among other results, the central result suggests that, if the manufacturers care about economic performance, distributing both products through a two-roof policy is an advantageous strategy. Conversely, if they care about environmental sustainability, one roof is the preferred strategy.
- 11 July 2018
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 10 (7) , 2427
Open AccessSelling Remanufactured Products under One Roof or Two? A Sustainability Analysis on Channel Structures for New and Remanufactured Products
Even though many manufacturers integrate remanufacturing into existing business models, it should be noted that such efforts are usually accompanied by a major concern for cannibalization of new product sales from remanufactured products. To deal with this problem, many manufacturers, such as Dell, adopt a “two-roof policy” where the sale of new products takes place in a store and their remanufactured products in another. However, in contrast, some manufacturers, including Apple and HP, adopt a “one-roof policy”, by which all new and remanufactured products are sold through one store/chain. Although the literature on remanufacturing has extensively addressed sustainability issues within operations management, little attention has been paid to how “differentiated roof policy” for the marketing of remanufactured products affects sustainability issues. To fill this gap, in this paper, the authors develop two theoretical models in which manufacturers have the flexibility to distribute new and remanufactured products (1) through a one-roof policy (Model O) or (2) through a two-roof policy (Model T), respectively, and strive to address the question of how differentiated roof policies impact sustainability issues related to remanufacturing operations. Among other results, the central result suggests that, if the manufacturers care about economic performance, distributing both products through a two-roof policy is an advantageous strategy. Conversely, if they care about environmental sustainability, one roof is the preferred strategy.