Paul Musgrave
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Paul Musgrave has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel H. Nexon
Georgetown University
5 shared publications Yu-Ming Liou
Georgetown University
3 shared publications- Marcelo M. Leal
University of Texas at Dallas
2 shared publications - Andrew Heiss
Georgia State University, Public Management and Policy
1 shared publication - Anjali Kaushlesh Dayal
Fordham Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Bronx, NY 10458 USA
1 shared publication - Damian Raess
Université Laval
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 11 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 70 (4)
Friending or Blocking? U.S. Public Attitudes toward Restricting Foreign Social Media Apps
What influences U.S. public support for bans of foreign social media applications? In particular, how do concerns about national security, economic opportunities and threats (such as industrial espionage), reciprocal market access, and the policies and traits of an app influence individual support for banning? We address these questions through a conjoint experiment conducted in November 2024 (N = 1,494). Respondents weighed security threats (such as risks to military interests) and economic interests (including job creation and reciprocal market access) heavily. Concerns about social media platforms themselves, such as strong data privacy protection and content moderation, also mattered, but to a lesser extent. A recontact survey conducted in spring 2025, after President Trump’s decision to reverse the January 2025 TikTok ban, shows stability over time. Overall, our findings reveal a surprisingly strong and stable consensus about what factors promote support for bans—with TikTok-like features arousing opposition among the American public. Nuanced differences do emerge: Republicans and Democrats differ over content moderation policies, while TikTok users and nonusers diverge regarding security threats and owners’ ties to governments. Our findings underscore the importance of the geopolitical and economic implications of foreign apps as well as how consumer experiences influence threat perceptions.
- 11 September 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 70 (4)
Open AccessFriending or Blocking? U.S. Public Attitudes toward Restricting Foreign Social Media Apps
What influences U.S. public support for bans of foreign social media applications? In particular, how do concerns about national security, economic opportunities and threats (such as industrial espionage), reciprocal market access, and the policies and traits of an app influence individual support for banning? We address these questions through a conjoint experiment conducted in November 2024 (N = 1,494). Respondents weighed security threats (such as risks to military interests) and economic interests (including job creation and reciprocal market access) heavily. Concerns about social media platforms themselves, such as strong data privacy protection and content moderation, also mattered, but to a lesser extent. A recontact survey conducted in spring 2025, after President Trump’s decision to reverse the January 2025 TikTok ban, shows stability over time. Overall, our findings reveal a surprisingly strong and stable consensus about what factors promote support for bans—with TikTok-like features arousing opposition among the American public. Nuanced differences do emerge: Republicans and Democrats differ over content moderation policies, while TikTok users and nonusers diverge regarding security threats and owners’ ties to governments. Our findings underscore the importance of the geopolitical and economic implications of foreign apps as well as how consumer experiences influence threat perceptions.
- Open Access
- 9 December 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 22 (1)
Degrees of Rivalry: U.S. Paradiplomacy and the Weaponization of Education Policy against Japan and China
Both education and subnational governments have been stereotyped as promoting cooperation and soft power in international relations. In 2023, however, the US state of Florida banned many Chinese researchers from its public universities, demonstrating that subnational governments can use educational policies to take hostile stances on international questions. To understand why subnational governments might use their prerogatives in this fashion, I use a multi-method approach to explore how policies restricting international ties may be demanded in a federal system and their potential effects. Survey data show that Americans who view China as a threat substantially favor limiting educational exchanges with China. San Francisco’s 1905–1907 segregation of Japanese students demonstrates how public demand for municipal actions produced a confrontation that strained US relations with a rising foreign power. Two pre-registered survey experiments demonstrate that neither federal disapproval nor Chinese warnings about diplomatic consequences arising from measures like Florida’s significantly reduce public support.
- 9 December 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 22 (1)
Open AccessDegrees of Rivalry: U.S. Paradiplomacy and the Weaponization of Education Policy against Japan and China
Both education and subnational governments have been stereotyped as promoting cooperation and soft power in international relations. In 2023, however, the US state of Florida banned many Chinese researchers from its public universities, demonstrating that subnational governments can use educational policies to take hostile stances on international questions. To understand why subnational governments might use their prerogatives in this fashion, I use a multi-method approach to explore how policies restricting international ties may be demanded in a federal system and their potential effects. Survey data show that Americans who view China as a threat substantially favor limiting educational exchanges with China. San Francisco’s 1905–1907 segregation of Japanese students demonstrates how public demand for municipal actions produced a confrontation that strained US relations with a rising foreign power. Two pre-registered survey experiments demonstrate that neither federal disapproval nor Chinese warnings about diplomatic consequences arising from measures like Florida’s significantly reduce public support.
- 27 October 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 56 (1) , e7-e10
American paradiplomacy and Chinese power: demystifying US–China subnational relations . Czeslaw Tubilewicz
- 27 October 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 56 (1) , e7-e10
American paradiplomacy and Chinese power: demystifying US–China subnational relations . Czeslaw Tubilewicz
- Open Access
- 16 October 2025
- Published by The R Foundation
qatarcars: Data on Cars in Qatar
Fuel economy, size, performance, and price data for cars in Qatar in 2025. Mirrors many of the columns in mtcars, but uses (1) non-US-centric makes and models, (2) 2025 prices, and (3) metric measurements, making it more appropriate for use as an example dataset outside the United States.
- 16 October 2025
- Published by The R Foundation
Open Accessqatarcars: Data on Cars in Qatar
Fuel economy, size, performance, and price data for cars in Qatar in 2025. Mirrors many of the columns in mtcars, but uses (1) non-US-centric makes and models, (2) 2025 prices, and (3) metric measurements, making it more appropriate for use as an example dataset outside the United States.
- Open Access
- 25 August 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
The US Public’s Views of Paradiplomacy, 1988–2024
US state and local governments engage in many activities involving foreign relations, from officials’ trips abroad to maintaining offices to promote trade and investment to passing resolutions about foreign policy. Yet we know little about what the public thinks about these activities. I report on a 2024 survey of Americans’ paradiplomacy views that updates a 1988 poll conducted by the federal Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. I find increased support for paradiplomatic activities, but I also find that the degree of support varies by activities’ objective, demographic characteristics, and partisan identity. Gubernatorial and mayoral travel for cultural or economic purposes elicits less opposition than climate-related trips. Urban respondents view city council resolutions on international activities more favorably than suburban or rural residents. Republicans generally support subnational international engagement less than Democrats. These data illuminate the domestic opportunity structures influencing US subnational governments’ external activities and open new lines of inquiry.
- 25 August 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
Open AccessThe US Public’s Views of Paradiplomacy, 1988–2024
US state and local governments engage in many activities involving foreign relations, from officials’ trips abroad to maintaining offices to promote trade and investment to passing resolutions about foreign policy. Yet we know little about what the public thinks about these activities. I report on a 2024 survey of Americans’ paradiplomacy views that updates a 1988 poll conducted by the federal Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. I find increased support for paradiplomatic activities, but I also find that the degree of support varies by activities’ objective, demographic characteristics, and partisan identity. Gubernatorial and mayoral travel for cultural or economic purposes elicits less opposition than climate-related trips. Urban respondents view city council resolutions on international activities more favorably than suburban or rural residents. Republicans generally support subnational international engagement less than Democrats. These data illuminate the domestic opportunity structures influencing US subnational governments’ external activities and open new lines of inquiry.
- Open Access
- 4 June 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 55 (3) , 563-591
From Cooperation to Conflict: Public Opinion, Parasecurity, and US States’ Divestment from China
Citing security concerns, many US states have recently divested or announced plans to divest from the People's Republic of China. This article explores how public opinion views such divestments. Responses to a high-quality national survey show baseline opposition to investing state funds in Chinese firms is pronounced, particularly among Republicans and older voters. Experimental results, however, show that warnings about financial losses, geopolitical tensions, and anti-Asian hate crimes can significantly reduce support for divestment policies. The effects for hate crimes are particularly strong when warnings come from an Asian-American source compared to a White one. I argue that these security-motivated divestments represent an example of a distinctive form of subnational foreign policy in which subnational units assert security interests against external threats, which I call “parasecurity.” This research demonstrates how studying public opinion contributes to understanding paradiplomacy in an era of increasing great-power competition.
- 4 June 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 55 (3) , 563-591
Open AccessFrom Cooperation to Conflict: Public Opinion, Parasecurity, and US States’ Divestment from China
Citing security concerns, many US states have recently divested or announced plans to divest from the People's Republic of China. This article explores how public opinion views such divestments. Responses to a high-quality national survey show baseline opposition to investing state funds in Chinese firms is pronounced, particularly among Republicans and older voters. Experimental results, however, show that warnings about financial losses, geopolitical tensions, and anti-Asian hate crimes can significantly reduce support for divestment policies. The effects for hate crimes are particularly strong when warnings come from an Asian-American source compared to a White one. I argue that these security-motivated divestments represent an example of a distinctive form of subnational foreign policy in which subnational units assert security interests against external threats, which I call “parasecurity.” This research demonstrates how studying public opinion contributes to understanding paradiplomacy in an era of increasing great-power competition.
- Open Access
- 10 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 21 (2)
To What End? Policy Objectives and US Public Support for Political Warfare
Research regarding military interventions suggests that the objective of an intervention (such as whether it is carried out for humanitarian or power-political ends) substantially influences public support. It is unknown, however, whether that holds for political warfare strategies such as electoral interventions. In a series of survey experiments, we evaluate how different objectives affect US audiences’ support for foreign electoral interventions, both overall and in relation to other forms of political warfare, such as sanctions and covert regime change. Humanitarian objectives elicit greater support than those carried out to stave off threats to US leadership or to promote US economic interests. Furthermore, religious identity affects support for interventions undertaken for humanitarian ends, with the congruence between the identity of respondents and victims substantially influencing support. Finally, support for partisan electoral interventions and other forms of political warfare varies in relation to each other and in relation to interventions’ objectives.
- 10 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 21 (2)
Open AccessTo What End? Policy Objectives and US Public Support for Political Warfare
Research regarding military interventions suggests that the objective of an intervention (such as whether it is carried out for humanitarian or power-political ends) substantially influences public support. It is unknown, however, whether that holds for political warfare strategies such as electoral interventions. In a series of survey experiments, we evaluate how different objectives affect US audiences’ support for foreign electoral interventions, both overall and in relation to other forms of political warfare, such as sanctions and covert regime change. Humanitarian objectives elicit greater support than those carried out to stave off threats to US leadership or to promote US economic interests. Furthermore, religious identity affects support for interventions undertaken for humanitarian ends, with the congruence between the identity of respondents and victims substantially influencing support. Finally, support for partisan electoral interventions and other forms of political warfare varies in relation to each other and in relation to interventions’ objectives.
- Open Access
- 24 July 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 19 (4)
The Tripwire Effect: Experimental Evidence Regarding U.S. Public Opinion
Claims about the deterrent role of forward military deployments often depend on the argument that attacks on troops stationed abroad will activate a “tripwire effect.” It is assumed that this effect would generate strong domestic pressure for further military intervention by the country whose troops have come under attack. In theory, the anticipation of a strong tripwire effect prospectively ties the hands of leaders, thereby bolstering the reliability of extended deterrent threats and promises. In this paper, we define the tripwire effect and use both conjoint and vignette survey experiments to evaluate its operation and magnitude among Americans. Results suggest that the tripwire effect is, at best, far weaker than many analysts and policymakers commonly assume. This finding raises serious questions about a core logic underpinning the United States’ forward military posture and highlights the need for more research on the deterrent functions of forward deployment.
- 24 July 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Foreign Policy Analysis
- Vol. 19 (4)
Open AccessThe Tripwire Effect: Experimental Evidence Regarding U.S. Public Opinion
Claims about the deterrent role of forward military deployments often depend on the argument that attacks on troops stationed abroad will activate a “tripwire effect.” It is assumed that this effect would generate strong domestic pressure for further military intervention by the country whose troops have come under attack. In theory, the anticipation of a strong tripwire effect prospectively ties the hands of leaders, thereby bolstering the reliability of extended deterrent threats and promises. In this paper, we define the tripwire effect and use both conjoint and vignette survey experiments to evaluate its operation and magnitude among Americans. Results suggest that the tripwire effect is, at best, far weaker than many analysts and policymakers commonly assume. This finding raises serious questions about a core logic underpinning the United States’ forward military posture and highlights the need for more research on the deterrent functions of forward deployment.
- 25 May 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary Security Policy
- Vol. 44 (3) , 437-461
Backwards from zero: How the U.S. public evaluates the use of zero-day vulnerabilities in cybersecurity
- 25 May 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary Security Policy
- Vol. 44 (3) , 437-461
Backwards from zero: How the U.S. public evaluates the use of zero-day vulnerabilities in cybersecurity
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Global Security Studies
- Vol. 7 (4)
New Questions for an Old Alliance: NATO in Cyberspace and American Public Opinion
Cybersecurity poses new questions for old alliances. These questions emerge with special force in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Russian Federation wields substantial cyber capabilities, but NATO members have been ambivalent about stating what sorts of attacks would trigger the North Atlantic Treaty's Article 5 collective self-defense provisions. Nevertheless, NATO officials state that there are some attacks that would trigger Article 5. This leads to a puzzle: why would an explicit alliance guarantee designed to ensure collective defense against certain forms of attack be informally extended to include others? Because the policy of the United States toward such questions will likely be of great significance in determining NATO policy, we use a series of survey experiments to test American public opinion regarding support for defending allies and friendly countries against cyber operations. Respondents are likelier to support a response to an attack that causes fatalities and when the victim has a treaty alliance with the United States. In contrast, support falls if US participation is likely to provoke further retaliation or the target attacked is civilian rather than military.
- 1 November 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Global Security Studies
- Vol. 7 (4)
New Questions for an Old Alliance: NATO in Cyberspace and American Public Opinion
Cybersecurity poses new questions for old alliances. These questions emerge with special force in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Russian Federation wields substantial cyber capabilities, but NATO members have been ambivalent about stating what sorts of attacks would trigger the North Atlantic Treaty's Article 5 collective self-defense provisions. Nevertheless, NATO officials state that there are some attacks that would trigger Article 5. This leads to a puzzle: why would an explicit alliance guarantee designed to ensure collective defense against certain forms of attack be informally extended to include others? Because the policy of the United States toward such questions will likely be of great significance in determining NATO policy, we use a series of survey experiments to test American public opinion regarding support for defending allies and friendly countries against cyber operations. Respondents are likelier to support a response to an attack that causes fatalities and when the victim has a treaty alliance with the United States. In contrast, support falls if US participation is likely to provoke further retaliation or the target attacked is civilian rather than military.