Gianna Maria Eick
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Gianna Maria Eick has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Marius R. Busemeyer
Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz
5 shared publications - Brian Burgoon
University of Amsterdam
3 shared publications - Benjamin Leruth
University of Groningen
2 shared publications - Ben Baumberg Geiger
Department of Global Health & Social Medicine, King’s College London, UK
1 shared publication Erik Gahner Larsen
University of Kent
1 shared publication- Janine Leschke
Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 13 August 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 120-167
How individual- and national-level power resources shape social rights take-up, spending and outcomes
This chapter explores empirically the claim that social rights outcomes rest upon “power resources” available to citizens, using quantitative information at both the individual and national levels in the realms of worker unemployment and employment. The analyses unearth broad descriptive and inferential evidence that power resources facilitate social rights realization. Settings with more generous unemployment, childcare, and parental leave benefits tend to have slightly higher take-up rates than do settings with less generous benefits, and national-level instrumental and enforcement resources also tend to spur such take-up rates. These same national-level normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources are associated with higher employment rates and lower poverty rates. Also, normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources tend to increase the likelihood that unemployed individuals rely upon unemployment insurance transfers. Such patterns clarify the view that power resources are crucial to Europe's social rights realization that is central to the European Pillar of Social Rights.
- 13 August 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 120-167
Open AccessHow individual- and national-level power resources shape social rights take-up, spending and outcomes
This chapter explores empirically the claim that social rights outcomes rest upon “power resources” available to citizens, using quantitative information at both the individual and national levels in the realms of worker unemployment and employment. The analyses unearth broad descriptive and inferential evidence that power resources facilitate social rights realization. Settings with more generous unemployment, childcare, and parental leave benefits tend to have slightly higher take-up rates than do settings with less generous benefits, and national-level instrumental and enforcement resources also tend to spur such take-up rates. These same national-level normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources are associated with higher employment rates and lower poverty rates. Also, normative, instrumental, and enforcement resources tend to increase the likelihood that unemployed individuals rely upon unemployment insurance transfers. Such patterns clarify the view that power resources are crucial to Europe's social rights realization that is central to the European Pillar of Social Rights.
- Open Access
- 13 August 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 210-234
The future of European social citizenship: what is the citizens’ view?
- 13 August 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 210-234
Open AccessThe future of European social citizenship: what is the citizens’ view?
- Open Access
- 29 May 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 26 (3) , 593-616
Equal rights to move? Public attitudes towards the free movement of patients, students and workers in the EU
While the free movement of people is one of the cornerstones of the European integration project, a pressing question remains whether public support depends on who is moving. Against the backdrop of increasing debates on the development of a European Health Union, this study focuses on the case of patient mobility and compares support levels to those of student and worker mobility rights. To this end, the study draws on an original survey conducted among 6000 respondents in Germany. The results reveal that patients are less supported than students and workers, both for incoming and outgoing mobility. We also find evidence of differentiated drivers of free movement attitudes, as a higher socio-economic status increases support for student and worker mobility but not for patient mobility.
- 29 May 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 26 (3) , 593-616
Open AccessEqual rights to move? Public attitudes towards the free movement of patients, students and workers in the EU
While the free movement of people is one of the cornerstones of the European integration project, a pressing question remains whether public support depends on who is moving. Against the backdrop of increasing debates on the development of a European Health Union, this study focuses on the case of patient mobility and compares support levels to those of student and worker mobility rights. To this end, the study draws on an original survey conducted among 6000 respondents in Germany. The results reveal that patients are less supported than students and workers, both for incoming and outgoing mobility. We also find evidence of differentiated drivers of free movement attitudes, as a higher socio-economic status increases support for student and worker mobility but not for patient mobility.
- Open Access
- 26 May 2024
- Published by Wiley in Social Policy & Administration
- Vol. 58 (4) , 545-553
Towards Social Europe? Obstacles and opportunities in the multi‐level governance of welfare states
Social Europe, or the social dimension of the European Union (EU), has been receiving increasing attention in academic debates. This special issue introduction discusses Social Europe through the analytical framework of multi‐level governance while asking, perhaps controversially, whether Social Europe has the potential to become a fully‐fledged welfare state. This introduction also summarises the articles included in this special issue which focus on different governance levels, including EU institutions, member states, national parties, economic sectors, workers and the general public. On this basis, the introduction identifies sources of challenges and opportunities for Social Europe from various levels of governance. We conclude that the needs and demands become more diverse when we move from European institutions to the citizens. Notably, obstacles from one governance level often carry over to another governance level. Consequently, it becomes much more difficult to design welfare policies on the EU level that work for everyone. While a more evolved EU‐level welfare state may be possible in the future, substantial obstacles make it difficult to achieve in the short run. Hence, future research should examine the multi‐level structure of Social Europe in more detail to better grasp what Social Europe can and cannot deliver and why. Such research is not only relevant in the European Union but also in other multi‐level governance systems across the world.
- 26 May 2024
- Published by Wiley in Social Policy & Administration
- Vol. 58 (4) , 545-553
Open AccessTowards Social Europe? Obstacles and opportunities in the multi‐level governance of welfare states
Social Europe, or the social dimension of the European Union (EU), has been receiving increasing attention in academic debates. This special issue introduction discusses Social Europe through the analytical framework of multi‐level governance while asking, perhaps controversially, whether Social Europe has the potential to become a fully‐fledged welfare state. This introduction also summarises the articles included in this special issue which focus on different governance levels, including EU institutions, member states, national parties, economic sectors, workers and the general public. On this basis, the introduction identifies sources of challenges and opportunities for Social Europe from various levels of governance. We conclude that the needs and demands become more diverse when we move from European institutions to the citizens. Notably, obstacles from one governance level often carry over to another governance level. Consequently, it becomes much more difficult to design welfare policies on the EU level that work for everyone. While a more evolved EU‐level welfare state may be possible in the future, substantial obstacles make it difficult to achieve in the short run. Hence, future research should examine the multi‐level structure of Social Europe in more detail to better grasp what Social Europe can and cannot deliver and why. Such research is not only relevant in the European Union but also in other multi‐level governance systems across the world.
- Open Access
- 7 May 2024
- Published by Wiley in Social Policy & Administration
- Vol. 58 (4) , 672-685
The hidden side of Social Europe: Revealing welfare Euroscepticism through focus group discussions
While the public opinion literature on Social Europe is growing, so far, it relies on quantitative survey evidence that hides some of the arguments and motivations lying behind the standardized results. This article reveals through qualitative research that ‘welfare Euroscepticism’ (i.e., opposition towards Social Europe) needs more attention in the literature and explains why. Specifically, this article uses qualitative focus group discussions on Social Europe collected in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain (134 participants in total). The participants filled out a quantitative survey before the discussions started and these survey results are in line with the usual public opinion literature on Social Europe, that is, relatively supportive of the social dimension of the EU. However, multi‐faceted welfare Eurosceptic attitudes appeared throughout the discussion. While participants may support the general idea of a Social Europe, they are highly critical about how it actually works in practice. The analysis reveals that the public is sceptic towards both harmonizing social policies on the EU level and redistributive social policy instruments on the EU level. Three overarching and partly overlapping rationales appear to drive welfare Euroscepticism: (1) economic self‐interest, (2) cultural ideology and (3) the democratic deficit. The results emphasize the public preferences for more conditional redistributive policies and the need to make Social Europe more visible to the public.
- 7 May 2024
- Published by Wiley in Social Policy & Administration
- Vol. 58 (4) , 672-685
Open AccessThe hidden side of Social Europe: Revealing welfare Euroscepticism through focus group discussions
While the public opinion literature on Social Europe is growing, so far, it relies on quantitative survey evidence that hides some of the arguments and motivations lying behind the standardized results. This article reveals through qualitative research that ‘welfare Euroscepticism’ (i.e., opposition towards Social Europe) needs more attention in the literature and explains why. Specifically, this article uses qualitative focus group discussions on Social Europe collected in Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain (134 participants in total). The participants filled out a quantitative survey before the discussions started and these survey results are in line with the usual public opinion literature on Social Europe, that is, relatively supportive of the social dimension of the EU. However, multi‐faceted welfare Eurosceptic attitudes appeared throughout the discussion. While participants may support the general idea of a Social Europe, they are highly critical about how it actually works in practice. The analysis reveals that the public is sceptic towards both harmonizing social policies on the EU level and redistributive social policy instruments on the EU level. Three overarching and partly overlapping rationales appear to drive welfare Euroscepticism: (1) economic self‐interest, (2) cultural ideology and (3) the democratic deficit. The results emphasize the public preferences for more conditional redistributive policies and the need to make Social Europe more visible to the public.
- Open Access
- 25 March 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of European Social Policy
- Vol. 34 (2) , 117-127
A farewell to welfare? Conceptualising welfare populism, welfare chauvinism and welfare Euroscepticism
This conceptual article and special issue introduction argues for the importance of studying three policy paradigms surrounding welfare policy opposition. The first is welfare populism, the opposition to welfare policies that do not benefit the ‘common people’. The second is welfare chauvinism, the opposition to welfare policies for non-natives within a nation-state. The third is welfare Euroscepticism, the opposition to welfare policies at the European Union level. These paradigms have distinct causes and consequences that should be studied in more detail across different political actors. And while welfare policy opposition may not lead to a complete farewell to welfare, they have been shaping and will continue to shape welfare state recalibration. This article offers summaries of the special issue contributions with empirical snapshots of welfare policy opposition and concludes with avenues for future research.
- 25 March 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of European Social Policy
- Vol. 34 (2) , 117-127
Open AccessA farewell to welfare? Conceptualising welfare populism, welfare chauvinism and welfare Euroscepticism
This conceptual article and special issue introduction argues for the importance of studying three policy paradigms surrounding welfare policy opposition. The first is welfare populism, the opposition to welfare policies that do not benefit the ‘common people’. The second is welfare chauvinism, the opposition to welfare policies for non-natives within a nation-state. The third is welfare Euroscepticism, the opposition to welfare policies at the European Union level. These paradigms have distinct causes and consequences that should be studied in more detail across different political actors. And while welfare policy opposition may not lead to a complete farewell to welfare, they have been shaping and will continue to shape welfare state recalibration. This article offers summaries of the special issue contributions with empirical snapshots of welfare policy opposition and concludes with avenues for future research.
- Open Access
- 28 February 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of European Social Policy
- Vol. 34 (2) , 220-236
Welfare Euroscepticism and socioeconomic status
While the European Union (EU) increasingly strengthens its social integration, opposition towards this process can also be observed, here defined as ‘welfare Euroscepticism’. To better understand this newly defined policy paradigm, this article aims to explain longstanding cleavages in both social policy and EU research: socioeconomic status (SES) divides. Contrary to the literature on public support for European integration, this article argues that higher SES groups are more likely to be welfare Eurosceptics than lower SES groups. This argument and its underlying explanations are examined through a multilevel approach using European Social Survey data from 18 EU member states, using the example of a potential EU-wide minimum income scheme. First, the results demonstrate that welfare Euroscepticism is indeed more prevalent among higher SES groups than lower SES groups (measured through occupation, education, income, and employment). The results indicate robust self-interest patterns among higher SES groups that do not want to carry (perceived) financial burdens of EU social policies. The opinion patterns also emphasize the multidimensionality of attitudes towards EU policies since the SES cleavages can reverse, depending on the policy in focus. Overall, the results indicate much potential to mobilize the larger proportion of the public to support EU social policies, that is, lower SES groups. However, potential conflicts may arise when the EU expands on policies that their traditional supporters – higher SES groups – are more likely to oppose. The article also shows that welfare solidarity on the individual and the country level can mitigate such conflicts. This is because higher levels of welfare generosity and lower levels of welfare chauvinism on the individual and the country level are related to smaller SES cleavages.
- 28 February 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of European Social Policy
- Vol. 34 (2) , 220-236
Open AccessWelfare Euroscepticism and socioeconomic status
While the European Union (EU) increasingly strengthens its social integration, opposition towards this process can also be observed, here defined as ‘welfare Euroscepticism’. To better understand this newly defined policy paradigm, this article aims to explain longstanding cleavages in both social policy and EU research: socioeconomic status (SES) divides. Contrary to the literature on public support for European integration, this article argues that higher SES groups are more likely to be welfare Eurosceptics than lower SES groups. This argument and its underlying explanations are examined through a multilevel approach using European Social Survey data from 18 EU member states, using the example of a potential EU-wide minimum income scheme. First, the results demonstrate that welfare Euroscepticism is indeed more prevalent among higher SES groups than lower SES groups (measured through occupation, education, income, and employment). The results indicate robust self-interest patterns among higher SES groups that do not want to carry (perceived) financial burdens of EU social policies. The opinion patterns also emphasize the multidimensionality of attitudes towards EU policies since the SES cleavages can reverse, depending on the policy in focus. Overall, the results indicate much potential to mobilize the larger proportion of the public to support EU social policies, that is, lower SES groups. However, potential conflicts may arise when the EU expands on policies that their traditional supporters – higher SES groups – are more likely to oppose. The article also shows that welfare solidarity on the individual and the country level can mitigate such conflicts. This is because higher levels of welfare generosity and lower levels of welfare chauvinism on the individual and the country level are related to smaller SES cleavages.
- Open Access
- 1 November 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of European Social Policy
- Vol. 33 (5) , 555-569
Public preferences for social investment versus compensation policies in Social Europe
The recent enactment of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) has significantly strengthened the social dimension of the European Union (EU), including the social investment (SI) elements of that social dimension. What is not known, however, to what extent the priorization of SI is supported by the broader public. To address this research gap, we investigate public opinion on 15 different policy areas from the EPSR using Eurobarometer data from 2020 across all EU countries, asking whether the public rather prefers these policies to be delivered at EU or national level. A principal finding is that the public indeed supports more SI than CP policies with respect to EU-level social policy, and more CP than SI policies with respect to national-level social policy. We also investigate whether socioeconomic status (SES) and welfare state effort can explain this phenomenon. We find that higher socio-economic status and more generous welfare states are associated with more support for SI policies on both EU and national levels and vice versa. The findings emphasize the importance of what policies are provided versus who provides them but also pose a puzzle for trade-offs in multilevel governance settings. Hence, the article has important implications for future research on public opinion and Social Europe.
- 1 November 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of European Social Policy
- Vol. 33 (5) , 555-569
Open AccessPublic preferences for social investment versus compensation policies in Social Europe
The recent enactment of the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) has significantly strengthened the social dimension of the European Union (EU), including the social investment (SI) elements of that social dimension. What is not known, however, to what extent the priorization of SI is supported by the broader public. To address this research gap, we investigate public opinion on 15 different policy areas from the EPSR using Eurobarometer data from 2020 across all EU countries, asking whether the public rather prefers these policies to be delivered at EU or national level. A principal finding is that the public indeed supports more SI than CP policies with respect to EU-level social policy, and more CP than SI policies with respect to national-level social policy. We also investigate whether socioeconomic status (SES) and welfare state effort can explain this phenomenon. We find that higher socio-economic status and more generous welfare states are associated with more support for SI policies on both EU and national levels and vice versa. The findings emphasize the importance of what policies are provided versus who provides them but also pose a puzzle for trade-offs in multilevel governance settings. Hence, the article has important implications for future research on public opinion and Social Europe.
- Open Access
- 27 October 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Welfare Euroscepticism and Socioeconomic Status
While the European Union (EU) increasingly strengthens its social integration, opposition towards this process can also be observed, here defined as 'welfare Euroscepticism'. To better understand this newly defined policy paradigm, this paper aims to explain longstanding cleavages in both social policy and EU research: socioeconomic status (SES) divides. The main argument is, that SES groups tend to follow their self-interest regarding welfare Euroscepticism and particularly the EU-wide minimum income benefit proposal examined in this paper. This means, while it is usually the higher SES groups that support EU policies, EU social policies can be assumed to receive more support from lower SES groups. This main argument and its underlying explanations are examined through a multilevel approach using European Social Survey data from 18 EU member states. First, the results demonstrate that welfare Euroscepticism is indeed more prevalent among higher SES groups than lower SES groups (measured through occupation, education, income, and employment). The results indicate robust self-interest patterns among higher SES groups that do not want to carry (perceived) financial burdens of EU social policies. The opinion patterns also emphasise the multidimensionality of attitudes towards EU policies since the SES cleavages can reverse, depending on the policy in focus. Overall the results indicate much potential to mobilise the larger proportion of the public to support EU social policies, i.e., lower SES groups. However, potential conflicts may arise when the EU expands on policies their traditional supporters – higher SES groups – are more likely to oppose. The paper also shows that welfare solidarity on the individual and the country level can mitigate such conflicts. This is because higher levels of welfare generosity and lower levels of welfare chauvinism on the individual and the country level are related to smaller SES cleavages.
- 27 October 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessWelfare Euroscepticism and Socioeconomic Status
While the European Union (EU) increasingly strengthens its social integration, opposition towards this process can also be observed, here defined as 'welfare Euroscepticism'. To better understand this newly defined policy paradigm, this paper aims to explain longstanding cleavages in both social policy and EU research: socioeconomic status (SES) divides. The main argument is, that SES groups tend to follow their self-interest regarding welfare Euroscepticism and particularly the EU-wide minimum income benefit proposal examined in this paper. This means, while it is usually the higher SES groups that support EU policies, EU social policies can be assumed to receive more support from lower SES groups. This main argument and its underlying explanations are examined through a multilevel approach using European Social Survey data from 18 EU member states. First, the results demonstrate that welfare Euroscepticism is indeed more prevalent among higher SES groups than lower SES groups (measured through occupation, education, income, and employment). The results indicate robust self-interest patterns among higher SES groups that do not want to carry (perceived) financial burdens of EU social policies. The opinion patterns also emphasise the multidimensionality of attitudes towards EU policies since the SES cleavages can reverse, depending on the policy in focus. Overall the results indicate much potential to mobilise the larger proportion of the public to support EU social policies, i.e., lower SES groups. However, potential conflicts may arise when the EU expands on policies their traditional supporters – higher SES groups – are more likely to oppose. The paper also shows that welfare solidarity on the individual and the country level can mitigate such conflicts. This is because higher levels of welfare generosity and lower levels of welfare chauvinism on the individual and the country level are related to smaller SES cleavages.
- Open Access
- 30 August 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
A farewell to welfare? Conceptualising welfare populism, welfare chauvinism and welfare Euroscepticism
This conceptual paper argues for the importance of studying three policy paradigms on welfare opposition: First, welfare populism, the opposition to welfare state policies and their administration that do not benefit the ‘common people’. Second, welfare chauvinism, the opposition to the inclusion of non-natives who live in a nation-state from welfare provisions. Third and finally, welfare Euroscepticism, the opposition to the harmonization of welfare policies at the European Union level. We argue that these paradigms have distinct causes and consequences that should be studied across countries in more detail, including a focus on their multidimensional nature and different political actors. And while these paradigms may not lead to a complete farewell to welfare, they most certainly have been shaping and will continue to shape welfare state recalibration. Precisely, we argue that due to welfare opposition, welfare states continue to be influenced by radical right and neoliberal logics instead of focusing on diminishing inequality. This paper concludes with avenues for future research.
- 30 August 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessA farewell to welfare? Conceptualising welfare populism, welfare chauvinism and welfare Euroscepticism
This conceptual paper argues for the importance of studying three policy paradigms on welfare opposition: First, welfare populism, the opposition to welfare state policies and their administration that do not benefit the ‘common people’. Second, welfare chauvinism, the opposition to the inclusion of non-natives who live in a nation-state from welfare provisions. Third and finally, welfare Euroscepticism, the opposition to the harmonization of welfare policies at the European Union level. We argue that these paradigms have distinct causes and consequences that should be studied across countries in more detail, including a focus on their multidimensional nature and different political actors. And while these paradigms may not lead to a complete farewell to welfare, they most certainly have been shaping and will continue to shape welfare state recalibration. Precisely, we argue that due to welfare opposition, welfare states continue to be influenced by radical right and neoliberal logics instead of focusing on diminishing inequality. This paper concludes with avenues for future research.