Howard Rosenthal
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Howard Rosenthal has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Alberto Alesina
Harvard University, Massachusetts
1 shared publication- Christopher Hare
University of California, Davis
1 shared publication - James Lo
Institute for Social Research 426 Thompson Street 48104-2321. Ann Arbor MI
1 shared publication - Jeffrey B. Lewis
University of California
1 shared publication Keith T. Poole
1 shared publication- Royce Carroll
Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester, UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 25 June 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 212
Sequential referenda with sophisticated voters
- 25 June 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 212
Open AccessSequential referenda with sophisticated voters
- Open Access
- 26 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 176 (1-2) , 1-5
Introduction to the issue in honor of Keith T. Poole
- 26 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 176 (1-2) , 1-5
Open AccessIntroduction to the issue in honor of Keith T. Poole
- 9 May 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 176 (1-2) , 7-15
37 years with Keith T. Poole
- 9 May 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 176 (1-2) , 7-15
37 years with Keith T. Poole
- 21 October 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 3 (2) , 155-168
Some Simple Tests of Rational Voting and Agenda Setting
This article analyzes election data that permit simple tests of rational voting and agenda setting. The voting test pertains to aggregate election results. The prediction is that when voters have single-peaked preferences, there will be more opposition to the second of two budget proposals that are voted on simultaneously. Unlike the standard binary choice setting, not all voters have weakly undominated voting strategies, but the game among the voters can be solved simply by iterative application of weak dominance. The agenda-setting prediction tested is that agenda setters should make one proposal rather than two when given the option. The data come from Oregon school district financial elections from 1980–83, years in which the rules for these elections were abruptly changed.
- 21 October 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Science Research and Methods
- Vol. 3 (2) , 155-168
Some Simple Tests of Rational Voting and Agenda Setting
This article analyzes election data that permit simple tests of rational voting and agenda setting. The voting test pertains to aggregate election results. The prediction is that when voters have single-peaked preferences, there will be more opposition to the second of two budget proposals that are voted on simultaneously. Unlike the standard binary choice setting, not all voters have weakly undominated voting strategies, but the game among the voters can be solved simply by iterative application of weak dominance. The agenda-setting prediction tested is that agenda setters should make one proposal rather than two when given the option. The data come from Oregon school district financial elections from 1980–83, years in which the rules for these elections were abruptly changed.
- 26 January 2011
- Published by The R Foundation
basicspace: Recovering a Basic Space from Issue Scales
- 27 January 1995
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 83-120
The midterm cycle
Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy - January 1995
- 27 January 1995
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 83-120
The midterm cycle
Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy - January 1995
- 29 June 1990
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 199-234
The Setter Model
Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting - June 1990
- 29 June 1990
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 199-234
The Setter Model
Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting - June 1990