Mouna Karmani
Research Subjects
Mouna Karmani has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Belgacem Hamdi
Laboratoire d’Electroniques et Microélectroniques, Université de Monastir, Monastir 5000, Tunisia
2 shared publications - Amal Hkiri
Physic Department, Electronics and Micro-Electronics Laboratory, Faculty of Sciences of Monastir, Monastir, 5000, Tunisia
1 shared publication Mohsen Machhout
Faculty of Sciences of Monastir, Physics Department, Electronics and Micro-Electronics Laboratory (E. μ. E. L), University of Monastir, Monastir, 5019, Tunisia
1 shared publication- Mohsen Machhout
Laboratory of Electronics and Microelectronics (EµE), Faculty of Sciences of Monastir, University of Monastir, Monastir 5000, Tunisia
1 shared publication - Mohsen Machhout
Electronics and Micro-Electronics Laboratory, University of Monastir, Tunisia
1 shared publication Noura Benhadjyoussef
Faculty of Sciences of Monastir, Physics Department, Electronics and Micro-Electronics Laboratory (E. μ. E. L), University of Monastir, Monastir, 5019, Tunisia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 22 March 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 143-148
The Routing Protocol for low power and lossy networks (RPL) under Attack: Simulation and Analysis
Routing protocol for low power and lossy networks (RPL) is the underlying routing protocol of 6LoWPAN, a core communication standard for the Internet of Things. In terms of quality of service (QoS), device management, and energy efficiency, RPL beats competing wireless sensor and ad hoc routing protocols. However, several attacks could threaten the network due to the problem of unauthenticated or unencrypted control frames, centralized root controllers, compromised or unauthenticated devices. Thus, in this paper, we aim to investigate the effect of topology and Resources attacks on RPL.s efficiency. The Hello Flooding attack, Increase Number attack and Decrease Rank attack are the three forms of Resources attacks and Topology attacks respectively chosen to work on. The simulations were done to understand the impact of the three different attacks on RPL performances metrics including End-to-End Delay (E2ED), throughput, Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) and average power consumption. The findings show that the three attacks increased the E2ED, decreased the PDR and the network throughput, and degrades the network’, which further raises the power consumption of the network nodes.
- 22 March 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 143-148
The Routing Protocol for low power and lossy networks (RPL) under Attack: Simulation and Analysis
Routing protocol for low power and lossy networks (RPL) is the underlying routing protocol of 6LoWPAN, a core communication standard for the Internet of Things. In terms of quality of service (QoS), device management, and energy efficiency, RPL beats competing wireless sensor and ad hoc routing protocols. However, several attacks could threaten the network due to the problem of unauthenticated or unencrypted control frames, centralized root controllers, compromised or unauthenticated devices. Thus, in this paper, we aim to investigate the effect of topology and Resources attacks on RPL.s efficiency. The Hello Flooding attack, Increase Number attack and Decrease Rank attack are the three forms of Resources attacks and Topology attacks respectively chosen to work on. The simulations were done to understand the impact of the three different attacks on RPL performances metrics including End-to-End Delay (E2ED), throughput, Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) and average power consumption. The findings show that the three attacks increased the E2ED, decreased the PDR and the network throughput, and degrades the network’, which further raises the power consumption of the network nodes.
- Open Access
- 2 March 2021
- Published by Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) in IET Computers & Digital Techniques
- Vol. 15 (2) , 160-170
The DFA/DFT‐based hacking techniques and countermeasures: Case study of the 32‐bit AES encryption crypto‐core
Integrated circuits (ICs) design plays a significant role in the embedded‐system performance, reliability and security. Thus, the constant advances in very large‐scale integration technology have led to design and manufacture of very complex ICs based on the System on a Chip (SoC) approach design. Therefore, the embedded system testing is considered earlier during the design process and testability is used as one of the objectives for evaluating safety‐critical embedded system designs. On the other hand, embedded systems used in critical applications execute security‐critical commands and collect sensitive data protected by cryptographic keys and authentication codes. The data and the unauthorised access of these embedded devices is an obvious target for attackers in order to obtain control or extract internal data. In this paper we consider that by using Design for Testability (DFT) approaches an attacker can control and affect a security‐critical embedded system. Thus, the authors focus on the DFT approach, as a means of violation of the security and confidentiality of embedded systems with security‐critical goals. In addition, with or without insertion of DFT circuitry, the crypto‐core is always exposed to the powerful differential fault analysis (DFA) attack. Here, a 32‐bit AES crypto‐core is used as a case study in order to analyse the DFA‐ and the DFT‐based Hacking techniques. A countermeasure was performed in order to avoid any scan or even DFA attack attempt.
- 2 March 2021
- Published by Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) in IET Computers & Digital Techniques
- Vol. 15 (2) , 160-170
Open AccessThe DFA/DFT‐based hacking techniques and countermeasures: Case study of the 32‐bit AES encryption crypto‐core
Integrated circuits (ICs) design plays a significant role in the embedded‐system performance, reliability and security. Thus, the constant advances in very large‐scale integration technology have led to design and manufacture of very complex ICs based on the System on a Chip (SoC) approach design. Therefore, the embedded system testing is considered earlier during the design process and testability is used as one of the objectives for evaluating safety‐critical embedded system designs. On the other hand, embedded systems used in critical applications execute security‐critical commands and collect sensitive data protected by cryptographic keys and authentication codes. The data and the unauthorised access of these embedded devices is an obvious target for attackers in order to obtain control or extract internal data. In this paper we consider that by using Design for Testability (DFT) approaches an attacker can control and affect a security‐critical embedded system. Thus, the authors focus on the DFT approach, as a means of violation of the security and confidentiality of embedded systems with security‐critical goals. In addition, with or without insertion of DFT circuitry, the crypto‐core is always exposed to the powerful differential fault analysis (DFA) attack. Here, a 32‐bit AES crypto‐core is used as a case study in order to analyse the DFA‐ and the DFT‐based Hacking techniques. A countermeasure was performed in order to avoid any scan or even DFA attack attempt.
- 1 July 2019
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in Journal of Circuits, Systems and Computers
- Vol. 29 (03)
A Hybrid Countermeasure-Based Fault-Resistant AES Implementation
A Fault-Resistant scheme has been proposed to secure the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) against Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) attack. In this paper, a hybrid countermeasure has been presented in order to protect a 32-bits AES architecture proposed for resource-constrained embedded systems. A comparative study between the most well-known fault detection schemes in terms of fault detection capabilities and implementation cost has been proposed. Based on this study, we propose a hybrid fault resistant scheme to secure the AES using the parity detection for linear operations and the time redundancy for SubBytes operation. The proposed scheme is implemented on the Virtex-5 Xilinx FPGA board in order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed fault-resistant scheme in terms of area, time costs and fault coverage (FC). Experimental results prove that the countermeasure achieves a FC with about 98,82% of the injected faults detected during the 32-bits AES process. The area overhead of the proposed countermeasure is about 14% and the additional time delay is about 13%.
- 1 July 2019
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in Journal of Circuits, Systems and Computers
- Vol. 29 (03)
A Hybrid Countermeasure-Based Fault-Resistant AES Implementation
A Fault-Resistant scheme has been proposed to secure the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) against Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) attack. In this paper, a hybrid countermeasure has been presented in order to protect a 32-bits AES architecture proposed for resource-constrained embedded systems. A comparative study between the most well-known fault detection schemes in terms of fault detection capabilities and implementation cost has been proposed. Based on this study, we propose a hybrid fault resistant scheme to secure the AES using the parity detection for linear operations and the time redundancy for SubBytes operation. The proposed scheme is implemented on the Virtex-5 Xilinx FPGA board in order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed fault-resistant scheme in terms of area, time costs and fault coverage (FC). Experimental results prove that the countermeasure achieves a FC with about 98,82% of the injected faults detected during the 32-bits AES process. The area overhead of the proposed countermeasure is about 14% and the additional time delay is about 13%.