Junlong Chen

This study develops a duopoly model incorporating artificial intelligence (AI) R&D investment and wage bargaining to analyze firms' wage and AI investment decisions. The main findings are as follows: First, bargaining power and AI R&D investment efficiency affect equilibrium results regardless of bargaining function forms. Second, bargaining modes influence how AI R&D investment affects wages and firm behavior. Third, AI R&D investment decisions are jointly determined by bargaining mode, bargaining power and R&D investment efficiency. When high‐skilled labor and AI investment exist a complementary effect, worker welfare and social welfare remain unchanged under different bargaining modes.

Tariff is an effective means to protect domestic enterprises and improve the competitiveness of domestic products. This paper constructs a differentiated duopoly model considering endogenous timing to investigate the tariff policy and the impact of product differentiation on the equilibrium results. The conclusions are presented by analyzing the observable two-period delay game as follows. In quantity competition, the welfare-maximizing government sets the tariff level under the home-leading Stackelberg equilibrium, which is contained in the choices of the two firms in the subsequent observable delay game. In price competition, the Bertrand equilibrium is best for the government. However, either of the two Stackelberg equilibria is optimal in observable delay game. It suggests that adjusting the tariff level cannot sufficiently encourage the firms to adopt the welfare-maximizing duopoly determinately. Moreover, increasing product differentiation enhances the home social welfare in homeleading Stackelberg competition but reduces consumer surplus in Bertrand competition.

This study presents a vertical supply chain model that considers bargaining power to explore independent innovation and co‐innovation decisions and their impacts and analyzes the optimal subsidy strategy for co‐innovation. We find that collaboration promotes technology innovation. Increases in consumer innovation preferences and government subsidies are conducive to co‐innovation. Both independent and co‐innovation can promote Pareto improvements under limiting conditions. Government subsidies can improve co‐innovation performance, but the subsidy parameter needs to be regulated. The optimal subsidy strategy is influenced by the subsidy target and budget. Governments prefer an innovative degree subsidy or a production cost subsidy.

I. Global warming is a serious issue that negatively affects human health, ecological environment, and natural resources. Carbon emission reduction (CER) has reached common consensus worldwide. CER...