Ioannis Spyridopoulos
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Ioannis Spyridopoulos has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alexander W. Butler
Rice University, USA
1 shared publication - Celso Brunetti
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)
1 shared publication Jeffrey H. Harris
Kogod School of Business, American University, Washington, District of Columbia 20016
1 shared publication- Larry Fauver
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, USA
1 shared publication Morad Zekhnini
Michigan State University Broad College of Business
1 shared publication- Morad Zekhnini
Eli Broad College of Business, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (6) , 5463-5489
The Role of Networks in Loan Syndicate Markets
Several large, well-connected banks jointly underwrite the vast majority of syndicated loans. Although syndication reduces risk by spreading large loans across multiple banks and may benefit borrowers, the process may also facilitate collusive pricing. Disentangling these two effects requires a network view of loan syndicates as traditional measures of market concentration do not capture the collaborative nature of syndication. We find that well-connected banks offer 5- to 15-basis-point-lower loan rates. Well-connected lenders leverage their network position to structure larger, more dispersed syndicates with fewer coarrangers, allowing them to earn higher fee income and reduce their loan risk exposure. We address potential selection biases by exploiting the stickiness in firm-bank relationships and the transfer of credit relationships around forced mergers during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Using new supervisory data on borrowers’ loan repayment and on-site inspections, we find little evidence that connectedness is related to superior monitoring or performance. Our findings suggest that connectivity is instrumental in lowering loan prices rather than facilitating collusive pricing. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06313 .
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (6) , 5463-5489
The Role of Networks in Loan Syndicate Markets
Several large, well-connected banks jointly underwrite the vast majority of syndicated loans. Although syndication reduces risk by spreading large loans across multiple banks and may benefit borrowers, the process may also facilitate collusive pricing. Disentangling these two effects requires a network view of loan syndicates as traditional measures of market concentration do not capture the collaborative nature of syndication. We find that well-connected banks offer 5- to 15-basis-point-lower loan rates. Well-connected lenders leverage their network position to structure larger, more dispersed syndicates with fewer coarrangers, allowing them to earn higher fee income and reduce their loan risk exposure. We address potential selection biases by exploiting the stickiness in firm-bank relationships and the transfer of credit relationships around forced mergers during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Using new supervisory data on borrowers’ loan repayment and on-site inspections, we find little evidence that connectedness is related to superior monitoring or performance. Our findings suggest that connectivity is instrumental in lowering loan prices rather than facilitating collusive pricing. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06313 .
- Open Access
- 7 April 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 61 (1) , 281-314
The Epidemiology of Financial Constraints and Corporate Investment
We show that a firm’s financial constraints trigger investment disruptions that propagate through the production network. Propagation effects account for about half of the total investment reduction due to constraints. Network rigidities such as high input specificity and the scarcity of alternative partners amplify these spillovers. Firms mitigate investment disruptions by supporting constrained partners through trade credit or equity stakes. To bolster identification, we employ a Network Regression Discontinuity Design that accounts for spillovers. Our estimates are robust to network measurement error, endogenous selection, and various constraint measures. The results demonstrate that interdependent investments amplify the consequences of capital-market frictions.
- 7 April 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 61 (1) , 281-314
Open AccessThe Epidemiology of Financial Constraints and Corporate Investment
We show that a firm’s financial constraints trigger investment disruptions that propagate through the production network. Propagation effects account for about half of the total investment reduction due to constraints. Network rigidities such as high input specificity and the scarcity of alternative partners amplify these spillovers. Firms mitigate investment disruptions by supporting constrained partners through trade credit or equity stakes. To bolster identification, we employ a Network Regression Discontinuity Design that accounts for spillovers. Our estimates are robust to network measurement error, endogenous selection, and various constraint measures. The results demonstrate that interdependent investments amplify the consequences of capital-market frictions.
- 1 March 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Corporate Finance Studies
- Vol. 9 (1) , 44-80
Tough Love: The Effects of Debt Contract Design on Firms' Performance
I investigate whether restrictive loan covenants disrupt or improve firms' operating performance. Using an instrumental variables approach to address the endogenous relationship between covenant strictness and firms' efficiency, I find that stricter loan covenants lead to an increase in profitability and firm value even when firms do not violate a covenant. Stricter covenants improve performance only in firms with managerial agency conflicts: those without large shareholder ownership, facing softer competition in their product market, or with weaker shareholder rights. The evidence suggests that by designing stringent contracts ex ante, creditors create positive externalities in poorly governed firms through managerial incentives. Received December 7, 2018; editorial decision May 31, 2019 by Editor Uday Rajan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
- 1 March 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Corporate Finance Studies
- Vol. 9 (1) , 44-80
Tough Love: The Effects of Debt Contract Design on Firms' Performance
I investigate whether restrictive loan covenants disrupt or improve firms' operating performance. Using an instrumental variables approach to address the endogenous relationship between covenant strictness and firms' efficiency, I find that stricter loan covenants lead to an increase in profitability and firm value even when firms do not violate a covenant. Stricter covenants improve performance only in firms with managerial agency conflicts: those without large shareholder ownership, facing softer competition in their product market, or with weaker shareholder rights. The evidence suggests that by designing stringent contracts ex ante, creditors create positive externalities in poorly governed firms through managerial incentives. Received December 7, 2018; editorial decision May 31, 2019 by Editor Uday Rajan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
- 7 March 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 54 (3) , 1025-1050
Local Economic Spillover Effects of Stock Market Listings
We show that initial public offerings (IPOs) have nontrivial positive spillover effects on local labor markets, business environments, consumer spending, real estate, and migration. We mitigate endogeneity concerns about unobserved heterogeneity with restrictive geographic fixed effects coupled with a matching procedure. We show that it is the listing decision, which encompasses both a wealth and liquidity shock, that induces economic spillovers. Conditional on an IPO occurring, we estimate that an additional $10 million in IPO proceeds is associated with an extra 41 jobs and 0.7 new establishments locally.
- 7 March 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 54 (3) , 1025-1050
Local Economic Spillover Effects of Stock Market Listings
We show that initial public offerings (IPOs) have nontrivial positive spillover effects on local labor markets, business environments, consumer spending, real estate, and migration. We mitigate endogeneity concerns about unobserved heterogeneity with restrictive geographic fixed effects coupled with a matching procedure. We show that it is the listing decision, which encompasses both a wealth and liquidity shock, that induces economic spillovers. Conditional on an IPO occurring, we estimate that an additional $10 million in IPO proceeds is associated with an extra 41 jobs and 0.7 new establishments locally.