Ling Lei Lisic
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Ling Lei Lisic has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bret A. Johnson
George Mason University
2 shared publications - Lauren M. Cunningham
The University of Tennessee
2 shared publications - Cory A. Cassell
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, USA
1 shared publication - E. Scott Johnson
Vanderbilt University Nashville Tennessee USA
1 shared publication - Feng Gao
Rutgers University
1 shared publication - Ivy Xiying Zhang
University of California, Riverside, Riverside, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Top Cited Papers
- 9 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 28 (2) , 862-909
SEC comment letters on form S-4 and M&A accounting quality
- 9 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 28 (2) , 862-909
Top Cited PapersSEC comment letters on form S-4 and M&A accounting quality
- 5 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 28 (1) , 307-339
Corporate social performance and the managerial labor market
- 5 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 28 (1) , 307-339
Corporate social performance and the managerial labor market
- Top Cited Papers
- 31 July 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 24 (4) , 1252-1276
The readability of company responses to SEC comment letters and SEC 10-K filing review outcomes
- 31 July 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 24 (4) , 1252-1276
Top Cited PapersThe readability of company responses to SEC comment letters and SEC 10-K filing review outcomes
- 29 June 2019
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 37 (2) , 917-944
The Switch‐Up: An Examination of Changes in Earnings Management after Receiving SEC Comment Letters
The SEC has long asserted that earnings management practices result in adverse consequences for investors. We examine whether SEC oversight affects firms' accounting quality in terms of earnings management trade‐offs. We expect that increased firm‐specific regulatory scrutiny, in the form of an SEC comment letter, will induce management to switch from accrual‐based earnings management (AEM), which is a main focus of the SEC, to real‐activities‐based earnings management (REM), which is not likely to be commented on in the SEC's review process. Consistent with our predictions, we find that AEM is lower and REM is higher following the receipt of a comment letter, relative to non‐comment‐letter years and a propensity‐score‐matched sample of non‐comment‐letter firms. However, we do not find a significant difference in total earnings management (i.e., the sum of AEM and REM), suggesting that the higher REM acts as a substitute for lower AEM activity. We further find that our results are driven by accounting comments relating to estimates and accruals and not by classification‐only comments, which suggests that a comment letter that does not question specific issues associated with estimates and accruals is not a strong enough signal to induce the firm to change earnings management behavior. Additionally, the shift to REM is attenuated for firms with high institutional ownership. These results collectively suggest that the comment letter process effectively constrains AEM but has the unintended consequence of firms, on average, switching to REM.
- 29 June 2019
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 37 (2) , 917-944
The Switch‐Up: An Examination of Changes in Earnings Management after Receiving SEC Comment Letters
The SEC has long asserted that earnings management practices result in adverse consequences for investors. We examine whether SEC oversight affects firms' accounting quality in terms of earnings management trade‐offs. We expect that increased firm‐specific regulatory scrutiny, in the form of an SEC comment letter, will induce management to switch from accrual‐based earnings management (AEM), which is a main focus of the SEC, to real‐activities‐based earnings management (REM), which is not likely to be commented on in the SEC's review process. Consistent with our predictions, we find that AEM is lower and REM is higher following the receipt of a comment letter, relative to non‐comment‐letter years and a propensity‐score‐matched sample of non‐comment‐letter firms. However, we do not find a significant difference in total earnings management (i.e., the sum of AEM and REM), suggesting that the higher REM acts as a substitute for lower AEM activity. We further find that our results are driven by accounting comments relating to estimates and accruals and not by classification‐only comments, which suggests that a comment letter that does not question specific issues associated with estimates and accruals is not a strong enough signal to induce the firm to change earnings management behavior. Additionally, the shift to REM is attenuated for firms with high institutional ownership. These results collectively suggest that the comment letter process effectively constrains AEM but has the unintended consequence of firms, on average, switching to REM.
- 13 May 2019
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 36 (4) , 2521-2553
Does Audit Committee Accounting Expertise Help to Promote Audit Quality? Evidence from Auditor Reporting of Internal Control Weaknesses
In this study, we examine whether audit committee accounting expertise helps to promote audit quality by motivating auditors to conduct diligent internal control audits and make appropriate internal control assessments because audit committee accounting expertise safeguards auditors from dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. Among clients with existing and likely internal control material weaknesses (as proxied by future restatements of audited financial statements), we find a greater likelihood of adverse internal control audit opinions when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise (measured by the proportion of accounting experts on the audit committee). Among all clients, we find a lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal following an adverse internal control audit opinion when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise. In further analyses, we find that this lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal occurs when at least two audit committee members possess accounting expertise. We also find some evidence that CFO influence (but not CEO influence) over the audit committee negates the increased likelihood of adverse internal control opinions when internal control material weaknesses likely exist, as well as the decreased likelihood of auditor dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. These findings have important implications for regulators and corporate nominating committees interested in promoting audit committee effectiveness.
- 13 May 2019
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 36 (4) , 2521-2553
Does Audit Committee Accounting Expertise Help to Promote Audit Quality? Evidence from Auditor Reporting of Internal Control Weaknesses
In this study, we examine whether audit committee accounting expertise helps to promote audit quality by motivating auditors to conduct diligent internal control audits and make appropriate internal control assessments because audit committee accounting expertise safeguards auditors from dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. Among clients with existing and likely internal control material weaknesses (as proxied by future restatements of audited financial statements), we find a greater likelihood of adverse internal control audit opinions when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise (measured by the proportion of accounting experts on the audit committee). Among all clients, we find a lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal following an adverse internal control audit opinion when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise. In further analyses, we find that this lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal occurs when at least two audit committee members possess accounting expertise. We also find some evidence that CFO influence (but not CEO influence) over the audit committee negates the increased likelihood of adverse internal control opinions when internal control material weaknesses likely exist, as well as the decreased likelihood of auditor dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. These findings have important implications for regulators and corporate nominating committees interested in promoting audit committee effectiveness.