Zuoping Xiao

Exploring the pathways to optimize the cost of equity capital is critical for enhancing resource allocation efficiency in capital markets and strengthening investor confidence. However, corporate development is often constrained by adverse external environments. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2010 to 2022, this study examines how corruption influences the cost of equity capital and the moderating role of forward-looking information disclosure. The results show that corruption significantly increases firms’ cost of equity capital, while forward-looking disclosure helps mitigate this negative effect. However, such mitigating effects are only observed when disclosure is characterized by low textual similarity, high readability and a normal, positive managerial tone. The findings provide novel insights into how corruption in transition economies affects corporate financing decisions through informal channels and underscore the critical role of high-quality disclosure in countering the adverse impact of political corruption. The results suggest that in the context of China’s anti-corruption initiatives, simply requiring greater transparency from corporate agents may be insufficient to change managerial behavior. Equally important is the need to refine China’s disclosure regulations and improve accountability mechanisms, offering practical evidence for strengthening investor protection.

This study investigates how firm risk factors affect bank loan pricing. Although firm‐specific stock price crash risk affects bank loan costs directly, it also prompts other risks, including financial restatement and litigation, which in turn trigger higher bank loan costs. Strong internal and external governance mechanisms help reduce agency problems and improve information transparency, alleviating the adverse effect of stock price crash risk on loan costs. Our results confirm that bankers take good corporate governance into account in their bank loan decisions. We also show that bond investors price the adverse effect of stock price crash risk, prompting higher corporate bond costs. Futher evidence suggests that banks impose stricter non‐price terms, such as smaller loan size, shorter loan maturity, and a higher likelihood of collateral requirement, on firms with higher crash risk.

This study examines the moderating effect of judicial efficiency and creditor rights on the relationship between internal pyramid structure and leverage. The results suggest that the effect of the vertical and horizontal pyramid structures on leverage is positive and significant. We find that the impact of the pyramid’s vertical structure on leverage is more substantial than that of the horizontal structure. The results also reveal that judicial efficiency and creditor rights weaken the association between a complex ownership structure and leverage.