JXJiayan Xu

Jiayan Xu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Jiayan Xu has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    When Gray Markets Meet "Made in China": The Impacts of Global Markets and VAT Refund

    by Zhong-Zhong Jiang, Yuanji Zang, Jiayan Xu

    Motivated by the trend that gray market such as overseas shopping is thriving on E-commerce platforms, this paper investigates the impacts of gray market on global supply chain management. We consider a multinational firm (MNF) that outsources product manufacturing to a contract manufacturer (CM) in China and sells products in both the China market and overseas market. Owing to the price gap between the two markets, gray firm may purchase products in the low-price market and compete with the MNF in the high-price market. We build MNF-led Stackelberg game models under the two cases where the wholesale price between the CM and MNF is exogenously given or endogenously set by the CM. We also consider the impacts of China's partial value-added tax (VAT) refund policy and consumers' valuation discount for gray product. Our analysis shows that gray market emerges if the two markets are highly asymmetric in size. Moreover, the gray market is more likely to emerge with lower values of valuation discount, substitutability and VAT loss. We find that both the MNF and CM may be better off with the emergence of gray market. When the gray market doesn't emerge but poses a threat, the MNF strategically adjusts her global pricing strategy to prevent gray market. In this case, the threat of gray market always hurts the MNF and CM under exogenous wholesale price, but may improve the MNF's profit under endogenous wholesale price, since the CM is motivated to lower wholesale price to restore demand.

  • Group Buying Between Competitors: Exogenous and Endogenous Power Structures

    by Ke Fu, Guoming Lai, Weixin Shang, Jiayan Xu

    Competing firms may engage in group buying (GB) to benefit from a quantity discount from a common supplier. We study GB under different power structures (i.e., Nash and Stackelberg) and investigate how the power structures can be endogenized along with the resulting GB outcome. We employ a game-theoretic framework in which two firms under Cournot competition can group their purchases if it is beneficial compared to individual purchasing. We show that under exogenous power structures, when the two firms have highly asymmetric market bases, Nash GB is unattainable due to severe co-opetition conflict, and Stackelberg GB can better resolve the conflict. Our results suggest that power structures may fundamentally affect firms’ GB incentives, and no power structure is always superior to others. We then endogenize the power structures of the two firms based on a two-stage extended game. Using Pareto-risk dominance, we identify conditions under which one firm endogenously emerges as the Stackelberg leader with the rival as the follower, as well as the conditions under which both firms endogenously choose Nash GB or opt for independent purchasing. We demonstrate that the two firms can largely resolve the battle for GB leadership and achieve an efficient outcome in most cases. Our study is the first to compare different exogenous power structures and consider endogenous power structures in the context of GB.


  • When Gray Markets Meet “Made in China”: The Impacts of Global Markets and Value-Added Tax Refund

    by Zhong-Zhong Jiang, Yuanji Zang, Jiayan Xu

    Motivated by the trend that a gray market such as overseas shopping is thriving on E-commerce platforms, this paper investigates the impacts of the gray market on global supply chain management. We consider a multinational firm (MNF) that outsources product manufacturing to a contract manufacturer (CM) in China and sells products in both the China market and overseas market. Owing to the price gap between the two markets, gray firms may purchase products in the low-price market and compete with the MNF in the high-price market. We build MNF-led Stackelberg game models under the two cases where the wholesale price between the CM and MNF is exogenously given or endogenously set by the CM. We also consider the impacts of China’s partial value-added tax (VAT) refund policy and consumers’ valuation discount for gray products. Our analysis shows that the gray market emerges if the two markets are highly asymmetric in size. Moreover, the gray market is more likely to emerge with lower values of valuation discount, substitutability, and VAT loss. We find that both the MNF and CM may be better off with the emergence of the gray market. When the gray market does not emerge but poses a threat, the MNF strategically adjusts her global pricing strategy to prevent the gray market. In this case, the threat of the gray market always hurts the MNF and CM under exogenous wholesale price, but may improve the MNF’s profit under endogenous wholesale price, since the CM is motivated to lower wholesale price to restore demand.


  • Open Access

    Remanufacturing and Product Recovery Strategies Considering Chain-to-Chain Competition and Power Structures

    by Housheng Duan, Jiayan Xu

    In addition to its economic potential and environmental significance, remanufacturing shows strategic importance in competition. Product recovery, a fundamental part of the remanufacturing system, should be aligned with the competition between supply chains. Moreover, the power structure of the supply chain influences interactive decisions. In this study, we investigate how supply chain competition and power structure influence product recovery strategies. We model the problem in two competing supply chains, where the manufacturers sell products through the respective retailers. Either manufacturer can choose between two product recovery strategies: collecting the used products for remanufacturing directly (that is, direct recovery) or assigning the task of product recovery to the retailer (indirect recovery). In addition, we conduct full-blown exploration of the impact of power structures, including Stackelberg-Manufacturer as the leader, Stackelberg-Retailer as the leader, and vertical Nash. The results reveal the joint inter- and intra-channel implications of the product recovery strategies.


  • The coopetition effect of learning-by-doing in outsourcing

    by Sijing Deng, Xu Guan, Jiayan Xu

    Learning-by-doing is a prevailing phenomenon in which a firm's production cost decreases in its production quantity. We build a two-period model to investigate the coopetition effect of learning-by-doing in a supply chain with two competing original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) outsourcing to a common contract manufacturer (CM) whose production exhibits the learning-by-doing effect. Excluding the learning cooperation between OEMs, the learning-by-doing intensifies the price competition to such an extent that OEMs' two-period overall profits could be lower than the case of no learning. Outsourcing to a common CM brings OEMs higher learning benefits which dominate the negative effect of intensified competition. OEMs' two-period overall profits are always higher in this case. Interestingly, increasing the product substitution rate has two opposite effects on the OEMs' overall profits. Under certain condition, OEMs' profits might be increasing in the substitution rate since the positive cooperation effect dominates the negative competition effect. With coopetition effect of learning-by-doing, we show that OEMs' other simpler pricing strategies, such as myopic pricing and uniform pricing, may outperform the strategic differential pricing strategy. Moreover, when the two OEMs are significantly differentiated in market base, the larger OEM may prefer not outsourcing to a common CM due to the coopetition concern. Finally, we find that asymmetric production learning and CM's pricing power have important impacts on OEMs' decisions and profits.