Abraham L. Wickelgren
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Abraham L. Wickelgren has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jin-Hyuk Kim
Department of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, USA
1 shared publication - Liad Wagman
Illinois Institute of Technology - Stuart School of Business, IIT
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 12 October 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 28 (3) , 373-391
The impact of access to consumer data on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers and exclusive dealing
We examine the influence of firms’ ability to employ individualized pricing on the welfare consequences of horizontal mergers. In a two‐to‐one merger, the merger reduces consumer surplus more when firms can price discriminate based on individual preferences compared to when they cannot. However, the opposite holds true in a three‐to‐two merger, in which the reduction in consumer surplus is substantially lower with individualized pricing than with uniform pricing. Further, the merger requires an even smaller marginal cost reduction to justify when an upstream data provider can make exclusive offers for its data to downstream firms. We also show that exclusive contracts for consumer data pose significant antitrust concerns independent of merger considerations. Implications for vertical integration and data mergers are drawn.
- 12 October 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 28 (3) , 373-391
The impact of access to consumer data on the competitive effects of horizontal mergers and exclusive dealing
We examine the influence of firms’ ability to employ individualized pricing on the welfare consequences of horizontal mergers. In a two‐to‐one merger, the merger reduces consumer surplus more when firms can price discriminate based on individual preferences compared to when they cannot. However, the opposite holds true in a three‐to‐two merger, in which the reduction in consumer surplus is substantially lower with individualized pricing than with uniform pricing. Further, the merger requires an even smaller marginal cost reduction to justify when an upstream data provider can make exclusive offers for its data to downstream firms. We also show that exclusive contracts for consumer data pose significant antitrust concerns independent of merger considerations. Implications for vertical integration and data mergers are drawn.
- 1 August 2003
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in American Law and Economics Review
- Vol. 5 (2) , 377-411
Justifying Imprisonment: On the Optimality of Excessively Costly Punishment
The criminal punishment literature has focused on justifying nonmaximal punishments and the use of nonmonetary sanctions. It has not addressed why imprisonment, rather than cheaper forms of corporal punishment, should be the dominant type of nonmonetary sanctions. David Friedman (1999) recently hypothesized that, because convicts lack political influence, it is desirable to make punishment costlier than necessary to prevent policy makers from excessively punishing convicts. This article explicitly models this hypothesis and uses simulations to determine under what circumstances this hypothesis justifies using imprisonment rather than cheaper nonmonetary sanctions.
- 1 August 2003
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in American Law and Economics Review
- Vol. 5 (2) , 377-411
Justifying Imprisonment: On the Optimality of Excessively Costly Punishment
The criminal punishment literature has focused on justifying nonmaximal punishments and the use of nonmonetary sanctions. It has not addressed why imprisonment, rather than cheaper forms of corporal punishment, should be the dominant type of nonmonetary sanctions. David Friedman (1999) recently hypothesized that, because convicts lack political influence, it is desirable to make punishment costlier than necessary to prevent policy makers from excessively punishing convicts. This article explicitly models this hypothesis and uses simulations to determine under what circumstances this hypothesis justifies using imprisonment rather than cheaper nonmonetary sanctions.