Chadni Islam

Malicious Python packages make software supply chains vulnerable by exploiting trust in open-source repositories like Python Package Index (PyPI). Lack of real-time behavioral monitoring makes metadata inspection and static code analysis inadequate against advanced attack strategies such as typosquatting, covert remote access activation, and dynamic payload generation. To address these challenges, we introduce DySec, a machine learning (ML)-based dynamic analysis framework for PyPI that uses eBPF kernel and user-level probes to monitor behaviors during package installation. By capturing 36 real-time features–including system calls, network traffic, resource usage, directory access, and installation patterns–DySec detects threats like typosquatting, covert remote access activation, dynamic payload generation, and multiphase attack malware. We developed a comprehensive dataset of 14,271 Python packages, including 7,127 malicious sample traces, by executing them in a controlled isolated environment. Experimental results demonstrate that DySec achieves 96% detection accuracy with an ML inference latency of <0.5s after dynamic feature extraction, reducing false negatives by 78.65% compared to static analysis and 82.24% compared to metadata analysis. During the evaluation, DySec flagged eleven packages that PyPI classified as benign. A manual analysis, including installation behavior inspection, confirmed six of them as malicious. These findings were reported to PyPI maintainers, resulting in the removal of four packages. DySec bridges the gap between reactive traditional methods and proactive, scalable threat mitigation in open-source ecosystems by uniquely detecting malicious install-time behaviors.

Security Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) are crucial for ensuring software security. However, their misuse introduces vulnerabilities, potentially leading to severe data breaches and substantial financial loss. Complex API design, inadequate documentation, and insufficient security training often lead to unintentional misuse by developers. The software security community has devised and evaluated several approaches to detecting security API misuse to help developers and organizations. This study rigorously reviews the literature on detecting misuse of security APIs to gain a comprehensive understanding of this critical domain. Our goal is to identify and analyze security API misuses, the detection approaches developed, and the evaluation methodologies employed along with the open research avenues to advance the state-of-the-art in this area. Employing the systematic literature review (SLR) methodology, we analyzed 69 research articles. Our review has yielded (a) identification of 6 security API types; (b) classification of 30 distinct misuses; (c) categorization of detection techniques into heuristic-based and ML-based approaches; and (d) identification of 10 performance measures and 9 evaluation benchmarks. The review reveals a lack of coverage of detection approaches in several areas. We recommend that future efforts focus on aligning security API development with developers’ needs and advancing standardized evaluation methods for detection technologies.

Malicious Python packages make software supply chains vulnerable by exploiting trust in open-source repositories like Python Package Index (PyPI). Lack of real-time behavioral monitoring makes metadata inspection and static code analysis inadequate against advanced attack strategies such as typosquatting, covert remote access activation, and dynamic payload generation. To address these challenges, we introduce DySec, a machine learning (ML)-based dynamic analysis framework for PyPI that uses eBPF kernel and user-level probes to monitor behaviors during package installation. By capturing 36 real-time features-including system calls, network traffic, resource usage, directory access, and installation patterns-DySec detects threats like typosquatting, covert remote access activation, dynamic payload generation, and multiphase attack malware. We developed a comprehensive dataset of 14,271 Python packages, including 7,127 malicious sample traces, by executing them in a controlled isolated environment. Experimental results demonstrate that DySec achieves a 95.99\% detection accuracy with a latency of <0.5s, reducing false negatives by 78.65\% compared to static analysis and 82.24\% compared to metadata analysis. During the evaluation, DySec flagged 11 packages that PyPI classified as benign. A manual analysis, including installation behavior inspection, confirmed six of them as malicious. These findings were reported to PyPI maintainers, resulting in the removal of four packages. DySec bridges the gap between reactive traditional methods and proactive, scalable threat mitigation in open-source ecosystems by uniquely detecting malicious install-time behaviors.

The increasing trend of using Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation raises the question of their capability to generate trustworthy code. While many researchers are exploring the utility of code generation for uncovering software vulnerabilities, one crucial but often overlooked aspect is the security Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). APIs play an integral role in upholding software security, yet effectively integrating security APIs presents substantial challenges. This leads to inadvertent misuse by developers, thereby exposing software to vulnerabilities. To overcome these challenges, developers may seek assistance from LLMs. In this paper, we systematically assess ChatGPT's trustworthiness in code generation for security API use cases in Java. To conduct a thorough evaluation, we compile an extensive collection of 48 programming tasks for 5 widely used security APIs. We employ both automated and manual approaches to effectively detect security API misuse in the code generated by ChatGPT for these tasks. Our findings are concerning: around 70% of the code instances across 30 attempts per task contain security API misuse, with 20 distinct misuse types identified. Moreover, for roughly half of the tasks, this rate reaches 100%, indicating that there is a long way to go before developers can rely on ChatGPT to securely implement security API code.

The increasing trend of using Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation raises the question of their capability to generate trustworthy code. While many researchers are exploring the utility of code generation for uncovering software vulnerabilities, one crucial but often overlooked aspect is the security Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). APIs play an integral role in upholding software security, yet effectively integrating security APIs presents substantial challenges. This leads to inadvertent misuse by developers, thereby exposing software to vulnerabilities. To overcome these challenges, developers may seek assistance from LLMs. In this paper, we systematically assess ChatGPT's trustworthiness in code generation for security API use cases in Java. To conduct a thorough evaluation, we compile an extensive collection of 48 programming tasks for 5 widely used security APIs. We employ both automated and manual approaches to effectively detect security API misuse in the code generated by ChatGPT for these tasks. Our findings are concerning: around 70% of the code instances across 30 attempts per task contain security API misuse, with 20 distinct misuse types identified. Moreover, for roughly half of the tasks, this rate reaches 100%, indicating that there is a long way to go before developers can rely on ChatGPT to securely implement security API code.

The emerging threat landscape causes continuous change in the Incident Response Process (IRP) and security tools of security orchestration platforms (SOAR). Users of such platforms often struggle to adapt to these changes because they are addressed in an ad-hoc manner through a complex architecture. The complex design of the SOAR can be hidden behind an easy-to-use user interface. This paper introduces a Declarative API (DAPI)-driven Orchestration approach, DecOr, that alleviates the need for security teams' detailed understanding of the libraries and plugins to address the changes of a SOAR. DecOr comprises (i) three sets of dAPIs to encapsulate the activities of security orchestration and (ii) a semantic framework to support the design and generation of dAPIs from task descriptions, leveraging natural language processing techniques. The dAPIs are mapped with an ontological knowledge base to execute IRPs. We experimentally evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of DecOr based on 147 task and dAPI pairs, curated from real-world playbooks. We show the end-to-end process from identifying dAPIs to executing 48 IRPs with seven security tools. The evaluation results show, DecOr accurately generates dAPIs in near real-time, with precision and recall values over 80% and successfully executes changing IRPs 93% of the time.

An Operating System (OS) combines multiple interdependent software packages, which usually have their own independently developed architectures. When a multitude of independent packages are placed together in an OS, an implicit inter-package architecture is formed. For an evolutionary effort, designers/developers of OS can greatly benefit from fully understanding the system-wide dependency focused on individual files, specifically executable files, and dynamically loadable libraries. We propose a framework, DepEx, aimed at discovering the detailed package relations at the level of individual binary files and their associated evolutionary changes. We demonstrate the utility of DepEx by systematically investigating the evolution of a large-scale Open Source OS, Ubuntu. DepEx enabled us to systematically acquire and analyze the dependencies in different versions of Ubuntu released between 2005 (5.04) to 2023 (23.04). Our analysis revealed various evolutionary trends in package management and their implications based on the analysis of the 84 consecutive versions available for download (these include beta versions). This study has enabled us to assert that DepEx can provide researchers and practitioners with a better understanding of the implicit software dependencies in order to improve the stability, performance, and functionality of their software as well as to reduce the risk of issues arising during maintenance, updating, or migration.