Sang-Yi Shin

This paper examines the association between analyst coverage and corporate social performance, using comprehensive donation expense data from Korea. Following analyst “investor recognition view”, analyst coverage might be the one of the key determinants of firms’ CSP to higher firms’ reputational capital. The empirical results suggest that analyst coverage is, on average, positively associated with corporate social performance (CSP) and that this positive association is more pronounced in a non-chaebol (i.e., non-large industrial conglomerate) sample. Further this result is consistent with a battery of robustness tests, such as alternative use of CSP, interaction analysis, two-stage least square regression (2SLS) and alternative use of analyst coverage. This paper goes beyond prior literature using audited donation expense and chaebol data, this paper shows that analysts could partially provide information to enhance firms’ reputations and thus their reputational capital by attending to CSP which would be regarded as pertinent firms’ sustainability. Furthermore, this tendency is more pronounced in relatively lower-reputation firms, such as non-chaebol ones in Korea. Mainstream literature on CSR is conducted within the context of developed countries, such as the U.S. or the U.K., leaving the empirical question as to whether such results apply to other developing countries such as Korea. So, using unique corporate giving data, this paper investigate analyst coverage might enhance firms’ CSP even in a relatively poor information environment such as Korea.

This study examines the effects of labor union influence on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of Korean firms, which is regarded as a pertinent sustainable factor to meet the various demands of the organizations around a firm. Further, this paper implies that labor unions might be part of a group of stakeholders that affect firms’ CSR activity. The empirical results suggest labor union existence as well as the labor unionization ratio is negatively associated with firms’ CSR activity. Additionally, this negative association is more pronounced for non-owner manager firms. Additional robustness tests using quantile regression, two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, and the Heckman two-step analysis support the above findings. Therefore, we conclude that labor unions might cooperate with non-owner managers to decrease firms’ CSR activity because decreasing CSR expenditure makes for a favorable wage negotiation process that advocates labor unions’ rent seeking behavior and non-owner managers’ agreement with labor unions in terms of business performance during their tenure.