Fabio Monteforte
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Fabio Monteforte has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Emanuele Millemaci
Department of Economics, University of Messina, Messina, Italy
5 shared publications - Jonathan Temple
University of Bristol
3 shared publications Emanuele Millemaci
2 shared publicationsJonathan R. W. Temple
2 shared publicationsPaolo Fabrizio Mustica
2 shared publications- Antonio Miralles
Department of Economics, The University of Messina, Messina ME 98122, Italy
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 5 December 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Do Special Economic Zones Boost Employment? Evidence from a Meta-Analysis
This paper investigates whether Special Economic Zones (SEZs) effectively foster em-ployment through a comprehensive meta-analysis. While numerous country-level studieshave examined SEZ policies, their results remain fragmented and potentially biased bymethodological and publication-related factors. To address this gap, we compile a meta-regression dataset of 851 estimates from 33 empirical studies that quantify the impactof SEZs on employment. Once corrected for publication bias, the average effect of SEZprograms on employment approaches zero. However, heterogeneous results emerge acrossdifferent development contexts, with developing countries recording significant employ-ment gains compared to their developed counterparts.
- 5 December 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessDo Special Economic Zones Boost Employment? Evidence from a Meta-Analysis
This paper investigates whether Special Economic Zones (SEZs) effectively foster em-ployment through a comprehensive meta-analysis. While numerous country-level studieshave examined SEZ policies, their results remain fragmented and potentially biased bymethodological and publication-related factors. To address this gap, we compile a meta-regression dataset of 851 estimates from 33 empirical studies that quantify the impactof SEZs on employment. Once corrected for publication bias, the average effect of SEZprograms on employment approaches zero. However, heterogeneous results emerge acrossdifferent development contexts, with developing countries recording significant employ-ment gains compared to their developed counterparts.
- Open Access
- 10 October 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
In the Right Zone? Firm-Level Evidence from Italy’s Special Economic Zones
This study evaluates the impact of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Southern Italy using a panel of firm-level data (2014–2023) and policy evaluation methods, including heterogeneous and synthetic Difference-in-Differences. SEZs, introduced in 2017 to re- duce regional disparities via tax incentives and administrative simplifications, are found from the outset to additionally increase tangible capital assets by 19%, while their effects on employment remain limited. Notably, the policy is more effective in areas with lower institutional quality, highlighting the importance of administrative efficiency in disad- vantaged contexts. Moreover, firm-specific characteristics contribute to explain observed heterogeneity of the impact, suggesting that tailored implementation strategies could en- hance SEZ performance.
- 10 October 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessIn the Right Zone? Firm-Level Evidence from Italy’s Special Economic Zones
This study evaluates the impact of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Southern Italy using a panel of firm-level data (2014–2023) and policy evaluation methods, including heterogeneous and synthetic Difference-in-Differences. SEZs, introduced in 2017 to re- duce regional disparities via tax incentives and administrative simplifications, are found from the outset to additionally increase tangible capital assets by 19%, while their effects on employment remain limited. Notably, the policy is more effective in areas with lower institutional quality, highlighting the importance of administrative efficiency in disad- vantaged contexts. Moreover, firm-specific characteristics contribute to explain observed heterogeneity of the impact, suggesting that tailored implementation strategies could en- hance SEZ performance.
- 5 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 247
Electing for stability: Democracy and output volatility, 1960-2019
- 5 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 247
Electing for stability: Democracy and output volatility, 1960-2019
- Open Access
Have Autocrats Governed for the Long Term?
The short answer is: probably not. We infer the priorities of national governments from observed outcomes, constructing a statistical proxy for long‐term benevolence. Using data between 1960 and 2019 for more than 100 countries, we show that, on average, democracies score more highly on our measure. We then investigate whether variation in long‐term benevolence can explain the ‘autocratic gamble’—the well‐known tendency for growth rates to vary more widely across autocracies than across democracies. We show that the distribution of long‐term benevolence under democracy first‐order stochastically dominates its distribution under autocracy. Put differently, although there is an autocratic gamble in growth rates, there is no autocratic gamble in wider development outcomes. The rapid growth seen in some autocracies probably originates in regime self‐interest rather than unusually benevolent leadership.
Open AccessHave Autocrats Governed for the Long Term?
The short answer is: probably not. We infer the priorities of national governments from observed outcomes, constructing a statistical proxy for long‐term benevolence. Using data between 1960 and 2019 for more than 100 countries, we show that, on average, democracies score more highly on our measure. We then investigate whether variation in long‐term benevolence can explain the ‘autocratic gamble’—the well‐known tendency for growth rates to vary more widely across autocracies than across democracies. We show that the distribution of long‐term benevolence under democracy first‐order stochastically dominates its distribution under autocracy. Put differently, although there is an autocratic gamble in growth rates, there is no autocratic gamble in wider development outcomes. The rapid growth seen in some autocracies probably originates in regime self‐interest rather than unusually benevolent leadership.
- Open Access
- 2 August 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Electing for stability: Democracy and output volatility, 1960-2019
This paper examines the relationship between output volatility and democracy, decade by decade after 1960. Using a range of approaches to identification, we find that democracy lowers volatility.
- 2 August 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessElecting for stability: Democracy and output volatility, 1960-2019
This paper examines the relationship between output volatility and democracy, decade by decade after 1960. Using a range of approaches to identification, we find that democracy lowers volatility.
- Open Access
- 23 December 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Have autocrats governed for the long term?
The short answer is: probably not. We infer the priorities of national governments fromobserved outcomes, constructing a statistical proxy for long-term benevolence. Using databetween 1960 and 2019 for more than 100 countries, we show that, on average, democraciesscore more highly on our measure.We then investigate whether variation in long-termbenevolence can explain the ‘autocratic gamble’ - the well-known tendency for growthrates to vary more widely across autocracies than across democracies. We show that thedistribution of long-term benevolence under democracy first-order stochastically dominatesits distribution under autocracy. Put differently, although there is an autocraticgamble in growth rates, there is no autocratic gamble in wider development outcomes.The rapid growth seen in some autocracies probably originates in regime self-interestrather than unusually benevolent leadership.
- 23 December 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessHave autocrats governed for the long term?
The short answer is: probably not. We infer the priorities of national governments fromobserved outcomes, constructing a statistical proxy for long-term benevolence. Using databetween 1960 and 2019 for more than 100 countries, we show that, on average, democraciesscore more highly on our measure.We then investigate whether variation in long-termbenevolence can explain the ‘autocratic gamble’ - the well-known tendency for growthrates to vary more widely across autocracies than across democracies. We show that thedistribution of long-term benevolence under democracy first-order stochastically dominatesits distribution under autocracy. Put differently, although there is an autocraticgamble in growth rates, there is no autocratic gamble in wider development outcomes.The rapid growth seen in some autocracies probably originates in regime self-interestrather than unusually benevolent leadership.
- Open Access
- 9 October 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 24 (1) , 69-96
Search and Matching in Political Corruption
We develop a search and matching model to analyze the dynamics of the political corruption market. This model serves as a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of a set of anti-corruption policies. Contrary to expectations, conventional policies such as enhancing penalties or allocating greater resources to criminal investigations do not universally emerge as the most effective tools. For mitigating small-scale political corruption, the optimal strategy is to curtail corruption signaling, achieved, for instance, through enhancing transparency and competitiveness in the exchanges between entrepreneurs and politicians. For large-scale corruption, raising the costs of corruption signaling proves less effective as a deterrent compared to ex-post policy measures, such as improved detection effectiveness and harsher sanctions.
- 9 October 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 24 (1) , 69-96
Open AccessSearch and Matching in Political Corruption
We develop a search and matching model to analyze the dynamics of the political corruption market. This model serves as a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of a set of anti-corruption policies. Contrary to expectations, conventional policies such as enhancing penalties or allocating greater resources to criminal investigations do not universally emerge as the most effective tools. For mitigating small-scale political corruption, the optimal strategy is to curtail corruption signaling, achieved, for instance, through enhancing transparency and competitiveness in the exchanges between entrepreneurs and politicians. For large-scale corruption, raising the costs of corruption signaling proves less effective as a deterrent compared to ex-post policy measures, such as improved detection effectiveness and harsher sanctions.
- 30 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 51-71
Tourism Flows in Italy: The Role of Local Public Policies Toward Disability
- 30 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 51-71
Tourism Flows in Italy: The Role of Local Public Policies Toward Disability
- 27 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Economics of Governance
- Vol. 21 (4) , 363-384
The autocratic gamble: evidence from robust variance tests
- 27 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Economics of Governance
- Vol. 21 (4) , 363-384
The autocratic gamble: evidence from robust variance tests
- 1 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Economic Modelling
- Vol. 86, 148-169
Structural change, the push-pull hypothesis and the Spanish labour market
- 1 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Economic Modelling
- Vol. 86, 148-169
Structural change, the push-pull hypothesis and the Spanish labour market