Terence Daniel Dores Cruz
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Terence Daniel Dores Cruz has a total of 624 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Paul A. M. Van Lange
VU Amsterdam
9 shared publications Bianca Beersma
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands
8 shared publications- Bianca Beersma
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Amsterdam The Netherlands
8 shared publications - Catherine Molho
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole 1
6 shared publications Annika S. Nieper
Department of Organization Sciences 6
5 shared publicationsFrancesca Righetti
Department of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Institute for Brain and Behaviour Amsterdam (IBBA) 1
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in The Leadership Quarterly
- Vol. 37 (6)
Think political leader — think he or she? A multi-country test of a gender-fair language intervention to reduce gendered leadership stereotypes
- 21 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in The Leadership Quarterly
- Vol. 37 (6)
Open AccessThink political leader — think he or she? A multi-country test of a gender-fair language intervention to reduce gendered leadership stereotypes
- Open Access
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Think Political Leader — Think He or She? A Multi-Country Test of a Gender Fair Language Intervention for Stereotype Bias
Women are greatly underrepresented in positions of political leadership around the world. In seeking to explain this underrepresentation, some researchers have pointed to people’s tendencies to stereotype leaders as more similar to men than women as these tendencies can support the belief that women are unsuited to leadership. This project aimed to test whether a subtle linguistic intervention was able to ameliorate this gender bias in political leadership stereotypes across different languages and national contexts (country N = 42, sample N = 22,995). Specifically, this project examined whether gender fair language (e.g., the use of paired pronouns ‘he or she’) can reduce the tendency for people to stereotype political leaders as more similar to men than women. To increase the rigor with which these stereotypes were measured, this project complemented the dominant ‘cheap talk’ measure of personal stereotype content with a novel incentivised community measure of this content. As expected, participants stereotyped political leaders as more similar to men than women; this pattern was stronger on the incentivised measure of community stereotypes. Unexpectedly, there was no evidence that paired pronouns reduced this bias (there was weak exploratory evidence that paired nouns increased participants’ tendencies to stereotype political leaders as more similar to women). This project suggests that the ability of gender fair language interventions to ameliorate gender bias in the political leadership domain may be limited.
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessThink Political Leader — Think He or She? A Multi-Country Test of a Gender Fair Language Intervention for Stereotype Bias
Women are greatly underrepresented in positions of political leadership around the world. In seeking to explain this underrepresentation, some researchers have pointed to people’s tendencies to stereotype leaders as more similar to men than women as these tendencies can support the belief that women are unsuited to leadership. This project aimed to test whether a subtle linguistic intervention was able to ameliorate this gender bias in political leadership stereotypes across different languages and national contexts (country N = 42, sample N = 22,995). Specifically, this project examined whether gender fair language (e.g., the use of paired pronouns ‘he or she’) can reduce the tendency for people to stereotype political leaders as more similar to men than women. To increase the rigor with which these stereotypes were measured, this project complemented the dominant ‘cheap talk’ measure of personal stereotype content with a novel incentivised community measure of this content. As expected, participants stereotyped political leaders as more similar to men than women; this pattern was stronger on the incentivised measure of community stereotypes. Unexpectedly, there was no evidence that paired pronouns reduced this bias (there was weak exploratory evidence that paired nouns increased participants’ tendencies to stereotype political leaders as more similar to women). This project suggests that the ability of gender fair language interventions to ameliorate gender bias in the political leadership domain may be limited.
- Open Access
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science
A Multi-Country Study of Women’s Political Representation and Gendered Political Leadership Stereotypes
Political leadership positions are dominated by men. Arguably the most visible of a society’s positions of power, these positions may be important symbols of women’s ability to lead. If so, levels of female political representation within a society should shape its stereotypes of women’s suitability for political leadership. This project will test this possibility by conducting a secondary analysis of a dataset that measured the stereotypes of women, men and political leaders in 44 countries covering six continents (Nsample = 23,256). Specifically, we will test whether, as a country’s representation of women in political leadership increases, there is a greater increase in the congruence of that country’s stereotypes of political leaders and women than in the congruence of that country’s stereotypes of political leaders and men. We will also conduct exploratory analyses to identity whether other socio-ecological and cultural variables correlate with cross-national heterogeneity in the content and congruence of these stereotypes. This project will shed light on the way in which macro-level variables can shape micro-level gendered leadership beliefs.
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science
Open AccessA Multi-Country Study of Women’s Political Representation and Gendered Political Leadership Stereotypes
Political leadership positions are dominated by men. Arguably the most visible of a society’s positions of power, these positions may be important symbols of women’s ability to lead. If so, levels of female political representation within a society should shape its stereotypes of women’s suitability for political leadership. This project will test this possibility by conducting a secondary analysis of a dataset that measured the stereotypes of women, men and political leaders in 44 countries covering six continents (Nsample = 23,256). Specifically, we will test whether, as a country’s representation of women in political leadership increases, there is a greater increase in the congruence of that country’s stereotypes of political leaders and women than in the congruence of that country’s stereotypes of political leaders and men. We will also conduct exploratory analyses to identity whether other socio-ecological and cultural variables correlate with cross-national heterogeneity in the content and congruence of these stereotypes. This project will shed light on the way in which macro-level variables can shape micro-level gendered leadership beliefs.
- Open Access
- 20 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Computers in Human Behavior
- Vol. 179
Training and oversight of algorithms in social decision-making: Algorithms with prescribed selfish defaults breed selfish decisions
- 20 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Computers in Human Behavior
- Vol. 179
Open AccessTraining and oversight of algorithms in social decision-making: Algorithms with prescribed selfish defaults breed selfish decisions
- Open Access
- 14 January 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Training and Oversight of Algorithms in Social Decision-Making: Algorithms With Prescribed Selfish Defaults Breed Selfish Decisions
Human social preferences serve as oversight or training data to shape how Artificial Intelligence (AI) makes decisions, which occurs increasingly across decision-making domains, including social decisions that influence human to human interactions. Here, we test how algorithms with and without prescribed social preferences, shape social decision-making and explore delegating further decisions. In an incentivized online experiment (n = 1290), participants provided social preferences for outcomes favoring oneself or an anonymous other, Social Value Orientation (SVO), as input to a decision-making algorithm. We manipulated whether for each SVO money division question, participants saw no default options (representing providing training data) or proself/prosocial default options (representing oversight of algorithms with prescribed selfish/prosocial preferences). Default options were either from an algorithm or not. Results showed that participants’ social preferences were not significantly impacted by providing input to an algorithm without prescribed preferences (vs no defaults) nor by an algorithm with prescribed prosocial preferences (vs the same defaults without an algorithm and vs the algorithm without prescribed preferences). Only providing input for an algorithm with prescribed proself preferences resulted in more selfish social preferences (vs the algorithm without prescribed preferences and vs the algorithm with prescribed prosocial preferences). Moreover, counter to this, participants perceived being less influenced by proself than prosocial defaults. Most people delegated a second social decision-making task to the algorithm they were exposed to. These findings suggest that human oversight could be insufficient to address algorithmic biases, as individuals act more selfishly when exposed to pre-existing selfish tendencies in algorithms.
- 14 January 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessTraining and Oversight of Algorithms in Social Decision-Making: Algorithms With Prescribed Selfish Defaults Breed Selfish Decisions
Human social preferences serve as oversight or training data to shape how Artificial Intelligence (AI) makes decisions, which occurs increasingly across decision-making domains, including social decisions that influence human to human interactions. Here, we test how algorithms with and without prescribed social preferences, shape social decision-making and explore delegating further decisions. In an incentivized online experiment (n = 1290), participants provided social preferences for outcomes favoring oneself or an anonymous other, Social Value Orientation (SVO), as input to a decision-making algorithm. We manipulated whether for each SVO money division question, participants saw no default options (representing providing training data) or proself/prosocial default options (representing oversight of algorithms with prescribed selfish/prosocial preferences). Default options were either from an algorithm or not. Results showed that participants’ social preferences were not significantly impacted by providing input to an algorithm without prescribed preferences (vs no defaults) nor by an algorithm with prescribed prosocial preferences (vs the same defaults without an algorithm and vs the algorithm without prescribed preferences). Only providing input for an algorithm with prescribed proself preferences resulted in more selfish social preferences (vs the algorithm without prescribed preferences and vs the algorithm with prescribed prosocial preferences). Moreover, counter to this, participants perceived being less influenced by proself than prosocial defaults. Most people delegated a second social decision-making task to the algorithm they were exposed to. These findings suggest that human oversight could be insufficient to address algorithmic biases, as individuals act more selfishly when exposed to pre-existing selfish tendencies in algorithms.
- Open Access
- 17 November 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Human-in-the-Loop Oversight of AI is Compromised by Political Preferences
Humans are legally responsible for monitoring sensitive Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, requiring a human-in-the-loop (HITL) to have the final say in approving or rejecting AI decisions. However, behavioral science shows humans are not error and bias free. We report the results of three experiments (n = 5798, 115960 decisions) modeled on real-world welfare allocation scenarios in which locals and immigrants are considered for financial support. Results revealed that HITL oversight does not reliably correct algorithmic errors, and may even exacerbate errors. Moreover, political preferences of the HITL shape the type of errors they make. Interventions incentivizing accuracy or clarifying instructions reduced HITL error rates. Nevertheless, HITL error rates were higher than algorithmic error rates. These results point out that HITL is not a silver-bullet solution across settings. Our work calls for more systematic research into when, and how, oversight of AI can effectively reduce error and improve decision making quality.
- 17 November 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessHuman-in-the-Loop Oversight of AI is Compromised by Political Preferences
Humans are legally responsible for monitoring sensitive Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, requiring a human-in-the-loop (HITL) to have the final say in approving or rejecting AI decisions. However, behavioral science shows humans are not error and bias free. We report the results of three experiments (n = 5798, 115960 decisions) modeled on real-world welfare allocation scenarios in which locals and immigrants are considered for financial support. Results revealed that HITL oversight does not reliably correct algorithmic errors, and may even exacerbate errors. Moreover, political preferences of the HITL shape the type of errors they make. Interventions incentivizing accuracy or clarifying instructions reduced HITL error rates. Nevertheless, HITL error rates were higher than algorithmic error rates. These results point out that HITL is not a silver-bullet solution across settings. Our work calls for more systematic research into when, and how, oversight of AI can effectively reduce error and improve decision making quality.
- Open Access
- 2 December 2023
- Published by Wiley in Social and Personality Psychology Compass
- Vol. 18 (2)
Punishing or praising gossipers: How people interpret the motives driving negative gossip shapes its consequences
Sharing negative gossip has been found to be pivotal for fostering cooperation in social groups. The positive function gossip serves for groups suggests that gossipers should be rewarded for sharing useful information. In contrast, gossip is commonly perceived negatively, meaning that gossipers incur more social costs than benefits. To solve this puzzle, we argue that whether receivers interpret gossip as stemming from pro‐social versus pro‐self motives shapes their reactions towards gossipers. We conducted a pre‐registered experimental vignette study ( n = 1188) in which participants received negative gossip statements, which we manipulated to reflect either pro‐self or pro‐social motives. Supporting our predictions, receivers were more likely to mistakenly interpret negative pro‐social gossip as stemming from pro‐self motives than vice versa. Nevertheless, receivers with a higher ability to overcome intuition were better able to correctly interpret negative gossip as driven by pro‐self and pro‐social motives. Furthermore, results showed that when receivers interpreted negative gossip as pro‐socially (vs. pro‐selfishly) motivated, they trusted gossipers more and gossip targets less (for behavioral as well as attitudinal measures of trust).
- 2 December 2023
- Published by Wiley in Social and Personality Psychology Compass
- Vol. 18 (2)
Open AccessPunishing or praising gossipers: How people interpret the motives driving negative gossip shapes its consequences
Sharing negative gossip has been found to be pivotal for fostering cooperation in social groups. The positive function gossip serves for groups suggests that gossipers should be rewarded for sharing useful information. In contrast, gossip is commonly perceived negatively, meaning that gossipers incur more social costs than benefits. To solve this puzzle, we argue that whether receivers interpret gossip as stemming from pro‐social versus pro‐self motives shapes their reactions towards gossipers. We conducted a pre‐registered experimental vignette study ( n = 1188) in which participants received negative gossip statements, which we manipulated to reflect either pro‐self or pro‐social motives. Supporting our predictions, receivers were more likely to mistakenly interpret negative pro‐social gossip as stemming from pro‐self motives than vice versa. Nevertheless, receivers with a higher ability to overcome intuition were better able to correctly interpret negative gossip as driven by pro‐self and pro‐social motives. Furthermore, results showed that when receivers interpreted negative gossip as pro‐socially (vs. pro‐selfishly) motivated, they trusted gossipers more and gossip targets less (for behavioral as well as attitudinal measures of trust).
- Open Access
- 25 May 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Vol. 50 (11) , 1596-1612
Nasty and Noble Notes: Interdependence Structures Drive Self-Serving Gossip
Much information people receive about others reaches them via gossip. But is this gossip trustworthy? We examined this in a scenario study ( Nsenders = 350, Nobservations = 700) and an interactive laboratory experiment ( Nsenders = 126; Nobservations = 3024). In both studies, participants played a sequential prisoner’s dilemma where a gossip sender observed a target’s (first decider’s) decision and could gossip about this to a receiver (second decider). We manipulated the interdependence structure such that gossipers’ outcomes were equal to targets’ outcomes, equal to receivers’ outcomes, or independent. Compared to no interdependence, gossip was more often false when gossipers were interdependent with targets but not when interdependent with receivers. As such, false positive gossip (self-serving when interdependent with targets) increased but false negative gossip (self-serving when interdependent with receivers) did not. In conclusion, the interdependence structure affected gossip’s trustworthiness: When gossipers’ outcomes were interdependent with targets, gossip was less trustworthy.
- 25 May 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Vol. 50 (11) , 1596-1612
Open AccessNasty and Noble Notes: Interdependence Structures Drive Self-Serving Gossip
Much information people receive about others reaches them via gossip. But is this gossip trustworthy? We examined this in a scenario study ( Nsenders = 350, Nobservations = 700) and an interactive laboratory experiment ( Nsenders = 126; Nobservations = 3024). In both studies, participants played a sequential prisoner’s dilemma where a gossip sender observed a target’s (first decider’s) decision and could gossip about this to a receiver (second decider). We manipulated the interdependence structure such that gossipers’ outcomes were equal to targets’ outcomes, equal to receivers’ outcomes, or independent. Compared to no interdependence, gossip was more often false when gossipers were interdependent with targets but not when interdependent with receivers. As such, false positive gossip (self-serving when interdependent with targets) increased but false negative gossip (self-serving when interdependent with receivers) did not. In conclusion, the interdependence structure affected gossip’s trustworthiness: When gossipers’ outcomes were interdependent with targets, gossip was less trustworthy.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation in Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
- Vol. 26 (4)
What Matters Most in Supporting Cooperation, the Gossip Content or the Gossiper’s Intention? Simulating Motive Interpretation in Gossip Dynamics
Gossip provides individuals a great volume of information, which allows them to make informed decisions and better adapt to the environment around them. Like all pieces of information, however, if not correctly interpreted, gossip can lead to harmful consequences for individuals. Indeed, computational models have portrayed a complex picture on how gossip impacts cooperation, identifying several limitations of the mechanism. Recent theoretical models and empirical studies have shown how interpreting the information received through gossip is a key component to understand how gossip influences individuals and groups. Thus, we built an agent-based model where we examine two reaction mechanisms for different reputation systems, in which agents first interpret the motive behind gossip and then react on the basis of this interpretation. While the first mechanism relies on an encompassing reputation system in which all pieces of information are used to inform future decisions with other group members, the second mechanism comprises a two-layer reputation system, in which agents' actions are separate from agents' reliability as gossipers. Our results support previous empirical findings asserting gossip as an effective way to sustain initial cooperation, and offer a solution for gossip driven by negative motives: as long as gossip receivers ignore the information provided by gossipers they deem unreliable and don't punish them by refraining from cooperative interactions with them, cooperation can be sustained.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation in Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
- Vol. 26 (4)
Open AccessWhat Matters Most in Supporting Cooperation, the Gossip Content or the Gossiper’s Intention? Simulating Motive Interpretation in Gossip Dynamics
Gossip provides individuals a great volume of information, which allows them to make informed decisions and better adapt to the environment around them. Like all pieces of information, however, if not correctly interpreted, gossip can lead to harmful consequences for individuals. Indeed, computational models have portrayed a complex picture on how gossip impacts cooperation, identifying several limitations of the mechanism. Recent theoretical models and empirical studies have shown how interpreting the information received through gossip is a key component to understand how gossip influences individuals and groups. Thus, we built an agent-based model where we examine two reaction mechanisms for different reputation systems, in which agents first interpret the motive behind gossip and then react on the basis of this interpretation. While the first mechanism relies on an encompassing reputation system in which all pieces of information are used to inform future decisions with other group members, the second mechanism comprises a two-layer reputation system, in which agents' actions are separate from agents' reliability as gossipers. Our results support previous empirical findings asserting gossip as an effective way to sustain initial cooperation, and offer a solution for gossip driven by negative motives: as long as gossip receivers ignore the information provided by gossipers they deem unreliable and don't punish them by refraining from cooperative interactions with them, cooperation can be sustained.