Giuseppe Garofalo

Biometric authentication systems have traditionally relied on the False Match Rate (FMR) to evaluate security against impersonation threats. However, this metric alone is insufficient for assessing vulnerabilities to statistical attacks because it cannot account for the non-uniformity of mismatches and atypical inputs that adversaries may manipulate. To address this issue, we propose a new evaluation framework that overcomes these limitations. The framework includes an estimate of the effective key space of biometrics and metrics that consider non-uniformity in the biometric embedding space. Our findings demonstrate that our framework provides a nuanced understanding of biometric security. Moreover, optimizing for the proposed metric leads to better security against statistical attacks than optimizing the FMR. Furthermore, the framework provides a comparative security analysis with traditional methods like passwords and PIN codes. It also quantifies the impact on security when adversaries partially know their victims, e.g., demographics.

We propose, design, and evaluate PIVOT, a privacy-enhancing and effective contact tracing solution that aims to strike a balance between utility and privacy: one that does not collect sensitive information yet allowing effective tracing and notifying the close contacts of diagnosed users. PIVOT requires a considerably low degree of trust in the entities involved compared to centralised alternatives while retaining the necessary utility. To protect users’ privacy, it uses local proximity tracing based on broadcasting and recording constantly changing anonymous public keys via short-range communication. These public keys are used to establish a shared secret key between two people in close contact. The three keys (i.e., the two public keys and the established shared key) are then used to generate two unique per-user-per-contact hashes: one for infection registration and one for exposure score query. These hashes are never revealed to the public. To improve utility, user exposure score computation is performed centrally, which provides health authorities with minimal, yet insightful and actionable data. Data minimisation is achieved by the use of per-user-per-contact hashes and by enforcing role separation: the health authority act as a mixing node, while the matching between reported and queried hashes is outsourced to a third entity, an independent matching service. This separation ensures that out-of-scope information, such as users’ social interactions, is hidden from the health authorities, whereas the matching service does not learn users’ sensitive information. To sustain our claims, we conduct a practical evaluation that encompasses anonymity guarantees and energy requirements.

Sensors provide the foundation of many smart applications and cyber–physical systems by measuring and processing information upon which applications can make intelligent decisions or inform their users. Inertial measurement unit (IMU) sensors—and accelerometers and gyroscopes in particular—are readily available on contemporary smartphones and wearable devices. They have been widely adopted in the area of activity recognition, with fall detection and step counting applications being prominent examples in this field. However, these sensors may also incidentally reveal sensitive information in a way that is not easily envisioned upfront by developers. Far worse, the leakage of sensitive information to third parties, such as recommender systems or targeted advertising applications, may cause privacy concerns for unsuspecting end-users. In this paper, we explore the elicitation of age and gender information from gait traces obtained from IMU sensors, and systematically compare different feature engineering and machine learning algorithms, including both traditional and deep learning methods. We describe in detail the prediction methods that our team used in the OU-ISIR Wearable Sensor-based Gait Challenge: Age and Gender (GAG 2019) at the 12th IAPR International Conference on Biometrics. In these two competitions, our team obtained the best solutions amongst all international participants, and this for both the age and gender predictions. Our research shows that it is feasible to predict age and gender with a reasonable accuracy on gait traces of just a few seconds. Furthermore, it illustrates the need to put in place adequate measures in order to mitigate unintended information leakage by abusing sensors as an unanticipated side channel for sensitive information or private traits.