JGJeremy Garlick

Jeremy Garlick

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Jeremy Garlick has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • How China is de-risking better than Europe

    by Jeremy Garlick

    Key takeaways: - The concept of de-risking, which above all refers to the need to address over-reliance on China, was introduced in 2023 in a speech by EU President Ursula von der Leyen. - However, like decoupling, which was introduced in the U.S. in 2018, the introduction of the term ‘de-risking’ has not led to consensus concerning a clear strategy for addressing potential risks emanating from economic and political relations with China. - In contrast, although without using the term de-risking, since 2018 China has been steadily diversifying its markets and resource suppliers more intensively in order to decrease dependence on Europe and the U.S. - Beijing has also been expanding its influence in the Global South through Belt and Road investments, as well as a range of other economic and diplomatic tools. - China has therefore implemented de-risking more successfully than Europe, which is still reliant on key imports from single dominant suppliers. - The EU would benefit from studying what China has done and implementing a similar programme of ‘comprehensive security’ to enhance European resilience to global shocks.

  • The internationalisation of China’s approach to human rights: implications for the EU

    by Jeremy Garlick

    Key takeaways: - China’s human rights record, alongside its one-party authoritarian governance system, has generated negative views of the country and its government, especially in the EU. - However, the human rights issue is less significant when assessing the views of people in the Global South, where there is an increasingly positive view of China, while views of the US are deteriorating. - There is a clash between the universalist, individual-based view of human rights promoted by Europe and China’s relativist/collectivist approach. - Also significant is the distinction between the Western emphasis on civil-political rights and the economic-social rights promoted by China. - The Chinese approach appeals to large sections of the impoverished Global South because it prioritises collective economic development, while the Western focus on democracy and individual rights is seen as unproductive and hypocritical. - Generally, while the Chinese Communist Party’s approach to human rights continues to affect public opinion in Europe, it is less significant than other issues for people in the Global South. - From the EU’s perspective, weighing up whether to prioritise European values or economic pragmatism is perhaps an insoluble dilemma, but one that demands more consistent policymaking than has hitherto been the case.

  • China’s increasing influence in the Global South: what does it mean for the EU?

    by Jeremy Garlick, Anja Senz

    Key takeaways - China is altering the international landscape by creating new norms and alliances, especially in the Global South. China is building a new set of international institutions and initiatives in opposition to the Western-led liberal international order. - China’s engagement with the developing world is relatively successful because it is better coordinated and more consistent than what the West has been doing. It is also better adjusted to the needs of countries in the Global South. This has enormous economic and security implications internationally. - The West – defined primarily as the US + Europe – needs to face the unpleasant truth that China is winning the influence battle in many parts of the world. - The Chinese Communist Party has the advantage of a relatively monolithic political structure, which enables it to coordinate financial institutions and corporations quite effectively. China can move much faster than the EU, even if this means that funds are misallocated, or used in ways that the West dislikes. - The West is undermining its image through self-inflicted wounds such as US withdrawal of aid and perceived US and EU support for Israel, unpopular in many Muslim countries. - China’s trade with the Global South is steadily increasing, building new markets which reduce dependence on Europe and North America. - In reshaping its engagement with the Global South, the West must take the experiences and concerns of developing countries more seriously. This will also provide a better understanding of why China is currently often successful. - The EU needs to decide whether to compete or cooperate with China – or, we suggest, to use a combination of strategic competition and cooperation in carefully selected areas.

  • Choosing to lose: how US and EU policy decisions contribute to greater Chinese influence in the Global South

    by Jeremy Garlick, Anja Senz

    Key takeaways: - Over the last ten years the USA and the EU have not been paying sufficient attention to rising Chinese influence in the Global South. - Studying public opinion survey data reveals that there has been a swing towards China and away from the USA across parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. - This shift comes not from any shift in Chinese policy, but from what the West is – and is not – doing, most notably in connection with the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine. - Since Trump was inaugurated for the second time in January 2025, decisions to cut aid to the Global South, introduce tariffs, and walk away from global climate action are leaving even more of a vacuum for China to fill. - In the context of rising Chinese and falling US engagement, Europe urgently needs to develop a clearer strategy in its relations with the developing world, focussing on smaller states as well as big players like India and Brazil.

  • Beyond Central Asia: the ever-expanding influence of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

    by Jeremy Garlick

    Key takeaways - The SCO is expanding beyond its Central Asian heartland southwards and westwards across Asia, reaching the Middle East and North Africa. As a “talking shop”, it has achieved relatively peaceful and cooperative relations between its ever-expanding club of members. - In 2024, Turkey, a NATO member, applied for membership of the SCO, indicating a probable shift by President Erdogan away from a frustrated bid for EU membership to closer ties with China and Russia. - SCO dialogue partners include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. This suggests that these oil- and gas-producing Middle Eastern states are interested in enhancing ties with China and Russia rather than being reliant on political and economic ties with the US and the EU. - The SCO should be seen as a sister organization of BRICS, enhancing Chinese and Russian influence in the global South, with a particular focus on Asia and the Middle East. As such, it should be taken seriously as a counter to the influence of legacy organisations of the US-led “liberal international order” such as the G7 and NATO.


  • Open Access

    Rising Power, Limited Influence: The Politics of Chinese Investments in Europe and the Liberal International Order Edited by Indrajit Roy, Jappe Eckhardt, Dimitrios Stroikos and Simona Davidescu. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024. 266 pp. £76.00 (hbk). ISBN 9780192887115

    by Jeremy Garlick

    Questions about China's ability to influence the international order have come to dominate discussions of the country's global role in the last quarter of a century. Such questions have intensified since the advent of President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013. Investment capital accumulated from China's export-led economy funds the BRI's programme of infrastructure construction in the Global South. Thus, it is only natural that observers should begin to critically examine the extent to which the Chinese government is building political influence in partner countries via BRI investments, as Yu Jie and Ran Hu do in the first two chapters of the edited volume Rising Power, Limited Influence. The book seeks to evaluate the extent to which Chinese investments are impacting the so-called "liberal international order" (LIO) set up by the US and its allies after the Second World War. In the introductory chapter, following John Ikenberry, Indrajit Roy and Ran Hu define the LIO in terms of five key features: openness in trade; rules-based relations between states; collective security; the transformation of international society through cooperation between states; and the spread of democracy through internationalization (p. 6). The study therefore sets out to investigate the extent to which Chinese investments present a challenge to the LIO or merely maintain and support it, while connecting this question to the issue of Chinese political influence arising from its investments in partner countries. Curiously, however, despite the focus on evaluating the connections between China's investments and the possible challenge to the LIO, the editors elect to focus predominantly on Chinese investments in Europe: six out of ten chapters analyse Chinese investments in specific European countries and regions, mainly in the east and south of the continent. The intent is to draw conclusions about China's intentions for the LIO from these European case studies. However, this seems an analytical stretch, since the LIO, being a phenomenon with global implications, is not only about Europe. It seems a tall order to draw conclusions about the degree to which Chinese investments are influencing the global order from studying only engagement with Europe. The issue is compounded by Roy and Hu's assumption that China's "sprawling investments across 120 countries via the Belt and Road Initiative have had limited impact in shaping host countries' attitudes towards China" (p. 2). This assertion is surprising for two reasons. First, this conclusion is reached very early in the book and without any supporting evidence. Second, the claim flies in the face of China's growing political influence arising from its considerable investments in economically weak neighbouring countries, such as Laos, Cambodia and Pakistan. None of the chapters analyse China's investments in Asia. Thus, the book does not examine

  • China’s Asymmetric Statecraft: Alignments, Competitors, and Regional Diplomacy by Yuxing Huang

    by Jeremy Garlick

    Interpreting shifts in a nation’s foreign policy can be a difficult task in the absence of direct access to leaders’ strategic thinking. At any rate, the complexity of geopolitical posturing and jockeying for position when multiple actors are involved do not lend themselves to straightforward answers. Yet, political scientists continue striving to find parsimonious explanations: ones that explain a state’s behavior with reference to one or a small set of variables. In China’s Asymmetric Statecraft, Yuxing Huang seeks to explain China’s statecraft toward its mostly smaller and weaker neighbors by positing that the number of regional rivals is the decisive factor. When there is one rival in a region, he claims, China adopts a uniform approach to its asymmetric statecraft with nonallied neighbors. This is intended to present an attractive image of fairness and consistency. At times when there are two or more rivals, China switches to a selective approach, tailoring its policy to each state. In each case, the uniform or selective approach is supposed to encourage the state to lean toward China rather than the competition. On the other hand, Huang claims, the reverse is true with regard to regional allies: a uniform approach when there is more than one competitor and a selective approach when there is only one.