Daniel Nolan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Daniel Nolan has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
C.S. Jenkins
University of Nottingham
2 shared publications- Rachael Briggs
Australian National University ACT 0200, Australia
2 shared publications The Hegeler Institute
2 shared publications- Alexander Sandgren
Australian National University
1 shared publication - C. S. Jenkins
University of Nottingham Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
1 shared publication Caroline West
University of Sydney
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 31 December 2025
- Published by Aletheia - Associacao Cientifica e Cultural in Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
- Vol. 81 (4) , 1047-1082
Say It, But Don’t Mean It
Call “fictional assertions” sentences that look or sound like assertions, but which are produced as parts of fictions, or in talk engaged with fictions. In contrast to standard views about these sentences, this paper argues that these fictional assertions are genuinely assertions, and have the same semantics that their literal counterparts have. The difference lies in the pragmatics of communication, rather than in content or force.
- 31 December 2025
- Published by Aletheia - Associacao Cientifica e Cultural in Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
- Vol. 81 (4) , 1047-1082
Say It, But Don’t Mean It
Call “fictional assertions” sentences that look or sound like assertions, but which are produced as parts of fictions, or in talk engaged with fictions. In contrast to standard views about these sentences, this paper argues that these fictional assertions are genuinely assertions, and have the same semantics that their literal counterparts have. The difference lies in the pragmatics of communication, rather than in content or force.
- 26 November 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 135 (1) , 244-250
Philosophical Manuscripts , by David Lewis, edited by Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Fraser MacBride
This work contains two previously unreleased books by David Lewis, as well as twenty-nine previously unpublished shorter pieces, ranging from short papers, to paper outlines, to unpublished replies, and ‘Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability’, a posthumous paper published in 2020 ( Lewis 2020, and see Beebee, Svedberg and Whittle 2020). The earliest unpublished paper is from 1965-6, and the latest from July 2001, only a few months before his death. That is all some will need to know before knowing they should acquire this book. David Lewis was an immensely influential philosopher, at least in academic circles, and at least in the English-speaking philosophical world, though his influence extended well beyond. His first publications appeared in 1966, and his unexpected death at just sixty in 2001 brought his work to an abrupt end. (Though posthumous papers continued to appear for a number of years afterwards.) Lewis was most influential in the fields of philosophy of language and metaphysics, though he had a deep and lasting impact in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, the philosophy of science and the theory of social convention, among other areas. Beyond his impact in specific debates, Lewis set the philosophical agenda for many philosophers in the generation after his: while many who were most influenced by him disagree with his positions on fundamental issues, his influence can be seen in how philosophers conceive of issues, their methods for approaching them, and even in their philosophical style. While his work is still relatively unknown outside the academy, it is starting to look as if intellectual historians will need to treat him as one of the most influential figures in English-speaking philosophy from the second half of the twentieth century.
- 26 November 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 135 (1) , 244-250
Philosophical Manuscripts , by David Lewis, edited by Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Fraser MacBride
This work contains two previously unreleased books by David Lewis, as well as twenty-nine previously unpublished shorter pieces, ranging from short papers, to paper outlines, to unpublished replies, and ‘Nihil Obstat: An Analysis of Ability’, a posthumous paper published in 2020 ( Lewis 2020, and see Beebee, Svedberg and Whittle 2020). The earliest unpublished paper is from 1965-6, and the latest from July 2001, only a few months before his death. That is all some will need to know before knowing they should acquire this book. David Lewis was an immensely influential philosopher, at least in academic circles, and at least in the English-speaking philosophical world, though his influence extended well beyond. His first publications appeared in 1966, and his unexpected death at just sixty in 2001 brought his work to an abrupt end. (Though posthumous papers continued to appear for a number of years afterwards.) Lewis was most influential in the fields of philosophy of language and metaphysics, though he had a deep and lasting impact in the philosophy of mind, epistemology, the philosophy of science and the theory of social convention, among other areas. Beyond his impact in specific debates, Lewis set the philosophical agenda for many philosophers in the generation after his: while many who were most influenced by him disagree with his positions on fundamental issues, his influence can be seen in how philosophers conceive of issues, their methods for approaching them, and even in their philosophical style. While his work is still relatively unknown outside the academy, it is starting to look as if intellectual historians will need to treat him as one of the most influential figures in English-speaking philosophy from the second half of the twentieth century.
- Open Access
- 14 March 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 69 (9) , 1-30
Counterpossibles, consequence and context
Some conditionals with necessarily false antecedents strike most of us as false, even when we are aware the antecedent cannot be true. While there is an ongoing debate about whether ‘counterpossibl...
- 14 March 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 69 (9) , 1-30
Open AccessCounterpossibles, consequence and context
Some conditionals with necessarily false antecedents strike most of us as false, even when we are aware the antecedent cannot be true. While there is an ongoing debate about whether ‘counterpossibl...
- 17 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 2 (2) , 1-19
Zurvanist Supersubstantivalism
- 17 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 2 (2) , 1-19
Zurvanist Supersubstantivalism
- Open Access
- 18 June 2023
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 108 (3) , 687-696
Charitable matching and moral credit
- 18 June 2023
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 108 (3) , 687-696
Open AccessCharitable matching and moral credit
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Verein philosophie.ch in Dialectica
- Vol. 77 (2) , 245-255
On the Plurality of Parts of Classes
On the Plurality of Parts of Classes
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Verein philosophie.ch in Dialectica
- Vol. 77 (2) , 245-255
Open AccessOn the Plurality of Parts of Classes
On the Plurality of Parts of Classes
- Open Access
Space, time and parsimony
This paper argues that all of the standard theories about the divisions of space and time can benefit from, and may need to rely on, parsimony considerations. More specifically, whether spacetime is discrete, gunky or pointy, there are wildly unparsimonious rivals to standard accounts that need to be resisted by proponents of those accounts, and only parsimony considerations offer a natural way of doing that resisting. Furthermore, quantitative parsimony considerations appear to be needed in many of these cases.
Open AccessSpace, time and parsimony
This paper argues that all of the standard theories about the divisions of space and time can benefit from, and may need to rely on, parsimony considerations. More specifically, whether spacetime is discrete, gunky or pointy, there are wildly unparsimonious rivals to standard accounts that need to be resisted by proponents of those accounts, and only parsimony considerations offer a natural way of doing that resisting. Furthermore, quantitative parsimony considerations appear to be needed in many of these cases.
- 12 May 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 67 (10) , 4131-4166
Marriage and its limits
Marriages come in a very wide variety: if the reports of anthropologists and historians are to be believed, an extraordinarily wide variety. This includes some of the more unusual forms, including marriage to the dead; to the gods; and even to plants. This does suggest that few proposed marriage relationships would require ‘redefining marriage’: but on the other hand, it makes giving a general theory of marriage challenging. So one issue we should face is how accepting we should be of the reports: to what extent reported ‘marriages’ really are marriages. This paper defends the view that almost all of these reported marriages are in fact marriages, and suggests some theoretical approaches that may be generous enough to account for this.
- 12 May 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 67 (10) , 4131-4166
Marriage and its limits
Marriages come in a very wide variety: if the reports of anthropologists and historians are to be believed, an extraordinarily wide variety. This includes some of the more unusual forms, including marriage to the dead; to the gods; and even to plants. This does suggest that few proposed marriage relationships would require ‘redefining marriage’: but on the other hand, it makes giving a general theory of marriage challenging. So one issue we should face is how accepting we should be of the reports: to what extent reported ‘marriages’ really are marriages. This paper defends the view that almost all of these reported marriages are in fact marriages, and suggests some theoretical approaches that may be generous enough to account for this.
- Top Cited Papers
- 3 February 2021
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 16 (2) , e12723
Impossible fictions part I: Lessons for fiction
Impossible fictions are valuable evidence both for a theory of fiction and for theories of meaning, mind and epistemology. This article focuses on what we can learn about fiction from reflecting on impossible fictions. First, different kinds of impossible fiction are considered, and the question of how much fiction is impossible is addressed. What impossible fiction contributes to our understanding of "truth in fiction" and the logic of fiction will be examined. Finally, our understanding of unreliable narrators and unreliable narration in fiction needs to accommodate stories that, on the face of it, cannot possibly be true.
- 3 February 2021
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 16 (2) , e12723
Top Cited PapersImpossible fictions part I: Lessons for fiction
Impossible fictions are valuable evidence both for a theory of fiction and for theories of meaning, mind and epistemology. This article focuses on what we can learn about fiction from reflecting on impossible fictions. First, different kinds of impossible fiction are considered, and the question of how much fiction is impossible is addressed. What impossible fiction contributes to our understanding of "truth in fiction" and the logic of fiction will be examined. Finally, our understanding of unreliable narrators and unreliable narration in fiction needs to accommodate stories that, on the face of it, cannot possibly be true.
- 12 January 2021
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 16 (2)
Impossible fictions part II: Lessons for mind, language, and epistemology
Impossible fictions have lessons to teach us about linguistic representation, about mental content and concepts, and about uses of conceivability in epistemology. An adequate theory of impossible fictions may require theories of meaning that can distinguish between different impossibilities; a theory of conceptual truth that allows us to make useful sense of a variety of conceptual falsehoods; and a theory of our understanding of necessity and possibility that permits impossibilities to be conceived. After discussing these questions, strategies for resisting the picture of impossible fictions presented here and in Part I are discussed. Perhaps apparently impossible fictions describe possibilities after all; or perhaps impossible fictions are all trivial; or perhaps some apparently intelligible impossible fictions are unintelligible after all.
- 12 January 2021
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 16 (2)
Impossible fictions part II: Lessons for mind, language, and epistemology
Impossible fictions have lessons to teach us about linguistic representation, about mental content and concepts, and about uses of conceivability in epistemology. An adequate theory of impossible fictions may require theories of meaning that can distinguish between different impossibilities; a theory of conceptual truth that allows us to make useful sense of a variety of conceptual falsehoods; and a theory of our understanding of necessity and possibility that permits impossibilities to be conceived. After discussing these questions, strategies for resisting the picture of impossible fictions presented here and in Part I are discussed. Perhaps apparently impossible fictions describe possibilities after all; or perhaps impossible fictions are all trivial; or perhaps some apparently intelligible impossible fictions are unintelligible after all.