Kenneth A. Schultz
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Kenneth A. Schultz has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alexander Lee
Stanford University Department of Political Science , 94305
1 shared publication - Caroline M. Kraan
Department of Environmental Science and Policy, Rosenstiel School of Marine, Atmospheric, and Earth Science, University of Miami, Miami, FL, United States of America
1 shared publication - Christopher B. Field
Stanford University
1 shared publication Cullen S. Hendrix
Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver Denver CO USA
1 shared publication- Halvard Buhaug
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Oslo, Norway
1 shared publication - Hein E. Goemans
University of Rochester
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 4 February 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 80 (1) , 76-110
Closing Pandora’s Box: Can Shared Vulnerability Underpin Territorial Stability?
Scholars and policymakers have argued that territorial revisionism is dangerous because it risks setting off a cascade of claims by states dissatisfied with their borders. This Pandora’s box logic suggests that states that are vulnerable to an unraveling of the status quo have incentives to restrain their territorial ambitions to preserve stability. This paper explores this claim theoretically and empirically. It provides descriptive evidence to determine whether vulnerability to territorial threats has historically been associated with a lower likelihood of initiating territorial disputes. We find some evidence of such an effect in postindependence Africa, where this logic is most frequently invoked, and to some extent in Asia, but not in other regions. To help explain these empirical observations, we develop a multistate model of territorial conflict that identifies the conditions under which cooperation to preserve the territorial status quo can be sustained. The model shows that while an equilibrium of mutual restraint can exist, the necessary conditions are quite restrictive, and this cooperative equilibrium is never unique. Thus while a Pandora’s box of potential claims can provide the basis for a norm of restraint, the emergence of such a norm is neither straightforward nor guaranteed.
- 4 February 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 80 (1) , 76-110
Closing Pandora’s Box: Can Shared Vulnerability Underpin Territorial Stability?
Scholars and policymakers have argued that territorial revisionism is dangerous because it risks setting off a cascade of claims by states dissatisfied with their borders. This Pandora’s box logic suggests that states that are vulnerable to an unraveling of the status quo have incentives to restrain their territorial ambitions to preserve stability. This paper explores this claim theoretically and empirically. It provides descriptive evidence to determine whether vulnerability to territorial threats has historically been associated with a lower likelihood of initiating territorial disputes. We find some evidence of such an effect in postindependence Africa, where this logic is most frequently invoked, and to some extent in Asia, but not in other regions. To help explain these empirical observations, we develop a multistate model of territorial conflict that identifies the conditions under which cooperation to preserve the territorial status quo can be sustained. The model shows that while an equilibrium of mutual restraint can exist, the necessary conditions are quite restrictive, and this cooperative equilibrium is never unique. Thus while a Pandora’s box of potential claims can provide the basis for a norm of restraint, the emergence of such a norm is neither straightforward nor guaranteed.
- Open Access
- 20 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 79 (S1) , S209-S223
Holding the World Together? The Future of Territorial Order
Scholars and policymakers have expressed concern that the decline of territorial conquest, a central pillar of the postwar international order, is under strain. Do the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the rise of China, and retrenchment of the United States portend a return to earlier patterns of international politics when boundaries were more frequently redrawn by force? This essay evaluates the theories and evidence that speak to this question. It delineates several mechanisms through which recent developments could destabilize the territorial order: the growing power of revisionist states, the declining credibility of third-party guarantees, and the erosion of the normative prohibition against conquest. At the same time, institutionalized equilibria at the dyadic and regional levels are sources of stability that can cushion the effect of these threats. Although escalation of conflicts in already disputed areas is possible, the most destabilizing outcome—widespread contestation of settled borders—is also the least likely.
- 20 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 79 (S1) , S209-S223
Open AccessHolding the World Together? The Future of Territorial Order
Scholars and policymakers have expressed concern that the decline of territorial conquest, a central pillar of the postwar international order, is under strain. Do the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the rise of China, and retrenchment of the United States portend a return to earlier patterns of international politics when boundaries were more frequently redrawn by force? This essay evaluates the theories and evidence that speak to this question. It delineates several mechanisms through which recent developments could destabilize the territorial order: the growing power of revisionist states, the declining credibility of third-party guarantees, and the erosion of the normative prohibition against conquest. At the same time, institutionalized equilibria at the dyadic and regional levels are sources of stability that can cushion the effect of these threats. Although escalation of conflicts in already disputed areas is possible, the most destabilizing outcome—widespread contestation of settled borders—is also the least likely.
- 10 April 2024
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 19 (2) , 157-190
Endogenous Sources of Compliance with Territorial Agreements
This paper develops a theory of compliance with international agreements, with a specific application to treaties about territory. Even though the signing of a treaty is (by assumption) an act of cheap talk, this decision can alter the incentives for subsequent compliance through the reactions of domestic or transnational actors. If these actors make decisions based on expectations of compliance, and if their welfare is valued by at least one of the parties to the agreement, the signing of an agreement can endogenously increase the costs or decrease the benefits of non-compliant behavior. The models developed here demonstrate how the signing of a border treaty can stimulate cross-border economic activities or the migration of co-ethnics living on the contested territory, both of which reduce the likelihood of reneging in response to future shocks to relative power. In both models, expectations of compliance driven by a selection mechanism become self-fulfilling by triggering actions that strengthen the constituency in favor of compliance or weaken the constituency in favor of non-compliance. The logic of the model is explored through a study of the Italy–Yugoslavia border after World War II.
- 10 April 2024
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 19 (2) , 157-190
Endogenous Sources of Compliance with Territorial Agreements
This paper develops a theory of compliance with international agreements, with a specific application to treaties about territory. Even though the signing of a treaty is (by assumption) an act of cheap talk, this decision can alter the incentives for subsequent compliance through the reactions of domestic or transnational actors. If these actors make decisions based on expectations of compliance, and if their welfare is valued by at least one of the parties to the agreement, the signing of an agreement can endogenously increase the costs or decrease the benefits of non-compliant behavior. The models developed here demonstrate how the signing of a border treaty can stimulate cross-border economic activities or the migration of co-ethnics living on the contested territory, both of which reduce the likelihood of reneging in response to future shocks to relative power. In both models, expectations of compliance driven by a selection mechanism become self-fulfilling by triggering actions that strengthen the constituency in favor of compliance or weaken the constituency in favor of non-compliance. The logic of the model is explored through a study of the Italy–Yugoslavia border after World War II.
- 8 August 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Security Studies
- Vol. 30 (4) , 485-516
Off the Menu: Post-1945 Norms and the End of War Declarations
Why do states no longer declare war? In a provocative analysis, Tanisha M. Fazal argues that states stopped declaring war to evade the costs of complying with the growing body of international humanitarian laws. We argue instead that post-1945 normative and legal developments that sought to prohibit war changed the meaning of war declarations in a way that made them at best irrelevant and at worst counterproductive. Although war-making did not end, a once routine feature of warfare came to be seen as a signal of extreme aims that could complicate escalation management and coalition building. Moreover, the United Nations (UN) system provided more desirable ways for states to justify military operations, particularly through self-defense claims. We support this argument through a reassessment of the empirical pattern of war declarations, an analysis of self-defense claims made under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and case studies of undeclared wars in the post-1945 period.
- 8 August 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Security Studies
- Vol. 30 (4) , 485-516
Off the Menu: Post-1945 Norms and the End of War Declarations
Why do states no longer declare war? In a provocative analysis, Tanisha M. Fazal argues that states stopped declaring war to evade the costs of complying with the growing body of international humanitarian laws. We argue instead that post-1945 normative and legal developments that sought to prohibit war changed the meaning of war declarations in a way that made them at best irrelevant and at worst counterproductive. Although war-making did not end, a once routine feature of warfare came to be seen as a signal of extreme aims that could complicate escalation management and coalition building. Moreover, the United Nations (UN) system provided more desirable ways for states to justify military operations, particularly through self-defense claims. We support this argument through a reassessment of the empirical pattern of war declarations, an analysis of self-defense claims made under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and case studies of undeclared wars in the post-1945 period.
- Open Access
- 3 July 2020
- Published by American Geophysical Union (AGU) in Earth's Future
- Vol. 8 (7)
Directions for Research on Climate and Conflict
The potential links between climate and conflict are well studied, yet disagreement about the specific mechanisms and their significance for societies persists. Here, we build on assessment of the relationship between climate and organized armed conflict to define crosscutting priorities for future directions of research. They include (1) deepening insight into climate‐conflict linkages and conditions under which they manifest, (2) ambitiously integrating research designs, (3) systematically exploring future risks and response options, responsive to ongoing decision‐making, and (4) evaluating the effectiveness of interventions to manage climate‐conflict links. The implications of this expanding scientific domain unfold in real time.
- 3 July 2020
- Published by American Geophysical Union (AGU) in Earth's Future
- Vol. 8 (7)
Open AccessDirections for Research on Climate and Conflict
The potential links between climate and conflict are well studied, yet disagreement about the specific mechanisms and their significance for societies persists. Here, we build on assessment of the relationship between climate and organized armed conflict to define crosscutting priorities for future directions of research. They include (1) deepening insight into climate‐conflict linkages and conditions under which they manifest, (2) ambitiously integrating research designs, (3) systematically exploring future risks and response options, responsive to ongoing decision‐making, and (4) evaluating the effectiveness of interventions to manage climate‐conflict links. The implications of this expanding scientific domain unfold in real time.
- 16 July 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Theory
- Vol. 11 (3) , 344-374
Aims, claims, and the bargaining model of war
Although in principle states can bargain over the entire extent of their combined territory, we observe historically that states bargain within far more limited confines defined by well-bounded claims. We argue that this observation stems from the fact that states generally have limited territorial aims due either to limited benefits of obtaining additional territory and/or the costs of absorbing and controlling new territories and their inhabitants. Using a formal model, we show that introducing states with limited aims over territory has strategic implications for bargaining that have not been appreciated in canonical models that do not consider heterogeneity in state preferences. Whereas traditional models generally imply that small demands undermine the credibility of a challenger's threat, the existence of states with limited territorial aims makes limited demands credible, effective, and stable in the face of shocks to relative power. We then employ geospatial data on the geographic extent of territorial disputes in the period 1947–2000 to establish two results: the size of claims is weakly related to the relative power of disputants and unaffected by dramatic changes in power, and smaller claims are associated with a higher probability that the challenger will receive any concession.
- 16 July 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Theory
- Vol. 11 (3) , 344-374
Aims, claims, and the bargaining model of war
Although in principle states can bargain over the entire extent of their combined territory, we observe historically that states bargain within far more limited confines defined by well-bounded claims. We argue that this observation stems from the fact that states generally have limited territorial aims due either to limited benefits of obtaining additional territory and/or the costs of absorbing and controlling new territories and their inhabitants. Using a formal model, we show that introducing states with limited aims over territory has strategic implications for bargaining that have not been appreciated in canonical models that do not consider heterogeneity in state preferences. Whereas traditional models generally imply that small demands undermine the credibility of a challenger's threat, the existence of states with limited territorial aims makes limited demands credible, effective, and stable in the face of shocks to relative power. We then employ geospatial data on the geographic extent of territorial disputes in the period 1947–2000 to establish two results: the size of claims is weakly related to the relative power of disputants and unaffected by dramatic changes in power, and smaller claims are associated with a higher probability that the challenger will receive any concession.
- 27 December 2015
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 61 (7) , 1565-1590
Mapping Interstate Territorial Conflict
This article describes a new data set consisting of precise digital maps of regions that were the subject of interstate territorial disputes in the period 1947 to 2000. Each dispute identified by Huth and Allee is rendered as a polygon corresponding to the area subject to overlapping claims. After describing the data collection procedures and presenting some descriptive statistics, this article develops three novel results that demonstrate the potential of geospatial data to advance our understanding of the causes and consequences of territorial conflict. In particular, I use the data to (1) show how different measurements of the geographic extent of disputes can help unpack the mechanisms through which they dampen international trade, (2) cast doubt on the role of oil deposits in fueling territorial conflict by analyzing the relationship at a finer level of spatial resolution than previously possible, and (3) examine the harmful legacy of territorial conflict on local development in formerly contested regions along the El Salvador-Honduras border.
- 27 December 2015
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 61 (7) , 1565-1590
Mapping Interstate Territorial Conflict
This article describes a new data set consisting of precise digital maps of regions that were the subject of interstate territorial disputes in the period 1947 to 2000. Each dispute identified by Huth and Allee is rendered as a polygon corresponding to the area subject to overlapping claims. After describing the data collection procedures and presenting some descriptive statistics, this article develops three novel results that demonstrate the potential of geospatial data to advance our understanding of the causes and consequences of territorial conflict. In particular, I use the data to (1) show how different measurements of the geographic extent of disputes can help unpack the mechanisms through which they dampen international trade, (2) cast doubt on the role of oil deposits in fueling territorial conflict by analyzing the relationship at a finer level of spatial resolution than previously possible, and (3) examine the harmful legacy of territorial conflict on local development in formerly contested regions along the El Salvador-Honduras border.
- 4 June 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 58 (6) , 1059-1084
What’s in a Claim? De Jure versus De Facto Borders in Interstate Territorial Disputes
This note uses a new data set on international territorial disputes and boundary agreements to explore whether and how legal commitments affect state behavior. Do border treaties reduce subsequent conflict simply through their effect on the distribution of the disputed good, or do treaties have legal and political implications such that a given distribution of territory has different effects depending on whether it is de facto or de jure? There are three main results. First, among states that have homeland territory disputes, the adoption of a legally binding border is associated with a significant reduction in the likelihood of future militarized conflict over the territory. Second, this effect is the same regardless of whether the treaty transfers territory or converts a de facto or contested border into a de jure border without changing the status quo distribution. Third, there is no equivalent reduction in conflict when states create explicitly provisional borders that allow them to retain their claims to areas that they do not possess. These findings suggest that border treaties do more than simply specify the distribution of territory and provide for transfers. By requiring states to renounce claims to territories that they do not receive, treaties generate ex ante costs of signing and/or ex post costs for reneging that explain their association with subsequent peace.
- 4 June 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 58 (6) , 1059-1084
What’s in a Claim? De Jure versus De Facto Borders in Interstate Territorial Disputes
This note uses a new data set on international territorial disputes and boundary agreements to explore whether and how legal commitments affect state behavior. Do border treaties reduce subsequent conflict simply through their effect on the distribution of the disputed good, or do treaties have legal and political implications such that a given distribution of territory has different effects depending on whether it is de facto or de jure? There are three main results. First, among states that have homeland territory disputes, the adoption of a legally binding border is associated with a significant reduction in the likelihood of future militarized conflict over the territory. Second, this effect is the same regardless of whether the treaty transfers territory or converts a de facto or contested border into a de jure border without changing the status quo distribution. Third, there is no equivalent reduction in conflict when states create explicitly provisional borders that allow them to retain their claims to areas that they do not possess. These findings suggest that border treaties do more than simply specify the distribution of territory and provide for transfers. By requiring states to renounce claims to territories that they do not receive, treaties generate ex ante costs of signing and/or ex post costs for reneging that explain their association with subsequent peace.
- Top Cited Papers
- 17 October 2012
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 7 (4) , 365-410
Comparing British and French Colonial Legacies: A Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon
Colonial institutions are thought to be an important determinates of post-independence levels of political stability, economic growth, and public goods provision. In particular, many scholars have suggested that British institutional and cultural legacies are more conducive to growth than those of France or other colonizers. Systematic tests of this hypothesis are complicated by unobserved heterogeneity among nations due to variable pre- and post-colonial histories. We focus on the West African nation of Cameroon, which includes regions colonized by both Britain and France, and use the artificial former colonial boundary as a discontinuity within a national demographic survey. We show that rural areas on the British side of discontinuity have higher levels of wealth and local public provision of piped water. Results for urban areas and centrally-provided public goods show no such effect, suggesting that post-independence policies also play a role in shaping outcomes. Though our ability to identify causal mechanisms is limited, the evidence suggests that communities on the British side benefited from a policy of indirect rule and lack of forced labor, which produced more vigorous local institutions.
- 17 October 2012
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 7 (4) , 365-410
Top Cited PapersComparing British and French Colonial Legacies: A Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon
Colonial institutions are thought to be an important determinates of post-independence levels of political stability, economic growth, and public goods provision. In particular, many scholars have suggested that British institutional and cultural legacies are more conducive to growth than those of France or other colonizers. Systematic tests of this hypothesis are complicated by unobserved heterogeneity among nations due to variable pre- and post-colonial histories. We focus on the West African nation of Cameroon, which includes regions colonized by both Britain and France, and use the artificial former colonial boundary as a discontinuity within a national demographic survey. We show that rural areas on the British side of discontinuity have higher levels of wealth and local public provision of piped water. Results for urban areas and centrally-provided public goods show no such effect, suggesting that post-independence policies also play a role in shaping outcomes. Though our ability to identify causal mechanisms is limited, the evidence suggests that communities on the British side benefited from a policy of indirect rule and lack of forced labor, which produced more vigorous local institutions.
- 1 January 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 64 (2) , 281-312
The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars
This article explores the strategic problems that arise when a state seeks to use military force to compel changes in another state's policies. Although the costs associated with military action mean that there generally exist compromises that both sides prefer to conflict, bargaining may fail if such deals are not enforceable in the face of temptations to renege on policy concessions. This study develops a model that shows that inefficient conflict can occur when states bargain over policies that one of them can change unilaterally and covertly. I then show that this theory is useful for understanding a common source of international conflict: conflicts that arise when one state supports rebel groups engaged in a civil war with another state. Episodes of rebel support are associated with a substantial increase in the risk of interstate militarized disputes, the lethality of these disputes, and the likelihood of repeated violence. Agreements to limit rebel support are unlikely to reduce interstate violence unless they are coupled with concessions by the target state and/or monitoring mechanisms, both of which are shown theoretically to mitigate the enforcement problem.
- 1 January 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 64 (2) , 281-312
The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars
This article explores the strategic problems that arise when a state seeks to use military force to compel changes in another state's policies. Although the costs associated with military action mean that there generally exist compromises that both sides prefer to conflict, bargaining may fail if such deals are not enforceable in the face of temptations to renege on policy concessions. This study develops a model that shows that inefficient conflict can occur when states bargain over policies that one of them can change unilaterally and covertly. I then show that this theory is useful for understanding a common source of international conflict: conflicts that arise when one state supports rebel groups engaged in a civil war with another state. Episodes of rebel support are associated with a substantial increase in the risk of interstate militarized disputes, the lethality of these disputes, and the likelihood of repeated violence. Agreements to limit rebel support are unlikely to reduce interstate violence unless they are coupled with concessions by the target state and/or monitoring mechanisms, both of which are shown theoretically to mitigate the enforcement problem.