ZYZhihu Yang

Zhihu Yang

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Zhihu Yang has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Role polarization and its effects in the spatial ultimatum game

    by Zhihu Yang

    Human society is believed to be becoming increasingly polarized, yet it remains unclear how role polarization influences the evolution of fairness. In addition, little is known about role adaptation, despite the fact that altering the roles of players can often change the outcome of the ultimatum game. Unlike earlier static, random, symmetric role assignment, here I suggest a succeed-reinforce–fail-slacken role adaptation rule that encourages successful proposers in the present round to propose again in the next round and vice versa. The results demonstrate that this simple rule can tip the scales in favor of fair strategies when it comes to the proposer advantage, and therein lies the key to promoting fairness. Depending on its pace, notably, role adaptation can direct the system to equilibrium states that bear variable degrees of role polarization, with two consequences incidentally. Not only does it favor fairness, it also fosters empathy. Noise associated with role adaptation often reduces role polarization and thus has a negative impact on fairness and empathy. The comparison of experiments with various networks validates the substantial resilience of role polarization to structural changes. These findings add to the evidence for role polarization and highlight the centrality of role adaptation in the evolution of fairness.


  • Random migration with tie retention promotes cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game

    by Zhihu Yang, Liping Zhang

    Migration has the potential to induce outbreaks of cooperation, yet little is known about random migration. Does random migration really inhibit cooperation as often as previously thought? Besides, prior literature has often ignored the stickiness of social ties when designing migration protocols and assumed that players always immediately disconnect from their ex-neighbors once they migrate. However, this is not always true. Here, we propose a model where players can still retain some bonds with their ex-partners after they move from one place to another. The results show that maintaining a certain number of social ties, regardless of prosocial, exploitative, or punitive, can nevertheless facilitate cooperation even if migration occurs in a totally random fashion. Notably, it reflects that tie retention can help random migration, previously thought to be harmful to cooperation, restore the ability to spark bursts of cooperation. The maximum number of retained ex-neighbors plays an important role in facilitating cooperation. We analyze the impact of social diversity in terms of the maximum number of retained ex-neighbors and migration probability, and find that the former enhances cooperation while the latter often engenders an optimal dependence between cooperation and migration. Our results instantiate a scenario in which random migration yields the outbreak of cooperation and highlight the importance of social stickiness.


  • Open Access

    Evolution of cooperation in synergistically evolving dynamic interdependent networks: fundamental advantages of coordinated network evolution

    by Zhihu Yang, Changbin Yu, Jonghyuk Kim, Zhi Li, Long Wang

    Real networks are not only multi-layered yet also dynamic. The role of coordinated network evolution regarding dynamic multi-layer networks where both network and strategy evolution simultaneously show diverse interdependence by layers remains poorly addressed. Here, we propose a general and simple coevolution framework to analyze how coordination of different dynamical processes affects strategy propagation in synergistically evolving interdependent networks. The strategic feedback constitutes the main driving force of network evolution yet the inherent cross-layer self-optimization functions as its compensation. We show that these two ingredients often catalyze a better performance of network evolution in propagating cooperation. Coordinated network evolution may be a double-edged sword to cooperation and the network-adapting rate plays a crucial role in flipping its double-sided effect. It often economizes the cost and time consumption for driving the system to the full cooperation phase. Importantly, strongly coupled slow-tuned networks can outperform weakly coupled fast-regulated networks in solving social dilemmas, highlighting the fundamental advantages of coordinated network evolution and the importance of synergistic effect of dynamical processes in upholding human cooperation in multiplex networks.


  • Open Access

    Evolution of cooperation driven by majority-pressure based interdependence

    by Zhihu Yang, Changbin Yu, Jonghyuk Kim, Zhi Li, Long Wang

    The evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks is arousing increasing concern based on the fact that more and more complex systems in the real-world have been proven to be organized in the form of multi-layer networks rather than single-layer networks. In this study, we examine effects of self-organized interdependence on the evolution and stabilization of cooperation with social dilemmas depicted by the Prisoner's Dilemma Game and the Public Goods Game in which agents with most common strategy have the chance to be rewarded proportionally to the fitness of corresponding agents belonging to the other network. We show that such a type-free rewarding rule, independent of game strategy, establishes a time-varying interdependence between two initially independent populations whereby cooperation is highly promoted as well as stabilized both in the two-player Prisoner's Dilemma Game and in the multi-player Public Goods Game. Majority-pressure based interdependence at stake has proven pretty neutral in regard to game strategy because it is contingent on strategy configuration rather than strategy itself, which thus gives birth to homologous communities, including cooperative as well as non-cooperative, and thereby an enhanced spatial reciprocity between nonidentical networks is triggered. Of particular interest is the double-edged sword effect of network interdependence on cooperation although in most instances the heavier the interdependence, the better the evolution of cooperation. Furthermore, interpretations of nontrivial relationship between cooperation and benchmark threshold measuring strategy's local popularity highlight that rewarding the minimum majority is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in such scenario. Finally, we claim our observations are also quite robust with respect to mutation.


  • Open Access

    Aspiration-Based Partner Switching Boosts Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

    by Zhi Li, Zhihu Yang, Te Wu, Long Wang

    Most previous studies concerning linking dynamics often assumed that links pairing individuals should be identified and treated differently during topology adjusting procedure, in order to promote cooperation. A common assumption was that cooperators were expected to avoid being exploited by quickly breaking up relationships with defectors. Then the so-called prosocial links linking two cooperators (abbreviated as CC links hereafter) would be much favored by evolution, whereby cooperation was promoted. However, we suggest that this is not always necessary. Here, we developed a minimal model in which an aspiration-based partner switching mechanism was embedded to regulate the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Individuals adjusted social ties in a self-questioning manner in line with the learning theory. Less game information was involved during dynamic linking and all links were tackled anonymously irrespective of their types (i.e., CD links, DD links, or CC links). The main results indicate that cooperation flourishes for a broad range of parameters. The denser the underlying network, the more difficult the evolution of cooperation. More importantly, moderate aspirations do much better in promoting the evolution of altruistic behavior and for most cases there exists the optimal aspiration level that most benefits cooperation. Too strong or too weak selection intensity turns out to be pretty conducive to the evolution of cooperation in such a dynamical system.