Zhihu Yang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Zhihu Yang has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Long Wang
Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China
8 shared publications Te Wu
Xidian University
6 shared publicationsZhi Li
Center for Complex Intelligent Networks, School of Mechano-Electronic Engineering, Xidian University, Xi’an, China
6 shared publications- Zhi Li
Xidian University
3 shared publications Changbin Yu
1 shared publication- Changbin Yu
College of Medical Information and Artificial Intelligence, Jinan Central Hospital Affiliated to Shandong First Medical University, Shandong First Medical University and Shandong Academy of Medical Sciences
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 6 September 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 187
The double-edged sword effect of conformity on cooperation in spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Games with reinforcement learning
- 6 September 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 187
The double-edged sword effect of conformity on cooperation in spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma Games with reinforcement learning
- 4 August 2023
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 108 (2) , 024106
Role polarization and its effects in the spatial ultimatum game
Human society is believed to be becoming increasingly polarized, yet it remains unclear how role polarization influences the evolution of fairness. In addition, little is known about role adaptation, despite the fact that altering the roles of players can often change the outcome of the ultimatum game. Unlike earlier static, random, symmetric role assignment, here I suggest a succeed-reinforce–fail-slacken role adaptation rule that encourages successful proposers in the present round to propose again in the next round and vice versa. The results demonstrate that this simple rule can tip the scales in favor of fair strategies when it comes to the proposer advantage, and therein lies the key to promoting fairness. Depending on its pace, notably, role adaptation can direct the system to equilibrium states that bear variable degrees of role polarization, with two consequences incidentally. Not only does it favor fairness, it also fosters empathy. Noise associated with role adaptation often reduces role polarization and thus has a negative impact on fairness and empathy. The comparison of experiments with various networks validates the substantial resilience of role polarization to structural changes. These findings add to the evidence for role polarization and highlight the centrality of role adaptation in the evolution of fairness.
- 4 August 2023
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review E
- Vol. 108 (2) , 024106
Role polarization and its effects in the spatial ultimatum game
Human society is believed to be becoming increasingly polarized, yet it remains unclear how role polarization influences the evolution of fairness. In addition, little is known about role adaptation, despite the fact that altering the roles of players can often change the outcome of the ultimatum game. Unlike earlier static, random, symmetric role assignment, here I suggest a succeed-reinforce–fail-slacken role adaptation rule that encourages successful proposers in the present round to propose again in the next round and vice versa. The results demonstrate that this simple rule can tip the scales in favor of fair strategies when it comes to the proposer advantage, and therein lies the key to promoting fairness. Depending on its pace, notably, role adaptation can direct the system to equilibrium states that bear variable degrees of role polarization, with two consequences incidentally. Not only does it favor fairness, it also fosters empathy. Noise associated with role adaptation often reduces role polarization and thus has a negative impact on fairness and empathy. The comparison of experiments with various networks validates the substantial resilience of role polarization to structural changes. These findings add to the evidence for role polarization and highlight the centrality of role adaptation in the evolution of fairness.
- 1 April 2023
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 33 (4) , 043126
Random migration with tie retention promotes cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game
Migration has the potential to induce outbreaks of cooperation, yet little is known about random migration. Does random migration really inhibit cooperation as often as previously thought? Besides, prior literature has often ignored the stickiness of social ties when designing migration protocols and assumed that players always immediately disconnect from their ex-neighbors once they migrate. However, this is not always true. Here, we propose a model where players can still retain some bonds with their ex-partners after they move from one place to another. The results show that maintaining a certain number of social ties, regardless of prosocial, exploitative, or punitive, can nevertheless facilitate cooperation even if migration occurs in a totally random fashion. Notably, it reflects that tie retention can help random migration, previously thought to be harmful to cooperation, restore the ability to spark bursts of cooperation. The maximum number of retained ex-neighbors plays an important role in facilitating cooperation. We analyze the impact of social diversity in terms of the maximum number of retained ex-neighbors and migration probability, and find that the former enhances cooperation while the latter often engenders an optimal dependence between cooperation and migration. Our results instantiate a scenario in which random migration yields the outbreak of cooperation and highlight the importance of social stickiness.
- 1 April 2023
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 33 (4) , 043126
Random migration with tie retention promotes cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game
Migration has the potential to induce outbreaks of cooperation, yet little is known about random migration. Does random migration really inhibit cooperation as often as previously thought? Besides, prior literature has often ignored the stickiness of social ties when designing migration protocols and assumed that players always immediately disconnect from their ex-neighbors once they migrate. However, this is not always true. Here, we propose a model where players can still retain some bonds with their ex-partners after they move from one place to another. The results show that maintaining a certain number of social ties, regardless of prosocial, exploitative, or punitive, can nevertheless facilitate cooperation even if migration occurs in a totally random fashion. Notably, it reflects that tie retention can help random migration, previously thought to be harmful to cooperation, restore the ability to spark bursts of cooperation. The maximum number of retained ex-neighbors plays an important role in facilitating cooperation. We analyze the impact of social diversity in terms of the maximum number of retained ex-neighbors and migration probability, and find that the former enhances cooperation while the latter often engenders an optimal dependence between cooperation and migration. Our results instantiate a scenario in which random migration yields the outbreak of cooperation and highlight the importance of social stickiness.
- 22 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Nonlinear Dynamics
- Vol. 108 (4) , 4599-4610
Oscillation and burst transition of human cooperation
- 22 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Nonlinear Dynamics
- Vol. 108 (4) , 4599-4610
Oscillation and burst transition of human cooperation
- 1 August 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Applied Mathematics and Computation
- Vol. 379
Evolution of cooperation in a conformity-driven evolving dynamic social network
- 1 August 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Applied Mathematics and Computation
- Vol. 379
Evolution of cooperation in a conformity-driven evolving dynamic social network
- Open Access
- 1 July 2019
- Published by IOP Publishing in New Journal of Physics
- Vol. 21 (7) , 073057
Evolution of cooperation in synergistically evolving dynamic interdependent networks: fundamental advantages of coordinated network evolution
Real networks are not only multi-layered yet also dynamic. The role of coordinated network evolution regarding dynamic multi-layer networks where both network and strategy evolution simultaneously show diverse interdependence by layers remains poorly addressed. Here, we propose a general and simple coevolution framework to analyze how coordination of different dynamical processes affects strategy propagation in synergistically evolving interdependent networks. The strategic feedback constitutes the main driving force of network evolution yet the inherent cross-layer self-optimization functions as its compensation. We show that these two ingredients often catalyze a better performance of network evolution in propagating cooperation. Coordinated network evolution may be a double-edged sword to cooperation and the network-adapting rate plays a crucial role in flipping its double-sided effect. It often economizes the cost and time consumption for driving the system to the full cooperation phase. Importantly, strongly coupled slow-tuned networks can outperform weakly coupled fast-regulated networks in solving social dilemmas, highlighting the fundamental advantages of coordinated network evolution and the importance of synergistic effect of dynamical processes in upholding human cooperation in multiplex networks.
- 1 July 2019
- Published by IOP Publishing in New Journal of Physics
- Vol. 21 (7) , 073057
Open AccessEvolution of cooperation in synergistically evolving dynamic interdependent networks: fundamental advantages of coordinated network evolution
Real networks are not only multi-layered yet also dynamic. The role of coordinated network evolution regarding dynamic multi-layer networks where both network and strategy evolution simultaneously show diverse interdependence by layers remains poorly addressed. Here, we propose a general and simple coevolution framework to analyze how coordination of different dynamical processes affects strategy propagation in synergistically evolving interdependent networks. The strategic feedback constitutes the main driving force of network evolution yet the inherent cross-layer self-optimization functions as its compensation. We show that these two ingredients often catalyze a better performance of network evolution in propagating cooperation. Coordinated network evolution may be a double-edged sword to cooperation and the network-adapting rate plays a crucial role in flipping its double-sided effect. It often economizes the cost and time consumption for driving the system to the full cooperation phase. Importantly, strongly coupled slow-tuned networks can outperform weakly coupled fast-regulated networks in solving social dilemmas, highlighting the fundamental advantages of coordinated network evolution and the importance of synergistic effect of dynamical processes in upholding human cooperation in multiplex networks.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2018
- Published by IOP Publishing in New Journal of Physics
- Vol. 20 (8) , 083047
Evolution of cooperation driven by majority-pressure based interdependence
The evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks is arousing increasing concern based on the fact that more and more complex systems in the real-world have been proven to be organized in the form of multi-layer networks rather than single-layer networks. In this study, we examine effects of self-organized interdependence on the evolution and stabilization of cooperation with social dilemmas depicted by the Prisoner's Dilemma Game and the Public Goods Game in which agents with most common strategy have the chance to be rewarded proportionally to the fitness of corresponding agents belonging to the other network. We show that such a type-free rewarding rule, independent of game strategy, establishes a time-varying interdependence between two initially independent populations whereby cooperation is highly promoted as well as stabilized both in the two-player Prisoner's Dilemma Game and in the multi-player Public Goods Game. Majority-pressure based interdependence at stake has proven pretty neutral in regard to game strategy because it is contingent on strategy configuration rather than strategy itself, which thus gives birth to homologous communities, including cooperative as well as non-cooperative, and thereby an enhanced spatial reciprocity between nonidentical networks is triggered. Of particular interest is the double-edged sword effect of network interdependence on cooperation although in most instances the heavier the interdependence, the better the evolution of cooperation. Furthermore, interpretations of nontrivial relationship between cooperation and benchmark threshold measuring strategy's local popularity highlight that rewarding the minimum majority is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in such scenario. Finally, we claim our observations are also quite robust with respect to mutation.
- 1 August 2018
- Published by IOP Publishing in New Journal of Physics
- Vol. 20 (8) , 083047
Open AccessEvolution of cooperation driven by majority-pressure based interdependence
The evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks is arousing increasing concern based on the fact that more and more complex systems in the real-world have been proven to be organized in the form of multi-layer networks rather than single-layer networks. In this study, we examine effects of self-organized interdependence on the evolution and stabilization of cooperation with social dilemmas depicted by the Prisoner's Dilemma Game and the Public Goods Game in which agents with most common strategy have the chance to be rewarded proportionally to the fitness of corresponding agents belonging to the other network. We show that such a type-free rewarding rule, independent of game strategy, establishes a time-varying interdependence between two initially independent populations whereby cooperation is highly promoted as well as stabilized both in the two-player Prisoner's Dilemma Game and in the multi-player Public Goods Game. Majority-pressure based interdependence at stake has proven pretty neutral in regard to game strategy because it is contingent on strategy configuration rather than strategy itself, which thus gives birth to homologous communities, including cooperative as well as non-cooperative, and thereby an enhanced spatial reciprocity between nonidentical networks is triggered. Of particular interest is the double-edged sword effect of network interdependence on cooperation although in most instances the heavier the interdependence, the better the evolution of cooperation. Furthermore, interpretations of nontrivial relationship between cooperation and benchmark threshold measuring strategy's local popularity highlight that rewarding the minimum majority is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in such scenario. Finally, we claim our observations are also quite robust with respect to mutation.
- 1 February 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Europhysics Letters
- Vol. 109 (4)
Effects of partner choice and role assignation in the spatial ultimatum game
- 1 February 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Europhysics Letters
- Vol. 109 (4)
Effects of partner choice and role assignation in the spatial ultimatum game
- Open Access
- 4 June 2014
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 9 (6) , e97866
Aspiration-Based Partner Switching Boosts Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Most previous studies concerning linking dynamics often assumed that links pairing individuals should be identified and treated differently during topology adjusting procedure, in order to promote cooperation. A common assumption was that cooperators were expected to avoid being exploited by quickly breaking up relationships with defectors. Then the so-called prosocial links linking two cooperators (abbreviated as CC links hereafter) would be much favored by evolution, whereby cooperation was promoted. However, we suggest that this is not always necessary. Here, we developed a minimal model in which an aspiration-based partner switching mechanism was embedded to regulate the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Individuals adjusted social ties in a self-questioning manner in line with the learning theory. Less game information was involved during dynamic linking and all links were tackled anonymously irrespective of their types (i.e., CD links, DD links, or CC links). The main results indicate that cooperation flourishes for a broad range of parameters. The denser the underlying network, the more difficult the evolution of cooperation. More importantly, moderate aspirations do much better in promoting the evolution of altruistic behavior and for most cases there exists the optimal aspiration level that most benefits cooperation. Too strong or too weak selection intensity turns out to be pretty conducive to the evolution of cooperation in such a dynamical system.
- 4 June 2014
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 9 (6) , e97866
Open AccessAspiration-Based Partner Switching Boosts Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Most previous studies concerning linking dynamics often assumed that links pairing individuals should be identified and treated differently during topology adjusting procedure, in order to promote cooperation. A common assumption was that cooperators were expected to avoid being exploited by quickly breaking up relationships with defectors. Then the so-called prosocial links linking two cooperators (abbreviated as CC links hereafter) would be much favored by evolution, whereby cooperation was promoted. However, we suggest that this is not always necessary. Here, we developed a minimal model in which an aspiration-based partner switching mechanism was embedded to regulate the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Individuals adjusted social ties in a self-questioning manner in line with the learning theory. Less game information was involved during dynamic linking and all links were tackled anonymously irrespective of their types (i.e., CD links, DD links, or CC links). The main results indicate that cooperation flourishes for a broad range of parameters. The denser the underlying network, the more difficult the evolution of cooperation. More importantly, moderate aspirations do much better in promoting the evolution of altruistic behavior and for most cases there exists the optimal aspiration level that most benefits cooperation. Too strong or too weak selection intensity turns out to be pretty conducive to the evolution of cooperation in such a dynamical system.
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
- Vol. 393, 304-311
Effects of payoff-related velocity in the co-evolutionary snowdrift game
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
- Vol. 393, 304-311
Effects of payoff-related velocity in the co-evolutionary snowdrift game