MBMatteo Basei

Matteo Basei

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Matteo Basei has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Uncertainty over Uncertainty in Environmental Policy Adoption: Bayesian Learning of Unpredictable Socioeconomic Costs

    by Matteo Basei, Giorgio Ferrari, Neofytos Rodosthenous

    The socioeconomic impact of pollution naturally comes with uncertainty due to, e.g., current new technological developments in emissions' abatement or demographic changes. On top of that, the trend of the future costs of the environmental damage is unknown: Will global warming dominate or technological advancements prevail? The truth is that we do not know which scenario will be realised and the scientific debate is still open. This paper captures those two layers of uncertainty by developing a real-options-like model in which a decision maker aims at adopting a once-and-for-all costly reduction in the current emissions rate, when the stochastic dynamics of the socioeconomic costs of pollution are subject to Brownian shocks and the drift is an unobservable random variable. By keeping track of the actual evolution of the costs, the decision maker is able to learn the unknown drift and to form a posterior dynamic belief of its true value. The resulting decision maker's timing problem boils down to a truly two-dimensional optimal stopping problem which we address via probabilistic free-boundary methods and a state-space transformation. We completely characterise the solution by showing that the optimal timing for implementing the emissions reduction policy is the first time that the learning process has become ``decisive'' enough; that is, when it exceeds a time-dependent percentage. This is given in terms of an endogenously determined threshold function, which solves uniquely a nonlinear integral equation. We numerically illustrate our results, discuss the implications of the optimal policy and also perform comparative statics to understand the role of the relevant model's parameters in the optimal policy.

  • Open Access

    A mean field model for the development of renewable capacities

    by Clémence Alasseur, Matteo Basei, Charles Bertucci, Alekos Cecchin

    We propose a model based on a large number of small competitive producers of renewable energies, to study the effect of subsidies on the aggregate level of capacity, taking into account a cannibalization effect. We first derive a model to explain how long-time equilibrium can be reached on the market of production of renewable electricity and compare this equilibrium to the case of monopoly. Then we consider the case in which other capacities of production adjust to the production of renewable energies. The analysis is based on a master equation and we get explicit formulae for the long-time equilibria. We also provide new numerical methods to simulate the master equation and the evolution of the capacities. Thus we find the optimal subsidies to be given by a central planner to the installation and the production in order to reach a desired equilibrium capacity.


  • Open Access

    A mean field model for the development of renewable capacities

    by Clémence Alasseur, Matteo Basei, Charles Bertucci, Alekos Cecchin

    We propose a model based on a large number of small competitive producers of renewable energies, to study the effect of subsidies on the aggregate level of capacity, taking into account a cannibalization effect. We first derive a model to explain how long-time equilibrium can be reached on the market of production of renewable electricity and compare this equilibrium to the case of monopoly. Then we consider the case in which other capacities of production adjust to the production of renewable energies. The analysis is based on a master equation and we get explicit formulae for the long-time equilibria. We also provide new numerical methods to simulate the master equation and the evolution of the capacities. Thus we find the optimal subsidies to be given by a central planner to the installation and the production in order to reach a desired equilibrium capacity.

  • Open Access

    A Stationary Mean-Field Equilibrium Model of Irreversible Investment in a Two-Regime Economy

    by René Aid, Matteo Basei, Giorgio Ferrari

    We consider a mean-field model of firms competing à la Cournot on a commodity market, where the commodity price is given in terms of a power inverse demand function of the industry-aggregate production. Investment is irreversible and production capacity depreciates at a constant rate. Production is subject to Gaussian productivity shocks, while large non-anticipated macroeconomic events driven by a two-state continuous-time Markov chain can change the volatility of the shocks, as well as the price function. Firms wish to maximize expected discounted revenues of production, net of investment and operational costs. Investment decisions are based on the long-run stationary price of the commodity. We prove existence, uniqueness and characterization of the stationary mean-field equilibrium of the model. The equilibrium investment strategy is of barrier-type and it is triggered by a couple of endogenously determined investment thresholds, one per state of the economy. We provide a quasi-closed form expression of the stationary density of the state and we show that our model can produce Pareto distribution of firms' size. This is a feature that is consistent both with observations at the aggregate level of industries and at the level of a particular industry. We establish a relation between economic instability and market concentration and we show how macroeconomic instability can harm firms' profitability more than productivity fluctuations.

  • Open Access

    Logarithmic regret for episodic continuous-time linear-quadratic reinforcement learning over a finite-time horizon

    by Matteo Basei, Xin Guo, Anran Hu, Yufei Zhang

    We study finite-time horizon continuous-time linear-quadratic reinforcement learning problems in an episodic setting, where both the state and control coefficients are unknown to the controller. We first propose a least-squares algorithm based on continuous-time observations and controls, and establish a logarithmic regret bound of order $O((\ln M)(\ln\ln M))$, with $M$ being the number of learning episodes. The analysis consists of two parts: perturbation analysis, which exploits the regularity and robustness of the associated Riccati differential equation; and parameter estimation error, which relies on sub-exponential properties of continuous-time least-squares estimators. We further propose a practically implementable least-squares algorithm based on discrete-time observations and piecewise constant controls, which achieves similar logarithmic regret with an additional term depending explicitly on the time stepsizes used in the algorithm.

  • Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Games and Mean-Field Games with Impulse Controls

    by Matteo Basei, Haoyang Cao, Xin Guo

    We consider a general class of nonzero-sum N-player stochastic games with impulse controls, where players control the underlying dynamics with discrete interventions. We adopt a veri?cation approach and provide su?cient conditions for the Nash equilibria (NEs) of the game. We then consider the limiting situation when N goes to in?nity, that is, a suitable mean-?eld game (MFG) with impulse controls. We show that under appropriate technical conditions, there exists a unique NE solution to the MFG, which is an ϵ-NE approximation to the N-player game, with [ ]. As an example, we analyze in detail a class of two-player stochastic games which extends the classical cash management problem to the game setting. In particular, we present numerical analysis for the cases of the single player, the two-player game, and the MFG, showing the impact of competition on the player’s optimal strategy, with sensitivity analysis of the model parameters.


  • Open Access

    Nonzero-sum stochastic games and mean-field games with impulse controls

    by Matteo Basei, Haoyang Cao, Xin Guo

    We consider a general class of nonzero-sum $N$-player stochastic games with impulse controls, where players control the underlying dynamics with discrete interventions. We adopt a verification approach and provide sufficient conditions for the Nash equilibria (NEs) of the game. We then consider the limit situation of $N \to \infty$, that is, a suitable mean-field game (MFG) with impulse controls. We show that under appropriate technical conditions, the existence of unique NE solution to the MFG, which is an $\epsilon$-NE approximation to the $N$-player game, with $\epsilon=O\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{N}}\right)$. As an example, we analyze in details a class of two-player stochastic games which extends the classical cash management problem to the game setting. In particular, we present numerical analysis for the cases of the single player, the two-player game, and the MFG, showing the impact of competition on the player's optimal strategy, with sensitivity analysis of the model parameters.

  • Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Differential Games with Impulse Controls: A Verification Theorem with Applications

    by René Aïd, Matteo Basei, Giorgia Callegaro, Luciano Campi, Tiziano Vargiolu

    We consider a general nonzero-sum impulse game with two players. The main mathematical contribution of this paper is a verification theorem that provides, under some regularity conditions, a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities for the payoffs and the strategies of the two players at some Nash equilibrium. As an application, we study an impulse game with a one-dimensional state variable, following a real-valued scaled Brownian motion, and two players with linear and symmetric running payoffs. We fully characterize a family of Nash equilibria and provide explicit expressions for the corresponding equilibrium strategies and payoffs. We also prove some asymptotic results with respect to the intervention costs. Finally, we consider two further nonsymmetric examples where a Nash equilibrium is found numerically.