LLLubomir P. Litov

Lubomir P. Litov

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Lubomir P. Litov has a total of 52 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Bankruptcy Law and Firm Size

    by Aras Canipek, Axel Kind, Lubomir P. Litov, Jiri Tresl

    Weaker creditor rights can increase credit costs and thus prompt firms to reduce debt and investment. Yet, they can reduce distress costs and thus allow firms to increase leverage and eliminate risk-reducing but unprofitable investments. We hypothesize that firm size influences the effect of creditor rights on credit costs and distress costs and thus which effect dominates. Weaker creditor rights should have a negative effect for small firms but a positive effect for large firms. Using a German bankruptcy reform, we find support for our hypothesis. Our findings reconcile mixed evidence and have important implications for optimal bankruptcy design.

  • Open Access

    Military Governors and Corporate Subsidies

    by Dhruv Aggarwal, Lubomir P. Litov

    Using a hand-coded dataset tracking the backgrounds of U.S. governors, we find that military governors grant relatively smaller amounts of corporate subsidies when they become “lame ducks” (i.e., ineligible to run for another term). This difference between military and other officeholders is weaker for Republican governors and stronger for governors who likely volunteered for military service rather than being drafted. We find that military governors are less likely to favor companies with the same political affiliation during their lame duck phase. Given the exogenous constitutional variation in term limits between states and governors, these effects are credibly causal.

  • Open Access

    Are Sell-Side Analysts Up to the Challenge of Climate Change?

    by Gil Aharoni, Bryan Lim, Lubomir P. Litov, Scott Luo

    Estimating the financial implications of climate change presents a significant challenge, one that aligns with the specialized expertise of sell-side analysts. This study examines analysts' performance in this context and finds that they exhibit systematic pessimism in their earnings forecasts for carbon-intensive firms. Our results suggest this pessimism is more likely represents a mistake rather than deliberate strategic behavior. Analysts appear to conflate elevated discount rates with diminished earnings prospects. Analysts with prior professional experience in pollutionintensive industries exhibit greater pessimism, suggesting this error is more likely driven by limitations in financial expertise rather than a lack of industry-specific knowledge.

  • Open Access

    Borders Bear the Brunt: State Environmental Review and Severed Agglomerations

    by Matthew Gustafson, Lubomir P. Litov, Bharat Raj Parajuli

    We study how state environmental review laws (SEPAs) shape local business activity. Using a stacked, border-pair event design around staggered SEPAs, we compare adjacent counties on either side of state lines. SEPA-side border counties experience slower post-adoption growth that cumulates into persistent level losses over two decades, with no mirror-image gains across the border and no broad underperformance in state interiors. Effects are strongest for SEPA-treated counties that border large metro areas, when SEPAs have substantive provisions, and when states devote more resources to environmental protection, and they fall disproportionately on pollution-intensive sectors and small firms. In sum, local environmental regulations can erode local agglomerations, adversely affecting local small business growth.

  • Growth Equity

    by Lubomir P. Litov, William Megginson


  • Open Access

    Poison Pills in the Shadow of the Law

    by K. J. Martijn Cremers, Simone M. Sepe, Michal Zator, Lubomir P. Litov

    Poison pills are among the most powerful antitakeover provisions, but studying their economic impact is challenging because of the obvious endogeneity concerns. We address the problem by studying U.S. states’ staggered adoption of poison pill laws (PPLs), which strengthen the right to adopt a pill (i.e., the shadow pill) and increase the validity of visible pills. We document that PPLs make visible pill policy aligned with economic incentives, increasing pill adoption among firms with a high likelihood of takeover, but decreasing it among firms with low takeover likelihood. We also document that PPLs positively impact firm value, especially for innovative firms with more intangible assets.


  • Open Access

    Value over Values: Evidence from State Pension Funds

    by Dhruv Aggarwal, Lubomir P. Litov, Shivaram Rajgopal

    This paper uses newly available data to systematically analyze the financial and political determinants of voting by pension funds in corporate governance. For shareholder meetings held after July 2023, a new regulatory mandate requires pension funds to disclose their voting decisions for executive compensation issues. We use the first batch of regulatory filings from public pension funds to reveal a striking partisan gap in the decision to vote against management on executive compensation issues. Democratic-run pension funds are approximately five percentage points more likely to vote against management, but their decision to do so does not seem to be driven by the financial performance of the firm. Instead, Democratic-run funds seem to be influenced by proxy advisor recommendations and the magnitude of CEO compensation. On the other hand, funds from Republican states that have been most vocal about corporate governance issues or passed laws forbidding their pension funds from considering environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors base their executive compensation votes on firm performance and are less reliant on proxy advisor recommendations or the magnitude of CEO compensation. Finally, we use the disclosures' novel data on share lending to find that pension funds with worse financial support are more likely to lend out their shares.

  • Growth Equity

    by Lubomir P. Litov, William Megginson

  • The Effect of Policy Uncertainty on VC Investments Around the World

    by Lubomir P. Litov, Xia (Summer) Liu, Romora E. Sitorus

    This study documents a significant negative relationship between policy uncertainty and venture capital (VC) investment in startups across emerging venture capital markets (i.e., outside the United States). The adverse effect of policy uncertainty is exacerbated for younger and early-stage startups. By contrast, the effect is attenuated for startups that have headquarters in cities with a high concentration of global VC investment, in countries with more developed stock markets, or if the VC is led by a bank or a corporate entity. Using close national elections to alleviate endogeneity concerns, we find that the baseline results continue to hold. Furthermore, this study provides evidence that uncertainty increases the number of financing rounds, decreases the fraction of investment amount during the first round, and reduces the likelihood of successful exit through acquisition. Finally, we also find that policy uncertainty reduces the amount of cross-border VC investment.


  • Open Access

    Why Are All-Star Analysts Influential?

    by Gil Aharoni, Bryan Lim, Lubomir P. Litov, Richard A. Price, Ling Zhang

    Ample evidence finds that Institutional Investor's (I/I) star analysts are more influential than nonstars (e.g., Loh and Stulz, 2011), but the reason for this is unclear. We explore two hypotheses: first, that their status itself generates influence, and second, that their quality is superior, consequently yielding them more influence. Across numerous tests, we find no evidence that status affects the influence of analysts. Instead, we find that analysts with influential recommendations are more likely to be selected as stars, supporting the quality hypothesis. We introduce a negative performance measure called blunder and document that by altering the weights on analysts' influential recommendations and blunders, voters can cater simultaneously to both their own and I/I's interests. Ordinary analysts are incentivized to demonstrate reliability, while reigning stars are incentivized to produce bold research. We additionally show that voting has a seasonal component that is consistent with previously documented seasonal analyst behavior.