Lubomir P. Litov
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Lubomir P. Litov has a total of 52 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dhruv Aggarwal
5 shared publications- Kose John
New York University Stern School of Business
5 shared publications Bernard Yin Yeung
National University of Singapore - Business School
4 shared publicationsSimone M. Sepe
University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law; IAST - Fondation Jean-Jacques Laffont - TSE ; University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
4 shared publications- William L. Megginson
University of Oklahoma
3 shared publications Aras Canipek
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Bankruptcy Law and Firm Size
Weaker creditor rights can increase credit costs and thus prompt firms to reduce debt and investment. Yet, they can reduce distress costs and thus allow firms to increase leverage and eliminate risk-reducing but unprofitable investments. We hypothesize that firm size influences the effect of creditor rights on credit costs and distress costs and thus which effect dominates. Weaker creditor rights should have a negative effect for small firms but a positive effect for large firms. Using a German bankruptcy reform, we find support for our hypothesis. Our findings reconcile mixed evidence and have important implications for optimal bankruptcy design.
- 23 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessBankruptcy Law and Firm Size
Weaker creditor rights can increase credit costs and thus prompt firms to reduce debt and investment. Yet, they can reduce distress costs and thus allow firms to increase leverage and eliminate risk-reducing but unprofitable investments. We hypothesize that firm size influences the effect of creditor rights on credit costs and distress costs and thus which effect dominates. Weaker creditor rights should have a negative effect for small firms but a positive effect for large firms. Using a German bankruptcy reform, we find support for our hypothesis. Our findings reconcile mixed evidence and have important implications for optimal bankruptcy design.
- Open Access
- 10 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Military Governors and Corporate Subsidies
Using a hand-coded dataset tracking the backgrounds of U.S. governors, we find that military governors grant relatively smaller amounts of corporate subsidies when they become “lame ducks” (i.e., ineligible to run for another term). This difference between military and other officeholders is weaker for Republican governors and stronger for governors who likely volunteered for military service rather than being drafted. We find that military governors are less likely to favor companies with the same political affiliation during their lame duck phase. Given the exogenous constitutional variation in term limits between states and governors, these effects are credibly causal.
- 10 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMilitary Governors and Corporate Subsidies
Using a hand-coded dataset tracking the backgrounds of U.S. governors, we find that military governors grant relatively smaller amounts of corporate subsidies when they become “lame ducks” (i.e., ineligible to run for another term). This difference between military and other officeholders is weaker for Republican governors and stronger for governors who likely volunteered for military service rather than being drafted. We find that military governors are less likely to favor companies with the same political affiliation during their lame duck phase. Given the exogenous constitutional variation in term limits between states and governors, these effects are credibly causal.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Are Sell-Side Analysts Up to the Challenge of Climate Change?
Estimating the financial implications of climate change presents a significant challenge, one that aligns with the specialized expertise of sell-side analysts. This study examines analysts' performance in this context and finds that they exhibit systematic pessimism in their earnings forecasts for carbon-intensive firms. Our results suggest this pessimism is more likely represents a mistake rather than deliberate strategic behavior. Analysts appear to conflate elevated discount rates with diminished earnings prospects. Analysts with prior professional experience in pollutionintensive industries exhibit greater pessimism, suggesting this error is more likely driven by limitations in financial expertise rather than a lack of industry-specific knowledge.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAre Sell-Side Analysts Up to the Challenge of Climate Change?
Estimating the financial implications of climate change presents a significant challenge, one that aligns with the specialized expertise of sell-side analysts. This study examines analysts' performance in this context and finds that they exhibit systematic pessimism in their earnings forecasts for carbon-intensive firms. Our results suggest this pessimism is more likely represents a mistake rather than deliberate strategic behavior. Analysts appear to conflate elevated discount rates with diminished earnings prospects. Analysts with prior professional experience in pollutionintensive industries exhibit greater pessimism, suggesting this error is more likely driven by limitations in financial expertise rather than a lack of industry-specific knowledge.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Borders Bear the Brunt: State Environmental Review and Severed Agglomerations
We study how state environmental review laws (SEPAs) shape local business activity. Using a stacked, border-pair event design around staggered SEPAs, we compare adjacent counties on either side of state lines. SEPA-side border counties experience slower post-adoption growth that cumulates into persistent level losses over two decades, with no mirror-image gains across the border and no broad underperformance in state interiors. Effects are strongest for SEPA-treated counties that border large metro areas, when SEPAs have substantive provisions, and when states devote more resources to environmental protection, and they fall disproportionately on pollution-intensive sectors and small firms. In sum, local environmental regulations can erode local agglomerations, adversely affecting local small business growth.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessBorders Bear the Brunt: State Environmental Review and Severed Agglomerations
We study how state environmental review laws (SEPAs) shape local business activity. Using a stacked, border-pair event design around staggered SEPAs, we compare adjacent counties on either side of state lines. SEPA-side border counties experience slower post-adoption growth that cumulates into persistent level losses over two decades, with no mirror-image gains across the border and no broad underperformance in state interiors. Effects are strongest for SEPA-treated counties that border large metro areas, when SEPAs have substantive provisions, and when states devote more resources to environmental protection, and they fall disproportionately on pollution-intensive sectors and small firms. In sum, local environmental regulations can erode local agglomerations, adversely affecting local small business growth.
- Open Access
- 7 April 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 60 (6) , 2718-2752
Poison Pills in the Shadow of the Law
Poison pills are among the most powerful antitakeover provisions, but studying their economic impact is challenging because of the obvious endogeneity concerns. We address the problem by studying U.S. states’ staggered adoption of poison pill laws (PPLs), which strengthen the right to adopt a pill (i.e., the shadow pill) and increase the validity of visible pills. We document that PPLs make visible pill policy aligned with economic incentives, increasing pill adoption among firms with a high likelihood of takeover, but decreasing it among firms with low takeover likelihood. We also document that PPLs positively impact firm value, especially for innovative firms with more intangible assets.
- 7 April 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 60 (6) , 2718-2752
Open AccessPoison Pills in the Shadow of the Law
Poison pills are among the most powerful antitakeover provisions, but studying their economic impact is challenging because of the obvious endogeneity concerns. We address the problem by studying U.S. states’ staggered adoption of poison pill laws (PPLs), which strengthen the right to adopt a pill (i.e., the shadow pill) and increase the validity of visible pills. We document that PPLs make visible pill policy aligned with economic incentives, increasing pill adoption among firms with a high likelihood of takeover, but decreasing it among firms with low takeover likelihood. We also document that PPLs positively impact firm value, especially for innovative firms with more intangible assets.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Value over Values: Evidence from State Pension Funds
This paper uses newly available data to systematically analyze the financial and political determinants of voting by pension funds in corporate governance. For shareholder meetings held after July 2023, a new regulatory mandate requires pension funds to disclose their voting decisions for executive compensation issues. We use the first batch of regulatory filings from public pension funds to reveal a striking partisan gap in the decision to vote against management on executive compensation issues. Democratic-run pension funds are approximately five percentage points more likely to vote against management, but their decision to do so does not seem to be driven by the financial performance of the firm. Instead, Democratic-run funds seem to be influenced by proxy advisor recommendations and the magnitude of CEO compensation. On the other hand, funds from Republican states that have been most vocal about corporate governance issues or passed laws forbidding their pension funds from considering environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors base their executive compensation votes on firm performance and are less reliant on proxy advisor recommendations or the magnitude of CEO compensation. Finally, we use the disclosures' novel data on share lending to find that pension funds with worse financial support are more likely to lend out their shares.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessValue over Values: Evidence from State Pension Funds
This paper uses newly available data to systematically analyze the financial and political determinants of voting by pension funds in corporate governance. For shareholder meetings held after July 2023, a new regulatory mandate requires pension funds to disclose their voting decisions for executive compensation issues. We use the first batch of regulatory filings from public pension funds to reveal a striking partisan gap in the decision to vote against management on executive compensation issues. Democratic-run pension funds are approximately five percentage points more likely to vote against management, but their decision to do so does not seem to be driven by the financial performance of the firm. Instead, Democratic-run funds seem to be influenced by proxy advisor recommendations and the magnitude of CEO compensation. On the other hand, funds from Republican states that have been most vocal about corporate governance issues or passed laws forbidding their pension funds from considering environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors base their executive compensation votes on firm performance and are less reliant on proxy advisor recommendations or the magnitude of CEO compensation. Finally, we use the disclosures' novel data on share lending to find that pension funds with worse financial support are more likely to lend out their shares.
- 24 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-3
Growth Equity
- 22 February 2024
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting
- Vol. 8 (1) , 1-53
The Effect of Policy Uncertainty on VC Investments Around the World
This study documents a significant negative relationship between policy uncertainty and venture capital (VC) investment in startups across emerging venture capital markets (i.e., outside the United States). The adverse effect of policy uncertainty is exacerbated for younger and early-stage startups. By contrast, the effect is attenuated for startups that have headquarters in cities with a high concentration of global VC investment, in countries with more developed stock markets, or if the VC is led by a bank or a corporate entity. Using close national elections to alleviate endogeneity concerns, we find that the baseline results continue to hold. Furthermore, this study provides evidence that uncertainty increases the number of financing rounds, decreases the fraction of investment amount during the first round, and reduces the likelihood of successful exit through acquisition. Finally, we also find that policy uncertainty reduces the amount of cross-border VC investment.
- 22 February 2024
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Journal of Law, Finance, and Accounting
- Vol. 8 (1) , 1-53
The Effect of Policy Uncertainty on VC Investments Around the World
This study documents a significant negative relationship between policy uncertainty and venture capital (VC) investment in startups across emerging venture capital markets (i.e., outside the United States). The adverse effect of policy uncertainty is exacerbated for younger and early-stage startups. By contrast, the effect is attenuated for startups that have headquarters in cities with a high concentration of global VC investment, in countries with more developed stock markets, or if the VC is led by a bank or a corporate entity. Using close national elections to alleviate endogeneity concerns, we find that the baseline results continue to hold. Furthermore, this study provides evidence that uncertainty increases the number of financing rounds, decreases the fraction of investment amount during the first round, and reduces the likelihood of successful exit through acquisition. Finally, we also find that policy uncertainty reduces the amount of cross-border VC investment.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Why Are All-Star Analysts Influential?
Ample evidence finds that Institutional Investor's (I/I) star analysts are more influential than nonstars (e.g., Loh and Stulz, 2011), but the reason for this is unclear. We explore two hypotheses: first, that their status itself generates influence, and second, that their quality is superior, consequently yielding them more influence. Across numerous tests, we find no evidence that status affects the influence of analysts. Instead, we find that analysts with influential recommendations are more likely to be selected as stars, supporting the quality hypothesis. We introduce a negative performance measure called blunder and document that by altering the weights on analysts' influential recommendations and blunders, voters can cater simultaneously to both their own and I/I's interests. Ordinary analysts are incentivized to demonstrate reliability, while reigning stars are incentivized to produce bold research. We additionally show that voting has a seasonal component that is consistent with previously documented seasonal analyst behavior.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWhy Are All-Star Analysts Influential?
Ample evidence finds that Institutional Investor's (I/I) star analysts are more influential than nonstars (e.g., Loh and Stulz, 2011), but the reason for this is unclear. We explore two hypotheses: first, that their status itself generates influence, and second, that their quality is superior, consequently yielding them more influence. Across numerous tests, we find no evidence that status affects the influence of analysts. Instead, we find that analysts with influential recommendations are more likely to be selected as stars, supporting the quality hypothesis. We introduce a negative performance measure called blunder and document that by altering the weights on analysts' influential recommendations and blunders, voters can cater simultaneously to both their own and I/I's interests. Ordinary analysts are incentivized to demonstrate reliability, while reigning stars are incentivized to produce bold research. We additionally show that voting has a seasonal component that is consistent with previously documented seasonal analyst behavior.