Leah Muriel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Leah Muriel has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Bradley P. Lawson
Oklahoma State University
2 shared publications- Michael S. Wilkins
The University of Kansas
2 shared publications - Adrienne Rhodes
The University of Iowa
1 shared publication Allison K. Beck
The Florida State University
1 shared publicationBrad S. Trinkle
Iowa State University
1 shared publication- Bradley P. Lawson
Oklahoma State University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 27 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (10) , 8521-8550
Delegation and Chief Financial Officer Retention: Evidence from Chief Accounting Officers on the Executive Team
In recent years, chief financial officer (CFO) responsibilities and resignations have increased. Given these trends, we examine whether delegating accounting is associated with CFO retention. We develop a methodology to identify voluntary CFO departures using the firm’s public messaging around the CFO’s exit. Our results suggest that CFOs are less likely to voluntarily depart when accounting is delegated. Further, we find evidence that the negative association between delegating accounting and voluntary CFO departures is stronger when accounting demands are higher. Moreover, we find evidence that delegating accounting increases the CFO’s human capital. When CFOs do leave, they are more likely to become a chief executive officer and less likely to make a lateral move to another CFO position. Taken together, this study finds evidence consistent with the delegation of accounting increasing CFO retention and human capital. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting. Funding: The authors appreciate research funding support from Coggin College of Business, University of North Florida and Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa. A. Rhodes gratefully acknowledges support from the Michael and Sandra Rocca Fellowship in Accounting. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06802 .
- 27 January 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (10) , 8521-8550
Delegation and Chief Financial Officer Retention: Evidence from Chief Accounting Officers on the Executive Team
In recent years, chief financial officer (CFO) responsibilities and resignations have increased. Given these trends, we examine whether delegating accounting is associated with CFO retention. We develop a methodology to identify voluntary CFO departures using the firm’s public messaging around the CFO’s exit. Our results suggest that CFOs are less likely to voluntarily depart when accounting is delegated. Further, we find evidence that the negative association between delegating accounting and voluntary CFO departures is stronger when accounting demands are higher. Moreover, we find evidence that delegating accounting increases the CFO’s human capital. When CFOs do leave, they are more likely to become a chief executive officer and less likely to make a lateral move to another CFO position. Taken together, this study finds evidence consistent with the delegation of accounting increasing CFO retention and human capital. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting. Funding: The authors appreciate research funding support from Coggin College of Business, University of North Florida and Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa. A. Rhodes gratefully acknowledges support from the Michael and Sandra Rocca Fellowship in Accounting. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.06802 .
- 1 March 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Current Issues in Auditing
- p. 1-8
Critical Audit Matters and Nonprofessional Investors’ Perceptions of Auditor Credibility, Information Overload, Audit Quality and Investment Risk
SUMMARY: The addition of critical audit matters (CAMs) to the audit report is a significant change intended to provide investors greater information that is useful for decision making, however, there were also concerns about unintended consequences. This article summarizes Carver, Muriel, Trinkle (2023), who find that the disclosure of a CAM enhances perceived auditor credibility and in turn, perceived audit quality, which then leads to a decrease in perceived investment risk. However, a CAM also increases feelings of information overload, partially offsetting the positive effect on auditor credibility. Auditors should balance the volume and complexity of information in CAMs to lessen the potential negative effects of information overload. However, auditors can also view CAMs as an opportunity to enhance transparency and credibility. These findings are timely for auditors, audit committees, financial statement preparers, and regulators, who must consider the impact CAMs can have on the information environment. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
- 1 March 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Current Issues in Auditing
- p. 1-8
Critical Audit Matters and Nonprofessional Investors’ Perceptions of Auditor Credibility, Information Overload, Audit Quality and Investment Risk
SUMMARY: The addition of critical audit matters (CAMs) to the audit report is a significant change intended to provide investors greater information that is useful for decision making, however, there were also concerns about unintended consequences. This article summarizes Carver, Muriel, Trinkle (2023), who find that the disclosure of a CAM enhances perceived auditor credibility and in turn, perceived audit quality, which then leads to a decrease in perceived investment risk. However, a CAM also increases feelings of information overload, partially offsetting the positive effect on auditor credibility. Auditors should balance the volume and complexity of information in CAMs to lessen the potential negative effects of information overload. However, auditors can also view CAMs as an opportunity to enhance transparency and credibility. These findings are timely for auditors, audit committees, financial statement preparers, and regulators, who must consider the impact CAMs can have on the information environment. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
- 1 April 2023
- Published by American Accounting Association in Behavioral Research in Accounting
- Vol. 35 (1) , 21-44
Does the Reporting of Critical Audit Matters Affect Nonprofessional Investors’ Perceptions of Auditor Credibility, Information Overload, Audit Quality, and Investment Risk?
A new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) standard requires the reporting of critical audit matters (CAMs) within the audit report. This change has lengthened the audit report but may provide investors with cues about auditor credibility and audit quality. Utilizing an experiment and 140 nonprofessional investors, we find evidence that the disclosure of a CAM improves perceived auditor credibility, but the disclosure also has the unintended consequence of increasing feelings of information overload. More importantly, the disclosure of a CAM has a significant, positive total effect on perceived audit quality. This effect, in turn, lowers investors’ perceptions of investment risk. These findings highlight the potential for CAMs to impact investor perceptions and, possibly, subsequent decision making.Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
- 1 April 2023
- Published by American Accounting Association in Behavioral Research in Accounting
- Vol. 35 (1) , 21-44
Does the Reporting of Critical Audit Matters Affect Nonprofessional Investors’ Perceptions of Auditor Credibility, Information Overload, Audit Quality, and Investment Risk?
A new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) standard requires the reporting of critical audit matters (CAMs) within the audit report. This change has lengthened the audit report but may provide investors with cues about auditor credibility and audit quality. Utilizing an experiment and 140 nonprofessional investors, we find evidence that the disclosure of a CAM improves perceived auditor credibility, but the disclosure also has the unintended consequence of increasing feelings of information overload. More importantly, the disclosure of a CAM has a significant, positive total effect on perceived audit quality. This effect, in turn, lowers investors’ perceptions of investment risk. These findings highlight the potential for CAMs to impact investor perceptions and, possibly, subsequent decision making.Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
- 1 July 2019
- Published by American Accounting Association in Current Issues in Auditing
- Vol. 13 (2) , P21-P28
How Do Auditors Respond to FCPA Risk?
SUMMARY: This article summarizes “How Do Auditors Respond to FCPA Risk?” (Lawson, Martin, Muriel, and Wilkins 2019), which investigates the pricing of audits for clients that violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). FCPA compliance has become a top priority for regulators who rely heavily on accountants as they combat illegal activity. We find that auditors charge higher fees for violators both before and during formal FCPA investigations. We also find that fees are more sensitive to accounts that are more susceptible to FCPA risk. Our findings are stronger (weaker) for clients with high (low) foreign sales. While this may seem intuitive from an audit materiality perspective, regulators are not required to prove materiality as they pursue FCPA violations (Ebright 2016). Our study should be of interest to practitioners and auditors, as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is considering whether updates should be made to PCAOB AS 2405
- 1 July 2019
- Published by American Accounting Association in Current Issues in Auditing
- Vol. 13 (2) , P21-P28
How Do Auditors Respond to FCPA Risk?
SUMMARY: This article summarizes “How Do Auditors Respond to FCPA Risk?” (Lawson, Martin, Muriel, and Wilkins 2019), which investigates the pricing of audits for clients that violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). FCPA compliance has become a top priority for regulators who rely heavily on accountants as they combat illegal activity. We find that auditors charge higher fees for violators both before and during formal FCPA investigations. We also find that fees are more sensitive to accounts that are more susceptible to FCPA risk. Our findings are stronger (weaker) for clients with high (low) foreign sales. While this may seem intuitive from an audit materiality perspective, regulators are not required to prove materiality as they pursue FCPA violations (Ebright 2016). Our study should be of interest to practitioners and auditors, as the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is considering whether updates should be made to PCAOB AS 2405
- 1 February 2019
- Published by American Accounting Association in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
- Vol. 38 (4) , 177-200
How Do Auditors Respond to FCPA Risk?
SUMMARY: Using a sample of public firm FCPA violations, we investigate how auditors respond to FCPA risk. We find that audit fees are higher for FCPA violators beginning in the violation period with an additional increase during the period in which regulatory investigations occur. Fees exhibit a greater sensitivity to payables and SG&A expenses for FCPA violators than for non-violators, suggesting that auditors adapt their procedures for accounts that have the highest likely FCPA risk. We also find evidence of a contagion effect with respect to FCPA risk and audit fees among non-violating peers of FCPA violators. Finally, we show that many of the relationships we document for FCPA violators exist among non-violating firms with elevated foreign bribery risk as well, but in magnitudes that are smaller than those of confirmed FCPA violators.
- 1 February 2019
- Published by American Accounting Association in AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory
- Vol. 38 (4) , 177-200
How Do Auditors Respond to FCPA Risk?
SUMMARY: Using a sample of public firm FCPA violations, we investigate how auditors respond to FCPA risk. We find that audit fees are higher for FCPA violators beginning in the violation period with an additional increase during the period in which regulatory investigations occur. Fees exhibit a greater sensitivity to payables and SG&A expenses for FCPA violators than for non-violators, suggesting that auditors adapt their procedures for accounts that have the highest likely FCPA risk. We also find evidence of a contagion effect with respect to FCPA risk and audit fees among non-violating peers of FCPA violators. Finally, we show that many of the relationships we document for FCPA violators exist among non-violating firms with elevated foreign bribery risk as well, but in magnitudes that are smaller than those of confirmed FCPA violators.
- 1 April 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Accounting Regulation
- Vol. 29 (1) , 30-43
A survey on firms' implementation of COSO's 2013 Internal Control–Integrated Framework
- 1 April 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Accounting Regulation
- Vol. 29 (1) , 30-43
A survey on firms' implementation of COSO's 2013 Internal Control–Integrated Framework
- 13 October 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 27 (1) , 79-82
Conflict Mineral Disclosure Requirements
- 13 October 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 27 (1) , 79-82
Conflict Mineral Disclosure Requirements
- 1 January 2013
- Published by American Accounting Association in Behavioral Research in Accounting
- Vol. 25 (2) , 71-95
Audit Fees and Investor Perceptions of Audit Characteristics
We investigate how audit fee disclosures affect investor perceptions of audit characteristics. We find evidence that when audit fees are presented to investors with supplementary contextual information indicating that the fees are low, average, or high (as compared to industry averages), investors perceive audit quality and auditor effort as being low, average, or high, respectively. When not provided with any additional information concerning the audit fee (similar to the present state of disclosures), investors assess audit quality and auditor effort as being average. Surprisingly, we find that while investors perceive auditor independence as low, average, and high when fees are presented as high, average, or low, respectively, investors not provided with any relative fee information assess auditor independence as low, similar to the investors who are presented with high relative fees. This latter finding provides important insight regarding investors' current perceptions of auditor independence, particularly in the absence of relative or comparative audit fee information. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by American Accounting Association in Behavioral Research in Accounting
- Vol. 25 (2) , 71-95
Audit Fees and Investor Perceptions of Audit Characteristics
We investigate how audit fee disclosures affect investor perceptions of audit characteristics. We find evidence that when audit fees are presented to investors with supplementary contextual information indicating that the fees are low, average, or high (as compared to industry averages), investors perceive audit quality and auditor effort as being low, average, or high, respectively. When not provided with any additional information concerning the audit fee (similar to the present state of disclosures), investors assess audit quality and auditor effort as being average. Surprisingly, we find that while investors perceive auditor independence as low, average, and high when fees are presented as high, average, or low, respectively, investors not provided with any relative fee information assess auditor independence as low, similar to the investors who are presented with high relative fees. This latter finding provides important insight regarding investors' current perceptions of auditor independence, particularly in the absence of relative or comparative audit fee information. Data Availability: Contact the authors.