George Kwaku Ofosu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Interests
George Kwaku Ofosu has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Sarah Brierley
London School of Economics and Political Science
4 shared publications - Daniel N. Posner
University of California, Los Angeles
1 shared publication Eric Kramon
George Washington University
1 shared publication- Eric Kramon
George Washington University
1 shared publication - Joseph Asunka
The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
1 shared publication - Miriam A. Golden
European University Institute, Fiesole (FI), Italy
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 November 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- p. 1-26
The Seeds of State Capture: Merit and Patrimonialism in the Colonial Bureaucracy
Bureaucracies vary in the extent to which hiring is meritocratic versus patrimonial. Such outcomes are typically seen as the result of politicians’ behavior. However, politicians often delegate hiring to existing bureaucrats. When political leaders are socially distant from communities they seek to govern and these areas are peripheral to politicians’ core interests, bureaucrats’ private preferences can dominate hiring decisions instead. Colonial and other forms of external state-building typify cases where patrimonialism created by bureaucrats, not politicians, can emerge. Digitizing individual-level records across six decades of British rule in Ghana, we find evidence of patrimonialism rather than meritocracy in the hiring of African staff, with large inequities across ethnic groups. Our results demonstrate the underexplored agency of local bureaucrats in state-building and highlight conditions under which bureaucrats’ preferences, rather than only political principals’, shape state institutions. They also challenge conventional wisdom about why, and when, newly-independent African states became “neopatrimonial.”
- 6 November 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- p. 1-26
Open AccessThe Seeds of State Capture: Merit and Patrimonialism in the Colonial Bureaucracy
Bureaucracies vary in the extent to which hiring is meritocratic versus patrimonial. Such outcomes are typically seen as the result of politicians’ behavior. However, politicians often delegate hiring to existing bureaucrats. When political leaders are socially distant from communities they seek to govern and these areas are peripheral to politicians’ core interests, bureaucrats’ private preferences can dominate hiring decisions instead. Colonial and other forms of external state-building typify cases where patrimonialism created by bureaucrats, not politicians, can emerge. Digitizing individual-level records across six decades of British rule in Ghana, we find evidence of patrimonialism rather than meritocracy in the hiring of African staff, with large inequities across ethnic groups. Our results demonstrate the underexplored agency of local bureaucrats in state-building and highlight conditions under which bureaucrats’ preferences, rather than only political principals’, shape state institutions. They also challenge conventional wisdom about why, and when, newly-independent African states became “neopatrimonial.”
- Open Access
- 1 April 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in African Affairs
- Vol. 123 (491) , 165-192
What do voters want from their legislators? evidence from ghana
Legislators make trade-offs when allocating their time and resources to their multiple tasks of representation, legislation, executive oversight, and constituency service. Furthermore, they must decide how much effort to exert or the balance to strike when undertaking a specific function. Existing research provides limited insights into citizens’ preferences over these officeholder multifaceted decisions in sub-Saharan Africa. I offer novel insights into citizens’ preferences using a conjoint survey experiment of Ghanaians to address this knowledge gap. My findings are threefold. First, I find that citizens put more ‘weight’ on constituency-related activities than parliamentary work. Second, in the constituency, citizens value political representation activities more than constituency services. Third, they weigh public-good-oriented constituency services higher than private ones. The research contributes to our understanding of citizen–legislator accountability relationships in sub-Saharan Africa.
- 1 April 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in African Affairs
- Vol. 123 (491) , 165-192
Open AccessWhat do voters want from their legislators? evidence from ghana
Legislators make trade-offs when allocating their time and resources to their multiple tasks of representation, legislation, executive oversight, and constituency service. Furthermore, they must decide how much effort to exert or the balance to strike when undertaking a specific function. Existing research provides limited insights into citizens’ preferences over these officeholder multifaceted decisions in sub-Saharan Africa. I offer novel insights into citizens’ preferences using a conjoint survey experiment of Ghanaians to address this knowledge gap. My findings are threefold. First, I find that citizens put more ‘weight’ on constituency-related activities than parliamentary work. Second, in the constituency, citizens value political representation activities more than constituency services. Third, they weigh public-good-oriented constituency services higher than private ones. The research contributes to our understanding of citizen–legislator accountability relationships in sub-Saharan Africa.
- Open Access
- 3 September 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 57 (10) , 1703-1734
Chiefs’ Endorsements and Voter Behavior
Traditional leaders can influence electoral outcomes. We designed an experiment to investigate why public endorsements by chiefs affect voters—and which types of voters they influence. Chiefs have incentives to prefer politicians who will promote local development, and can use endorsements to sway elections accordingly. We argue that voters often interpret chiefs’ endorsements as a signal of candidate quality. To assess this argument, we exposed voters to real endorsements made by chiefs during Ghana’s 2020 presidential election. We show that endorsements impact the vote choice of undecided voters. Consistent with a signaling mechanism, respondents exposed to chiefs’ rationale for endorsing a candidate were no more likely to vote for the endorsed candidate than those who only heard chiefs’ approval of a candidate. Further, treated respondents hold higher evaluations of the endorsed candidate on multiple dimensions of candidate quality. Our results suggest that chiefs influence voters through a non-coercive mechanism, which has positive implications for accountability.
- 3 September 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 57 (10) , 1703-1734
Open AccessChiefs’ Endorsements and Voter Behavior
Traditional leaders can influence electoral outcomes. We designed an experiment to investigate why public endorsements by chiefs affect voters—and which types of voters they influence. Chiefs have incentives to prefer politicians who will promote local development, and can use endorsements to sway elections accordingly. We argue that voters often interpret chiefs’ endorsements as a signal of candidate quality. To assess this argument, we exposed voters to real endorsements made by chiefs during Ghana’s 2020 presidential election. We show that endorsements impact the vote choice of undecided voters. Consistent with a signaling mechanism, respondents exposed to chiefs’ rationale for endorsing a candidate were no more likely to vote for the endorsed candidate than those who only heard chiefs’ approval of a candidate. Further, treated respondents hold higher evaluations of the endorsed candidate on multiple dimensions of candidate quality. Our results suggest that chiefs influence voters through a non-coercive mechanism, which has positive implications for accountability.
- Open Access
- 31 March 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 21 (1) , 174-190
Pre-Analysis Plans: An Early Stocktaking
Pre-analysis plans (PAPs) have been championed as a solution to the problem of research credibility, but without any evidence that PAPs actually bolster the credibility of research. We analyze a representative sample of 195 PAPs registered on the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) and American Economic Association (AEA) registration platforms to assess whether PAPs registered in the early days of pre-registration (2011–2016) were sufficiently clear, precise, and comprehensive to achieve their objective of preventing “fishing” and reducing the scope for post-hoc adjustment of research hypotheses. We also analyze a subset of ninety-three PAPs from projects that resulted in publicly available papers to ascertain how faithfully they adhere to their pre-registered specifications and hypotheses. We find significant variation in the extent to which PAPs registered during this period accomplished the goals they were designed to achieve. We discuss these findings in light of both the costs and benefits of pre-registration, showing how our results speak to the various arguments that have been made in support of and against PAPs. We also highlight the norms and institutions that will need to be strengthened to augment the power of PAPs to improve research credibility and to create incentives for researchers to invest in both producing and policing them.
- 31 March 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 21 (1) , 174-190
Open AccessPre-Analysis Plans: An Early Stocktaking
Pre-analysis plans (PAPs) have been championed as a solution to the problem of research credibility, but without any evidence that PAPs actually bolster the credibility of research. We analyze a representative sample of 195 PAPs registered on the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) and American Economic Association (AEA) registration platforms to assess whether PAPs registered in the early days of pre-registration (2011–2016) were sufficiently clear, precise, and comprehensive to achieve their objective of preventing “fishing” and reducing the scope for post-hoc adjustment of research hypotheses. We also analyze a subset of ninety-three PAPs from projects that resulted in publicly available papers to ascertain how faithfully they adhere to their pre-registered specifications and hypotheses. We find significant variation in the extent to which PAPs registered during this period accomplished the goals they were designed to achieve. We discuss these findings in light of both the costs and benefits of pre-registration, showing how our results speak to the various arguments that have been made in support of and against PAPs. We also highlight the norms and institutions that will need to be strengthened to augment the power of PAPs to improve research credibility and to create incentives for researchers to invest in both producing and policing them.
- 9 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 64 (1) , 19-37
The Moderating Effect of Debates on Political Attitudes
In theory, candidate debates can influence voters by providing information about candidates' quality and policy positions. However, there is limited evidence about whether and why debates influence voters in new democracies. We use a field experiment on parliamentary debates during Ghana's 2016 elections to show that debates improve voters' evaluations of candidates. Debates have the strongest effect on partisan voters, who becomemorefavorable toward and more likely to vote for opponent‐party candidates and less likely to vote for co‐partisans. Experimental and unique observational data capturing participants' second‐by‐second reactions to the debates show that policy information was the most important causal mechanism driving partisan moderation, especially among strong partisans. A follow‐up survey shows that these effects persist in electorally competitive communities, whereas they dissipate in party strongholds. Policy‐centered debates have the potential to reduce partisan polarization in new democracies, but the local political context conditions the persistence of these effects.
- 9 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 64 (1) , 19-37
The Moderating Effect of Debates on Political Attitudes
In theory, candidate debates can influence voters by providing information about candidates' quality and policy positions. However, there is limited evidence about whether and why debates influence voters in new democracies. We use a field experiment on parliamentary debates during Ghana's 2016 elections to show that debates improve voters' evaluations of candidates. Debates have the strongest effect on partisan voters, who becomemorefavorable toward and more likely to vote for opponent‐party candidates and less likely to vote for co‐partisans. Experimental and unique observational data capturing participants' second‐by‐second reactions to the debates show that policy information was the most important causal mechanism driving partisan moderation, especially among strong partisans. A follow‐up survey shows that these effects persist in electorally competitive communities, whereas they dissipate in party strongholds. Policy‐centered debates have the potential to reduce partisan polarization in new democracies, but the local political context conditions the persistence of these effects.
- 1 February 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 113 (4) , 963-979
Do Fairer Elections Increase the Responsiveness of Politicians?
Leveraging novel experimental designs and 2,160 months of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) spending by legislators in Ghana, I examine whether and how fairer elections promote democratic responsiveness. The results show that incumbents elected from constituencies that were randomly assigned to intensive election-day monitoring during Ghana’s 2012 election spent 19 percentage points more of their CDFs during their terms in office compared with those elected from constituencies with fewer monitors. Legislators from all types of constituencies are equally present in parliament, suggesting that high levels of monitoring do not cause politicians to substitute constituency service for parliamentary work. Tests of causal mechanisms provide suggestive evidence that fairer elections motivate high performance through incumbents’ expectations of electoral sanction and not the selection of better candidates. The article provides causal evidence of the impact of election integrity on democratic accountability.
- 1 February 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 113 (4) , 963-979
Do Fairer Elections Increase the Responsiveness of Politicians?
Leveraging novel experimental designs and 2,160 months of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) spending by legislators in Ghana, I examine whether and how fairer elections promote democratic responsiveness. The results show that incumbents elected from constituencies that were randomly assigned to intensive election-day monitoring during Ghana’s 2012 election spent 19 percentage points more of their CDFs during their terms in office compared with those elected from constituencies with fewer monitors. Legislators from all types of constituencies are equally present in parliament, suggesting that high levels of monitoring do not cause politicians to substitute constituency service for parliamentary work. Tests of causal mechanisms provide suggestive evidence that fairer elections motivate high performance through incumbents’ expectations of electoral sanction and not the selection of better candidates. The article provides causal evidence of the impact of election integrity on democratic accountability.
- Top Cited Papers
- 7 February 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 49 (1) , 129-151
Electoral Fraud or Violence: The Effect of Observers on Party Manipulation Strategies
This article reports on the effects of domestic election observers on electoral fraud and violence. Using an experimental research design and polling station data on fraud and violence during Ghana’s 2012 elections, it shows that observers reduced fraud and violence at the polling stations which they monitored. It is argued that local electoral competition shapes party activists’ response to observers. As expected, in single-party dominant areas, parties used their local political networks to relocate fraud to polling stations without an election observer, and, in contrast, party activists relocated violence to stations without observers in competitive areas – a response that requires less local organizational capacity. This highlights how local party organization and electoral incentives can shape the manipulative electoral strategies employed by parties in democratic elections.
- 7 February 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 49 (1) , 129-151
Top Cited PapersElectoral Fraud or Violence: The Effect of Observers on Party Manipulation Strategies
This article reports on the effects of domestic election observers on electoral fraud and violence. Using an experimental research design and polling station data on fraud and violence during Ghana’s 2012 elections, it shows that observers reduced fraud and violence at the polling stations which they monitored. It is argued that local electoral competition shapes party activists’ response to observers. As expected, in single-party dominant areas, parties used their local political networks to relocate fraud to polling stations without an election observer, and, in contrast, party activists relocated violence to stations without observers in competitive areas – a response that requires less local organizational capacity. This highlights how local party organization and electoral incentives can shape the manipulative electoral strategies employed by parties in democratic elections.
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Electoral Studies
- Vol. 35, 382-385
The presidential and parliamentary elections in Ghana, December 2012
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Electoral Studies
- Vol. 35, 382-385
The presidential and parliamentary elections in Ghana, December 2012