Tetsuo Ono
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Tetsuo Ono has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Ryo Arawatari
Nagoya University
4 shared publications- Ryo Arawatari
Nagoya University
3 shared publications - Ryo Arawatari
Faculty of Economics Doshisha University Karasuma‐higashi‐iru, Kamigyo‐ku Kyoto Japan
3 shared publications Yasuo Maeda
Keio University
3 shared publicationsYuki Uchida
2 shared publicationsKatsuyuki Naito
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 6 March 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 25 (1) , 29-60
International coordination of debt rules with time‐inconsistent voters
In this study, we investigate the international coordination of debt rules in an economy consisting of several countries with varying degrees of present bias. A case wherein each country sets its own uncoordinated debt rules is compared with a case wherein all countries have common coordinated debt rules. Countries with weak present‐biased preferences increase their debt issuance and suffer from welfare losses by participating in coordination. In contrast, countries with strong present‐biased preferences reduce their debt issuance and can enjoy welfare improvement by participating in coordination. The contrasting results suggest the possibility that countries with weak present‐biased preferences have little incentive to follow the coordinated rule.
- 6 March 2022
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 25 (1) , 29-60
International coordination of debt rules with time‐inconsistent voters
In this study, we investigate the international coordination of debt rules in an economy consisting of several countries with varying degrees of present bias. A case wherein each country sets its own uncoordinated debt rules is compared with a case wherein all countries have common coordinated debt rules. Countries with weak present‐biased preferences increase their debt issuance and suffer from welfare losses by participating in coordination. In contrast, countries with strong present‐biased preferences reduce their debt issuance and can enjoy welfare improvement by participating in coordination. The contrasting results suggest the possibility that countries with weak present‐biased preferences have little incentive to follow the coordinated rule.
- 25 November 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 27 (4) , 980-1018
Inequality and education choice
- 25 November 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 27 (4) , 980-1018
Inequality and education choice
- 19 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 27 (2) , 435-460
Age gap in voter turnout and size of government debt
- 19 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 27 (2) , 435-460
Age gap in voter turnout and size of government debt
- Open Access
- 5 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 22 (1) , 190-219
Fiscal rules in a monetary economy: Implications for growth and welfare
This study considers two fiscal rules, a debt rule that controls the debt‐to‐gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, and an expenditure rule that controls the expenditure‐to‐GDP ratio, in a monetary growth model with financial intermediation. Tightening of fiscal rules promotes economic growth and thus, benefits future generations. However, there could be two equilibria of the nominal interest rates, and the welfare effects of the rules on the current generation are different between the two equilibria. In particular, the effects of a decreased debt‐to‐GDP ratio depend on its initial ratio; a high (low)‐ratio country has no incentive (an incentive) to reduce the ratio further from the viewpoint of the current generation's welfare. This result provides an explanation for difficulties with fiscal reform in countries with already high debt‐to‐GDP ratios.
- 5 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 22 (1) , 190-219
Open AccessFiscal rules in a monetary economy: Implications for growth and welfare
This study considers two fiscal rules, a debt rule that controls the debt‐to‐gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, and an expenditure rule that controls the expenditure‐to‐GDP ratio, in a monetary growth model with financial intermediation. Tightening of fiscal rules promotes economic growth and thus, benefits future generations. However, there could be two equilibria of the nominal interest rates, and the welfare effects of the rules on the current generation are different between the two equilibria. In particular, the effects of a decreased debt‐to‐GDP ratio depend on its initial ratio; a high (low)‐ratio country has no incentive (an incentive) to reduce the ratio further from the viewpoint of the current generation's welfare. This result provides an explanation for difficulties with fiscal reform in countries with already high debt‐to‐GDP ratios.
- 1 October 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 166, 39-52
Intergenerational policies, public debt, and economic growth: A politico-economic analysis
- 1 October 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 166, 39-52
Intergenerational policies, public debt, and economic growth: A politico-economic analysis
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Macroeconomics
- Vol. 57, 1-14
Human capital, public debt, and economic growth: A political economy analysis
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Macroeconomics
- Vol. 57, 1-14
Human capital, public debt, and economic growth: A political economy analysis
- 27 March 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Macroeconomic Dynamics
- Vol. 23 (8) , 3099-3139
GROWTH, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND FISCAL POLICY: A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS
This study presents an overlapping-generations model featuring capital accumulation, collective wage-bargaining, and probabilistic voting over fiscal policy. The study characterizes a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of the voting game within and across generations, and it derives the following results. First, the greater bargaining power of unions lowers the capital growth rate and creates a positive correlation between unemployment and public debt. Second, an increase in the political power of elderly persons lowers the growth rate and shifts government expenditure from unemployed persons to elderly ones. Third, prohibiting debt finance increases the growth rate and benefits future generations; however, it worsens the state of present-day employed and unemployed persons.
- 27 March 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Macroeconomic Dynamics
- Vol. 23 (8) , 3099-3139
GROWTH, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND FISCAL POLICY: A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS
This study presents an overlapping-generations model featuring capital accumulation, collective wage-bargaining, and probabilistic voting over fiscal policy. The study characterizes a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of the voting game within and across generations, and it derives the following results. First, the greater bargaining power of unions lowers the capital growth rate and creates a positive correlation between unemployment and public debt. Second, an increase in the political power of elderly persons lowers the growth rate and shifts government expenditure from unemployed persons to elderly ones. Third, prohibiting debt finance increases the growth rate and benefits future generations; however, it worsens the state of present-day employed and unemployed persons.
- 20 June 2017
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 25 (5) , 1155-1173
Inequality and public debt: A positive analysis
This study extends the multi‐country, politico‐economic model of fiscal policy to incorporate wage inequality within each country. In this extended framework, we present conflict over fiscal policy within and across generations and show that a low‐inequality country realizes tight fiscal policy with low public debt accumulation, whereas a high‐inequality country experiences loose fiscal policy with high public debt. This model prediction is consistent with empirical evidence from OECD countries for the years 1980 to 2010.
- 20 June 2017
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 25 (5) , 1155-1173
Inequality and public debt: A positive analysis
This study extends the multi‐country, politico‐economic model of fiscal policy to incorporate wage inequality within each country. In this extended framework, we present conflict over fiscal policy within and across generations and show that a low‐inequality country realizes tight fiscal policy with low public debt accumulation, whereas a high‐inequality country experiences loose fiscal policy with high public debt. This model prediction is consistent with empirical evidence from OECD countries for the years 1980 to 2010.
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Mohr Siebeck in FinanzArchiv
- Vol. 73 (2) , 163-189
Aging, Pensions, and Growth
This study presents an endogenous-growth overlapping-generations model featuring probabilistic voting over public pensions. The analysis shows that (i) the pension-GDP ratio increases as life expectancy increases in the presence of an annuity market, while it may show a hump-shaped pattern in its absence; (ii) the growth rate is higher in the presence of an annuity market than in its absence, but its presence implies an intergenerational trade-off in terms of utility.
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Mohr Siebeck in FinanzArchiv
- Vol. 73 (2) , 163-189
Aging, Pensions, and Growth
This study presents an endogenous-growth overlapping-generations model featuring probabilistic voting over public pensions. The analysis shows that (i) the pension-GDP ratio increases as life expectancy increases in the presence of an annuity market, while it may show a hump-shaped pattern in its absence; (ii) the growth rate is higher in the presence of an annuity market than in its absence, but its presence implies an intergenerational trade-off in terms of utility.
- 1 June 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Macroeconomics
- Vol. 48, 127-143
Pensions, education, and growth: A positive analysis
- 1 June 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Macroeconomics
- Vol. 48, 127-143
Pensions, education, and growth: A positive analysis