LALu An

Lu An

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Lu An has a total of 33 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • A Robust Stackelberg Game for Cyber-Security Investment in Networked Control Systems

    by Pratishtha Shukla, Lu An, Aranya Chakrabortty, Alexandra Duel-Hallen

    We present a resource-planning game for cyber-security of networked control systems (NCSs). The NCS is assumed to be operating in closed loop using a linear state feedback $\mathcal {H}_{2}$ -controller. A zero-sum, two-player Stackelberg game (SG) is developed between an attacker and a defender for this NCS. The attacker aims to disable communication of selected nodes and thereby render the feedback gain matrix to be sparse, leading to degradation of closed-loop performance, while the defender aims to prevent this loss by investing in the protection of targeted nodes. Both the players trade their $\mathcal {H}_{2}$ -performance objectives for the costs of their actions. The standard backward induction (BI) method is modified to determine a cost-based Stackelberg equilibrium (CBSE) that saves the players’ costs without degrading the control performance. We analyze the dependence of a CBSE on the relative budgets of the players and on the node “importance” order. Moreover, a robust defense (RD) method is developed for the realistic case when the defender is not informed about the attacker’s resources. The proposed algorithms are validated using examples from wide-area control of electric power systems. It is demonstrated that reliable and RD is feasible unless the defender’s resources are severely limited relative to the attacker’s resources. We also show that the proposed methods are robust to time-varying model uncertainties and thus are suitable for long-term security investment in realistic NCSs. Finally, we use computationally efficient genetic algorithms (GAs) to compute the optimal strategies of the attacker and the defender in realistic large power systems.


  • Open Access

    A Robust Stackelberg Game for Cyber-Security Investment in Networked Control Systems

    by Pratishtha Shukla, Lu An, Aranya Chakrabortty, Alexandra Duel-Hallen

    We present a resource-planning game for cyber-security of networked control systems (NCS). The NCS is assumed to be operating in closed-loop using a linear state-feedback $\mathcal{H}_2$ controller. A zero-sum, two-player Stackelberg game (SG) is developed between an attacker and a defender for this NCS. The attacker aims to disable communication of selected nodes and thereby render the feedback gain matrix to be sparse, leading to degradation of closed-loop performance, while the defender aims to prevent this loss by investing in the protection of targeted nodes. Both players trade their $\mathcal{H}_2$-performance objectives for the costs of their actions. The standard backward induction method is modified to determine a cost-based Stackelberg equilibrium (CBSE) that saves the players' costs without degrading the control performance. We analyze the dependency of a CBSE on the relative budgets of the players as well as on the node "importance" order. Moreover, a robust-defense method is developed for the realistic case when the defender is not informed about the attacker's resources. The proposed algorithms are validated using examples from wide-area control of electric power systems. It is demonstrated that reliable and robust defense is feasible unless the defender's resources are severely limited relative to the attacker's resources. We also show that the proposed methods are robust to time-varying model uncertainties and thus are suitable for long-term security investment in realistic NCSs. Finally, we employ computationally efficient genetic algorithms (GA) to compute the optimal strategies of the attacker and the defender in realistic large power systems.

  • Open Access

    Scalable Security Investment Methods for Voltage Stability of Power Systems

    by Lu An, Pratishtha Shukla, Aranya Chakrabortty, Alexandra Duel-Hallen

    We develop investment approaches to secure electric power systems against load attacks that may cause voltage instability. The attacker attempts to alter the reactive power setpoints of the loads covertly and intelligently to reduce the voltage stability margin of the grid. The defender, or the system operator, aims to compensate for this reduction by retuning the reactive power dispatch of control devices such as shunt capacitor banks. The question is: how much financial investment should the attacker and the defender plan for to succeed in their respective objectives? To address this question, we formulate a cost-based Stackelberg game, where the defender is aware of the attacker’s budget, and a robust-defense sequential algorithm for the realistic case when the defender is not fully informed about the attacker’s resources. We demonstrate that these methods operate reliably under time-varying load uncertainties. To provide scalability to large-scale power system models, we develop a genetic algorithm where both players evolve their candidate solutions in opposite directions simultaneously. Finally, the proposed methods are validated using IEEE prototype models, demonstrating that reliable and robust defense is feasible unless the defender’s resources are severely limited relative to the attacker’s resources.

  • Open Access

    Downlink transmission and channel estimation for cell-free massive MIMO-OFDM with DSDs

    by Yunxiang Guo, Zhenqi Fan, An Lu, Pan Wang, Dongjie Liu, Xinjiang Xia, Dongming Wang

    In a cell-free massive MIMO system, multiple users arrive at multiple access points at separate times, while in an OFDM system, different delays can be equivalent to delay spread differences (DSDs). Since DSDs are not all the same, in the downlink transmission process, it is necessary to consider its impact on transmission techniques, such as channel estimation and downlink precoding. In this paper, aiming at the performance loss caused by DSDs in cell-free massive MIMO-OFDM system, we propose a multi-RB precoding optimization algorithm that maximizes the downlink sum rate. We derive the sum rate maximization problem into an iterative second-order cone programming form to achieve convex approximation. Then, considering the impact of DSDs on the accuracy of cell-free massive MIMO-OFDM channel estimation, we propose a downlink channel estimation method, which jointly uses channel state information reference signal and demodulation reference signal. The simulation results show that the proposed multi-RB optimal precoding can effectively improve the downlink sum rate, and the proposed downlink channel estimation can obtain accurate multi-RB frequency-domain channel parameters.


  • Open Access

    A Stackelberg Security Investment Game for Voltage Stability of Power Systems

    by Lu An, Aranya Chakrabortty, Alexandra Duel-Hallen

    We formulate a Stackelberg game between an attacker and a defender of a power system. The attacker attempts to alter the load setpoints of the power system covertly and intelligently, so that the voltage stability margin of the grid is reduced, driving the entire system towards a voltage collapse. The defender, or the system operator, aims to compensate for this reduction by retuning the reactive power injection to the grid by switching on control devices, such as a bank of shunt capacitors. A modified Backward Induction method is proposed to find a cost-based Stackelberg equilibrium (CBSE) of the game, which saves the players' costs while providing the optimal allocation of both players' investment resources under budget and covertness constraints. We analyze the proposed game extensively for the IEEE 9-bus power system model and present an example of its performance for the IEEE 39-bus power system model. It is demonstrated that the defender is able to maintain system stability unless its security budget is much lower than the attacker's budget.

  • A Distributed and Resilient Bargaining Game for Weather-Predictive Microgrid Energy Cooperation

    by Lu An, Jie Duan, Mo-Yuen Chow, Alexandra Duel-Hallen

    A bargaining game is investigated for cooperative energy management in microgrids. This game incorporates a fully distributed and realistic cooperative power scheduling algorithm (CoDES) as well as a distributed Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)-based method of allocating the overall power bill resulting from CoDES. A novel weather-based stochastic renewable generation (RG) prediction method is incorporated in the power scheduling. The proposed game accounts for each user's ambivalence about cooperation with other microgrid users and provides conditions for successful bargaining. We demonstrate the proposed game using a 4-user grid-connected microgrid model with diverse user demands, storage, and RG profiles, and examine the effect of weather prediction on day-ahead power scheduling and cost/profit allocation. Finally, the impact of users' ambivalence on the bargaining outcome is investigated, and it is shown that the proposed game is resilient to malicious users' attempts to avoid payment of their fair share of the overall bill.


  • Distributed multi-step power scheduling and cost allocation for cooperative microgrids

    by Lu An, Jie Duan, Yuan Zhang, Mo-Yuen Chow, Alexandra Duel-Hallen

    Microgrids are self-sufficient small-scale power grid systems that can employ renewable generation sources and energy storage devices and can connect to the main grid or operate in a stand-alone mode. Most research on energy-storage management in microgrids does not take into account the dynamic nature of the problem and the need for fully-distributed, multi-step scheduling. First, we address these requirements by extending our previously proposed multi-step cooperative distributed energy scheduling (CoDES) algorithm to include both purchasing power from and selling the generated power to the main grid. Second, we model the microgrid as a multi-agent system where the agents (e.g. households) act as players in a cooperative game and employ a distributed algorithm based on the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) to fairly allocate the costs of cooperative power management (computed using CoDES) among themselves. The dependency of the day-ahead power schedule and the costs on system parameters, e.g., the price schedule and the user activity level (measured by whether it owns storage and renewable generation devices), is analyzed for a three-agent microgrid example.


  • Open Access

    Distributed Multi-Step Power Scheduling and Cost Allocation for Cooperative Microgrids

    by Lu An, Jie Duan, Yuan Zhang, Mo-Yuen Chow, Alexandra Duel-Hallen

    Microgrids are self-sufficient small-scale power grid systems that can employ renewable generation sources and energy storage devices and can connect to the main grid or operate in a stand-alone mode. Most research on energy-storage management in microgrids does not take into account the dynamic nature of the problem and the need for fully-distributed, multi-step scheduling. First, we address these requirements by extending our previously proposed \textit{multi-step cooperative distributed energy scheduling} (CoDES) algorithm to include both purchasing power from and selling the generated power to the main grid. Second, we model the microgrid as a multi-agent system where the agents (e.g. households) act as players in a cooperative game and employ a distributed algorithm based on the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) to fairly allocate the costs of cooperative power management (computed using CoDES) among themselves. The dependency of the day-ahead power schedule and the costs on system parameters, e.g., the price schedule and the user activity level (measured by whether it owns storage and renewable generation devices), is analyzed for a three-agent microgrid example.

  • Energy Efficiency of Base Station Deployment in Ultra Dense HetNets: A Stochastic Geometry Analysis

    by Tiankui Zhang, Jiaojiao Zhao, Lu An, Dantong Liu

    Ultra dense heterogeneous networks (HetNets), which involve densely deployed small cells underlaying traditional macro cellular networks, will be an enabling solution for extremely high data rate communications. However, the dense deployment of small cell base stations (BSs) inevitably triggers a tremendous escalation of energy consumption. In this letter, we investigate the impact of BS deployment, especially BS density on energy efficiency in ultra dense HetNets using the stochastic geometry theory. The minimum achievable data rate in terms of the traffic load in each tier is characterized, and then the minimum achievable throughput of the whole HetNets is obtained. Finally, the closed-form energy efficiency with respect to the BS deployment is derived. The simulation validates the accuracy of the theoretical analysis, and demonstrates that the energy efficiency maximization can be achieved by the optimized BS deployment.


  • Stochastic geometry based energy-efficient base station density optimization in cellular networks

    by Lu An, Tiankui Zhang, Chunyan Feng

    In the research of green networks, considering the base station (BS) density from the perspective of energy efficiency is very meaningful for both network deployment and BS sleeping based power saving. In this paper, we optimize the BS density for energy efficiency in cellular networks by the stochastic geometry theory. First, we model the distribution of base stations and user equipment (UE) as spatial Poisson point process (PPP). Based on such model, we derive the closed-form expressions of the average achievable data rate, the network energy consumption and the network energy efficiency with respect to the network load. Then, we optimize the BS density for network energy efficiency maximization by adopting the Newton iteration method. Our study reveals that we can improve the network energy efficiency by deploying the suitable amount of BSs or switching on/off proportion of the BSs according to the network load. The simulation results validate the theoretical analysis, and show that when the right amount of BSs is deployed according to the network load, the network energy efficiency can be maximized and the maximum energy efficiency is a fixed value once the network parameters are given.