Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bryan Hardy
Bank Int Settlements, Basel, Switzerland
1 shared publication - David Moreno
Banco Central de Chile , Chile
1 shared publication - Ilhyock Shim
Bank for International Settlements Representative Office for Asia and the Pacific, Hong Kong, China
1 shared publication - Luc Laeven
ECB, Germany
1 shared publication - Luis Servén
Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI) , Spain
1 shared publication Nick Sander
International Monetary Fund , USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
SME Failures Under Large Liquidity Shocks: an Application to the Covid-19 Crisis
We study the effects of financial frictions on firm exit when firms face large liquidity shocks. We develop a simple model of firm cost-minimization, where firms’ borrowing capacity to smooth temporary shocks to liquidity is limited. In this framework, firm exit arises from the interaction between this financial friction and fluctuations in cash flow due to aggregate and sectoral changes in demand conditions, as well as more traditional shocks to productivity. To evaluate the implications of our model, we use firm level data on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in 11 European countries. We confirm that our framework is consistent with official failure rates in 2017–2019, a period characterized by standard business cycle fluctuations. To capture a large liquidity shock, we apply our framework to the COVID-19 crisis. We find that, absent government support, SME failure rates would have increased by 6.01 percentage points, putting 3.1% of employment at risk. Our results also show that in the presence of financial frictions and in the absence of government support, the firms failing due to COVID have similar productivity and growth to firms that survive COVID.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
SME Failures Under Large Liquidity Shocks: an Application to the Covid-19 Crisis
We study the effects of financial frictions on firm exit when firms face large liquidity shocks. We develop a simple model of firm cost-minimization, where firms’ borrowing capacity to smooth temporary shocks to liquidity is limited. In this framework, firm exit arises from the interaction between this financial friction and fluctuations in cash flow due to aggregate and sectoral changes in demand conditions, as well as more traditional shocks to productivity. To evaluate the implications of our model, we use firm level data on small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in 11 European countries. We confirm that our framework is consistent with official failure rates in 2017–2019, a period characterized by standard business cycle fluctuations. To capture a large liquidity shock, we apply our framework to the COVID-19 crisis. We find that, absent government support, SME failure rates would have increased by 6.01 percentage points, putting 3.1% of employment at risk. Our results also show that in the presence of financial frictions and in the absence of government support, the firms failing due to COVID have similar productivity and growth to firms that survive COVID.
- 7 July 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 20 (5) , 2098-2135
Gross Capital Flows by Banks, Corporates, and Sovereigns
We construct a new quarterly data set of international capital flows broken down by sector—banks, corporates, and sovereigns—and demonstrate the importance of distinguishing capital flows by the sector of domestic borrowers and lenders. We document four new sets of facts. First, banks account for the largest part of the external debt (stocks and flows) in advanced economies, whereas in emerging markets, banks, corporates, and sovereigns have roughly equal shares. Second, the high correlation between total capital inflows and outflows documented in the literature is driven by banking sector flows; that is, domestic banks’ borrowing from foreigners is highly correlated with domestic banks’ lending to foreigners. Third, sovereign flows behave very differently from and often act as a countervailing force to private sector (banking and corporate) flows, especially in emerging markets. Fourth, different shocks (global financial cycles versus domestic business cycles; banking versus currency versus sovereign crises) generate very distinct patterns of capital inflows and outflows by sector. The stylized facts we document deepen our understanding of the dynamics and behavior of capital flows and have important implications for open economy models.
- 7 July 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 20 (5) , 2098-2135
Gross Capital Flows by Banks, Corporates, and Sovereigns
We construct a new quarterly data set of international capital flows broken down by sector—banks, corporates, and sovereigns—and demonstrate the importance of distinguishing capital flows by the sector of domestic borrowers and lenders. We document four new sets of facts. First, banks account for the largest part of the external debt (stocks and flows) in advanced economies, whereas in emerging markets, banks, corporates, and sovereigns have roughly equal shares. Second, the high correlation between total capital inflows and outflows documented in the literature is driven by banking sector flows; that is, domestic banks’ borrowing from foreigners is highly correlated with domestic banks’ lending to foreigners. Third, sovereign flows behave very differently from and often act as a countervailing force to private sector (banking and corporate) flows, especially in emerging markets. Fourth, different shocks (global financial cycles versus domestic business cycles; banking versus currency versus sovereign crises) generate very distinct patterns of capital inflows and outflows by sector. The stylized facts we document deepen our understanding of the dynamics and behavior of capital flows and have important implications for open economy models.
- Top Cited Papers
- 5 April 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 20 (6) , 2353-2395
Debt Overhang, Rollover Risk, and Corporate Investment: Evidence from the European Crisis
We quantify the role of financial leverage behind the sluggish post-crisis investment performance of European firms. We use a cross-country firm-bank matched database to identify separate roles for firm leverage, bank balance sheet weaknesses arising from sovereign risk, and aggregate demand conditions. We find that firms entering the crisis with higher debt levels reduce their investment more after the crisis. This negative effect is stronger for firms holding short-term debt in countries whose banks are weak due to sovereign stress, consistent with rollover risk being an important channel influencing investment. The negative effect of firm leverage on investment is also persistent for several years after the shock in the countries with sovereign stress. The corporate leverage channel can explain about 20% of the cumulative decline in aggregate private sector investment over the crisis period.
- 5 April 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 20 (6) , 2353-2395
Top Cited PapersDebt Overhang, Rollover Risk, and Corporate Investment: Evidence from the European Crisis
We quantify the role of financial leverage behind the sluggish post-crisis investment performance of European firms. We use a cross-country firm-bank matched database to identify separate roles for firm leverage, bank balance sheet weaknesses arising from sovereign risk, and aggregate demand conditions. We find that firms entering the crisis with higher debt levels reduce their investment more after the crisis. This negative effect is stronger for firms holding short-term debt in countries whose banks are weak due to sovereign stress, consistent with rollover risk being an important channel influencing investment. The negative effect of firm leverage on investment is also persistent for several years after the shock in the countries with sovereign stress. The corporate leverage channel can explain about 20% of the cumulative decline in aggregate private sector investment over the crisis period.
- 1 February 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in IMF Economic Review
- Vol. 69 (1) , 90-121
Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Firm Leverage
- 1 February 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in IMF Economic Review
- Vol. 69 (1) , 90-121
Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Firm Leverage
- 26 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in IMF Economic Review
- Vol. 67 (3) , 421-423
The Euro at 20
- 26 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in IMF Economic Review
- Vol. 67 (3) , 421-423
The Euro at 20