Christoforos Bouzanis
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Christoforos Bouzanis has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aikaterini Katmada
Information Technologies Institute, CERTH
1 shared publication Anna Satsiou
Information Technologies Institute, CERTH
1 shared publicationAurora Prospero
FEBEA
1 shared publication- Eirini Karapistoli
Democritus University of Thrace
1 shared publication Georgios A. Panos
University of Glasgow, UK
1 shared publication- Georgios A. Panos
University of Glasgow - Adam Smith Business School
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
- Vol. 56 (4)
The Paradoxes of a Pre‐reflective Will to Interpret: A Critical Comment on Junghun Oh's Idea of ‘Embodied Moral Reflexivity’
In her recent publication in this journal, Junghun Oh offers an alternative reading of Pierre Bourdieu's notion of the habitus by invoking the ideas of ‘the will to interpret’ and ‘embodied moral reflexivity’. Oh premises her analysis on the idea that there are inner interpretive processes or re‐evaluations that the habitus is assumed to allow. My main line of critique in this comment is, first, that this approach is similar to past inconsistent efforts by other authors to reconcile the irreconcilable ideas of Bourdieu's habitus and self‐reflection; and, second, that, in the absence of an ontological stratum that can enable the emergence of the reflective interpreter that Oh assumes, the idea that Bourdieu's habitus allows for subtle reinterpretations of personal values and dominant norms is theoretically unintelligible and leads to paradoxical imageries.
- 28 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
- Vol. 56 (4)
Open AccessThe Paradoxes of a Pre‐reflective Will to Interpret: A Critical Comment on Junghun Oh's Idea of ‘Embodied Moral Reflexivity’
In her recent publication in this journal, Junghun Oh offers an alternative reading of Pierre Bourdieu's notion of the habitus by invoking the ideas of ‘the will to interpret’ and ‘embodied moral reflexivity’. Oh premises her analysis on the idea that there are inner interpretive processes or re‐evaluations that the habitus is assumed to allow. My main line of critique in this comment is, first, that this approach is similar to past inconsistent efforts by other authors to reconcile the irreconcilable ideas of Bourdieu's habitus and self‐reflection; and, second, that, in the absence of an ontological stratum that can enable the emergence of the reflective interpreter that Oh assumes, the idea that Bourdieu's habitus allows for subtle reinterpretations of personal values and dominant norms is theoretically unintelligible and leads to paradoxical imageries.
- Open Access
- 3 August 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
- Vol. 55 (3)
Immanent Idealism
This article introduces immanent idealism as an alternative path in social ontology and theory. It argues for a distinction between three basic ontological dimensions, the ideational, the institutional and the structural. This approach highlights the cognitional priority of worldviews as the core element of the ideational dimension, and it also argues for the immanence, the transhistorical existential priority (over the institutional and the structural dimensions) and the transituational pervasiveness of the ideational dimension. It is argued that this approach is both antirealist and antinaturalist in socio‐theoretical terms, and that it has decisive implications for the emerging subfield of cognitive sociology. These steps lead us to the invocation of a new idealism standing in opposition to new materialist approaches in social theory.
- 3 August 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
- Vol. 55 (3)
Open AccessImmanent Idealism
This article introduces immanent idealism as an alternative path in social ontology and theory. It argues for a distinction between three basic ontological dimensions, the ideational, the institutional and the structural. This approach highlights the cognitional priority of worldviews as the core element of the ideational dimension, and it also argues for the immanence, the transhistorical existential priority (over the institutional and the structural dimensions) and the transituational pervasiveness of the ideational dimension. It is argued that this approach is both antirealist and antinaturalist in socio‐theoretical terms, and that it has decisive implications for the emerging subfield of cognitive sociology. These steps lead us to the invocation of a new idealism standing in opposition to new materialist approaches in social theory.
- Open Access
- 3 July 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Innovation in the Social Sciences
- Vol. 2 (2) , 273-299
For Immanent Idealism
"For Immanent Idealism" published on 03 Jul 2024 by Brill.
- 3 July 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Innovation in the Social Sciences
- Vol. 2 (2) , 273-299
Open AccessFor Immanent Idealism
"For Immanent Idealism" published on 03 Jul 2024 by Brill.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in History of the Human Sciences
- Vol. 35 (2) , 167-193
On the assumption of self-reflective subjectivity
Contemporary social theory has consistently emphasized habitual action, rule-following, and role-performing as key aspects of social life, yet the challenge remains of combining these aspects with the omnipresent phenomenon of self-reflective conduct. This article attempts to tackle this challenge by proposing useful distinctions that can facilitate further interdisciplinary research on self-reflection. To this end, I argue that we need a more sophisticated set of distinctions and categories in our understanding of habitual action. The analysis casts light on the idea that our contemporary social theories of self-reflection are not consistent with everyday notions of agential knowledgeability and accountability, and this conclusion indicates the need to reconceptualize discourse and subjectivity in non-eliminative terms. Ultimately, the assumption of self-reflective subjectivity turns out to be a theoretical necessity for the conceptualization of discursive participation and democratic choice.
- 1 September 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in History of the Human Sciences
- Vol. 35 (2) , 167-193
Open AccessOn the assumption of self-reflective subjectivity
Contemporary social theory has consistently emphasized habitual action, rule-following, and role-performing as key aspects of social life, yet the challenge remains of combining these aspects with the omnipresent phenomenon of self-reflective conduct. This article attempts to tackle this challenge by proposing useful distinctions that can facilitate further interdisciplinary research on self-reflection. To this end, I argue that we need a more sophisticated set of distinctions and categories in our understanding of habitual action. The analysis casts light on the idea that our contemporary social theories of self-reflection are not consistent with everyday notions of agential knowledgeability and accountability, and this conclusion indicates the need to reconceptualize discourse and subjectivity in non-eliminative terms. Ultimately, the assumption of self-reflective subjectivity turns out to be a theoretical necessity for the conceptualization of discursive participation and democratic choice.
- 29 August 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in Sociological Theory
- Vol. 37 (3) , 282-292
Residuality and Inconsistency in the Interpretation of Socio-Theoretical Systems
This article addresses the interpretation and criticism of theoretical systems. Its particular focus is on how to assess the success of theories in dealing with some specific phenomenon. We are interested in how to differentiate between cases where a theory offers an unsatisfactory acknowledgment of a specified phenomenon and those where a theory offers a deeper, more systematic understanding. We address these metatheoretical issues by developing Parsons’s analysis of positive and residual categories in various respects, including a focus on mutual support as the basis of positivity, differentiating synectic (reconcilable) and antinomic (irreconcilable) residual categories, and distinguishing divisions that are central to systems from those between center and periphery. We also consider how this conceptual toolkit can be put into practice.
- 29 August 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in Sociological Theory
- Vol. 37 (3) , 282-292
Residuality and Inconsistency in the Interpretation of Socio-Theoretical Systems
This article addresses the interpretation and criticism of theoretical systems. Its particular focus is on how to assess the success of theories in dealing with some specific phenomenon. We are interested in how to differentiate between cases where a theory offers an unsatisfactory acknowledgment of a specified phenomenon and those where a theory offers a deeper, more systematic understanding. We address these metatheoretical issues by developing Parsons’s analysis of positive and residual categories in various respects, including a focus on mutual support as the basis of positivity, differentiating synectic (reconcilable) and antinomic (irreconcilable) residual categories, and distinguishing divisions that are central to systems from those between center and periphery. We also consider how this conceptual toolkit can be put into practice.
- 20 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
- Vol. 50 (1) , 64-83
The two stories of the habitus/structure relation and the riddle of reflexivity: A meta‐theoretical reappraisal
This article argues that two key puzzles arising from the theories of Bourdieu are inter‐related. One is the question of how Bourdieu analyses the relationship between structure and habitus, and the other is the place of reflexivity in Bourdieu's work. We contend that it is only by carefully analysing Bourdieu's theoretical structure to grasp the relationship between these elements that one can understand whether or not his work offers useful resources for analysing the relation between routine action and self‐reflection. This paper argues that there are two narrations of the structure/habitus relation in Bourdieu's work, and that the concept of self‐reflective subjectivity is a residual element of the first narration and does not appear in the second. We then contend that this residual and under‐developed concept of self‐reflective subjectivity should not be confused with Bourdieu's analysis of epistemic reflexivity. These moves allow us to contribute to ongoing debates about the relation between routine action and self‐reflection by arguing that the concept of the “reflexive habitus” – which some have argued is characteristic of social agents in high/late modernity – is both conceptually confused and is not a logical extension of Bourdieu's theories. In this way we try to clear the ground for more productive ways of thinking about routine action and self‐reflection.
- 20 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour
- Vol. 50 (1) , 64-83
The two stories of the habitus/structure relation and the riddle of reflexivity: A meta‐theoretical reappraisal
This article argues that two key puzzles arising from the theories of Bourdieu are inter‐related. One is the question of how Bourdieu analyses the relationship between structure and habitus, and the other is the place of reflexivity in Bourdieu's work. We contend that it is only by carefully analysing Bourdieu's theoretical structure to grasp the relationship between these elements that one can understand whether or not his work offers useful resources for analysing the relation between routine action and self‐reflection. This paper argues that there are two narrations of the structure/habitus relation in Bourdieu's work, and that the concept of self‐reflective subjectivity is a residual element of the first narration and does not appear in the second. We then contend that this residual and under‐developed concept of self‐reflective subjectivity should not be confused with Bourdieu's analysis of epistemic reflexivity. These moves allow us to contribute to ongoing debates about the relation between routine action and self‐reflection by arguing that the concept of the “reflexive habitus” – which some have argued is characteristic of social agents in high/late modernity – is both conceptually confused and is not a logical extension of Bourdieu's theories. In this way we try to clear the ground for more productive ways of thinking about routine action and self‐reflection.
- Open Access
- 14 September 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in History of the Human Sciences
- Vol. 30 (5) , 125-146
For reflexivity as an epistemic criterion of ontological coherence and virtuous social theorizing
This article offers an approach that combines, on the one hand, the philosophical notion of reflexivity, which is related to the ideas of self-reference and paradox, and, on the other hand, the sociological discussion of epistemic reflexivity as a problem of coherence, which was mainly initiated by certain branches of ethnomethodology and social constructionism. This combinatory approach argues for reflexivity as an epistemic criterion of ontological coherence, which suggests that social ontologies should account for the possibility of self-reflective subjectivity – for otherwise they result in a paradoxical conclusion according to which a social scientist reflects on her or his ontological commitments even though these commitments deny her or him the capacity for self-reflection. This analysis presupposes that all human sciences are categorically premised on social ontologies; and it argues for an analytical distinction between self-reflection, which refers to the agential capacity for reflecting on one’s own commitments, and the epistemic criterion of reflexivity hereby proposed. These two analytically distinct though interdependent socio-theoretical concepts are frequently conflated in the literature; thus, this article also aims at a ‘clearing of the ground’ that can be of categorical use to the human sciences.
- 14 September 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in History of the Human Sciences
- Vol. 30 (5) , 125-146
Open AccessFor reflexivity as an epistemic criterion of ontological coherence and virtuous social theorizing
This article offers an approach that combines, on the one hand, the philosophical notion of reflexivity, which is related to the ideas of self-reference and paradox, and, on the other hand, the sociological discussion of epistemic reflexivity as a problem of coherence, which was mainly initiated by certain branches of ethnomethodology and social constructionism. This combinatory approach argues for reflexivity as an epistemic criterion of ontological coherence, which suggests that social ontologies should account for the possibility of self-reflective subjectivity – for otherwise they result in a paradoxical conclusion according to which a social scientist reflects on her or his ontological commitments even though these commitments deny her or him the capacity for self-reflection. This analysis presupposes that all human sciences are categorically premised on social ontologies; and it argues for an analytical distinction between self-reflection, which refers to the agential capacity for reflecting on one’s own commitments, and the epistemic criterion of reflexivity hereby proposed. These two analytically distinct though interdependent socio-theoretical concepts are frequently conflated in the literature; thus, this article also aims at a ‘clearing of the ground’ that can be of categorical use to the human sciences.
- 10 July 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of General Management
- Vol. 42 (4) , 92-95
Book review: Greece, Financialization and the EU: The Political Economy of Debt and Destruction
- 10 July 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of General Management
- Vol. 42 (4) , 92-95
Book review: Greece, Financialization and the EU: The Political Economy of Debt and Destruction
- Open Access
- 30 November 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 9-56
What Do People Expect from a Financial Awareness Platform? Insights from an Online Survey
- 30 November 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 9-56
Open AccessWhat Do People Expect from a Financial Awareness Platform? Insights from an Online Survey
- 6 April 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Studies
- Vol. 39 (4) , 569-599
Ontogenesis Versus Morphogenesis Towards an Anti-realist Model of the Constitution of Society
- 6 April 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Studies
- Vol. 39 (4) , 569-599
Ontogenesis Versus Morphogenesis Towards an Anti-realist Model of the Constitution of Society