Anthony Saunders
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Anthony Saunders has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Barry Scholnick
University of Alberta
2 shared publications - Edward I. Altman
New York University (NYU) - Salomon Center; New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance
2 shared publications - Ingo Walter
New York University
2 shared publications - Amar Gande
Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX, 75275, USA
1 shared publication Anand Srinivasan
Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, 30605, USA
1 shared publication- April Klein
New York University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 21 July 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 53 (6) , 1373-1416
International Lending: The Role of Lender's Home Country
The multinational syndicated loan market has crossed the $7 trillion threshold. Prior literature argues that weak borrower country's creditor rights is the main limiting factor to cross‐border lending. We find that lender country's creditor rights can partly substitute for weak borrower creditor rights if a lender is from a better creditor rights country. Our results are robust to controlling for a borrower's country laws, its foreign assets, the loan guarantees provided by its foreign parent, and its choice set of lenders.
- 21 July 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 53 (6) , 1373-1416
International Lending: The Role of Lender's Home Country
The multinational syndicated loan market has crossed the $7 trillion threshold. Prior literature argues that weak borrower country's creditor rights is the main limiting factor to cross‐border lending. We find that lender country's creditor rights can partly substitute for weak borrower creditor rights if a lender is from a better creditor rights country. Our results are robust to controlling for a borrower's country laws, its foreign assets, the loan guarantees provided by its foreign parent, and its choice set of lenders.
- 30 August 2019
- Published by With Intelligence LLC in The Journal of Portfolio Management
- Vol. 45 (6) , 117-132
Is There a Quid Pro Quo between Hedge Funds and Sell-Side Equity Analysts?
In this article, the authors posit a quid pro quo in economic benefits between sell-side equity analysts and large hedge fund managers. They show that large hedge funds opportunistically trade one to four days prior to the publication of a recommendation change, a finding consistent with flow of information from analysts to hedge funds. Next, the authors demonstrate that in return for the information provided, analysts benefit from (1) better external evaluations and (2) higher trading commissions and fees for their brokerage firm. Notably, pre-trading occurs only when the analyst issuing the recommendations has a high external evaluation and the analyst’s brokerage house is a prime broker to the hedge fund. TOPICS:Manager selection, fundamental equity analysis, portfolio construction
- 30 August 2019
- Published by With Intelligence LLC in The Journal of Portfolio Management
- Vol. 45 (6) , 117-132
Is There a Quid Pro Quo between Hedge Funds and Sell-Side Equity Analysts?
In this article, the authors posit a quid pro quo in economic benefits between sell-side equity analysts and large hedge fund managers. They show that large hedge funds opportunistically trade one to four days prior to the publication of a recommendation change, a finding consistent with flow of information from analysts to hedge funds. Next, the authors demonstrate that in return for the information provided, analysts benefit from (1) better external evaluations and (2) higher trading commissions and fees for their brokerage firm. Notably, pre-trading occurs only when the analyst issuing the recommendations has a high external evaluation and the analyst’s brokerage house is a prime broker to the hedge fund. TOPICS:Manager selection, fundamental equity analysis, portfolio construction
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 42, 335-355
Why and how do banks lay off credit risk? The choice between retention, loan sales and credit default swaps
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 42, 335-355
Why and how do banks lay off credit risk? The choice between retention, loan sales and credit default swaps
- 24 December 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 30 (3) , 948-987
Mind the Gap: The Difference between U.S. and European Loan Rates
We analyze pricing differences between U.S. and European syndicated loans over the 1992–2014 period. We explicitly distinguish credit lines from term loans. For credit lines, U.S. borrowers pay significantly higher spreads, but lower fees, resulting in similar total costs of borrowing in both markets. Credit line usage is more cyclical in the United States, which provides a rationale for the pricing structure difference. For term loans, we analyze the channels of the cross-country loan price differential and document the importance of: the composition of term loan borrowers and the loan supply by institutional investors and foreign banks. Received September 18, 2015; editorial decision July 13, 2016 by Editor Philip Strahan.
- 24 December 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 30 (3) , 948-987
Mind the Gap: The Difference between U.S. and European Loan Rates
We analyze pricing differences between U.S. and European syndicated loans over the 1992–2014 period. We explicitly distinguish credit lines from term loans. For credit lines, U.S. borrowers pay significantly higher spreads, but lower fees, resulting in similar total costs of borrowing in both markets. Credit line usage is more cyclical in the United States, which provides a rationale for the pricing structure difference. For term loans, we analyze the channels of the cross-country loan price differential and document the importance of: the composition of term loan borrowers and the loan supply by institutional investors and foreign banks. Received September 18, 2015; editorial decision July 13, 2016 by Editor Philip Strahan.
- 28 May 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 47 (4) , 701-735
The Monitoring Incentive of Transactional and Relationship Lenders: Evidence from the Syndicated Loan Market
We identify a group of lenders specializing in syndicating tradable loans (referred to as transactional lenders [TLs]). We show that borrowers borrowing from TLs experience worse operating performance and more severe credit quality deterioration after loan origination compared to those borrowing from relationship lenders. This difference in the postloan issue performance remains robust after controlling for the potential self‐selection of the lender type, or using percentage of traded loans out of all syndicated loans to capture lenders’ propensity for syndicating tradable loans. Our results also remains qualitatively the same after we drop various types of risky loans.
- 28 May 2015
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 47 (4) , 701-735
The Monitoring Incentive of Transactional and Relationship Lenders: Evidence from the Syndicated Loan Market
We identify a group of lenders specializing in syndicating tradable loans (referred to as transactional lenders [TLs]). We show that borrowers borrowing from TLs experience worse operating performance and more severe credit quality deterioration after loan origination compared to those borrowing from relationship lenders. This difference in the postloan issue performance remains robust after controlling for the potential self‐selection of the lender type, or using percentage of traded loans out of all syndicated loans to capture lenders’ propensity for syndicating tradable loans. Our results also remains qualitatively the same after we drop various types of risky loans.
- Open Access
- 23 May 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 44 (4) , 631-659
The Role of Lending Banks in Forced CEO Turnovers
This article investigates the governance role of banks exercised through the replacement of underperforming CEOs in borrowing firms. An average level of bank loans outstanding implies a 22% to 47% increase in the forced turnover probability of a borrowing firm’s CEO if a firm’s industry adjusted performance is one standard deviation below average. This increase is much larger, 68% to 92%, when an underperforming firm violates its loan covenants. Overall, the paper’s findings suggest that banks play a key role in the governance of underperforming firms, especially when covenants are violated.
- 23 May 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 44 (4) , 631-659
Open AccessThe Role of Lending Banks in Forced CEO Turnovers
This article investigates the governance role of banks exercised through the replacement of underperforming CEOs in borrowing firms. An average level of bank loans outstanding implies a 22% to 47% increase in the forced turnover probability of a borrowing firm’s CEO if a firm’s industry adjusted performance is one standard deviation below average. This increase is much larger, 68% to 92%, when an underperforming firm violates its loan covenants. Overall, the paper’s findings suggest that banks play a key role in the governance of underperforming firms, especially when covenants are violated.
- 22 December 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Financial Markets and Portfolio Management
- Vol. 26 (1) , 39-59
Financial architecture, systemic risk, and universal banking
- 22 December 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Financial Markets and Portfolio Management
- Vol. 26 (1) , 39-59
Financial architecture, systemic risk, and universal banking
- 30 June 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Stability
- Vol. 7 (2) , 49-59
The cost of being late? The case of credit card penalty fees
- 30 June 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Stability
- Vol. 7 (2) , 49-59
The cost of being late? The case of credit card penalty fees
- 20 May 2010
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 42 (4) , 755-767
Bank Debt versus Bond Debt: Evidence from Secondary Market Prices
This paper uses a new data set of daily secondary market prices of loans to analyze the specialness of banks as monitors. Consistent with a monitoring advantage of loans over bonds, we find the secondary loan market to be informationally more efficient than the secondary bond market prior to a loan default. Specifically, we find that secondary market loan returns Granger cause secondary market bond returns prior to a loan default. In contrast, secondary market bond returns do not Granger cause secondary market loan returns prior to a loan default.
- 20 May 2010
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 42 (4) , 755-767
Bank Debt versus Bond Debt: Evidence from Secondary Market Prices
This paper uses a new data set of daily secondary market prices of loans to analyze the specialness of banks as monitors. Consistent with a monitoring advantage of loans over bonds, we find the secondary loan market to be informationally more efficient than the secondary bond market prior to a loan default. Specifically, we find that secondary market loan returns Granger cause secondary market bond returns prior to a loan default. In contrast, secondary market bond returns do not Granger cause secondary market loan returns prior to a loan default.
- 31 October 2005
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 29 (10) , 2407-2408
An appreciation of Lawrence G. Goldberg
- 31 October 2005
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 29 (10) , 2407-2408
An appreciation of Lawrence G. Goldberg